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ABSTRACT 
Judicial discretion is at the heart of a humane criminal justice system, but the 
latitude exercisable in the UK juvenile courts allowed constructive treatment at one 
end of the spectrum and penal custody the other. Official acknowledgement of the 
different culpability of adult and juvenile offenders really began in the middle of the 
19th century, and Parliament finally made provision early in the 20th century for this 
‘welfare principle’, that reform and welfare rather than punishment were to guide 
judicial discretion in the decisions and conduct of juvenile criminal courts.  
This thesis offers an explanation for the varying emphasis given to this 
principle in England/Wales and Scotland, concentrating on the last 40 years of the 
20th century. The lack of implementation of earlier reforms was confronted in two 
major reports, chaired by Kilbrandon in Scotland and Longford in England and 
Wales. Although they came to similar conclusions about the causes and the remedies 
for juvenile delinquency, and their subsequent legislation shared the same general 
philosophy, the implementation took diametrically different routes in the two 
jurisdictions.  
It is argued that deep-seated cultural and historical differences played a 
significant role both in legislative reforms and their application, coupled in Scotland 
with a conjunction of agency and political pragmatism that produced radical reforms. 
Significant factors implicated in the failure of the English reforms were political 
ambivalence towards the legislation; judicial/magisterial resistance or lack of 
training, particularly on child development; the absence of accountability in the 
magistracy; and the influence exercised by the Magistrates' Association.  
The research draws on archival papers and research literature, supplemented 
by interviews with key people. It has sought to find the origin of some influential 
ideas and explain their acceptance or rejection by the lay justices, through their 
exercise of judicial discretion. As there were further Acts related to juvenile 
defendants in both jurisdictions in the 1990s, the research was concluded with a 
consideration of their implementation. 
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GLOSSARY 
England and Wales  
Legislation was applicable to both these countries during this period as one 
jurisdiction. For ease of reference, they will be referred to collectively as 
England/Wales.  
Children, juveniles and young persons 
Under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by the UK 
in 1991, a child is defined as one aged under 18 years.  
The age of criminal responsibility from 1933 was 8 years in both 
jurisdictions, and raised in England/Wales in 1961 to 10 years. 
From the 1933 Act in England/Wales in juvenile courts, those aged under 14 
were referred to as children, those aged 14-17 and later 18 (1991) as young persons. 
To avoid confusion, all aged under the maximum age are here referred to as 
juveniles rather than children. 
The relevant age of a juvenile was decided as at first appearance in court, by 
the Lord Chief Justice (TLR 11 February 1982)  
In Scotland until 1971, the maximum age for those appearing in juvenile 
courts was under 17, and thereafter reduced to 16, in certain circumstances 18,  at the 
‘hearings’.  
Justices of the Peace and Magistrates  
In England and Wales, the lay, non-paid members of summary courts could be called 
justices of the peace (JP) or magistrates: it was one and the same title. In this 
research they will be referred to as magistrates, although some quotations may refer 
to them as justices.  
Stipendiary magistrates were legally qualified and paid members of the 
summary courts, in the 1970s numbering less than 100 throughout the major cities, 
the vast majority in London. 
In Scotland, justices of the peace were not called magistrates, but like their 
English and Welsh counterparts were appointed to a Commission of the Peace. They 
were entitled under certain circumstances to put JP after their names. In this 
research, the Scots justices of the peace will be referred to as JPs or justices.  
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Magistrates or bailies were local councillors who were appointed by their 
colleagues to sit in the Burgh or Police courts. They will be referred to as bailies. 
None of them was paid. 
Chairman 
The word ‘chairman’ was used in the 1968 and 1969 Acts, and was still used by the 
Magistrates' Association in 2010. It was used here for consistency. 
Juries 
Scots juries included 15 people, with a simple majority vote sufficient for a 
conviction, and verdicts included guilty, not guilty and not proven. 
English/Welsh had juries of 12, a unanimous decision of guilty or nor guilty 
necessary until 1967, when, in restricted circumstances, a decision of 10 was 
possible.  
Latin Phrases 
doli incapax  incapable of evil 
parens patriae  parenthood of the state 
actus reus  action as a constituent element of a crime 
mens rea  intention or knowledge of wrongdoing 
sui generis a unique situation -  In this instance,  legal cases held 
under civil proceedings yet requiring the test ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ to establish a finding of guilt 
Scots Terminology 
Accused  defendant 
Admonition  a ‘telling off’ 
Procurator Fiscal prosecutor – commonly referred to as ‘fiscal’ 
Solemn Proceedings Higher courts for grave crimes (murder, manslaughter, 
 gbh with intent) 
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ACRONYMS/ ABBREVIATIONS 
ACOP  Association of Chief Officers of Probation 
ACPS  Advisory Council on the Penal System 
ACTO  Home Office Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders 
ADSS  Association of Directors of Social Services 
AJJ  Association of Juvenile Justice 
BASW  British Association of Social Workers 
BOV  Board of Visitors 
CAYP  Children and Young Persons  
CFYO  White Paper ‘Child, the Family and the Young Offender’  
CHE  Community Home with Education  
CPAC  Children’s Panel Advisory Committee  
CRPC  Children’s Regional Planning Committee  
DC  Detention Centre 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights 
EWO  Education Welfare Officer 
GBH  Grievous Bodily Harm 
HC  House of Commons 
HC SC  House of Commons Standing Committee  
HL  House of Lords 
HOC  Home Office Circular 
HORU  Home Office Research Unit 
ILJC  Inner London Juvenile Court 
ILJP  Inner London Juvenile Panel 
ISMS  Intensive Support and Monitoring Service 
IT  Intermediate Treatment 
JCC  Juvenile Courts Committee, Magistrates’ Association Council 
JP  Justice of the Peace 
LAC  Local Authority Circular 
LCJ  Lord Chief Justice 
MA  Magistrates' Association  
MAC  Magistrates’ Association Council 
MCC  Magistrates’ Courts Committee 
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MNTI  Magistrates’ National Training Initiative  
MRC  Movement Restriction Condition 
NACRO National Association for the Care and Resettlement of 
Offenders 
NAPO  National Association of Probation Officers 
NCCL  National Council of Civil Liberties 
NCVCCO National Council of Voluntary Child Care Organisations 
NITF  National Intermediate Treatment Federation 
PSSC  Personal Social Services Council 
PPS  Parliamentary Private Secretary 
RCPS  Royal Commission on the Penal System 
RSSPCC Royal Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children 
SACCC Scottish Advisory Council on Child Care 
SACTO Scottish Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders 
SASD  Scottish Association for the Study of Delinquency 
SCRA  Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration  
SED  Scottish Education Department 
SHHD  Scottish Home and Health Department 
SOHHD Scottish Office Home and Health Department 
SWSG  Social Work Services Group 
TWOC Taking (a motor vehicle) Without the Owner’s Consent  
UNCRC United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
YCC  Youth Courts Committee, Magistrates’ Association Council 
YJB  Youth Justice Board    
YOI  Young Offender Institution 
YOT  Youth Offending Team 
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CHAPTER 1  
 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is a study, in the two jurisdictions of England/Wales and 
Scotland, of the application of the principle that children committing offences should 
be treated as ‘children in need’, as envisaged in the 1960s legislation reinforcing the 
welfare principle enshrined in  the 1930s Acts. The Ingleby Report 1960 drew 
attention to the institutional contradictions of the juvenile court, highlighting its 
seemingly irreconcilable tasks of being a criminal court, with the focus on the 
offence, and having regard to the welfare of the juvenile, with the focus on the 
defendant. 
The findings may have implications for future juvenile justice legislation, 
particularly in relation to the control of judicial discretion and the training and 
accountability of juvenile panel members. Indeed, it could be argued that the welfare 
of young offenders will only be paramount, as envisaged by the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child 1991,   when the power to punish is removed entirely from 
the range of disposals available to bodies dealing with such defendants. 
There is a wealth of literature on each jurisdiction and some comparing the 
two on specific aspects. None concentrates on the role of the judiciary throughout 
the period, particularly the English/Welsh magistracy from the perspective of the 
minutes of Magistrates' Association (MA) and articles and letters in the ‘Magistrate’. 
It is important to remember that magistrates did not act alone. Decisions were taken 
by two, more usually by three magistrates, with a majority decision acceptable, and 
the chairman, sitting in the middle, having no greater rights than the ‘wingers’. Most 
magistrates sat very infrequently in the juvenile courts, rarely twice a month, with 
adult court sittings in between. All juvenile courts until 1991 dealt with care and 
protection cases of children, often of a highly sensitive nature such as sexual abuse 
and incest, usually interspersed amongst their criminal cases in the day’s list. This 
research is only concerned with those children whose presenting factor was their 
alleged offending.   
This research both provides a detailed history of juvenile justice and aims to 
shed light on why Scotland and England/Wales, under the same national 
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government, took such seemingly divergent paths in juvenile justice from the late 
1960s onwards.  
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1.2 Methodology 
The Research Strategy 
Research must be approached with an open mind, and guided by the 
theoretical proposition. This author was a practising magistrate and juvenile court 
panel member for 23 years, from 1976. She was a member of the Magistrates’ 
Association Council for 5 years, finally chairing its Youth Courts Committee in 
1998, and was given complete access to the archives of the MA for this research. She 
served on the Magisterial Committee of the Judicial Studies Board 1995-2000, and 
was particularly involved with the introduction of appraisal for magistrates, and 
more training on domestic violence issues. She was also a member of the Council of 
the Howard League for Penal Reform for 25 years and served on committees of 
‘Justice’ and NACRO, and as such was conscious of and sympathetic to many 
criticisms made of the lay judiciary in the literature on juvenile and youth courts. As 
an ‘insider’ the researcher had the advantage of knowing the culture, the history and, 
personally, many people in the criminal justice system (Bryman 1988), but has not 
relied on any personal experiences or anecdotes. She attended a study tour of the 
Scottish Hearings System in 1986, became a member of the Scottish Association for 
the Study of Delinquency
1
, and later led a study tour of the Scottish criminal justice 
system for the MA, and also one in Denmark. 
Few researchers come to their task free of value judgments (May 1997), but, 
given constant self-reflection and a desire to maintain the high standards of good 
scientific research (Becker 1970), it is hoped that any bias shown was open to 
scrutiny. As an interviewer, the researcher was sensitive to new evidence which 
might counter expectations, sought corroboration from other sources, and was aware 
that her own reputation or personal relationship to people or events could influence 
the responses (Yin 1994). 
An historical, comparative case study was chosen as the most suitable 
research strategy, given that this was not an experiment to test causal relationships, 
nor a survey of quantitative data. It was essentially a chronological, comparative 
narrative, and an examination of why and how two jurisdictions under the same 
                                                 
1
 Became Scottish Association for the Study of  Offending - SASO 
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national government, Scotland and England/Wales, came to similar conclusions 
about dealing with juvenile delinquency and then followed seemingly contradictory 
paths in practice for the next 40 years. It concentrated on the 1960s juvenile justice 
reforms, from their conception,  almost certainly beyond personal living recollection,  
to their enactment, which was within the recall of key players, so that the later 
documentary evidence could be enriched by personal interviews, often including 
their subjective interpretations (Lofland 1971). The research followed standard 
historical research practice in drawing on primary and secondary sources, largely 
documentary.  
The Design of the Case Study 
There were three distinct periods to this research: pre-1900 to 1963, 1964 to 
1970 and 1971 to 2000. Initially the research was restricted to a period covering the 
major juvenile justice legislation of the 1960s, from the appointment of the 
Kilbrandon Committee in Scotland in 1960 to the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968; 
and in England/Wales from the Longford Committee to the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1969; and their implementation. This period was then extended to the 
year 2000 in order to examine further major legislation in both jurisdictions in the 
1990s.  
After reading the official documents, reviewing the literature and having 
preliminary discussions with various practitioners in the Scottish system, it became 
clear that there were fundamental differences between the two jurisdictions in the 
philosophy and understanding of juvenile offending. To find an explanation for this 
historical or cultural divergence it was necessary to investigate the social and 
political responses informing criminal justice legislation before the 20th century, and 
the early juvenile justice legislation and policy documents until the 1960s. It was 
also apparent that the institutional attitude and actions of the MA had changed 
radically over time, and this, too, needed an explanation. 
The Units of Analysis 
The juvenile court magistrates and the MA in England/Wales and the 
‘hearing panel’ members in Scotland were the main subjects for research, along with 
the reports of major inquiries into juvenile justice, especially Kilbrandon and 
Longford, as well as others who tried to influence the legislation. As this research 
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was concerned with the behaviour of around 10,000 magistrates and about 2000 
panel members at any given time, inevitably there were great variations shown in 
attitudes and responses both to their task and to juvenile offenders. At all times the 
researcher sought to be fair and objective in reporting the comments and actions of 
these decision-makers, whether in quoting the voluminous literature, archives or the 
interviews.  The Parliamentary debates were read in their entirety to discover major 
ideas and their sources for the differing attitudes to solutions for juvenile offending; 
and political biographies and autobiographies provided additional perspectives on 
the thinking of politicians and civil servants. 
Data Collection  
All data were collected by the author, relying on a wide variety of 
documentary evidence, both primary and secondary, and on personal interviews. 
This triangulation aimed to increase the validity of the findings (Robson 1993).  
The primary documentary sources were the Parliamentary debates in Hansard 
and government papers from throughout the 20
th
 century, from the 1908 Children 
Act, the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act, the 1948 Criminal Justice Act, the 
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 to 
the relevant Acts in the 1990s. The major inquiries relevant to juvenile offenders 
were also studied, from Molony and Morton in the 1920s, the Cadogan Report of 
1938, and the Ingleby Report of 1960. The Kilbrandon and Longford Reports of the 
1960s were examined in great detail, as were parts of later Acts which impinged 
upon the welfare principle.  
The archives of the MA, the MA Council and sub-committee minutes, annual 
reports and the ‘Magistrate’, the official organ of the MA, were all extremely 
important sources of information and very lengthy, over 30,000 pages.  The minutes 
were usually only a record of final decisions and seldom indicated the atmosphere or 
the level of support or dissent for any proposal, which was only revealed by a rare 
vote.  Where there was a choice between the minutes and articles, editorials or letters 
in the ‘Magistrate’, the latter were quoted in preference, as this journal was sent to 
all magistrates who belonged, about 80% of active magistrates from the 1960s, and 
was thus the main forum for their views. Other primary sources included the Public 
Records Office, (PRO) the London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), letters from 
magistrates in ‘The Times’, political memoirs, and standard reference volumes: the 
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National Dictionary of Biography, ‘Who’s Who’, and annual volumes of Whitaker’s 
Almanack. All are included under References.  
These sources were augmented by some 25 semi-structured interviews with 
key players at the time of the 1960s reforms, including magistrates, clerks, and 
politicians and civil servants who had varying perspectives on the MA’s response to 
the 1969 legislation; and politicians, ‘panel’ members and ‘reporters’ involved in the 
early years of the Children’s Hearings in Scotland. The researcher has attended a 
number of conferences in both jurisdictions as an observer, in particular the annual 
conferences of the Scottish Association for the Study of Offending and the AGMs of 
the MA.  
Interviewees were chosen in several different ways. For the research in 
England/Wales, a list was compiled of all magistrates who were members of the MA 
Council and the Juvenile Courts Committee (JCC) in 1970. The Chief Executive of 
the MA agreed to check their availability and asked each person to contact the 
researcher via the MA. Three magistrates came forward and were subsequently 
interviewed. Additionally, two magistrates were interviewed who had served on the 
JCC and as chairman of the MA, and a further two who had chaired the JCC, all 
either during implementation in the 1970s or in the 1980s and 1990s.  They were the 
only surviving members fulfilling the criteria. Another JCC member who was on the 
Inner London Juvenile Panel (ILJP) was interviewed, as was the chairman of the 
ILJP, as their appointment and court arrangements were historically very different 
from the normal juvenile courts in the rest of the country. One other Council member 
from the 1970s invited two senior bench colleagues to join the interview for a group 
discussion, with topics suggested by the researcher. The only surviving editor of the 
‘Magistrate’ of the period covered was also interviewed. 
The Council and sub-committees of the MA have always invited observers / 
advisers, their status varied over time, from the relevant government departments to 
their meetings. The researcher identified and interviewed four of these who had been 
present at the time of the 1960s reforms, and who eventually held senior positions in 
Ministries. The researcher also found the last surviving members of both the 
Longford Committee and the Kilbrandon Committee and interviewed them at length. 
Three Conservative MPs who were active in the debates in England were invited to 
be interviewed; all declined, two explaining, despite a ‘prompting’ letter, that they 
could not remember anything about the issue. The one surviving Conservative 
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involved with the Scottish reforms declined for the same reason. No Labour 
members have been located except for two in Scotland, who were interviewed. A 
justices’ clerk with experience of the implementation of the 1969 Act was 
interviewed, and two other clerks gave ad hoc interviews on specific questions 
relating to the training for magistrates. 
In Scotland, interviews included two of the original ‘reporters’ to the 
Hearings and two Children’s Panel members, one of whom was also chairman of the 
appointments advisory committee. Ad hoc interviews were conducted with panel 
members, civil servants and academics attending conferences, several of whom 
provided documents, information and further contacts. 
All who agreed to be interviewed at length were sent a prior explanatory 
letter about the nature of the research and their particular area for discussion, and 
informed that the interviews would be tape-recorded and transcribed by the 
researcher. Almost all the interviews were held in the home of the person being 
interviewed, which involved visits to London, Hampshire, Kent, Lancashire, 
Norfolk, Suffolk, Sussex, Wiltshire and in Scotland, Dumfries, Edinburgh, and 
Glasgow. A few people providing specific points only were interviewed over the 
telephone. Each person was later invited to check the typed interview and make any 
alterations or delete or add any comments they wished. Few comments were deleted, 
and none that impinged on the research questions
2
. 
Each in-depth, semi-structured interview was conducted in the manner of a 
co-operative venture, with a sharing of information and ideas (Humm 1995), and 
lasted between one and two hours. The researcher used her knowledge of the 
documentary evidence and her personal knowledge and understanding of magisterial 
history and culture to stimulate or even remind participants of historic events, and 
was conscious of the interviewer-respondent dynamic (Kahn & Cannell 1957). She 
was also aware of the difficulties and dilemmas of accurate recall after such a long 
period of time, and of the danger of influencing the responses, particularly as many 
of the participants were in their eighties or nineties. In three cases it was clear that 
there were serious problems with short-term memory, but by using triangulation, 
asking the same questions from different angles, it was possible to ascertain credible 
answers from two of the participants.  
                                                 
2
 Appendix 1.1 Interviewees and Questions 
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All interviews were analysed according to subject matter, and each quotation 
is referenced in the text. Much of their evidence enriches the narrative, but in some 
cases also provided vital clues and insights that this researcher had not found in the 
literature, which is the source of much of the narrative and comparison.  
For secondary sources, there is an enormous literature on juvenile justice in 
general, and particularly on the English/Welsh system from the implementation of 
the 1969 Act. There is remarkably little on the early period of the Scots reforms, 
significantly more in the 1990s. The researcher selected the literature originally from 
that suggested in the youth justice module of the Masters in criminal justice, London 
University, and thereafter followed up the relevant bibliography provided in each 
book, in ‘snowball’ fashion, eventually totalling some 300 articles and books.  
This research has looked at the two differing systems from the perspective of 
the decision-makers in the juvenile courts and the hearings panels, first to find out 
how Scotland could move to an entirely welfare-based system and England and 
Wales could not, and second how that situation was compounded and confused by 
subsequent events. The evidence has enabled a cohesive and plausible narrative to 
emerge explaining the divergence in the two jurisdictions, and to offer some possible 
solutions to the welfare and punishment dichotomy in the future. 
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1.3 Plan of Thesis 
Chapter Two considers theories of juvenile justice: the tension between the 
protection of the public, a justice-based model, and the welfare of the delinquent 
child, an individualized treatment-based model. It gives examples of other Western 
democracies. It describes the complexity of the exercise of judicial discretion, and 
the accountability of those charged with such power. It considers the theory of the 
political process and pressure groups wishing to change public policy; and the 
people and organisations connected with the judiciary leading to the juvenile justice 
reforms. 
Chapter Three examines the historical situation of political and judicial 
decision making in relation to juvenile offending, and the theory, principles and 
practice in the two jurisdictions to seek an explanation for the subsequent 
divergence. It describes the actual practice of the law within the courtroom until the 
early 1960s, the attitudes to parents, and the role of the MA throughout the period. 
The next four chapters deal with the juvenile justice reforms of the 1960s. 
Chapter Four is concerned with the two committees charged with investigating the 
situation of juvenile justice, Kilbrandon in Scotland and Longford in England/Wales, 
both reporting in 1964. It reveals the importance of agency, along with the official 
responses and subsequent Bills for reforming legislation. Chapter Five follows in 
detail the passage of both Bills through Parliament, and their relationship to each 
other, with particular reference to the role the judiciary in the summary courts played 
in attempting to influence the course of events. Chapter Six describes the 
implementation of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, the system, the decision-
makers and any subsequent legislation and regulations, and how it was viewed by 
those subject to its measures. Chapter Seven follows the fate of the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1969, and explains what extraneous factors may have helped 
thwart the intentions of the legislators, and the effect of subsequent legislation by 
both Conservative and Labour governments on the original Act. 
Chapter Eight gathers all the evidence and explains the conclusion and policy 
implications, and suggests further useful avenues for research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK AND DECISION-MAKING  
This chapter describes the broad socio-political and legal context of the two 
jurisdictions, Scotland and England/Wales; the status of childhood and the complex 
issues around the age of criminal responsibility; and the problems of criminal 
statistics. It considers decision-making and juvenile justice; the theories associated 
with the ‘welfare punishment’ dichotomy; the exercise of judicial discretion and the 
accountability of the judiciary. It looks at the political processes and pressure groups, 
in particular the MA and at the judiciary in the juvenile courts: the lay, non-legally 
qualified, unpaid justices of the peace (JPs) or magistrates in England/Wales and in 
Scotland, the bailies or magistrates, and justices of the peace. It explains their role in 
court, their appointment and training, their accountability, their interest groups and 
organisations, and the mechanisms available to them to try and influence juvenile 
justice legislation.  
 
2.1 The Socio-Political and Legal Context 
2.1.1   Scotland and England/Wales  
Under the 1707 Act of Union Scotland kept control of the church, education 
and legal systems, although its civil proceedings remained subject to the House of 
Lords acting as a Supreme Court. The ‘tandem principle’ applied whereby at the UK 
Parliament in Westminster Scottish legislation usually followed the provisions for 
England and Wales (Murphy 1992, Devine 2000). With only five politicians 
responsible for Scottish affairs, the Secretary, Minister and three joint Parliamentary 
Under-Secretaries of State, great power and knowledge rested with the Departmental 
heads, the civil servants based in Edinburgh (Cowperthwaite 1988).  
The Scots Church, with ministers rather than priests, had promulgated its 
message through the written word, so that “by the 1660s it was already a ‘normal 
thing’ for a Lowland parish to have a school under the supervision of the kirk 
session”, a system then uncommon in Western Europe (Devine 2000:68). In 1872, 
compulsory schooling was introduced for children aged between 5-13 years, with 
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assistance from the Poor Law if necessary; and with inducements for the charitable 
foundations to be integrated,  by 1918 these ‘board schools’ incorporated almost all 
private and church schools. In England/Wales, from the 1870 Education Act 
“schooling was not at first compulsory and a large voluntary sector survived that had 
higher status than the public
3
 schools, which were virtually confined to the poorer 
classes”. In Scotland, “since the vast majority of pupils attended the board schools, 
the public system possessed no such stigma” (2000:396) as children of the middle-
classes sat alongside their working-class neighbours. By 1963, only 2% of children 
were in private schools in Scotland, 9% in England/Wales (Whitakers 1964). 
Until the discovery of oil in 1971, Scotland was a poor country and the need 
to “escape poverty was widespread” with “saving habits often to the point of 
parsimony”. The powerful “in industry, commerce, the professions and local 
government usually believed in the efficacy of running works, businesses or services 
on the simplest and cheapest lines” (Murphy 1992:10). This also contributed to high 
levels of emigration, depriving the country of much of the “educated, leisured, 
influential middle class” which made up most of the magistracy in England (p.11). 
Money was not to be wasted, and courts avoided the more expensive corporal and 
custodial sentences in favour of fines (Skyrme 1991 vol.III:73).  
The legal systems of the two jurisdictions were historically different. 
England/Wales developed its own independent adversarial system based on common 
law, while Scotland maintained a hybrid one more akin to the Continental 
inquisitorial system, rather than the Roman law which only really developed in 
Scotland in 1887
4
. Many Scots advocates studied abroad, particularly Utrecht and 
Leyden until the middle of the 18
th
 century (Skyrme 1991 vol. III), and learned more 
of the different disciplines of the criminal justice system, and Dutch cases were even 
cited in Scottish courts. Dutch prosecutors, seen as part of the judiciary, 
recommended the sentence, and therefore learnt about criminology and the options 
available (Downes 1988). With the creation of the Lord Advocate’s office in 1587, 
Scotland, developed a network of independent prosecutors, procurators fiscal, 
“grown out of the sheriff’s job, not a man created   by Parliament to harry the 
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4
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criminal…”5. Their duty was to decide on prosecution and trial venue, with their 
added non-partisan, magisterial role of acting in the interests of the accused to “find 
the truth in an objective and neutral manner” (Ringnalda 2010:125), and could even 
withdraw a prosecution “up to the stage between conviction and sentence” 
(Cowperthwaite 1988:70). With a small group of lawyers acting in the criminal field, 
around 200
6
, they would have known each other and their culture handed down. 
Legal representation was available, while in England/Wales this was not a right until 
1836.  In Scotland only, the 1617 Act
7
 confirming and strengthening the role of JP 
also stated that fines and ‘recompense’ were by Statute “according to the qualitie of 
the crime and the estate of the offender” (Findlay 2000:32). 
 At the end of the 1960s England/Wales had a population of about 50 million, 
Scotland around 5 million. In 1964, the Conservatives lost the General Election, 
never to regain their supremacy in Scotland. Under the Labour administration of the 
1960s, William Ross
8
 “extracted as large a share as possible from the public purse 
for Scotland... public expenditure rose spectacularly by 900%”, the universities were 
doubled to eight and 20% more teachers were employed (Devine 2000:579). 
As to the state of domestic life in the-mid 1960s, Kilbrandon noted (1964 
para 66): 
At 12 a girl can leave home, but for the next year until 13 she may not be 
employed. She must attend school until 15. She may not purchase 
cigarettes until she is 16. She may marry at 16, but she is still subject to 
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court until she reaches the age of 17, and 
may not purchase a bottle of stout until 18, by which time she may be a 
wife and a mother.  
And as the Longford Committee began its deliberations in 1964,  
We perceived children as living in families. We went along with the 
stereotype of father, mother, more likely to be married than not married, 
representing a structured, easily identifiable household unit … We saw 
divorce as a deviant pattern.
9
 
Martin et al. (1981:19) claimed Scotland was “an unlikely setting” for a radical 
reform of juvenile justice as it “seemed to retain many illiberal and even punitive 
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features in its social life”, outside the social reforms passed in England on divorce 
and homosexuality. Hart
10
 rejected using the education department as having “too 
many illiberal features” (p.6) for the Kilbrandon reforms.  
By the end of the 20
th
 century, major cities in both countries were more 
ethnically diverse than in the 1960s.  34% of the black and ethnic minority 
population were children, as opposed to 20% of the white population, and their 
families 50% bigger and four times more likely to be living in overcrowded 
conditions, lacking basic amenities. Estimates suggested 5000 young people were 
sleeping rough, and 3000 children accommodated in domestic violence refuges 
(Tisdall & Donaghy 1995). At least 30% of marriages ended in separation or 
divorce, 20% of families were headed by one parent, and some children were coping 
with multiple relationships with little continuity of care; and alcohol, drug and 
substance abuse were no longer rare in primary schools (Lockyer & Stone 1998: xii). 
In both jurisdictions, compulsory schooling began at five and in 1973 the 
school leaving age was raised from 15 to 16. This meant that just as the juvenile 
justice reforms of the late 1960s were being introduced a cohort of reluctant pupils 
was forced to stay at school for another year: many truanted
11
. Comprehensive 
schools were replacing the old bifurcated system of grammar and secondary modern 
schools. This process was virtually completed in Scotland by 1974, when the number 
of school leavers gaining certification rose from 27% in 1964 to 66%, whereas only 
half the schools in England/Wales had changed (Devine 2000), and several counties 
retained grammar schools permanently, or sold them to the private sector. This 
division by the ‘11 Plus’ exam where unsuccessful children were perceived as 
failures contributed to low achievement, which with a poor life-style was closely 
related to delinquency (Tutt 1974).  
2.1.2   Childhood and Parents – Rights and Responsibilities 
Most of the first Children Act 1908 dealt with the protection of children from 
cruelty, exploitation, and parental neglect (Steedman 1990). At the end of the 20
th
 
century, legislation and reports were still concerned with child abuse, whether 
physical, sexual or emotional: estimates suggested that 150,000 children suffered 
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severe physical punishment each year and 350-400,000 children lived in 
environments “low in warmth and high in criticism” (Williams Report 1996). About 
20,000 children were in refuges escaping domestic violence, and Britain had the 
highest child poverty rates in the EU (Cunningham 2006). Over 10,000 children 
under 16 ran away from home ten times or more; one in seven who had run away, 
usually to escape an abusive situation, was “providing sex for money as a means of 
survival
” 
(Stein et al 1994).  
For many, life as a child is one of humiliation and shame as parents 
irrationally vent their spleen. If a child tries to express his feelings of 
distress, he is often punished even more…any wonder these same 
youngsters experience uncontrollable rage that surfaces and manifests 
itself in violent behaviour (Boyle 1994:124) 
Psychiatrists dealing with traumatised families and children during and after 
the Second World War found a close link with later delinquency (Winnicott 1990; 
Bowlby 1969; Stone
12
). This problem was also identified by a London magistrate, 
Margery Fry, a founder member of the MA Council; and confirmed by 
criminological research (Wilkins 1960). Trauma included events such as the great 
depression of the 1920/30s causing abnormal family circumstances, particularly 
damaging to children 0-5 years and surfacing as delinquent behaviour in teenagers. 
“Delinquency is basically caused by deprivation” of affection and love, through 
death, illness, separation, alcoholism and ignorance, and of “opportunities to play 
and develop” through poverty, unemployment, and inadequate housing (Tutt 
1974:29-32; Jones 1983). “Particularly serious, from all points of view, are the 
instances of some children subjected to persistent abuse who then abuse others” 
(Utting 1997 para.1 29/30). A wealth of research provides a link between abuse, 
trauma, poverty, and domestic violence all leading through exclusion to alienation 
and delinquency (Sprott et al. 1954; Newson & Newson 1968; West & Farrington 
1973; Windlesham 1987; Hagell 2000).  
History has shown a tension between the rights and responsibilities of 
parents, the latter only coming to the fore in the 20th century, after the Children Act 
1908 with its concern for the protection of children. In 1887, the Charity 
Organisation Society had strongly opposed free school meals for the under-fed as,  
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it is better, in the interests of the community, to allow in such cases… the 
sins of the parents to be visited on the children than to impair the 
principle of the solidarity of the family and run the risk of permanently 
demoralising large numbers of the population by the offer of free meals 
to their children. (Cohen, E 1949:20) 
There was also a tension between the need to provide support and advice and 
to hold parents accountable for their children’s behaviour. This research may 
establish where the balance lay in the two jurisdictions, and how the courts regarded 
parents and applied any sanctions, for “whatever can be done to help parents to do 
the job of parenting well, will at the same time be preventing future criminal 
behaviour” (Bonnell Report 1980:61). 
2.1.3   Juvenile Crime – Statistics and Systems  
Children have always posed conceptual and philosophical problems for 
the criminal law by virtue of their age and status of dependency on 
adults. (Asquith 1983:4) 
In both jurisdictions, the age of criminal responsibility was raised from seven 
to eight in 1933. In England/Wales it was raised to ten years in 1963. Until 1992, the 
maximum age for those appearing in juvenile courts was 17, and thereafter 18. In 
Scotland the maximum age for those appearing in juvenile courts was 17 until 1971, 
and then reduced to 16 for appearance in the hearings while the age of criminal 
responsibility remained at eight. In almost every other European country it was much 
higher
13. The concept of an ‘age of criminal responsibility’ indicates both when a 
child is thought to have the mental and moral capacity to commit a crime, and when 
society expects prosecution and formal sanctions for such behaviour. Historically, 
under common law, a child under seven was protected by the doctrine known as doli 
incapax, incapable of evil, unable to know the difference between right and wrong 
and thus not able to commit a crime.  
“The criminal law makes few concessions to the youth of an accused” and 
the presumption of doli incapax could mitigate that (Ashford and Chard 1997:27). In 
England and Wales only, there was the rebuttable presumption that a child aged 7-14 
was doli incapax: the prosecution had to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the actus reus with the necessary mens reus at the time of the 
offence. It also had to be proved by clear evidence that the child knew it was 
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seriously wrong: the facts alone of the offence were not sufficient to rebut the 
presumption (R v Kershaw (1902) 18 TLR 357). The home background, education 
and previous convictions would be relevant, and the prosecution should bring that 
evidence (R v B [1979] 3 All ER 460, DC). The courts had to be aware of  
the trap of applying the presumption of normality – that any child of the 
appellant’s age in today’s society would know perfectly well that to 
behave in this way was to behave in a way that was seriously wrong. (W 
[A Minor] v DPP [1996] CLR 320; Fionda 1998; Bandalli 1998) 
In 1998
14
 the rebuttable presumption was removed by statute. It had been 
‘abolished’ by a case15 in 1994 and reinstated by the House of Lords in 199516. 
Straw (1996:11), a future Home Secretary, claimed “most young people aged 10-13 
are plainly capable of differentiating between right and wrong, especially where the 
issue is one of theft or damage to the property of others”. Yet, the act of theft 
required five elements to be proved, including the intention to permanently deprive 
the owner of the goods. The government had rejected the view that “the general law 
was not meant to apply without qualification to children under 14” (WLR 1994 vol 
III:888); and some felt an important protection for youngsters suffering from 
behavioural disorders and mental disabilities had been removed (BJFCS 2000: 
March), or that some courts might not ascertain the comprehension of the children 
(Howard League 1999:5). The MA had asked that the presumption should remain, 
with the burden resting with the defence on the civil test of a balance of probabilities 
(Mag.1997: 258). It is hard to perceive how magistrates could assess the 
understanding of children if they did not engage with them and their parents, yet 
there was a wealth of evidence that magistrates throughout the existence of the 
juvenile/ youth courts had failed to do so (Elkin 1938; Fry 1942; Burney 1979; 
McCabe 1984; Allen 2001). 
Criminal statistics are highly problematical. They can conceal almost as 
much as they reveal, can be misleading, and can be abused (Giles 1946; Downes 
1965; Watson & Austin 1975; Mayhew and Smith 1985, Morris and Giller 1987; 
Raine 1989). The criminal justice system consists of a collection of separate agencies 
all dependent upon the actions of the others, and not least upon the general public, 
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who report over 80% of all recorded crimes (Maguire 1996). The attrition rate is 
high: of 100 crimes committed, only two end in conviction and sentence (BCS 
1994). Historical comparisons are problematic as ‘new’ crimes are defined; domestic 
violence, child abuse, white-collar and corporate crime, drug offences and football 
hooliganism were all virtually unheard of before 1970 (Ditton 1977, Pearson 1987, 
Dobash 1992). Moral panics are fuelled by the media (Pearson 1983, Cohen S. 1987, 
Gelsthorpe & Morris 1994, Muncie 1984, Campbell 1993, Taylor 1994, Winter & 
Connolly 1995) and by politicians (Gibson 1994, Newburn 1996), and the police can 
change their priorities and targets (Morris T.1989, Ashworth 1994).  
Recorded crime seriously underestimates the true level of crime: people do 
not report if they think no action is likely or that action will further aggravate their 
situation; companies remove rather than prosecute staff to protect their reputations; 
the Inland Revenue settles with its debtors, and many motoring offences are 
victimless (Raine 1989). Many children, like their adult counterparts, will escape 
notice or detection: in the age range 14-25, half of all males and one third of females 
admit to having committed an offence (Graham 1995). Others may be apprehended, 
referred to a welfare agency, or given an informal or formal caution. There is 
discretion to be exercised at every stage. Different types of offences have different 
attrition rates, with violent offences more likely to be reported and detected, as are 
offences by juveniles. Defendants in court are not a random group but have been 
selected in some way, and since so few offences end up attracting a sentence, undue 
weight should not be placed upon the deterrent effect (Ashworth 1994).  
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2.2 Official Responses to Juvenile Crime 
2.2.1   The Welfare / Punishment Dichotomy 
I will take a bolder and more perilous line, and will attack the concept of 
‘due process’ itself, so far as it is sought to apply it in this field. The 
doctrine is a concomitant of the accusatorial or adversary system of 
criminal procedure… But I wonder whether some form of the 
inquisitorial system is not more appropriate to the work of the panels 
than is our current dogma. Certainly we hear nothing about ‘due process’ 
in the nursery or the schoolroom, where it would be totally out of place. 
It is not necessarily a reputable concept. It is part of the armoury of the 
accusatorial lawyer, who when he leaves the court having obtained the 
acquittal of his guilty client is not at all ashamed of himself... 
(Kilbrandon 1968: 239). 
 
The entire history of the juvenile court has reflected the competing and 
conflicting ideologies of punishment and welfare, both in the decision-making 
(Molony 1927; Ingleby 1960; Longford 1964; Feeley 1979; Adler 1985; Morris & 
Giller 1987), and in the manner in which the courts were conducted (Carlen 1976; 
Wootton 1978). Traditionally, sentencing has been based on the four classic 
principles of retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation
17
 (Wasik 1991; 
Duff & Garland 1994), to which some have added respect for the law (Cooke 1987). 
These principles have often conflicted or overlapped (Hogarth 1971; Samuels 1987). 
There were no guidelines as to which aim was applicable to what type of offence or 
offender (Ashworth 1995). In addition there were the legal constraints on sentencing 
in the juvenile court, including from the 1930s, the requirement to have “regard to 
the welfare of the child or young person.” 18  The juvenile court was obliged to 
balance this duty, although with no guidance as to what weight should be put upon it, 
with the sentencing principles, first by deterrence, both general and specific through 
punishment or the fear of it (Raine 1989; Howard 1993); or secondly by 
rehabilitation through ‘treatment’ (Rutherford 1992), i.e. welfare measures 
implemented through social support (Fry & Russell 1942; Miller 1976; Farrington 
1984). 
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Traditional punishment was seen as the classicist approach. It was identified 
in the ‘justice’ model of legal rules and procedures, the ‘due process’ designed to 
protect the rights of the individual (Morris et al 1980; Freeman 1981), with 
determinate sentences to reflect the seriousness of the offence. This was usually 
coupled with a ‘law and order’ and just deserts rhetoric, concern with the offence, 
retribution and punishment to fit the crime. The court was held to express society’s 
disapproval of the act (Bankowski, Hutton and McManus 1987), and to deter that 
defendant or others from offending in the future (Kapardis 1981), regardless of the 
needs of the young defendant which would not be addressed by such a sentence 
(Eadie & Morley 1999). Critics, however, claimed that severe punishment might 
make offenders more likely to re-offend (Brody 1976; West 1982), the young thief 
meeting and learning from more experienced criminals (Becker 1963:35), or through 
isolation and stigma, excluded from normal groups and then identifying with deviant 
sectors of society.  
The ‘welfare’ model looked at the individual circumstances of a child and to 
the future, was consequentialist, and offender-oriented. For some it was an attempt to 
relieve social injustice and deprivation, with treatment based on the pathology of the 
individual child (Longford 1964, Rutherford 1992, Hughes 2001). Critics said the 
wide discretion required could and in many cases did lead to injustice, 
discrimination, disproportionality and net-widening (Morris & McIsaac 1978; Morris 
et al 1980; Cohen 1985); or that as juvenile delinquency was patently widespread, it 
should be seen as part of adolescent development and that treatment would thus 
make the behaviour abnormal (Morris & Hawkins 1970). Others claimed that 
appearance in court itself could be criminogenic (Bacon 1963; Longford 1964; 
Wootton 1968; Kilbrandon 1965; Christie 1974; ACC 1984). Some felt it was wrong 
that children should have to go to court to get treatment (NCCL
19
 1971), whilst 
others considered that only courts should take decisions that impinged upon a child’s 
freedom or time (Cavenagh 1959; NAPO 1965; MAC 1965). As welfare was seen to 
give more discretion to social workers and punishment was the prerogative of the 
magistrates, “the Magistrates’ Association, with its scepticism about welfarism, [has] 
fought to retain, and indeed to enhance, the magistrates’ right to punish young 
offenders” (Parker et al.1989:4).  
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An added disadvantage to the welfare model, particularly if the treatment 
involved adventure activities as in IT schemes, was the fear of “creating an ‘elite’ 
amongst offenders and tempting some of the less privileged youngsters to offend in 
order to participate in activities normally beyond their reach” 20(Mag.1977:136). 
This meant that “these measures be always provided in a less eligible form and that 
they be supplemented by a strong deterrent policy for the wicked and the dangerous” 
(Garland 1985:259). Yet such measures for reform were not new. Boys’ Clubs were 
introduced to “provide other outlets for the energies and high spirits of the young 
people” (Cadogan 1938: para 31), yet an attempt to bring constructive and positive 
influences – fitness skills, techniques, by a visit of the Ballet Rambert into a borstal, 
was treated with contempt by a magistrate
21
 (Mag.1977:188). 
It was argued that procedural rules must be observed (Adler 1985), but those 
were often incomprehensible to the defendants (Wootton 1978; Pitts 1988). The 
situation was further complicated by the age range of defendants, from child to near 
adult; some had learning or behavioural difficulties; some specific measures were 
available for different ages to reflect the developmental nature of the young (Adler 
1985; Rutherford 1992), and at different times in history to reflect social changes.  
Additional to all these complexities, many commentators throughout the 
existence of the juvenile court have noted that policy has often been ignored, the 
practice contradictory or there have been unintended consequences (Elkin 1938; 
Skyrme 1979; Muncie 1984; Burney 1985; Morris & Giller 1987; Harris & Webb 
1987; Cavadino & Dignan 1997). It is thought, for example, that the movement to 
protect children’s rights from the preventive work of expanding social work 
departments, enabled the proponents of punishment to advance their cause in the 
guise of the due process model (Hudson 1987). Those passing sentence had little 
idea of the effect of their decisions. There was neither oversight nor any method of 
ascertaining whether the order made had achieved the required outcome, nor any 
systematic, if any, access to research findings. 
From the inception of the juvenile court there was debate as to whether the 
identity of juvenile defendants should be revealed to the general public via the press: 
the competing theories mirrored the arguments about welfare and punishment. Some 
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argued that the public was entitled to know the offenders in its midst, or that the fear 
of publicity deterred juveniles from committing offences. Others said that juveniles 
either acted on the spur of the moment, or conversely, courted the notoriety to be 
gained from exposure in the local newspapers (Henriques 1950). The contrary 
argument held that anonymity was important to facilitate the rehabilitation of the 
juvenile, so that it did not perceive itself as an outcast nor be treated by society as 
such (Parsloe 1978). 
2.2.2   Other Juvenile Justice Jurisdictions 
By the late 1950s Cavenagh JP (1959:237) noted that of all European 
countries, “only England, Scotland and Ireland still bring schoolchildren before a 
court of criminal jurisdiction”, a situation, that was little changed by the end of the 
century (McCarney 1996). The 1970 International Association of Youth Magistrates 
held in Geneva, ironically under the chairmanship of an English magistrate and MA 
Council member
22
, with 49 countries represented, decided that: 
the moral and educational needs of children, not the gravity of the 
offence must determine the court’s decision, the commission of an 
offence being considered a symptom, and its nature should not be the 
over-riding factor in making an order (Mag.1971:9). 
United States of America 
In 1967, the USA had moved towards a justice-based model, in the opposite 
direction from most of Europe. The Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency 
(President’s Commission 1967) reported that the informality of the juvenile court 
deprived young offenders of their liberty without the protection of the due process of 
law. There was an enormous diversity of systems in the USA, with some 50 states 
and varying legal definitions, let alone the discretion exercised by some 12,000 
enforcement agencies (Carter 1984:20). The Supreme Court  decision, Kent v the 
United States (383 U.S. 541, 1966)  challenged this “almost unlimited discretion”  
claiming that the child had the worst of both worlds, neither the due process 
accorded an adult nor the “solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for 
children” (Carter 1984:32).  
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In the landmark case of re Gault 1967 387 U.S.1, the court changed the 
juvenile justice system, which had been based on the notion of ‘parens patriae’ and 
the welfare of the child, to one of due process, just deserts and determinate 
sentences, as in the adult court (Powers 1968:38-9). This decision was probably 
based on the recognition of the increasing maturity and independence of youth in 
Western societies and the growing awareness of civil rights and individual liberty. 
Some states went further with transfers to adult courts, the ‘waiver’, for greater 
punishment (Hudson 1987:138). However, as in Europe, there was acceptance that 
court appearances could lead to young defendants identifying with criminals, the 
‘labelling theory’ (Becker 1963: 35-9; Farrington 1977:112-125). 
The reforms in the United States were virtually unknown in Britain at the 
time of the proposed reforms to juvenile justice in the mid 1960s, and were never 
used by any of the opponents to the English 1969 legislation (Bottoms 1974). By the 
end of the 1970s even within the United Kingdom there were four different 
arrangements for dealing with youngsters who offended. This research studied in 
great detail the Scots and English systems, but Inner London and Northern Ireland 
were different from both of those. 
Northern Ireland (N.I.) 
The Black Committee (1979) rejected both the new Scots and English 
systems and chose a clear separation of criminal and care cases: the Youth Court was 
essentially a criminal court for 10-17, with a professional judge and two lay people, 
the latter appointed by the Lord Chancellor on the advice of a selection committee 
chaired by the N.I. Resident Magistrate. Young offenders only appeared in court 
after three cautions from the Juvenile Liaison Bureau run by the police. The 
custodial sentence, a Juvenile Justice Centre Order for 1-24 months, with half served 
in the community, could only be passed if the juvenile was considered a real danger 
to the public (O’Neill 1999). 
Inner London Juvenile Courts 
For historical reasons related to corruption and incompetence there were no 
lay justices in London (Findlay 2000). The Juvenile Courts (Metropolis) Act 1920 
created the first Juvenile Court Panel anywhere in the country, with a stipendiary or 
Metropolitan magistrate as the chairman, and two lay justices of each gender, the 
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first time such equality was recognised in the courts. They worked exclusively on 
juvenile justice matters and were drawn from a panel nominated by the Home 
Secretary, who also appointed the chairmen, lay presidents from 1936. Over the 
following 50 years, many members played a prominent national role in promoting 
and formulating new policies in regard to juvenile offenders, and sat on official 
inquiries, Royal Commissions and Advisory Councils. Their juvenile courts were 
held in a variety of buildings, even church halls in Brixton and Greenwich in 1964. 
The clerks were specialists in juvenile law and procedure. Renamed the Inner 
London Juvenile Panel (ILJP) in the early 1960s, the members were appointed by the 
Lord Chancellor, their ages “a long way below the average for the rest of the 
country” (Mag.1968:181). Secrecy prevailed around appointments nationally until 
1989, but the names of the Inner London Advisory Committee were published from 
1970. The London branch of the MA, with this high concentration of juvenile 
justices, was able to promote regular training through conferences with national and 
international speakers (Mag.1964:72 & 74).  
Whilst it appeared that much was different from juvenile courts outside 
London, there was little available evidence to suggest that the sentencing practices 
were or were not different as the separate statistics have not been located. Official 
criminal statistics, those published in Parliamentary records as Command Papers, did 
not include patterns of sentencing compiled by petty sessional areas until the 1980s. 
After 50 years of this juvenile specialism, the Conservative Lord Chancellor 
Hailsham in 1971 felt “It was wrong that the two jurisdictions of Adult and Juvenile 
should be separate” (Lowry Report Consultation Document 1978:1). In 1978, the 
Labour Lord Chancellor Elwyn-Jones appointed the Lowry Committee, which 
claimed that the desperate shortage of qualified juvenile court magistrates was: 
a consequence of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. Many of 
the experienced Adult Court magistrates are of the opinion that the 
Juvenile Courts play no real judicial role; that a court with little or no 
power to order effective punishment is really not a court at all (Lowry 
1979:9), 
and that a small, elite group of the ILJP gave an impression that “juvenile 
courts are more interested in doing good, than in doing justice” (p.7). Even so, in 
1974 there were complaints about the "criminal atmosphere” of the juvenile courts 
being unsuitable for domestic court work (PRO BN 229/1377). 
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Complete integration of the ILJP with the adult system was rejected as the 
workload of the juvenile courts was too great for other magisterial duties. The 
compromise solution meant that magistrates should serve at least 18 months on the 
adult bench before applying to the ILJP, and thereafter to sit sometime in the adult 
court as well. Candidates were interviewed and selected by an appointments’ panel, 
which ensured that “everyone selected had some relevant experience in the realm of 
children, youth clubs, social work or education”23 . However, when there was a 
desperate shortage, interviews could be “most perfunctory”24. Members of the ILJP 
were required to sit double the normal minimum requirement for adult courts. By 
1978, only 12%, 18 of the 149 ILJP justices, sat in the adult court as well and in the 
1980s about 20%. Once refresher training came in 1980, those appointed before that 
“used to tell you quite firmly ‘It wasn’t part of my contract’… they had never agreed 
to do it”25. 
A comparison by Anderson (1978) between a northern court and the ILJP, 
found the latter acting as an agent of social welfare, with disposals concentrated on 
meeting individual needs. However, such research findings were similar to those of 
Parker et al. 1981 comparing two urban and rural panels in northern England. 
Although detention centres were intended to be abolished, ILJP members felt they 
were “one of the things you might have to do if there were no alternative” 26 . 
Comparative disposal statistics from the 1980s, when little integration had taken 
place between the adult and juvenile courts, did not indicate a radical difference 
between the ILJP and other major urban areas.
27
  
In the mid 1990s with too few applicants,  
about 20-30 people found to their great surprise that they had been 
appointed to the youth panel, and according to them, had not expressed 
any great preference for youth work… and were not happy about it.28  
After the failure of a brief system of electing chairmen, too few had known enough 
to choose, a structured selection procedure was introduced in the 1980s. After five 
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years’ service, candidates spent a week-end being interviewed, doing mock exercises, 
with the chairmanship selection panel. Successful candidates sat alongside chairmen 
and finally went on to an intensive four day training course, long before other areas 
introduced any such schemes. 
Eventually, the administration came through the adult court, and the clerks 
did both adult and youth work. Although the physical separation of juvenile and 
adult remained, as did their less formal physical courtroom arrangements, they lost 
their anonymity, and ‘Juvenile’, later ‘Youth Court’ was clearly marked outside the 
building. “Everyone knew they were going to court”.29  
The ILJP may have been more welfare-oriented in the first 60 years of its 
existence, but even in the early 1970s, if intensive constructive welfare measures 
were not available, magistrates would use the punitive detention centres. By the 
1980s and 1990s, despite its earlier history as a discrete, welfare-oriented juvenile 
panel, statistics suggest that the ILJP was not exercising significantly fewer powers 
of punishment than the national average. Magistrates’ courts generally showed huge 
variations in sentencing practice, even within benches (Ashworth 1995). 
2.2.3   Judicial Discretion and Accountability 
The exercise of any judicial discretion is historically comparatively new, as 
all felonies had warranted the death penalty until the 17
th
 century and when 
transportation was introduced as an alternative there were mandatory time limits. It 
was only in the 19
th
 century that judges were able to exercise their discretion by 
deciding the length of time for such banishment (Thomas 2003). In 1907, limits on 
judicial discretion were promulgated through the establishment of the Appeal Court, 
providing some measure of accountability in the sentencing process, although this 
was not applicable to the magistrates’ courts, of which the juvenile court was one 
(Thomas 1974).  
The exercise of discretion is essential if there is to be any individualization of 
sentencing, but exercised within a framework to limit the risk of discrimination on 
unfair grounds such as race or class, or of disparity, such as like cases not being 
treated with like sentences (Gelsthorpe & Padfield 2003). There was no training on 
dealing with ‘diversity’, particularly on race relations, until the 1990s: Hailsham, 
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when Lord Chancellor, “resisted any pressure that this type of training should be 
made compulsory… I see no need for it” (Mag.1985:4). 
Decision-making in the courtroom is not done in isolation and is dependent 
on many factors. Discretion may be fettered by earlier decisions such as plea-
bargaining by the prosecution; the nature of the offence as presented to the court 
(Shapland 1987); or the availability of the options applicable to the particular case 
(Hawkins 2003). Even where guidelines with sentencing tariffs were issued, they 
appear to make little difference to sentencing and can even have had the opposite 
effect from that intended (Thomas 1974). Some people follow rules more closely 
than others and some do not understand them. Others may be more influenced by a 
colleague, or the charisma of an expert, and each will bring their own viewpoint 
according to their experience of life (Wilkinson 1992). Within the criminal justice 
system, decision-makers should be aware of the consequences of their actions upon 
others, such as potential victims, and may tailor their responses accordingly. 
the more complex the range of information presented to an individual, 
the more likely will judgements be made according to the most simple 
and obvious variables. This has been found time and time again…what 
counts are crude variables of offence seriousness, past record and social 
status. (Cohen S. 1985:189)  
Whilst discretion allows greater “flexibility to respond to different 
combinations of facts” (Ashworth 1995:24), it can also be used to subvert policies 
with which the decision-maker disagrees (Gelsthorpe & Padfield 2003). There was 
no compulsory training at all for magistrates until 1966. Discretion is the power to 
decide the fate of others, and the safeguard against misuse is accountability through 
some external body or an appellate system. However, there was little effective 
control or accountability over the decisions of juvenile courts: appeal was to the 
Crown Court where sentences could be increased, an effective deterrent. Different 
judges took different views and their rulings were not binding on the magistrates. It 
was not until the 1980s that guidelines from ‘liaison judges’ on mode of trial 
decisions were thought to  be having some effect (Riley & Vennard 1988).  
Scotland and England/Wales were unique in having criminal courts presided 
over by people with no legal qualifications, a situation that has been examined by 
many but never significantly altered (Radzinowicz 1977, Bankowski et al. 1987, 
Raine 1989, Royal Commission 1948 & 1991, Morgan 2000, Auld 2001). Some 
critics have proposed legally qualified chairs (Law Society 1967).  
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This lay involvement in the criminal justice system, like the jury system, was 
seen as giving legitimacy to the state’s exercise of power over citizens: the decisions 
of the court broadly in line with the man and woman in the street or on ‘the Clapham 
omnibus’ (Morgan 2000). Rather than being “the esoteric preserve of lawyers” 
(Skyrme 1979:8), this was expected to help maintain respect for the law (Darbyshire 
1996). This concept of citizens’ involvement was also reinforced by changing 
attitudes to authority in the late 1960s and 1970s, with the recognition that ordinary 
citizens should take part in decision-making institutions, such as Community Health 
Councils and the governing bodies of schools (Richardson 1983).  
Under both international and domestic law (van Beuran 1998), courts should  
be accessible, fair, open and comprehensible, acting within defined aims and values 
(Ashworth 1994, Duff & Garland 1994, Raine 1989, Bankowski 1987). Many have 
thought this has not always happened (Carlen 1976, Gray 1980, Ball 1983, Adler 
1985, Pitts 1988, Feeley 1992, Allen et al. 2001) and have referred to inexplicable 
disparities in court procedures and sentencing (Parker 1981 & 1989, Burney 1985, 
Moxon 1985, Tonry 1996, NACRO 2000), along with various other discriminatory 
practices (Harris & Webb 1987, Campbell 1981). It is important that the 
appointment of those passing judgment should be by open and accountable 
processes, (Burney 1979, McCabe 1984, Raine 1989, Bankowski 1987) which was 
not the case until the last five years of the 20
th
 century in England/Wales. 
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2.3 Decision Makers 
2.3.1   Political Processes and Pressure Groups 
Public policy making is “ a set of processes, including at least (1) the 
setting of the agenda, (2) the specification of alternatives from which 
a choice is to be made, (3) an authoritative choice among those 
specified alternatives, as in a legislative vote or a presidential 
decision, and (4) the implementation of the decision.” (Kingdon 
1995:3) 
In order for a policy matter to reach a government’s agenda, Kingdon 
suggests that both participants and processes are involved in recognising the 
particular issue, generating the policy and utilising the political system. The critical 
point for success is when the “three process streams” coalesce (1995:19), the 
problem, the solution and a change in the political climate, all largely independent of 
each other and with their own dynamics.  
In Scotland, by the beginning of the 1960s, for ideological or financial 
reasons, the radical reforms to juvenile justice of the 1930s had largely not been 
implemented, and the vast majority of areas still had no specialist juvenile courts. In 
1960, the Ingleby Report, based on England/Wales but reviewed by Scotland, 
highlighted the dichotomy of the justice and welfare axis in the juvenile court. It also 
noted that the punitive measures introduced in the 1948 Criminal Justice Act had not 
stemmed the rise in juvenile crime, a matter of concern to a ‘law and order’ 
administration. The Conservative government sought to remedy the deficiencies by 
measures in the 1961 and 1963 Acts, which did not satisfy the Labour Opposition, 
nor did they apply to Scotland. Thus, these two agencies, the Labour Party in 
England/Wales and the civil service in Scotland, separately identified ‘the problem’.  
Two committees, albeit with different structures, timescales and briefs, were 
appointed to deal with the juvenile justice dilemma in their jurisdictions. By 1964, 
through the workings of what Kingdon calls “the policy primeval soup” (1995:200), 
the complex collection and evaluation of ideas and alternatives, committees chaired 
by Kilbrandon in Scotland and Longford in England/Wales produced broadly similar 
proposals, providing a potential solution in each jurisdiction. Later that autumn, a 
new, Labour government came to power providing the change in the political climate 
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and with a raft of measures for social and criminal justice reform. Thus the three 
‘streams’ were joined and the policy proposals added to the government’s agenda.  
Once through the Parliamentary process and on the statute book 
implementation of policy is by no means guaranteed and, as Jackson (1985:12) 
argues, “a number of constraints must be satisfied”. Are sufficient resources 
allocated to implement the measures, and are they technically possible?  
Additionally, are the objectives clearly defined for if not, given that policy is 
implemented by individuals, the exercise of local discretion or a lack of 
communication may thwart the intentions of the legislators. This research will reveal 
how differently the two jurisdictions received and dealt with the juvenile justice 
reforms relevant to them.  
Presthus (1974) argues that governments need interest groups who can advise 
them with their expert knowledge and experience, while governments can advise the 
interest groups of proposed legislation in exchange. In England/Wales, from the 
MA’s inception in 1921 there was constant communication between senior civil 
servants and ministers in London and the MA Council. In the 1950s some members 
of the MA Council used its countrywide membership to galvanise support for the 
reintroduction of corporal punishment, and enabled a future Council to utilise this 
active membership: the interest group had become a pressure group, mobilizing 
support and lobbying on a wide scale to achieve its ends. In the 1960s, it was much 
helped by the Conservative Opposition, who, seeking power, found it difficult to 
resist the opportunity (Stewart 1974) and championed the magistrates’ resistance to 
proposed legislative changes. There was no such interest or pressure group co-
ordinating the disparate juvenile justice system in Scotland. 
Labour won the 1964 general election with a majority of just five, reduced to 
three before another general election in March 1966, when it was returned with a 
majority of 99. Over a quarter of the country’s electorate was a member of either the 
Conservative or Labour Parties (McKenzie 1974). In 1968, no fewer than 65 
members of the House of Commons and 120 members of the House of Lords were or 
had been justices.
30
 There was a general perception that the magistracy had closer 
links with the Conservatives than Labour (Morris T 1989), and this continued to be 
equally true in the 1980s (Wilkinson 1992). A Labour government with a tiny 
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majority knowing these factors would have been unwise to propose radical reforms 
which were not supported by the magistracy.  
The optimum period thought necessary for successful reforms is between two 
and six years (Kingdon 1995). The Longford Committee produced its report 
(Longford 1964) after only four months, and the resulting White Paper with its 
radical juvenile justice proposals was published just a year later. In Scotland, the 
Kilbrandon Committee members deliberated for three years, and the White Paper 
was published another two years later, allowing ample time to test “the political 
support or opposition they might experience” (1995:19), to consult relevant 
organisations, and make plans for their radical proposals. 
Interest and pressure groups are sometimes argued to fall into two categories, 
those that share a common attitude and those that share a common interest (Castles 
1967). Thus professional bodies, such as the MA to which about 75% of the 16,000 
active magistrates belonged in 1965 (Mag.1965:118), were essentially interest or 
sectional groups. Interest groups are concerned with “protecting current benefits and 
prerogatives,” and professional organisations of higher income and status, like the 
magistracy, were more likely to resist change than promote it (Kingdon 1995:67). 
The proposals in the 1965 White Paper ‘The Child, the Family and the Young 
Offender’ (CFYO) included the abolition of juvenile courts, so it was not surprising 
that when the MA saw a major part of its work threatened - about 50% of 
magistrates were also members of juvenile panels - it resisted fiercely. There was a 
similar response to the 1969 Bill, which severely restricted the magistrates’ powers 
of punishment in the juvenile courts.  
Interest groups also provide services such as training and information, and 
their leaders negotiate with governments on proposed policy. MA members may not 
have shared the same attitudes to crime and punishment but joined a ‘promotional’ 
group to support a broad view of criminal justice matters. Over time, priorities and 
policies vary within a group, as the history of the MA showed. The effectiveness of a 
cause can be damaged by internal conflicts (Baumgartner & Jones 1993), as was 
made clear to the Juvenile Courts Committee of the MA (JCC) when it was asked to 
give a final response before the Second Reading of the 1969 Bill (JCC 1969:274).  
Most groups mirror governments in their hierarchical structures (Castles 
1967), with elected boards and paid staff, accountability to members exercised 
through annual general meetings, and policy proposals subject to ratification. The 
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MA was no exception, and furthermore, its President was the Lord Chancellor of the 
day; some Council members were MPs or peers; and even its meetings were held in 
Committee Rooms in Parliament until 1965. Whilst members generally need to feel 
involved in order to continue their membership, decisions are likely to be made by 
an elite group, the oligarchy, in this instance the ‘executive committee’. The length 
of service of this committee was on average over 12 years in 1986 (Wilkinson 
1992:223), and the very nature of the work of the magistracy enabled the committee   
to build up a network of contacts with the government and associated bodies 
(Presthus 1974).  
Success may depend on the lack of an “articulate opponent” at a given time 
(Kingdon 1995:190). In Scotland, Kilbrandon was appointed by the Conservative 
government and there was no organised body to campaign against the loss of 
juvenile courts. It was the parallel reforms to local government, by their very nature 
affecting many, which attracted controversy, rather than the changes to juvenile 
justice, which affected comparatively few. In England, Longford faced a highly 
organised, nation-wide, politicised body, the MA, able to campaign against the 
juvenile justice proposals from the start, if it chose to do so.  
Success too, may depend on a “policy entrepreneur”. Kilbrandon was a much 
admired, senior judge, who rigorously and persistently promoted the reforms and 
prompted “important people to pay attention” (Kingdon 1995:20), helped by the 
smaller arena of Scotland. Longford was a Labour politician, whose report 
encompassed many wide-ranging, important and radical reforms within the criminal 
justice system, and was distracted with his fellow political colleagues from 
promoting the juvenile justice reforms. These lacked a dedicated protagonist to 
challenge any articulate opponent. 
2.3.2   The Judiciary in Summary Courts up to 1970 
Lay Justices in England and Wales  
…a third are competent, a third passable and a third who ought not to be 
there at all. (Criminal Law Review 1961:661
31
) 
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Although potentially the system of lay justices can be very good, in 
practice it can be very bad, as has happened in the past. Constant effort is 
needed to see that it does not slip backwards… (Skyrme 1979: 214) 
The office of ‘Justice of the Peace’, or magistrate, dates from the 14th 
century, and throughout the centuries has included the most powerful men in their 
counties: “as JPs the gentry put down the riots of their labourers, and as MPs they 
passed the statutes which allowed them to do so” (Harding 1966:244). Many became 
county councillors when the new councils took over their administrative functions in 
1888 (Moir 1969). With the creation of police forces in the mid-19
th
 century, they 
were relieved of their direct policing function, but survived as representatives on 
Standing Joint Committees and later the Police Authorities, still giving them 
influence over local law enforcement (McCabe & Treitel 1984), even in the late 20
th
 
century. It was only in 1949 that ‘Police Courts’ were renamed ‘Magistrates Courts’. 
It was one of the few offices to receive public recognition by the use of titular initials 
J.P. (Justice of the Peace). Women were first appointed in 1920, but only represented 
one seventh of the 28,000 magistrates in 1983 (Skyrme 1991 vol. II). 
Until 1971, some 2,550 holders of certain offices from Privy Councillors to 
mayors were ex officio justices, who were often, despite sitting rarely, chairman of 
the ‘borough bench’. Governments recognised that a lay magistracy was both cheap 
and flexible; part of the ancient traditions of the country (Radzinowicz 1977; Raine 
1998); and that a local bench reflecting its community should be more democratic 
and open than remote professional judges.  
The 1910 Royal Commission created ‘advisory committees’, an official body 
to advise the Lord Lieutenants -  most of whom “were of course politically active 
peers” (Moir 1969:184), who appointed the ‘county benches’ and submitted the list 
to the Lord Chancellor. Borough advisory committees and their chairmen were 
appointed by the Lord Chancellor. The interviewing of candidates by advisory 
committees only started in the late 1960s, and was made compulsory from 1972. 
There was constant criticism throughout the latter part of the 20th century that the 
recruitment of the lay magistracy remained secretive (Burney 1979; Ravenscroft 
1987). In 1987 advice to advisory committees stated that chairmen should begin the 
interview of a candidate by saying “I will not introduce myself or my colleagues to 
you by name” and end it by telling the candidate “not to reveal anything about it to 
anyone else, not even the identity of any of us whom you may recognise” (Lord 
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Chancellor’s Department 1987). Gardiner 32  suggested the members should be 
named, but Sir Thomas Skyrme,
33
 in defending their anonymity, strongly supported 
by the ‘Magistrate’ (1979:84), wrote, “it protects their members from being 
lobbied…” as there were instances after publicity when “the Advisory Committee 
became submerged in a spate of wholly unsuitable candidates.” The qualities 
required of magistrates were never clearly defined, although Skyrme (p.73) claimed 
that,  
The most essential qualification for the magistracy is a judicial mind and 
sound common sense, which are congenital qualities; nevertheless, if 
present in embryo, they can be developed with training and experience.  
Given that the appointment of magistrates was never advertised, potential 
candidates could almost only approach or be approached by serving magistrates,  
It was 1959… I received a telephone call one morning and it was the 
Duke’s secretary saying that he wished to see me that afternoon… I said 
that my uncle had been chairman of the … Bench, and he had known 
him.
 34
 
There were a few exceptions: Cheshire advertised in the local press (Mag. 
1971:87) and Lord Denning in a radio interview explained how anyone could apply 
(1972:8). In 1986, 72% of magistrates were still nominated by another magistrate 
(Wilkinson 1992), perpetuating “their own attitudes and beliefs about justice” (King 
& May 1985:154). It was not until the late 1980s that a universal system was 
suggested for encouraging applications by publishing the names of Advisory 
Committee members and even by advertising.  
Many observers and even Lord Chancellors have commented on the elitist 
and unrepresentative nature of the appointments (Hood 1962; Baldwin 1976; Dignan 
& Wynne 1997; Morgan 2000). Skyrme was offered inducements and sometimes 
threats to secure the appointment of some individual. As early as 1910 the Royal 
Commission stated that magistrates should be “working men with a first-hand 
knowledge of the conditions of life among their own class” (Skyrme 1991 vol. II: 
226). Gardiner (Mag.1965:178) declared that there was a strong connection between 
social class and political affiliation, and Labour passed the Employment Protection 
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Act of 1968. Employers were required to release workers for magisterial duties, 
although in practice employers were reluctant to take on such a commitment.  
Hood (1962:53) found 61% of magistrates in his survey belonged to a 
political party, 34% Conservative and 24% Labour, although Raine (1989) has 
argued that there is little evidence to link political affiliation and attitudes to crime 
and punishment. In 1971, Hailsham announced that magistrates could not operate in 
the constituency where they were the MP, agent or adopted candidate, as they were 
“peculiarly vulnerable to political pressure in difficult decisions” (Mag.1971:186), 
but county councillors were free to be magistrates. In June 1977, candidates and 
current magistrates were invited but not obliged “to indicate in confidence their 
political views” to help balance the bench (Mag.1977:144). Wilkinson (1992) found 
56% of magistrates supported Conservative views, more than double that of any 
other party. 
This limited range of backgrounds, even husband and wife on the same bench 
(Mag.1979:32), encouraged insularity and little interest in other methods, often 
reinforced by the lack or nature of the training, which for most was  
none at all. You had a chat with the Clerk to the Justices at the beginning 
who gave you the basics... Otherwise, you really learnt by sitting on the 
Bench with your colleagues.
35
  
And on one small rural bench,  
…the training by the Chairman was pretty good, as he had a very 
pleasant habit, which taught me so much about the set-up as a whole, as 
when business finished in the morning, he would say ‘Come along, we 
will go to the local hostelry and we will have a glass of sherry and I am 
going to ask the prosecuting person and the defending solicitor. If they 
are free, they can come too’.36 
Downes (1988:81-9) has related extensive judicial training to more humane, 
progressive sentencing. Initial training was not made compulsory until 1966, and 
then only for the newly appointed. Six years later, the Solicitor-General
37
 considered 
it “an intolerable burden to enforce attendance at even one course of instruction a 
year” (Mag.1973:114). Later, there was a major change in the attitudes of the 
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professional judiciary to the idea of their having training which would affect 
magisterial training. 
The abhorrence which all concerned had previously shown to such a 
concept was abandoned, and although the expression ‘training’ remained 
unacceptable on the ground that the independence of the judiciary would 
be undermined if they were told what they should do, it was agreed that 
some degree of judicial education was desirable. (Skyrme 1991 vol. II: 
323) 
There was “strong opposition, especially from the judiciary” (Skyrme 
1991:323) before a study programme of one week for new judges was accepted, and 
in 1979 the Judicial Studies Board was created, the title “an exercise in semantics” to 
avoid “the objection that ‘training’ provided the means of influencing or 
conditioning the mind…” (Skyrme 1991:324). A Magisterial Committee was added 
in 1985 to formulate the principles and approve the syllabus for magistrates’ 
training, produced and delivered locally as the responsibility of the Magistrates’ 
Courts Committee (MCC). Refresher training for magistrates, just 12 hours over a 
period of three years, was not introduced until 1980 and initially only applied to 
those appointed from that date. 
For new magistrates there was a pressure to conform, the subtle process 
“which instils in new recruits (and reinforces in existing magistrates) the 
predominant norms, values, attitudes and expectations” of the bench (Wilkinson 
1992:21). This could distort judgment (Parsons 1995), even taking precedence over 
legal advice (Hogarth 1971) and key players could also influence matters (Hood 
1962 & 1972). Interest was rarely taken in the sentencing practices of other benches 
(Tarling & Weatheritt 1979): disparities between Benches and even the same Bench 
have been called “excessive and occasionally scandalous” (CLR 1961: 661). It was 
little wonder that the new magistrates thought their work unique, almost an ideology 
(Cavadino 1997) binding them together, and obliging them to “accept certain 
inhibitions on [their] freedom of behaviour” (Skyrme 1979:141).  
Only the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of a Bench could preside in court 
until Parliament
38
 in 1977 decided the chairman could “invite another magistrate to 
preside, and to sit beside him and help him in the daunting ordeal of taking the 
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Chair” (Mag.1977:120). Scott 39  was horrified in the 1980s at the system of 
appointing chairmen in the London adult court, “Buggins' turn with the entire 
emphasis on seniority and virtually no attention paid to suitability”.  
It became a mercy when the chairmen’s tenure was limited. We joined 
the Bench when the chairman was on until he retired. After all, you 
appraise a chairman by voting them off don’t you, in a way? In those 
days, you couldn’t, you were stuck with them. 40 
Specific chairmanship training was not introduced nationally until the 1990s, 
despite a “litany of appalling behaviour by chairmen” (Mag.1978: 164). 
It was exceptionally rare to dismiss a justice, and only possible by the Lord 
Chancellor: 
…the independence of the magistracy must be maintained… no justice 
should be removed, suspended or reprimanded except for substantially 
indisputable cause.…Independence requires some tolerance of 
magisterial behaviour, and conduct which would exclude a person from 
appointment does not necessarily justify removal if it occurs after he has 
become a magistrate…(Skyrme 1979:136). 
The Juvenile Courts in England and Wales in the 1960s 
As constituted under the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act (CAYP), the 
juvenile courts were to be composed of three magistrates, “specially qualified for 
dealing with juvenile cases”.41 The qualifications were not defined “as it was thought 
best to leave this to the good sense and discretion of justices” (Mag.1933:697). The 
‘Magistrate’ (1964:2) suggested factors such as having children, or “plenty of 
nephews and nieces”, or working with children; and having  
less easily identifiable qualities, such as elasticity of mind, acceptability 
of personality and appearance, and even that elusive achievement, being 
'with it' which justices will have to look for , as best they can, in their 
colleagues .  
However, one magistrate
42
 in 1962 “found, first in Durham County and then 
in Cumberland, a total disregard of the requirement that only those fitted for juvenile 
courts were elected to the panel” (JCC 1962:10). Outside Inner London, juvenile 
court justices were elected by and from the members of their Petty Sessional 
Division.  
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The age range for appointment was 21-50, with retirement fixed, despite 
some resistance, at 65 from 1949 (MAC 1952:1025). In 1946, nearly 40% were over 
the age of 60.
43
 In the early 1960s, Skyrme received complaints that magistrates 
were elected on seniority rather than aptitude for juvenile court work. Hogarth 
(1971:211-2) noted that age was closely associated with certain attitudes and beliefs: 
older people “…select fewer factors concerning causes of crime”, were more 
“offence oriented” but had a “greater feeling of independence, self-reliance, 
confidence and moderation”. Despite the strong suggestion in ‘News for 
Magistrates’   that “women often ‘jump’ to a conclusion… the very antithesis of the 
working of the judicial mind” (Mag.1947:17), the Home Secretary announced that 
from 1955, “all juvenile courts should contain at least one man and at least one 
woman … except in emergency” (MAC 1954:1128).  
As some magistrates sat so rarely in the juvenile court, just four times a year, 
there was little inducement to learn (Fry and Russell 1942). Ingleby (1960 para.164) 
commented that few areas had combined to increase their workload. In 1966, there 
were 820 juvenile courts, with 5,060 men and 3,450 women on the juvenile panels 
(Mag.1966:80): “we didn’t have to sit very often, because in those pleasant days 
parents took a lot of responsibility for their own children”.44 To  cover all the Bench 
work, including juvenile and adult courts, the minimum number of sittings was 52 
sessions, or 26 full days a year. In 1973 this was reduced by half to only 13 full days. 
The chairman of the juvenile court was elected by all members of the panel. 
Ingleby (1960 para.157) rejected the idea of their appointment by the Home 
Secretary, as “he and his staff would rarely have personal knowledge of those 
suitable … or any source from which they could properly take advice except the 
local justices to whom the power of appointment belongs.” In Inner London, the 
Home Secretary, and later the Lord Chancellor, appointed the juvenile panels and 
their chairmen.  
In 1952, many justices did not “seek to keep themselves up to date by 
attending conferences, nor even to gain an elementary knowledge of their duties” 
(Mag.1952:221). Ingleby (para.160) said magistrates needed training, “particularly 
true of those who are to sit in the juvenile court” and that every MCC should make 
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and administer training schemes. There was no official requirement for any training 
until 1966, and no commitment to require refresher or further training until 1980. 
The MA had provided its members with training programmes for those who wanted 
them, often at their own expense, and published articles in the ‘Magistrate’. It was 
the clerk’s duty, whether invited or not by the magistrates, to advise them on the law, 
practice and procedure, as well as having administrative and judicial functions for 
their courts. Clerks were often on a part-time basis from local solicitor’s offices: 
… the chief clerk had his own solicitor’s firm… I was horrified when I 
learnt about this. He would have his people defending somebody and he 
sitting there as Clerk of the court… (Patience Marshall JP, 200745) 
 There is much evidence to suggest that “magistrates tend to believe the 
police” (Parker et al.1981:57; Carlen 1976; Raine 1987; Vennard 1981; Skyrme 
1979). One very senior magistrate explained that when the police lost they just 
shrugged and said “‘We know he did it, but we couldn’t prove it’… One used to go 
to the poor sergeant and say ‘You tried hard’”.46 
Molony (1927 para. 36) concluded that juvenile courts should not be held in 
the same building as any other courts, as separation was “one of the best ways of 
emphasizing the difference of treatment between the juvenile and the adult”. This 
was not specifically included in the CAYP Act 1933, merely separation from adults 
in courts and police stations. However, Elkin (1938) found that the majority of 
juvenile courts were still held in the same building as ordinary courts, with the 
magistrates sitting high up on a raised dais. This structural elevation was seen as 
necessary for practical purposes by some, but as part of the coercive, dominating 
nature of the courts, by others (Argyle 1967). Cavenagh JP (1959:131) suggested 
that if parents stood near their child, it could 
reveal a highly suggestive resemblance between parent and child, 
seeming to imply that the accused is after all nothing more nor less than 
a chip off the old block and as unlikely to yield to treatment. 
“There was often confusion in the mind of the child or his parents about what 
was happening…” (Ingleby para.186), with too many people in court; and differing 
practices in regard to handling reports, some being read aloud in full, to the 
detriment of the child. In Brighton in 1965, “Parents…were often rudely addressed 
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by the magistrate or clerk, not allowed to say what they wanted to...” (Cohen S. 
1987:104). An Inner London chairman of 40 years’ experience complained that 
simplifying “the language and the formalities as one may, the extreme artificiality of 
any criminal trial must be wholly incomprehensible to young children” (Wootton 
1967:222). In practice, many of the juvenile courts throughout the country appeared 
to be little different from their adult counterparts, yet were dealing with children as 
young as ten years old, many with social, physical and mental difficulties. As 
Asquith (1983:39) has noted, 
the ideological orientations of members of relevant organisations affect 
whether or not, or to what extent, the objectives contained in the formal 
or official ideology are actually realised. 
Sheriffs, Justices and Burgh Magistrates – Bailies in Juvenile Courts in Scotland 
The Edinburgh Burgh Court was like Dante’s ‘Inferno’. The bailie’s 
qualification was that he or she was a senior councillor, and in the main 
they were absolutely useless. (Finlayson 2008
47
) 
 
In 1587
48
 James VI of Scotland made provision for the appointment of 
Justices of the Peace “because of the overwhelming success of the English 
justices…” (Findlay 2000:1). However, the legal system of England/Wales was 
based on common law which, along with the “large and independent squirearchy”, 
was “the basis of the Institution of the Justice of the Peace” (Skyrme 1991 vol. 
III:58). The Scots had remained under the Continental system, and its justices were 
of “low social standing”, and “lack of education” (2000:61). They had more limited 
powers: fines, corporal punishment, and a maximum two months’ custody, the last 
two rarely used “to avoid the appreciable cost” and some “sentiments of humanity” 
(vol.III:73); while English justices had the additional, harrowing powers of capital 
punishment, transportation and prison. After 1747, the sheriffs replaced the JPs, and 
as qualified lawyers were “more impressive both in their personal status and in the 
ability with which they performed their judicial, administrative and investigative 
functions” (p.72).  
Until 1955, when the Secretary of State for Scotland assumed responsibility, 
appointments for JPs in either country were by the Lord Chancellor, although in 
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some parts of Scotland, there were no JP courts. The 1930s legislative reforms had 
required appointment by the Secretary of State on the advice of local Advisory 
Committees (Morton 1928) but this was never implemented. In 1953 Scottish JPs, 
who sat two or three at a time, dealt with only 10% of the criminal work and minor 
civil matters; English JPs dealt with 90% (Skyrme 1991 vol. III). As Cowperthwaite 
(1988:6) has observed, a “large proportion of Scottish justices of the peace did not sit 
in court (and would have been surprised if called upon to do so).” There was no 
national body to represent their interests.  
The sheriff court, presided over by a single lawyer, was the main court for 
summary jurisdiction with, until 1975, two other summary courts both involving lay 
members advised by clerks, the JP courts and the burgh or police courts. The last 
were essentially town councillors appointed by their colleagues to act as 
‘magistrates’ or bailies, sitting alone, and whose jurisdiction was limited to their 
burghs, dealing with minor criminal offences. Otherwise, JP courts had jurisdiction 
over the whole county.  
All three courts could sit as juvenile courts until 1971, and were not without 
their critics. Kilbrandon spoke of the ineffectiveness of the “kindly admonition” of 
the juvenile court (The Scotsman 13.iv.1964). One solicitor, later a senior ‘reporter’ 
to the hearings, said of a burgh juvenile court,  
the city prosecutor was a very able chap but had the bailies in his pocket. 
There was no legal aid … Pre 1964, there were the Poor Law solicitors, 
but after that, nobody went…  
The county juvenile court  
was presided over by three worthies, justices … a different breed from 
the city bailies. They tended to be very posh and very, very courteous to 
everyone in the court… But, they were pretty incompetent too. They had 
no training at all. They relied very heavily on the legal adviser…49.  
The sheriff’s juvenile court fared little better, with  
horror tales of how these courts operated where it was by no means 
unusual to have 40 individual cases disposed of in a two hour session 
(Finlayson 1992:41).  
There was considerable resistance to lay people sitting in law courts 
(Bankowski 1987:11-16). In the 1970s when their abolition was proposed by the 
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Conservatives, reversing their earlier decision,
50
 both the Scottish Law Society and 
the Glasgow Bar were delighted, “the principle of lay – or half-baked – justice has 
been discarded” (Scotsman 19.x.1973). Nonetheless, in 1975 the Labour government 
abolished burgh and JP courts but replaced them with District Courts with lay 
justices, one or more to sit. An editorial in the ‘Scotsman’ (15.ii.1975) declared that 
“lay justice is inferior whether it operates in England or in Scotland”, others said it 
stood for a trend to a more ‘welfare’ oriented and thus ‘humane’ justice, in line with 
Kilbrandon (Bankowski 1987:28). 
The fiscals exercised their discretion, as a filter between the police and the 
court, whether to prosecute or not, and to decide the venue and type of trial. The 
English and Welsh courts had no such officer until 1986
51
: the police prosecuted 
their own cases through local solicitors, and the magistrates decided the venue for 
trial. The English magistrates were fully part of the legal and social framework of the 
town and countryside, stemming from their historical role as keepers of the king’s 
peace and their multitude of administrative duties, and the juvenile courts were their 
sole preserve. From 1921 they were represented by a powerful, influential body, the 
MA, with close links to Parliament. Historically, the Scottish JP had been less 
influential; by the 20
th
 century their role was minimal, and as juvenile court justices 
they were the least used tribunal. 
2.3.3   The Magistrates’ Association (MA) 
The MA was formed in 1921, with considerable assistance from the penal 
reforming Howard League, whose Secretary became the Secretary of the MA in 
1924, although some members had reservations about the connection (MAC 1921:4). 
The objects of the MA were to publish information and advice for magistrates; 
provide conferences and meetings; promote “uniformity of practice and the best 
methods of preventing crime and of treating offenders with a view to their reform”; 
and consult with governmental and other bodies (MA 1954: Memorandum). The MA 
was lobbied by many different organisations, the majority demanding more severe 
punishments, some offering constructive advice and knowledge of child 
development matters. 
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Perhaps its most important function, before compulsory training was 
introduced in 1966, was to provide training, even “the examination and correction of 
such papers as were sent in by the magistrates” (MAC 1948: 837). The MA provided 
postal courses, lectures and conferences: hundreds of magistrates took these courses 
at their own expense (Mag. 1949:230). Ingleby (1960 para.160) commented on its 
“admirable publication entitled ‘Lectures on the work of the Juvenile Courts’”. All 
this was paid for out of subscriptions, the Lord Chancellor refusing to give financial 
help (MAC 1948:851), until the MA’s contribution to training was recognised in 
1970 (Exec.1970:3757).  
Through its magazine, the ‘Magistrate’, published bimonthly, and monthly 
from the 1960s, magistrates read erudite articles by experts covering a wide range of 
criminal justice issues from different perspectives, juvenile justice systems in other 
countries (Mag.1966-68), and reports of the MA ‘council’, official publications and 
Home Office circulars. A correspondence column allowed differing views to be 
aired, most received were published, although occasionally letters were censored 
(Exec 1966:3463). Editors remained in post for many years and were invariably 
retired justices’ clerks. The appointment of an academic, Caroline Ball JP in 1990 
broke that mould and her editorial freedom was exercised to the full, articles and 
editorials expressing views contrary to MA policy, received with conflicting views 
by different chairmen. On her resignation in 1995, the magazine returned to being a 
House magazine, with professional editors 
Magistrates and stipendiaries originally joined the MA on an individual basis 
or by belonging to their local bench, which had joined. By 1950, there were 7,473 
members and 133 benches (Exec: 1950:1793). Benches and later branches held local 
meetings, the MA held the ‘annual meeting’, usually in London. Open to all 
members, it regularly attracted an audience of 400, which the Lord Chancellor 
invariably addressed (MAC 1934:358). Debates were held and votes taken, although 
the result was not binding as “the policy of the Association was the policy of the 
representative Council” (MAC 1965:1791).  
The ruling body of the MA was the council, which, in the early years 
included five of the first women justices. Individual appointments to the Council, 
many from Inner London, were a feature of the first thirty years. Their nominations 
were ratified at the Annual Meetings in London, later roughly in equal numbers to 
bench representation, all holding office for three years (Exec: 1949:1766). In 1950, 
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there was criticism “in many quarters that the Association was not in fact 
representative of the views of the members throughout the country” (MAC 
1953:1115). Looking back to that time, Sir William Addison
52
 declared, 
The Council in the 1950s was a self-perpetuating body drawn from the 
magisterial elite of London and the Home Counties, and it was 
distinguished by a belief in the perfectibility of human nature that was in 
the best – or worst – traditions of Rousseau. (Mag.1977:6) 
Dissatisfaction culminated in the constitutional reforms and would appear to 
be related to the abolition of corporal punishment in the 1948 Criminal Justice Act. 
This had attracted national interest in the press, and showed a clear conflict between 
the Council members and magistrates in the country. The MA had given evidence to 
the Cadogan Committee in favour of the abolition of whipping in 1937, but support 
for whipping was raised by members in 1942, 1947, and 1948 when the MA 
reiterated its support for abolition. In 1950, the Executive Committee was over–ruled 
in objecting to a referendum on corporal punishment, but headed off further calls for 
the re-introduction of corporal punishment until 1952, when the Lord Chief Justice 
wanted it re-introduced (MAC 1952:1059). Eventually, the Council felt obliged by 
the supporters of corporal punishment to hold a referendum of the whole 
membership. The Council effectively lost (MAC 1953:1118), some “47% of 
members who received papers voted for corporal punishment and 22% against, 
leaving 31% who had not voted at all (MAC 1953:1085). Much of these proceedings 
was shrouded in secrecy.  
The reintroduction of corporal punishment was never accepted as MA policy, 
despite being raised a further three times. In 1960, however, after the major 
constitutional changes, the Council sent a Memorandum to the Advisory Council on 
the Treatment of Offenders (MAC 1960:1476) with a more equivocal statement of 
its views:  
The question of a return to corporal punishment must largely depend 
upon whether or not it is a deterrent to individual offenders and to 
potential offenders. This is a matter needing intensive investigation into 
the results of past sentences… 
The new Labour government abolished corporal punishment in prisons in the 
1967 Criminal Justice Act, and a later Labour government finally abolished it in all 
schools and institutions in 1999. The issue was not seriously raised again but it 
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would seem there is an “enduring appeal… exemplified above all in the issue of 
corporal punishment, especially for young offenders” (Bottoms & Stevenson 
1992:16). As one magistrate opined, “My boys got whacked at school, and they are 
very nice and successful now.”53 
The unprecedented increase in membership of the MA in 1950-51, which 
was attributed to new appointments following the Justice of the Peace Act 1949, was 
followed by a decline, thought owing to the “undesirable publicity arising out of the 
referendum” on corporal punishment (MAC 1954:1171). The new chairman Lord 
Merthyr instigated a reform of the constitution. This led to the gradual replacement 
of bench with branch membership, so that by 1956 all members were assigned to 
branches, often coterminous with Commission of the Peace boundaries (MAC 
1955:1231). By 1965 there were 12,400 members, and by 1972 some 18,700 of the 
21,000 active justices were members (Mag.1972:187).  
Individual elections to the council were abolished and all its members were 
elected on a regional basis. The first newly constituted council meeting was held in 
November 1956: 40% of the JCC membership had been replaced. Eventually, 
council members were elected by their own branches and co-options were reduced to 
five in 1971 (MAC 1971:2041). Morris, an Inner London magistrate, noted the 
difference in attitudes from those in London,  
Out in the sticks, you had splendid examples of what I call ‘fossilised 
reaction’, utterly opposed to what they regarded as a softening and lily-
livered approach to dealing with a problem that needed to be addressed 
by much sterner measures. This resonated right through all my time on 
the Council…54  
A chairman of the ILJP who served on the JCC found members in the 1980s 
of whom “I cannot imagine how they got there... they seemed to have very little 
knowledge of children and young people”. Nonetheless, there were “some very able 
and enlightened people at the head of the Association, but they had a hard job 
introducing change”.55 Both (Lady) Cordelia James and (Lady) Teresa Rothschild of 
the JCC were members of the Younger Committee (1970 para 16) on detention 
centres, which successfully recommended the closure of the only detention centre for 
girls, and recommended much more constructive regimes. 
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The council met three times a year, with a similar number of meetings by the 
various sub-committees, whose decisions had to be ratified by the main council, and 
occasionally led to serious conflict (MAC 1968:1918). Observers from government 
departments attended council and sub-committee meetings. Many of the meetings 
were held in Committee Rooms of the Houses of Parliament until 1965, when that 
arrangement ceased for practical reasons (MAC 1965:174), rather than from any 
sense of safeguarding the independence of the magistracy from the legislature and 
the executive.  
The leadership of the MA was the executive committee, comprising the 
officers, elected by the Council, and sub-committee chairmen. The average length of 
service was over 12 years, only five for Council membership (Wilkinson 1992:223). 
The executive provided the delegations visiting government ministers, and members 
sat on official working parties and Royal Commissions. It also chose the members of 
the sub-committees, vetted the resolutions for the ‘annual meeting’, and produced 
the nominations for co-options to the Council. During most of the 1960s, the 
Chairman of the Council was a Deputy Chairman of the House of Lords and a 
Deputy Chairman was a Labour MP, later ennobled, and member of the Longford 
Committee. With these lengthy time commitments on top of bench sittings, they 
were a very unrepresentative selection of the magistracy.  
A close relationship with the government was almost the raison d’etre of the 
MA, and it was prepared to forgo financial benefits as a charity rather than “be 
unable to take an active part in making representations to Parliament” (MAC 
1951:13). The Lord Chancellor was, by virtue of his office, the President. The MA 
expected to be listened to, and usually was. In 1955, the Home Secretary agreed to a 
deputation from the council after being “informed of Council’s view that the time 
was ripe for a new inquiry into the treatment of young people appearing before the 
juvenile courts” (MAC 1955:1232): the Ingleby Committee was appointed in 1956. 
Historically, the MA was careful to remain politically impartial, at least 
publicly. In 1944, Mr Turton JP MP said that as the Conservatives were considering 
reforms they would like help from the MA. This was refused, though with the caveat 
that it was “better not to send a member officially” (MAC 1944:682). The MA had 
discussions with both main political parties after an approach by the Conservatives 
to discuss the Criminal Justice Bill 1967 (Exec 1967: 3535), and thereafter openly 
sought political support for its own proposals. These mostly coincided with those of 
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the Conservatives, and maintained relations with them in and out of office. However, 
it was angry with them at their removal of magistrates’ powers of imprisonment for 
serious motoring offences in the 1973 Road Traffic Bill, and was rebuked for being 
so by the Lord Chancellor (Mag.1974:20). It was equally irate with the following 
Labour government when it reintroduced the same measures (MAC 1973:2130 & 
MAC 1974:2161). Nonetheless, the MA was seen to be generally more sympathetic 
to the Conservatives (Pitts 1988:118; Wilkinson 1992:241). 
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2.4 Conclusion 
The political processes and the pressure groups relating to juvenile justice 
were different in Scotland and England/Wales during the 1960s. The passage of the 
Kilbrandon reforms fitted the optimum pattern for success as propounded by both 
Kingdon and Presthus, whilst those of Longford did not. The proponents of the 
detailed and carefully argued and constructed Scottish proposals foresaw resistance 
and worked hard to minimize it. Meanwhile, the English juvenile justice reforms 
were part of a wide-ranging, radical package of criminal justice reforms, and this 
small section was subjected to a sustained attack by several groups, their authors 
seemingly caught unawares or unable to respond to the criticism. Given the history 
of the MA, the background of its leading officers, and the regular attendance and 
advice of civil servants, there was ample opportunity for it to respond to and 
influence any proposed legislation. The reformed Council of the late 1950s reflected 
the views of magistrates throughout the country, members less exposed to new ideas 
and criminological research. A significant number of magistrates were members of 
both Houses of Parliament from all Parties. They were in a formidable lobbying 
position. 
Judicial decision-making is problematical for adult offenders held fully 
responsible for their actions, but, for juveniles, courts were faced with extra 
difficulties and responsibilities. The evidence would suggest that in neither 
jurisdiction were the judicial decision-makers selected, trained or supported to fulfil 
their functions properly. How they were expected to deal with juvenile offenders is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
 
ooOoo 
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CHAPTER 3 
 LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE: PRE 1900 TO 1963 
 
In 1814, five children aged between eight and twelve were hanged for petty 
larceny (Pinchbeck and Hewitt 1973:352): in 1849 more than 10,000 young 
offenders under 17 were sentenced to prison or transportation. Until the legislative 
measures of the 20
th
 Century set up special courts for juveniles, whether troubled or 
troublesome, there were few criminal justice agencies which recognised the needs of 
children at all. Juveniles, as young as seven years, took their turn with the most 
hardened criminals appearing in Magistrates’ Courts and Assizes in England/Wales, 
before Stipendiaries in London; and in Scotland, before Justice of the Peace Courts, 
Police or Burgh Courts, and Sheriff Courts. Bailies, justices, sheriffs and judges did 
not have any expertise or training in dealing with such youthful offenders. Of the lay 
members in both jurisdictions, none was trained, many sat rarely, there were no 
women, and no upper age limit, with some in their nineties still sitting.  
When those with responsibility for decision-making, the Parliamentarians, 
civil servants, the judiciary and criminal justice agencies, became aware of the 
different needs of young people, working parties were appointed with a range of 
expertise, to inform the legislators of suitable methods to deal with juvenile 
delinquency. However, once on the Statute Book, the enactment of those provisions 
would be at the mercy of many others. It would need the commitment of the authors 
with both the political will and the resources, financial and otherwise; it would need 
application by the judiciary, some thousands of justices or magistrates, with little 
contact even within their own courts, let alone between a thousand petty sessional 
divisions and counties; and it would require enforcement by the agencies given 
responsibility for the practicalities, scattered across the country, with different 
funding arrangements and priorities. In addition, the ‘law of unintended 
consequences’ was to complicate the issues still further.  
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3.1 Before the 20
th
 Century 
In the 17
th
 & 18
th
 centuries, “the harshness of the law, together with the 
changing social conditions” led to a “large increase in the number of youthful 
delinquents, recruited from what were termed the ‘perishing and dangerous classes’” 
(Molony 1927:7-8). The charities turned their attention to the failure of the State to 
provide help. They ran schools and reformatories, saving children from 
transportation or imprisonment. The Parkhurst Act of 1838 was the first legislative 
recognition of separate treatment for young offenders, “a separate prison…to be 
conducted on such lines as should ‘appear most conducive to their reformation and 
to the repression of crime’” (1927:7-8).  
In 1854, the Reformatory Schools Act enabled courts to send young 
offenders to institutions with powers of detention and control. The same year, 
Scotland passed the Industrial Schools Act (Scotland) providing for “the needs of 
destitute and erring children” (Morton 1928:83). It was said that these schools played 
an important part in reducing the prison population for those aged 14-16. England 
passed a similar Act in 1857. “For the first time children in trouble began to be seen 
officially as being the victims of society and their poverty, rather than as the 
performers of evil deeds” (Murray K 1976:140). The 1887 Prison Act introduced a 
national, centrally controlled system under the Prison Commission, although some 
local powers remained including “the decision to promote and maintain special 
institutions for juveniles” (Garland 1985:10).  
The issue of parental rights and responsibilities was to be at the core of 
juvenile justice thinking, with parental rights uppermost during the 19
th 
and early 20
th
 
centuries, their responsibilities coming to greater prominence afterwards, as social 
reformers understood child development more. In 1840, an Act
56
 gave the High 
Court the power to give custody to any person willing to take certain children, as  
“the object of the Act, which was vigorously opposed as an interference with the 
rights of parents, was to remove children from the influence of vicious parents” 
(Molony 1927:10). Shaftesbury had opposed compulsory education as “a direct 
infringement of the right of a parent to bring up his child as he saw fit and could only 
encourage a dependence on the State” (Pinchbeck & Hewitt 1973:358). The 
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Youthful Offenders Act 1901 enabled courts to punish parents who “conduced to the 
commission of the alleged offence by wilful default or by habitually neglecting to 
exercise due care of him”. 
There was a marked difference in attitudes to punishment in the two 
jurisdictions. In England in the 19
th
 century, there were nearly 300 capital offences, 
yet Scotland only had 50 (Findlay 2000). In England/Wales, the 1865 Prison Act 
proposed a regime “non-productive and of a harsh and menial character, designed 
not to teach particular skills but to enforce discipline, work habits and obedience” 
(Garland 1985:13).  
Sentences, involving hard labour, are comparatively rare in Scotland 
while in England they form the great majority…the tread-wheel and the 
crank have both been tried in Scotland and abandoned many years ago as 
improper instruments of punishment. The Scottish prisoner is therefore 
engaged entirely in industrial labour (Scottish Office 1895:vii).  
The courts had made no distinction between adult and juvenile offenders, 
children facing trial by jury. The 1879 Summary Jurisdiction Act provided that under 
16s could be tried summarily for almost all indictable offences, which reduced the 
number of juveniles in prison, and their trial process was simplified. At the turn of 
the 20
th
 century other powers included reformatory and industrial schools; whipping 
and fining. The Gladstone Report 1895 introduced the concept of reform through 
training and education in prisons, which eventually led to the creation of borstals. 
From the outset, there were three major differences between the two criminal 
jurisdictions of England/Wales and Scotland. The English justices of the peace were 
fully part of the legal and social framework, entirely responsible for all summary 
courts, except in London, whilst the judicial role and standing of their Scottish 
counterparts was negligible (Skyrme 1979). In Scotland, since 1587 the fiscals 
exercised their discretion, choosing whether to prosecute or to divert from the courts, 
and the venue, a summary or higher court. There were no such officials in the 
English jurisdiction until 1986: where there was discretion, the magistrates chose the 
trial venue, a higher court to exercise greater powers of punishment when necessary. 
Finally, attitudes to prisoners were markedly different, Scotland promoting 
productive work, England menial, hard labour. 
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3.2 The First Decade of the 20
th
 Century 
The 1908 Children Act - saturated with the rising spirit of 
humanitarianism (Hansard HC 186: 1284). 
 
In 1906 the landslide victory for the Liberal Party heralded a period of 
significant social welfare reforms designed to reduce poverty, sickness, and 
criminality, which, during this period applied both to England/Wales, and to 
Scotland. ‘The Times’ (31.v.1906) referred to HJ Tennant’s 57  Bill to introduce 
separate courts for children, a precursor to the government reforms. The Home 
Secretary noted that regulations keeping children’s cases separate from adults in 
summary courts were being applied in 49 areas and later, that the “working of the 
Children’s Courts in Birmingham have been most satisfactory in reducing the 
number of children committed to prison” (29.xi.1906).  
3.2.1   The Probation of Offenders Act 1907 
Special probation officers were appointed to deal with offenders under 16, 
with a duty to visit, receive reports, and inform the court about the child’s behaviour 
and to “ advise, assist, and befriend him, and, when necessary, to endeavour to find 
him suitable employment”. The order was made without a conviction being 
recorded, “discharging the offender conditionally on his entering into a 
recognizance, with or without sureties, to be of good behaviour …” This wording 
caused some confusion and led to a perception by some that the child was being ‘let 
off’.  
The Act was often ignored by the magistrates and the Home Office urged 
them to use probation more widely, particularly for young offenders (Bailey 1987). 
Many of the key figures in the Children’s Department of the Home Office had been 
teachers or worked in Boys’ Clubs and saw the need for education, sport and 
hobbies. These ideas became the basis for this 1907 Act and the Prevention of Crime 
Act 1908, which introduced borstal institutions for training, although the early ones 
had an “austere, discipline-orientated regime developed by its founder, Sir Evelyn 
Ruggles-Brise” (Hood 1965:xi). Significantly, the governor decided the date of 
release, not the judge. 
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3.2.2   The Children Act 1908 
In February 1908, Herbert Samuel, Under-Secretary Home Office, introduced 
his Children Bill, “To consolidate and amend the law relating to the protection of 
children and young persons, reformatory and industrial schools, and juvenile 
offenders” (HC.183:1432). It extended to the whole of the UK and of the six parts, 
most dealt with the protection and welfare of juveniles, only the last dealing with 
juvenile offenders. There were three main principles: the child offender was to be 
kept separate from the adult criminal; second, parental responsibility was 
emphasised, for  
He cannot be allowed to neglect the upbringing of his children and 
having committed the grave offence of throwing on society a child 
criminal, wash his hands of the consequences and escape scot-free”. 
(HC.183:1436) 
Third, committing children to common gaols stopped, “with a few carefully 
defined and necessary exceptions”.  
The fundamental tenet was that:  
the child offender… should receive at the hands of the law a treatment 
differentiated to suit his special needs… the courts should be the agents 
of rescue as well as the punishment of children… held in a separate room 
or at a separate time from the courts which are held for adult cases, and 
that the public who are not concerned in the cases shall be excluded from 
admission. (HC.183:1436) 
At the Second Reading, the Scottish Lord Advocate Shaw explained that:  
The magistrate has placed before him a series of alternatives, the object 
being to treat these children not by way of punishing them – which is no 
remedy – but with a view to their reformation. 
He too, spoke strongly of parental responsibility and liability, a view much 
supported in both Houses of Parliament (186:1252-8). A clause required a parent to 
give security for the good behaviour of a young offender under 16, without a 
conviction recorded.
58
 
Almost everyone agreed that juvenile offenders should be kept separate from 
adult offenders, and not held in prison. There was concern that Metropolitan 
Magistrates (lawyers) varied greatly in their sentencing, although few children in 
London were sent to prison. Birmingham in 1904 sent 166 to prison and after the 
juvenile court was established, only 20. Newcastle, half the size of Birmingham sent 
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159 in 1905/6. Both Irish and Scots MPs spoke enthusiastically of the new proposals, 
the Scottish Gulland “heartily approved of Children’s Courts” noting them in a 
dozen places already in Scotland and that public opinion was very strongly in favour 
of them (187: 570). 
The part relating to juvenile offenders defined a child as being under 14, and 
a young person as one aged 14-16, and required designated courts for all young 
offenders with separate rooms if not separate buildings. It abolished prison for under 
14s, otherwise sanctions included fines, birching, probation, industrial & reform 
schools, and prison in exceptional cases. Parents had to attend court if not 
unreasonable, and in the case of a child pay the monetary penalty, unless they were 
found not to have conduced to the commission of the offence by neglecting to 
exercise due care of the child or young person. They could be ordered to give 
security for his good behaviour. No young person could be sentenced to penal 
servitude for any offence, and only to prison if of so unruly a character, or so 
depraved. The death penalty for those under 17 was replaced with detention ‘at His 
Majesty’s Pleasure’. Those convicted of attempted murder, manslaughter, or GBH 
with intent would be detained for the length of sentence, the Secretary of State to 
determine the place. No one could enter the court except those involved and bona 
fide newspaper representatives.  
The Earl of Crewe, Lord Privy Seal, expressed “deep gratification at the 
reception… unanimous and harmonious chorus of approval… a universal bill 
dealing with England, Scotland and Ireland” (HL.195: 235). Paterson (1911:190), 
later of the Prison Commission, hoped “employers will with confidence prosecute 
their office-boys…” because of the help the boys would receive. Most of the Act was 
concerned with protecting children from abuse and neglect, usually by their families, 
such that “from the first the court was empowered to intervene to rescue the child 
from the vagaries of working-class socialisation” (Garland 1985:223). This 
eventually led to cases where children were removed from their own homes for 
welfare purposes, which many children saw as punishment, a sentence (Morris, 
Giller, Szwed & Geach 1980). Nonetheless, this Act, with the support of all the 
political parties, established the principle that delinquent children should be treated 
differently from adults: the next crucial stage would be its implementation. 
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3.3 The 1920s, Molony 1927 and Morton 1928 
England/Wales - …neglect and delinquency often go hand in hand. 
(Molony 1927:6) 
Scotland - The connection between neglect and delinquency is 
distressingly close. (Morton 1928:95) 
 
The publicity surrounding children’s courts, predicated on reform rather than 
punishment (Elkin 1938:281), was thought responsible for the 40% increase in the 
number of juveniles charged between 1907 and 1910 in England/Wales, with a 
similar rise in Scotland (Morton 1928). Ironically, most of the reforms were never 
implemented in either jurisdiction. Special juvenile courts were not set up, 
(Mag.1924); many justices were not fit for the work; and some new sanctions were 
largely ignored
59
 (Molony 1927). During the 1914-18 War and afterwards, it was a 
period of review concerning juvenile justice, with parallel inquiries, reports and 
organisations in both jurisdictions, both involving well-informed, active justices.  
In England/Wales a small, influential group of the lay magistracy was at the 
forefront of promoting reform in the early half of the 20
th
 century. Its leaders, largely 
London based and helped by stipendiary magistrates, in 1921 formed the 
Magistrates' Association (MA) to educate their own members and to lobby the 
government with ideas for reform. An early campaign was to remove the distinction 
between the much criticised reformatory and industrial schools. Over the first half-
century, the leaders were distinguished citizens serving on national bodies and would 
have been obvious candidates for government inquiries, regardless of their 
magisterial experience. They wrote erudite articles in the ‘Magistrate’, had regular 
access to government ministers, and attended conferences around the world on 
juvenile justice issues. 
Applicable to London, the Juvenile Courts (Metropolis) Act 1920 not only 
required that the appointment of presidents of the London juvenile courts must have 
regard “to their previous experience and their special qualifications for dealing with 
cases of juvenile offenders” but, of the justices sitting, one must be a woman, and the 
court must not be held in the building of the police courts, as summary courts were 
then called. Scotland followed suit, a Scottish Office Circular (1923) requested: 
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a separate rota of magistrates or justices, which should include those who 
have gained experience of the problems of juvenile delinquency as social 
workers or teachers, or who are otherwise specially interested in the 
training of young people.  
3.3.1   The Probation Service  
Despite the increase in crime during the war, the Home Secretary issued a 
circular to all justices to encourage the wider use of probation, yet by 1922 out of 
1034 summary courts “no less than 215 have taken no steps to appoint a Probation 
Officer” (MAC 1922:29). The Criminal Justice Act 1925 set up, on a local basis, 
‘probation committees’ of justices in England/Wales, with a duty to appoint a 
probation officer for their area, and specially qualified children’s officers for every 
juvenile court (Baird Report: 425-438). This gave the magistrates in England/Wales 
the responsibility and control of the probation service. The MA laid “great stress on 
the considerable saving to public funds which is likely to follow from the use of 
probation” (Mag.1923:9), thereby not excluding financial considerations in its 
sentencing criteria. 
The Act did not apply to Scotland, which relied on the Probation of 
Offenders Act 1907, and the Criminal Justice Administration Act 1914. There was 
no national body, some areas relying entirely on volunteers for probation officers, 
and others a mixture of professionals and volunteers. The Morton Committee 
(1928:74) had favoured a probation service under local probation committees, but 
was not included in the CAYP (Scotland) Act 1937. This Act made greater demands 
on the probation service as it included care and protection cases and meant it was 
disproportionately concerned with juveniles until at least the Morison Report in 1962. 
3.3.2   Molony and Morton 
In 1925, two committees were appointed, one in England/Wales under Sir 
Thomas Molony, the other in Scotland under Sheriff Principal George Morton,  
to inquire into the treatment of young offenders and young people who, 
owing to bad associations or surroundings, require protection and 
training; and to report what changes, if any, are desirable in the present 
law or its administration. (Molony 1927:1)  
Both committees had leading magistrates on them. Molony reported in April 
1927 and Morton in April 1928 (p.9), the latter observing that “it is significant to 
find that the two Committees are agreed with reference to a large number of the 
questions which came before them”.  
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They both entirely agreed that there was no distinction between neglected 
and delinquent children, and recommended that industrial and reform schools should 
be amalgamated into schools ‘approved’ by the Home Secretary. Whilst Molony 
acknowledged the importance of preventive measures in reducing juvenile 
offending, it was Morton which devoted nearly 12% of the report to the dreadful 
social conditions, with 114, 937 people in Glasgow living more than four to a room 
(1928:21); and felt “no solution of the problem of delinquency is possible without 
the removal of these conditions”. Reports from both jurisdictions referred to the 
serious and demoralising effects of juvenile unemployment, bearing in mind the 
school leaving age then at 14. 
Parental responsibility was again emphasised, which included paying their 
children’s fines, but Morton (p.53) wanted to help them, with the court “held in the 
evenings and at an hour at which the parents can attend”. Both wanted a complete 
separation of juvenile courts from other courts; the use of simple, intelligible 
language; and ordinary tables and chairs, with only people involved in the 
proceedings present. The press would not be able to publish anything leading to the 
identification of any child. The police could only be present if essential and the court 
would decide if they should wear uniforms.  
The Committees were critical of the current personnel in the juvenile courts 
and wanted people with “a love of young people, sympathy with their interests, and 
an imaginative insight into their difficulties” (Molony p.25), younger magistrates 
and a sufficient number of women. However, Molony (26-7) did not accept a direct 
appointment scheme as in London, as it attached “great importance to local interest 
and local initiative”, still leaving the members of the Petty Sessions to choose from 
their numbers, whilst Morton (p.43) favoured the Lord Chancellor appointing on 
advice from local Advisory Committees.  
Both Committees recommended that the age of criminal responsibility should 
be raised to eight years, although only Molony confirmed the common law principle 
of doli incapax and its rebuttal. Scotland had never relied on this and Morton (p.48), 
remained “satisfied that the courts make every necessary allowance and that no 
hardship is caused” without it. Aware that most European countries had an upper age 
limit of 18, Morton only recommended to 17 years because “in all but the most 
serious cases, the problem of the offender and not the nature of the charge should be 
the first consideration. To this principle we attach paramount importance…” and did 
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not want the character of the juvenile court changed (p.49). It recognised the 
importance of the discretion exercised by the fiscals and their power to issue a 
caution. It did not want the police to have the power to caution with supervision, but 
greater co-operation between the police and schools, although there should be no 
corporal punishment as a result. Molony made no reference to any pre-court 
diversion. 
Molony (p.20) rejected a suggestion from some magistrates for civil rather 
than criminal procedures, because there were serious cases and any disposal made 
outside a court would undermine respect for the law, the “gravity should be brought 
home to the offender”. Morton however, was “attracted by the proposal” of an 
‘education authority tribunal’, less formal, with no stigma of a court appearance and 
whose members could have a “real knowledge of child life”, able to gain information 
about the character, health, home circumstances, and education. Morton regretted it 
could not accept the idea, largely because of constitutional problems, but hoped that 
its own proposals for reform of the juvenile court would “secure the advantages 
claimed for an education authority tribunal” (p.39). Neither committee had made any 
reference to the high percentage of guilty pleas,  and each wanted anyone under 21 
charged with a juvenile to be tried in the juvenile court.  
In each jurisdiction the recommendations regarding the new juvenile courts 
focused on choosing the best qualified magistrates to sit on a panel with sufficient, 
regular sittings to acquire the necessary experience. In England/Wales this should 
have been feasible given that magistrates sat in ordinary summary courts as well as 
dealing with juvenile offenders. They also had the added responsibility of 
administering and controlling the probation service. In Scotland, the situation was 
more complicated as there were three different judicial avenues for dealing with 
juveniles, the sheriff courts, the police or burgh courts and the justice of the peace 
courts. Morton concluded that sheriffs were not appointed for their skills with 
dealing with young offenders, and burgh magistrates, the bailies, were elected for 
their administrative skills on local councils. Neither was as suitable as justices of the 
peace, who could be specially chosen by the Lord Chancellor on advice from area 
Advisory Committees. It was not seen as a disadvantage, given the equal lack of 
expertise shown by the others, that the justice of the peace court was currently the 
least used forum for juvenile offenders (Morton:42).  
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3.4 The 1930s -Children and Young Persons Acts 1932/33 and 1937  
Every court in dealing with a child or young person who is brought 
before them, either as needing care or protection or as an offender, shall 
have regard to the welfare of the child or young person…and for 
securing that proper provision is made for his education and training. 
(Section 44 CAYP Act 1933.) 
 
In 1932 the Labour Lord Chancellor, Viscount Sankey, congratulated the MA 
on the 1932 CAYP Bill, its “offspring” (Mag. 1932:561-3). Ministers had closely 
consulted the MA, which had made some 23 recommendations (MAC 1932:294) and 
frequent articles appeared in the ‘Magistrate’. These legislative reforms took place at 
a time of severe economic depression, high unemployment, and rising crime in 
general, the proportion of offenders under 16 rising from 267 per 100,000 in 1921 to 
354 in 1932. Ramsay MacDonald was the Prime Minister of the National 
Government, with ministers from all the major political parties, the Home Secretary, 
Samuel, had introduced the 1908 Act. The CAYP Bill was shared with Scotland, 
certain minor matters applicable to one jurisdiction or the other, and MPs from both 
jurisdictions spoke in the debates. Eventually, there were two Consolidated Acts, the 
1932 Act for Scotland, further consolidated in 1937 and the 1933 Act for 
England/Wales, each dealing with offenders and children who were in need of 
protection and care.  
Introducing the Bill, mostly based on the Molony Report, the Conservative 
Oliver Stanley, Under-Secretary Home Office, explained the philosophy: 
the child’s upbringing at home, the discipline he receives in the home 
circle or the lack of it, the economic conditions under which he lives, the 
squalor and misery of his life, even the companions with whom he 
associates in school or out of it may have had much more to do in turning 
that child into an offender than any spirit of natural evil… the prison, the 
fine, the whip and all the paraphernalia of the law are useless if they are 
followed by the immediate return of the offender to the very condition 
which caused the offence. (HC.261:1168)  
Juvenile court magistrates would not be  
chosen from the ranks of ordinary magistrates, but from a panel of those 
magistrates who have been selected for their knowledge and interest in 
work of this kind… it is essential that this is done… and a special 
chairman to preside (1171). 
No age limit was specified, despite one MP speaking of a juvenile case in 
1930 where the average age of the magistrates had been over 80 years (HC.SC ABC: 
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1143). When the Rules were published, the MA “recommended that every panel 
should have at least one woman on it” (MAC 1933:315). Lady Astor, the 
Conservative MP, had fought hard, with support from some Scottish MPs, to have 
such a clause included in the Bill (SC ABC: 1074), but the Rules merely said “…so 
far as practicable, one woman”. The MA sent out some 11,500 copies of the article 
“On Selecting Children’s Magistrates,” and other matters relating to the Act 
(Ann.Rep 1933-1934).  
Court procedures were to be “more intelligible, less frightening” (HC. 
261:1171) and held in separate buildings altogether, not least because the 
government wanted  
the co-operation and not the hostility of the parent, and we believe we 
are much more likely to get it if we take them away from the ordinary 
police court and from the ordinary police court penalties (1172).  
Fatally, a clause allowed dispensation in certain circumstances, usually for financial 
constraint. As the MP Morgan Jones had questioned at the time, “what guarantee is 
there that some future Home Secretary may not be rather less inclined to look 
favourably upon a provision of this kind?” (HC SC. ABC 1931-2:1064)  
The Act raised the upper age limit of the juvenile court from 16 to 17, against 
considerable opposition. Stanley mentioned the support of the MA (HC.265: 2220). 
No one opposed raising the age of criminal responsibility, from seven to eight years. 
However, the Act said that juveniles co-accused with adults should be tried in the 
adult court, when both Molony and Morton had advocated the reverse. All offences 
other than homicide should be dealt with by the juvenile court, with a maximum 
power of 40 shillings (£2) for indictable offences. Offences that for an adult would 
qualify for imprisonment could be dealt with by way of an approved school order, or 
being placed in the care of a ‘fit’ person, with probation added. The lower age for 
incurring the death penalty was raised from 16 to 18. 
The Bill had proposed the abolition of whipping for boys under 14, but this 
was defeated in the House of Lords (HL 87:740). A duty was placed on local 
authorities, rather than the Home Office, to provide remand homes for their area; and 
the police had to notify both the probation service and the local authority when a 
juvenile offender was referred to court (HC.SC.ABC 1931-2:1202). The difference 
between industrial and reformatory schools was finally abolished, and replaced by 
‘approved schools’. Against the wishes of the MA, the magistrates’ discretion to 
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choose the length of time was transferred to the school head, the maximum period 
set at three years. However, an attempt to allow the local authority to alter a ‘fit’ 
person order was firmly rejected by Stanley, foreshadowing difficulties that were to 
arise in the 1969 reforms.  
We must hold inviolate that it is for the magistrates to decide the case to 
settle the form of treatment required; that we cannot allow a subsequent 
body entirely to alter the course of treatment which the magistrates 
consider is the proper sequel to the offence they have dealt with… 
(1229) 
Parental responsibility was clearly defined, as were their rights, the courts 
obliged to give parents the opportunity to be heard, challenge remarks made in 
reports, bring further evidence,
60
 and appeal. The parents of the ‘child’ were to pay 
the fine, damages or costs, and in the case of a ‘young person’ may, unless found not 
to have conduced to the commission of the offence by neglecting to exercise due 
care of the child or young person.
61
 The court may order parent / guardian to give 
security for his good behaviour.
62
  A Home Office Circular (1933) stated that “The 
new Act makes no fundamental change of principle, but it embodies the results of 
experience”, banning the use of the words “conviction” and “sentence”, replacing 
them with “finding of guilt” and “order upon such finding”, endorsing the concept of 
welfare rather than law enforcement. It forbade the publication of anything leading 
to the identification of the juvenile offender, although the court could lift this 
restriction if it were in the public interest. The Act was explained in a lengthy article 
in the ‘Magistrate’, the juvenile courts to “get away from too much legal formality” 
(Mag. 1933:701). 
Scotland and the Act 
The CAYP (Scotland) Act 1932 had followed the recommendation of the 
Morton Report, using the JP courts for the new juvenile courts, with the JPs for the 
county appointing sufficient for a juvenile court panel.
63
 At a time of severe financial 
constraint and requiring the reduction of three types of juvenile courts to the one 
“least used and least organised” (Cowperthwaite 1988:9) the Act would come into 
force only when the Secretary of State made an order for that area. These 
                                                 
60
 Ryle 11 s.47(3) Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
61
 Cl.55(1) 
62
 Cl.55(2) 
63
 Juvenile Courts (Constitution) (Scotland) Rules 1933 
 72 
administrative changes fell victim to institutional inertia and legal battles over 
funding.
64
 
The legislation was consolidated in the CAYP (Scotland) Act 1937. A 
Circular in 1938 wrote ‘when’ rather than ‘whether’ it should be implemented, but 
the Second World War was declared before any further developments 
(Cowperthwaite 1988:10-11).  
Whatever was to happen in either jurisdiction as to the practicalities of the 
1930s CAYP Acts during the succeeding years, the framework of the juvenile court 
was permanently enshrined in s44, the ‘welfare principle’, “a first and guiding 
principle which enshrines the whole spirit in which the English juvenile courts shall 
approach their task” (Watson65 1943:24). The Annual Meeting of the MA claimed 
the difference between the 1908 and the 1933 Acts was because  
those who drafted the new Children Act could consult magistrates 
collectively… and draw up its provisions in the light and with the 
experience of the magistrates who have to administer it (Mag.1933:713). 
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3.5 The 1940s – Criminal Justice and Children Acts 1948 & 1949 
and Justices of the Peace Act 1949 
We are, however, anxious that these [detention] centres shall be 
definitely reformative in their effect, and to that end desire to see special 
provision made for education and training for those detained therein, 
followed by a period of skilled supervision on release. (MAC 1948:838) 
 
In England/Wales in 1930, some 11,000 under 16 year olds were found guilty 
of indictable offences, but by 1938, including those under 17 years, the figure had 
risen to nearly 28,000 and to 44,000 in 1948.
66
 There was a widely held belief that 
the courts’ leniency had been responsible for rising crime, although the courts had 
not changed their sentencing practices significantly (Elkin 1938:289): articles in the 
‘Magistrate’ disagreed (Mag.1939: 24767). Whipping was very rarely used, but in 
1935 figures showed that the Scots used this disposal four times more often than the 
English, 1.63% of the 14,215 juveniles found guilty in Scotland, 0.39% in England 
(Cadogan 1938:para.14). By 1948, a similar proportion of juveniles was sent to some 
form of residential disposal as had been in 1930, but probation had decreased by 
about 12% and fining increased by four times the 1930 figure (Bailey 1987:316).  
If the sentencing practices had not significantly changed since the 1933 Act 
in England/Wales, the administration had not either. Many articles in the 
‘Magistrate’ referred to the failings; “the scandalous lack of equipment” and “the 
failure of the justices in many parts of the country to work the machinery for the 
local administration of probation” (Mag. 1938:25); magistrates sending inappropriate 
cases to approved schools, epileptics, the nearly blind, and “mental defectives so 
gross as to be certifiable” (Mag. 1939:210-12); a solicitor justice not knowing his 
powers nor how to discover them (Mag.1938:69); and clerks inexperienced in 
dealing with children and adolescents (MAC 1942:597). Elkin (1938:210) reported, 
“I have rarely come across a head master or mistress who did not deplore the lack of 
interest taken by the justices” in approved schools. There was much advice to 
justices on how to change their courts and practices.  
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By the middle 1930s, “borstal was seen as a panacea for adolescent crime 
where boys would be taught a trade, educated and taught to develop their sense of 
responsibility.” Paterson, the Prison Commissioner responsible, had changed the 
nature of the regime,  
abolished the staff’s prison uniform, strengthened its educative role, 
imported men from public schools and universities as housemasters, 
established open institutions and fired them with a missionary zeal”. 
(Hood 1965: xi)  
In 1938, the MA Council welcomed the Circular, ‘The Resignation of 
Justices’,  in which “justices who feel themselves unable or unfit to attend regularly 
at the Court” could be placed on the ‘Supplemental List’ and cease active work 
(MAC 1938:482). This was a necessary option given that in 1933, there were 1,284 
aged 70-80 and 130 over 90 years (Elkin 1938:298). Unfortunately, “it quickly 
became known as the ‘Resurrection Circular’… the somewhat senile hastened to put 
in appearances on the Bench…” (Wootton 1967:218),  an unintended consequence. 
In 1936, the Cadogan Committee was appointed to examine the efficacy of 
corporal punishment, four of the nine members being magistrates. The Report 
(Cadogan 1938 paras. 13-18), said that in Scotland there was a marked difference 
between sheriffs who were unanimous in wanting to keep whipping and extend it to 
under 17s, and the lay judiciary in the juvenile and burgh courts, who did not use it. 
In England/Wales, whipping was used mainly in country districts or in the smaller 
towns: in London and in many of the larger towns, the practice had ceased, although 
“birching still remains dear to the heart of certain justices, probably because it is 
traditional, it involves little trouble and it is cheap” (Elkin 1938:160). It was 
certainly not a deterrent with many returning to court within weeks of their 
punishment (Fry and Russell 1942:14). The MA gave evidence to the Committee, 
and recommended that all birching by any courts of males under 16 should cease, as 
should the “infliction of the ‘cat’ on adult offenders” (MAC 1937:458). For the next 
two decades, there were regular and vociferous requests from members of the MA to 
keep corporal punishment, against the wishes of the Council. Cadogan recommended 
the abolition of judicial whipping and suggested “some form of short and sharp 
punishment which will pull him up and give him the lesson which he needs” (1938 
para 31).  
Scotland never had the power to order corporal punishment for any offence 
against discipline in local prisons or in Borstal Institutions, only in relation to penal 
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servitude in Peterhead Prison (para.6). In England and Wales Prison Boards could 
still order birching until 1967 and flogging as late as 1955, when 10 men were 
flogged with the cat-o-nine tails (Morris T. 1989). 
In 1938, the Conservative Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare introduced a 
Criminal Justice Bill abolishing judicial corporal punishment, not to be replaced by 
any residential detention but by ‘attendance centres’, 
some new form of quick, sharp punishment that would not mean a break, 
or a serious break, in the young offender’s life... quick short punishment, 
say, of the loss of a half-holiday…to prevent their going to a football 
match or a cinema. (HL 156:297)  
He wanted to strengthen probation, as half the juveniles convicted of 
indictable offences were given probation. The Bill fell because of the impending 
War. 
After the Second World War, crime, which from 1938 to 1945 increased 
overall by 70%, was nonetheless seen as part of the general malaise, and not a party 
political issue: social reconstruction was the pressing need (Morris T. 1989). 
Following the 1944 Education Act, the new Labour government in 1945 embarked 
on reforms to create the ‘welfare state’, with National Health, National Insurance, 
and National Assistance Acts. The magistracy expressed its concern at the unhappy 
homes, poor health, bad social conditions, indifference of parents, and lack of 
educational and recreational facilities. This led the Council to campaign for 
preventive measures such as better facilities for children, and more child guidance 
clinics (MAC 1942:597). The Council in 1944 considered further reforms of the 
juvenile court. It rejected detention up to 28 days but accepted education in remand 
homes, or special camps for up to six months followed by 12 months supervision. It 
wanted proper training for all juvenile panels and, apart from London, appointment 
by their local benches from a selected list. The information was sent to the Home 
Office and the Lord Chancellor’s Department (MAC 1944:663).  
In 1948, the new Labour Home Secretary, Chuter Ede, introduced the 
Criminal Justice Bill, which finally abolished judicial whipping
68
 (this part applied 
to Scotland too); introduced ‘detention centres’, ‘attendance centres’, and 
‘conditional discharges’; and probation only became an order after conviction. The 
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Conservative Viscount Templewood,
69
  now chairman of the MA, was pleased to see 
his idea of attendance centres, “an experiment supported by the Magistrates’ 
Association” (HL 157:41). The Act also abolished flogging with cat-o-nine-tails as a 
sentence, which Scotland had abandoned in “Mediaeval times” (HC.SC.vol.1:730). 
Chuter Ede explained that the detention centres were for those aged 14-21, 
needing residential training for three or six months, according to age, 
 a short sharp punishment that will cause the young offender clearly to 
realise the injudiciousness of attempting to continually flout the law. I 
want that part of the work to be clearly understood by all concerned… I 
do not want these places turned into a kind of junior or specialised 
approved school. (HC.SC 1947-8:971) 
This measure was probably based on the experience of military detention 
centres during the war (Younger 1970): punishment was gaining prominence. As the 
government minister, Lord Chorley stated, “The primary object of this type of 
sentence is not, by any means, reformatory” (HL.156: 781). Templewood was 
alarmed and regarded the proposal  
with very grave apprehension. Moreover, my anxiety is shared by the 
Magistrates’ Association, who have considered this question, and they 
also take the view that there is a grave risk of these detention centres 
becoming nothing more than little short-term prisons for the young. (HL 
156:297) 
Scotland, in its Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949, had certain different 
powers. The powers of restitution in the 1908 Children Act were removed, as they 
were “not matters appropriate to the criminal courts” (Kilbrandon 1964 para.30). 
Attendance centres were not included, although significantly, there was provision for 
detention centres for the 14-17s. These were never provided, possibly because “the 
smaller a system is the less it can specialise”,70 the expenditure could not have been 
justified, and 
 “on the principle of the inappropriateness of including young persons in 
the penal system. The only such sanction in Scotland for the younger 
group was detention for a limited period in a Remand Home under the 
Children and Young Persons Act, which was frequently if not very 
effectively used”.  
These too, were in short supply because “the small numbers involved made it 
difficult to justify provision in any one place” (Murphy 1992:72). That provisions in 
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the Act were never implemented also suggests that, “In the late 1940s … the Scottish 
Office as well as the Scottish people seemed less compliant to a London lead…” 
(p.73), or was it system inertia again? Borstal was seen then as “a course of training 
to fit the offender, and not a term of punishment to fit the offence” (Mag.1947: 83).  
Parallel to these reforms, in England the Curtis Report (1946) and in Scotland 
the Clyde Report (1946) were both highly critical of social work and the care 
afforded to children in care. The government acted on the advice
71
 : local authorities 
were obliged to further the best interests of the child, for the proper development of 
its character and abilities. The experience of Bowlby in London and Stone
72
 in Israel 
working with evacuees and displaced families, along with the problems of cost and 
the failure of placements, led to the emphasis on prevention and keeping the family 
together (Hendrick 1994). New ‘children’s departments’ in each local authority 
“were given wide powers of intervention when children appeared to be at risk and 
for the promotion of child care in all its preventive and remedial aspects”, any 
dispute with parents to be settled in the juvenile court as before (McCabe & Treitel 
1984:30). They would provide reports on young offenders to the courts and have 
responsibility for children sent to remand homes, approved schools or to ‘fit 
persons’. This enabled local authorities to acquire greater knowledge of child 
development, and in Scotland “provided a motive for reforms for juvenile offenders 
from experience gained” (Cowperthwaite 1988:8). Much of this ‘Children Code’ was 
later to be incorporated into the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.  
In England/Wales the 1948 Criminal Justice Act regularised the position of 
the probation service, as many magistrates had not been supportive of probation and 
appointed part-time, poorly paid officers (Skyrme 1991 vol. II). The service not only 
remained under the control of the magistracy, but one third of the juvenile panel was 
to constitute the ‘case committee’ to discuss each juvenile case with the probation 
officer, meeting quarterly. This was the first formal method for magistrates to know 
the effect of their sentencing. The ‘tandem’ Act73 in Scotland too, was important for 
the probation service, which came under the control of ad hoc local authority 
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committees. This was “to prove crucial when it came to the question of including 
probation within the new social work departments” in the 1960s (Murphy 1992:73-4). 
The 1949 Justices of the Peace Act was applicable to both jurisdictions, and 
arose from the findings of the Royal Commission on the Justices of the Peace 1948. 
The Act introduced an upper age limit of 75 years (in 1947, 28% of all male justices 
were over 70) and a limit of 65 years for the juvenile court. There was to be one 
qualification only for justices in either jurisdiction: they must live within 15 miles of 
the Commission area. By then in England/Wales, the magistrates were dealing with 
90% of all criminal cases, but in Scotland only 10%, and juvenile courts had still 
been established only in Aberdeen and the counties of Renfrew, Fife and Ayr. An 
important provision affecting England/Wales was the introduction of Magistrates’ 
Courts Committees (MCC), which gave magistrates the duty to administer the 
summary courts, with responsibility for staff, buildings and all necessary facilities, 
and the training of magistrates. These new committees could recommend combining 
areas: in the 1940s there were 619 juvenile courts, many with not enough work for 
either clerks or magistrates to gain the necessary experience. There appeared to be 
little public or political pressure for further change in Scotland. 
Fifteen years after the reforming Acts of the 1930s regarding juveniles in 
trouble, little had changed in the courts practices. In the 1940s, three further pieces 
of legislation were passed, one concerning offending children, another mostly about 
the deprived, although the earlier Acts had recognised their overlapping and similar 
needs; and one about the structures for the appointment and retirement of 
magistrates. Most changes were applicable to both England/Wales and Scotland, but, 
regarding court disposals, Scotland did not introduce the punitive attendance and 
detention centres. The magistrates in England/Wales, unlike in Scotland, were now 
responsible for everything to do with the management and administration of their 
courts and the probation service. Would any of these reforms help change the 
practices of the juvenile courts or affect juvenile crime rates? 
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3.6 The 1950s, Ingleby, and 1961 1963 Acts 
The latter half of the 1950s was a period of  rising crime figures alongside a 
growing realisation of the long-term harm that disruption throughout the war years 
had inflicted on families in both jurisdictions, with children born during the war 
having “an exceptionally high crime rate in each year of their childhood and 
adolescence” (McClintock & Gibson 1961:47, Wilkins 1961). For some, there was a 
suspicion that support from the State was leading to dependency on the State. In 
criminal justice, there was the beginning of a polarization between those who felt the 
loss of strict discipline enforced by corporal punishment, and those who wanted 
much more support for welfare services to aid the family with whatever social or 
health problems it might have. As in past decades, the new government, now the 
Conservatives, sought solutions to intractable problems through more inquiries and 
then legislation.   
3.6.1   The Results of the 1940s Legislative Reforms 
The new decade heralded a stormy period for the MA. Templewood, in the 
Parliamentary debate abolishing whipping in 1948, had mentioned that in the 
previous year there were only 25 sentences of birching for under 16s in the whole 
country (HL 157:34). Despite this simple fact, the issue of judicial corporal 
punishment was to dominate the MA’s business for years. It would seem that a 
schism between the Council and the rank and file members had been exposed once 
the issue of whipping had become a matter of national interest following the 
Parliamentary debate. By late 1950, with membership of the MA rising significantly, 
and the overall numbers of magistrates falling, the MA could claim to represent 
about 50% of magistrates. In 1952, Templewood, who had strongly opposed 
whipping, retired as chairman of the MA. Goddard LCJ had announced he wanted 
whipping reinstated, and the membership forced a referendum, the result being 70% 
in favour of its reintroduction (MAC 1953:1085). That never became MA policy. 
There were regular proposals for a reintroduction of whipping from 1950 to 1958 
(MAC 1958:1371) and, ten years after its abolition the Council was more equivocal 
in its objection. In Scotland there was no such campaign at all. 
Contemporaneous to the whipping debate, and not it is argued merely 
coincidental, was a major reform of the structure and leadership of the MA. In 1953, 
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the new Chairman, Lord Merthyr, proposed a complete reform of the Council, 
responding to “the many adverse criticisms levelled at the Association from time to 
time” (MAC 1953:1095). After several different methods had been examined, by 
1956 all members of the Council were elected for a triennium by their branches only, 
largely based on Commission areas, bench members having been absorbed into 
branches (MAC 1955:1231). There was provision for six annual co-options. The 
Council now reflected the magistracy throughout England/Wales, with members 
from the punitive country benches (Parker, Caswell and Turnbull 1981), rather than 
just the elite and often highly informed, erudite members in London. There appears 
to have been no active, comparable organisation for JPs in Scotland. 
An article on the new detention centres (DC) in the ‘Magistrate’ commented 
that “the nature of the discipline to be enforced at these centres is going to displease 
some who envisaged them as providing “short, sharp punishment”, with the accent 
on punishment (Mag.1950:37). The first junior DC, Campsfield House, Kidlington, 
Oxfordshire, opened in 1952, for those aged 14-17, and only if the court considered 
that none of the other available methods of dealing with him was appropriate. The 
period was normally for three months, with a minimum of one and maximum of six 
months, and up to 1/6th remitted for good conduct. They were to occupy the boys “in 
a manner conducive to health of mind and body”. However, in 1954, Council 
member Lady Archibald, after her visit to Campsfield House,  
“expressed concern because the aim and regime were entirely punitive 
and there appeared to be no reformative element…” with “provision for 
removal to a detention room as a punishment which she considered to be 
solitary confinement, a practice which had been condemned many years 
ago.”  
Some Council members who had visited agreed with her, others felt “that this new 
form of hard training was fulfilling a need and was proving successful” (MAC 
1954:1128). A report of the newly constituted Council in 1957 found “divided 
opinion on the general principle of the value of these centres, particularly for those 
aged 14-17” (MAC 1957:1326), but a year later Council made representations to the 
Home Secretary wanting more places (MAC 1958:1387).  
The Probation (No.2) Rules 1953 made it clear that magistrates as members 
of case committees, rather than follow up their own cases,  
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were required under the Rules to exercise general supervision over the 
work and records of probation officers, including after-care work, and to 
afford officers help and advice in carrying out their duties, and to review 
their work or part of it not less often than once every three months. 
(MAC 1953:1119) 
There were examples of the magistracy being most obstructive in the 
development of the probation service as late as 1958 (MAC 1958:1359). 
The 1948 Royal Commission on JPs made 80 recommendations, including a 
new organisation for magistrates in Scotland (Mag.1951:153). MCCs needed to be 
reminded of their power to amalgamate juvenile courts to “secure an adequate 
selection of justices, a good choice of chairman, and a volume of work that will give 
both justices and their clerks the necessary experience” (Mag.1951:162). 
Compulsory retirement at 75 years was an unpopular decision for some, as was 
retirement at 65 from the juvenile panel (MAC 1952:1025).  
Improvements to the advisory committees did not appear to make much 
difference to the “social-class backgrounds from which magistrates came in the years 
between 1946 and the second half of the 1960s” (Hood 1972:50). Skyrme (1979:48) 
from the Lord Chancellor’s Office admitted in 1947 that “many justices regarded 
their office as one of social distinction only…” and were often retired or of 
independent means, whilst Council member Viscountess Ridley found magistrates 
on the juvenile panels still not “appointed for any special qualifications for 
understanding and handling children” (Mag.1951:158). After years of campaigning 
by the MA, the Home Secretary announced that from 1955, “all juvenile courts 
should contain at least one man and at least one woman … except in emergency 
when a court can be composed of two men or women” (MAC 1954:1128).  
Training was part of the new MCCs, but many “argued that all training was 
profitless…This was the almost unanimous opinion of the professional judges and 
was shared by successive Lord Chancellors from 1951 to 1964” (Skyrme 1979:95). 
It would seem it was shared by “many justices who, for one reason or another, do not 
seek to keep themselves up to date by attending conferences, nor even to gain an 
elementary knowledge of their duties” (Mag.1952:221). The Lord Chancellor’s 
Office and the MA designed a postal course, taken by over 3000 justices at their own 
expense between 1955 and 1965. There were constant demands by the MA for more 
training. Finally, in 1964 Lord Chancellor Dilhorne appointed a National Advisory 
Council on the Training of Magistrates (1979:67). A lengthy article with full details 
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of requirements for appointments to juvenile panels appeared in ‘The Magistrate’ 
(1964:1), and the first Home Office handbook of its kind, ‘The Sentence of the 
Court’ was given to all magistrates (p.77). 
In Scotland, the Morton Report had recommended that juvenile courts should 
be based only on JP courts, yet 21 years later only four areas had complied. A high 
level meeting at the end of 1951, with the new Conservative Scottish ministers, their 
officials and some of the judiciary, failed to agree a solution. The sheriff courts in 
Lanarkshire, including Glasgow, wished to be relieved of their task but the county 
councils were fearful of added expenditure and the burgh magistrates, who were the 
local politicians in Glasgow, would not relinquish their role in the juvenile courts 
“outfacing the possibility that the alternative could be an improvement. Heads 
bloodied, Central Government retreated to consider the next move” (Cowperthwaite 
1988:12).  
Cowperthwaite (1988: 12-14) argued that the ensuing stalemate was largely a 
result of three factors; the Morton recommendation to use the JP courts; a less 
progressive attitude to juvenile offending in the 1950s; and the unacceptability of 
English solutions to Scottish problems, as they were perceived to be. Lord Advocate 
Cooper, in 1939, had said, “Scotland will never be reconciled to the alien institution 
of the J.P. for the native institution of the Magistrate and the Sheriff.” In January 
1952, the Secretary of State James Stuart, respecting the independence of the 
judiciary, announced there would be no more 1932 Act juvenile courts. 
In England/Wales in 1954, the Labour politician, Lord Pakenham
74
, 
undertook an ‘Inquiry into the Causes of Crime’ and sought the views of the MA 
(MAC 1954:1145). Senior members responded:  
We think criminality is the result of environment rather than heredity… 
physical or mental inferiority, emotional instability by far the most 
important… it may be the predominant reason for much anti-social 
conduct (para 9-10)…most offenders come from broken homes by death, 
divorce, separation, service abroad and extra-marital 
relations…disharmony and constant friction and disagreement… many 
aggressive and anti-social attitudes are forms of compensation for lack of 
affection in childhood... a very important factor indeed (MAC 
1954:1145-para 13).  
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They were concerned at the lack of parental responsibility, which they 
attributed to those parents considering “that the school and the State have taken over 
the welfare of their children” (para 16.). Some Association members shared that 
view of the Welfare State too (para 28). But, they  
“always wholeheartedly supported the present emphasis on the 
reformative element in punishment and treatment... We recognise 
however that the primary function of the court must always be the 
protection of society” (para 36). They emphasised the “importance of 
help given to the family when difficulties arise, by probation officers, 
Family Service Units and the like” (MAC 1954 June para 38,).  
There was no mention of any specific forms of deterrence such as whipping or 
detention centres, the thrust of the Memorandum being entirely one of support and 
guidance.  
3.6.2   Ingleby 
The law bids us consider the ‘welfare’ of the child; instinct may suggest 
punishment. These different aspects may or may not result in the same 
decision in court.
75
 (Cavenagh 1959:9) 
In 1956, the Conservative Home Secretary G. Lloyd George appointed 
Viscount Ingleby, a former Conservative MP and barrister, and fourteen members, 
none was a social worker but eight were magistrates, to inquire into all aspects of the 
juvenile courts, both civil and criminal, in England/Wales only. With crime rising 
considerably, the under 14 offenders in 1958 had increased by 27% on 1955, the 14-
17 group by 47% on 1954, the Committee considered that “current methods were not 
working and would review the whole approach” (Ingleby 1960 para.6). The MA was 
delighted, having sent a delegation of senior Council members to meet the Home 
Secretary to consider just such an inquiry in 1955, even wanting a ministry of 
Juvenile Welfare (MAC 1955:1213 and 1232). 
The Ingleby Report (1960 paras. 7-8) proposed  
…not only that children are not neglected but that they get the best 
upbringing possible… It is often the parents as much as the child who 
need to alter their ways, and it is therefore with family problems that any 
preventive measures will be largely concerned.  
Thus, the main focus was to identify the needs of families at risk and provide 
better, more comprehensive welfare services to deal with social breakdown, 
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recognising the need for much closer co-operation between the agencies, with their 
different professional backgrounds, specialisms, and rivalry. “We regard such 
positive measures for prevention and for the building up of community services as 
the first and main line of defence” (para.14) and only when they failed, should legal 
sanctions be invoked.  
However, Ingleby spoke of the need for the courts to protect the public and 
noted that the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police had said cautioning was 
used much less since the 1933 Act. This was with the approval of magistrates and 
probation officers, as the  
intention of Parliament… was to provide in the juvenile court system a 
means of dealing with young offenders in the interests of their own 
welfare and in a way that would prevent them from taking to a life of 
crime. (para. 145-6)  
The MA had objected in principle to the creation of police juvenile liaison officers 
providing supervision, as “an extra judicial body” (MAC 1956:1288). A similar 
approach was reflected in the provision
76
 forbidding written guilty pleas to be 
submitted by juvenile offenders, in order to enable courts to assess the understanding 
of the juvenile in front of them. 
Despite recognising the conflicting principles involved, with the court’s need 
to focus on the offence to establish guilt, through an adversarial system, and on the 
offender to establish any welfare needs through an inquisitorial system, Ingleby 
(para. 60) did not alter the juvenile court structure. The “majority of the members of 
the Ingleby Committee which recommended the retention of juvenile courts were 
magistrates” (McCabe & Treitel 1984:31). Magistrates were expected to be 
adequately trained and “best to have adult court experience” (1960: 162). Ingleby 
rejected any merger of approved schools and residential homes feeling that the 
former should stay within the Home Office, perhaps mindful of an MA Council 
member’s comment, “An Approved school ... should be dreaded, even if in fact there 
are few grounds for such fears” (Henriques, B. 1950:150). Ingleby wanted, as had 
the MA, to raise the age of criminal responsibility from 8 to 12, having rejected up to 
age 14 on the basis that the ages 13 and 14 were peak offending times. The minimum 
age for eligibility for borstal was to be reduced to 15 for those misbehaving in 
approved schools, and juvenile courts should have the power to sentence directly to 
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borstals. The MA had also wanted to raise the upper age limit to 18; to remove the 
common law presumption of doli incapax, reversing its earlier opinion; and to 
reduce the minimum age for attendance centres to ten years (Ann Rep. 1958 
Appendix III). In a Fabian Pamphlet article, an ILJC chairman proposed separating 
offenders and non-offenders to appear on different days, and the age of criminal 
responsibility to be 13. The danger from the stigma of courts was highlighted, and 
greater emphasis placed on helping the family, as breakdown played an “important 
part in producing the delinquents (Donnison et al 1962:22-4). 
According to Cowperthwaite, (1988:17) in 1956, there was no great concern 
about juvenile offenders in Scotland, despite the non-implementation of the 1932 
juvenile courts. With its police warnings and police juvenile liaison officer schemes, 
there was an underlying belief that dealing with minor offences in court was 
disproportionate and possibly harmful, whether the appearance resulted in a penal 
sentence or an admonition. A corrective, educational approach was preferred to 
“prosecution, with its connotations of personal responsibility, criminal guilt and 
punishment” (Cowperthwaite1988: 7). The Children Act 1948, dealing with the 
protection of children, had covered both England/Wales and Scotland and there had 
been close co-operation between the countries. However, relating to juvenile 
delinquency, the differences in the criminal law between the two jurisdictions 
precluded any joint committee, and the Scottish Secretary of State agreed to the 
advice of the Scottish Office to have a separate inquiry, in December 1960.  
3.6.3   The 1960s 
Although Ingleby made no changes to the juvenile court itself, it had laid 
great emphasis on the environmental and psychological factors affecting 
delinquency. Such views were not those of the Conservative backbenchers, who 
attributed the rising delinquency to lack of parental discipline, the ending of birching 
and conscription (Harris & Webb 1987). As a result, few of Ingleby’s proposals were 
in the 1961 Criminal Justice Act, and those that were mostly increased the likelihood 
of more punitive responses to juvenile offending. 
There were four significant changes affecting juvenile justice, and only one 
could be seen to reduce the risk of more punishment: detention centre (DC) orders  
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could now only be made if the court had been notified that an appropriate DC was 
available to it. For the most serious offences,
77
 the categories of attempted murder, 
manslaughter and wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm were deleted, 
and replaced by “any offence punishable in the case of an adult with imprisonment 
of 14 years or more”. At the time, just three more offences were added to the list, 
rape, robbery and firearms offences, but in later years this less specific criterion was 
to have a profound effect on the number of juveniles being held for lengthy periods 
in custody. The minimum age for an attendance centre order was reduced to ten 
years, the normal period being for 12 hours. The fourth change concerned borstal 
training. As prison was no longer an option for under 21s, the whole  
concept of borstal training, which has ceased to be regarded primarily as 
a special rehabilitative measure… must now be considered as a general 
purpose sentence fulfilling deterrent as well as reformative purposes… 
(Hall Williams, 1965:273-280). 
For under 17s, the court had to find “that no other method of dealing with 
him is appropriate”,78 but it was no longer necessary to consider character, previous 
conduct and the nature of the offence to ascertain whether borstal training would be 
“expedient for his reformation and the prevention of crime”.79 As Parker, LCJ stated, 
“borstal training nowadays ranges from schooling to near imprisonment and the 
courts may indicate the kind of treatment they consider defendants should receive” 
(Angell 1964 CLR 553). Additionally, the Act lowered the qualifying age to 15. 
Magistrates still had to commit juveniles to the Quarter Sessions for consideration 
for borstal, except for the transfer of those in approved schools on application from 
the manager. The minimum period was reduced from nine months to six, and the 
maximum from three years to two.  
In the 1963 CAYP Act no changes were made to the juvenile court structure 
but juvenile panels were yet again encouraged to amalgamate to provide sufficient 
experience, and panels were warned to resist “the temptation to put everybody on the 
juvenile court panel who is thought worthy of the honour, or who has time to spare” 
(Mag. 1964:2). After 30 years, despite a successful amendment to raise it to twelve 
in the Lords, the age of criminal responsibility was only raised from eight to ten. 
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Even at that low age compared to other countries, Brooke, the Home Secretary 
“knew there was concern among some magistrates and probation officers as to 
whether this was wholly in the child's best interest or in the interest of society” 
(Mag.1963: 171). The Council of the MA had overruled the unanimous decision of 
the JCC, all juvenile panel members, to raise it to twelve years (Mag. 1963:42).  
The Act removed the discretion of magistrates to choose the approved 
school, which the MA had wanted to keep. The Act stated that for appeals from 
juvenile courts at Quarter Session, the Recorder would have one man and one 
woman from the juvenile panel, although when earlier “discussed at some length” by 
the newly constituted Council, “no resolution was proposed by any member” (MAC 
1962:1581). Earlier Councils had fought hard for such equal treatment.  
The MA had wanted probation to be replaced by a supervision order for 
under 14s, a measure that it bitterly opposed later in the 1969 CAYP Act. The 1963 
Act acknowledged the failure for 50 years to provide separate juvenile court 
premises, whether from lack of commitment or financial constraint, and made 
provision that juvenile courts could be held once again in adult courthouses, one 
hour before or after any adult court sitting. 35 years earlier, Morton (1928:51) in 
Scotland had strongly deprecated such a practice, not least because, “If they meet 
and wait with adult offenders, they are more likely to see themselves as criminals” 
(Parsloe 1978:140).  
However, if most of these changes were minor or retrogressive, Clause 1 of 
the Act could have had a profound impact upon juvenile justice, and was “rightfully 
claimed to be one of the most progressive and imaginative pieces of legislation 
concerning children in this country” (NCCL80 1971:2-3). It placed a duty on every 
local authority to provide advice, guidance and assistance, even cash, to “promote 
the welfare of children” by diminishing the need to receive them into care or to take 
them before the juvenile court; and the police were obliged to consult with the local 
authorities before prosecuting anyone under twelve.
81
  As Alice Bacon had said, “it 
is not just the nature of the charge made in court; it is the appearance in court which 
can do so much damage to a young child” (Hansard HC 672:1288). The politicians 
had not yet abandoned penal welfarism (Garland 2001) but the MA was wary of 
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local authorities introducing diversionary schemes, which might lack the legal 
safeguards of a “juvenile court sitting in a civil capacity” (JCC 1963:86). 
In 1959 the Morison Committee (1962: 88) was set up to “Inquire into and 
make recommendations on all aspects of the probation service in England and Wales 
and Scotland”. It considered “Scotland has not developed as it should have done, 
because it has been regarded as a relatively minor local authority service” and 
preferred the method of administration in England/Wales, by the magistrates, 
because it was “efficient, and has been of prime importance in the growth of the 
probation system”. But, with the McBoyle Committee (Report 1963) and Kilbrandon 
(Report 1964) committee still sitting, probation remained part of the local authority, 
and became part of the later re-organisation of social work. Probation in 
England/Wales remained “a specialist service to the courts, administered largely by 
the justices of the peace” (Murphy 1992:78-9). It was recommended in both 
jurisdictions that probation officers required professional training and that their 
reports to the courts would be known as ‘social enquiry reports’. 
The reforms of the 1950s and early 1960s were against a backdrop of rising 
crime and a debate about corporal punishment that was not confined to the 
magistracy. The Conservative Home Secretary Butler (1971:110) complained of “the 
birching and flogging at the Home Office, which haunted me almost every week of 
my time at the Home Office”. He was under strong pressure by the Tory grass-roots 
to reintroduce it, as the “Tories [were] in no mood to minimise the moral seriousness 
of juvenile crime” (Bottoms 1974:324). But, in explaining the 1963 Act, his 
successor, Henry Brooke, recognised that  
“parents' inadequacy and family breakdown often gave rise in the 
children not only to suffering and maladjustment but to delinquency” and 
“every local authority [was] to offer material assistance and the 
experienced help of social case-workers to families.” (Mag. 1963:171)  
Conversely, the new Lord Chancellor, Dilhorne claimed “excessive leniency can be 
the greatest encouragement to the young offender to embark on a career of crime 
while a short sentence may deter him from doing so” (Mag.1964:102). Borstals were 
no longer restricted to those in need of training and DC places were in great demand 
in England/Wales: neither was available in Scotland for those under 16.  
An attempt, by the Streatfield Committee ( Streatfield Report 1961) to reform 
the structure of the criminal courts largely failed as it succumbed to the power of 
“traditional professional values and local loyalties” (Bottoms & Stevenson 1992:15). 
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This could be seen as a warning to any government considering radical reform of the 
judicial and legal systems. In 1963, the new Home Secretary, Brooke “set up an 
Advisory Committee on Juvenile Delinquency whose members included a pop 
singer” (Windlesham 1993:92).  
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3.7 Conclusion 
The history of juvenile justice in the first half of the 20
th
 century reveals a 
number of factors which suggest that by the early 1960s, despite the ‘tandem 
principle’, parallel legislation and official reports throughout, the situation in 
England/Wales and Scotland was significantly different. In addition, the spirit of the 
law, if not the legislation itself, had certainly not been followed in either jurisdiction. 
Despite the hopes of the 1908 Parliament, crime rates steadily rose; more juveniles 
appeared in courts designed for adults; and more punitive sanctions were added, 
albeit whipping was abolished 40 years later. However, s.1.of the 1963 Children and 
Young Persons Act offered great hope for the welfare protagonists. Encouragement 
of parental responsibility was seen as a key factor in both jurisdictions, initially 
through co-operation but by punitive means such as fines when that failed. But the 
Scots had favoured co-operation with parents, and wanted evening courts to make it 
easier for them to attend. 
 Special juvenile courts, as demanded under the 1930s Acts, had hardly been 
set up in either jurisdiction. Scotland used four different types of courts for juveniles 
while in England/Wales, there were two types, Inner London Juvenile Courts and 
those in the rest of the country. In Inner London, the Home Secretary chose the panel 
members; most never sat in adult courts; and their juvenile courts were held in 
buildings quite separate from the police or courts. In England/Wales through the 
creation of the MCCs, the justices were responsible for their own courts, and most 
had chosen not to provide special juvenile courthouses and by 1961 were no longer 
required to do so. There were magistrates in place throughout the country, appointed 
to juvenile panels by their colleagues, many without consideration of their ‘special 
qualifications’ for juvenile work. Many had been part of a highly organised grass-
roots campaign to restore corporal punishment, and apart from having more punitive 
views, were well skilled in lobbying politicians. Scotland had always favoured the 
central, independent appointment of justices, and it was only the sheriffs in Scotland 
who had supported whipping.  
The Scots justices had no national organisation to campaign on their behalf, 
and were the least regarded of the judiciary in Scotland. From its inception in 1921, 
the MA had well informed, mostly progressive minded, influential leaders, who 
maintained strong links with government ministers. However, with its constitutional 
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reforms of 1956, the Council membership had changed radically, with new members 
from all over the country, the small towns and rural areas where whipping had been 
used most, and access to training the least. The Labour Opposition may have relied 
on the MA’s earlier, more progressive views expressed in the Pakenham Report of 
1954, and would feel the MA would support progressive measures for juvenile 
offenders. 
Historically, Scotland had always had an independent prosecuting body, the 
procurators fiscal, able to act over and above the wishes of the police, to divert 
juveniles from the courts, and choose the trial venue. It also had police warnings and 
police juvenile liaison officer schemes. The magistrates in the English summary 
courts had no such body exercising its discretion to prosecute or not, only the police 
who caught, charged and prosecuted the suspects. The magistrates decided the 
venue, a higher court if they thought necessary to exercise greater powers of 
punishment. The police were cautioning fewer juveniles as a result of the ‘welfare’ 
provision of the 1933 Act; provisions in the 1957 Act specifically forbad guilty pleas 
by post; and the MA had objected to the creation of police juvenile liaison officers 
providing supervision and social workers diversionary schemes. It would seem that 
the Scots favoured diversion from the court rather more than the English.  
The Scots in the 19
th
 century had shown a much more constructive and 
reformative attitude towards prisoners, while the English felt it necessary to inflict 
harsh and demeaning punishment. In England/Wales the magistrates increasingly 
used DCs, conceived solely as a punitive sanction, but Scotland had none for 
juveniles. The only punitive sanction available to the Scots was fining, which had 
always been related to the means of the offender, and few children had any means. 
Borstals, not available to under 16s in Scotland, had been seen as a constructive, 
training and educative sanction, but were beginning to accept juveniles for 
punishment rather than training, the regime changing considerably.  
The Probation Service in England/Wales was under the management and 
control of the justices, who were responsible for their employment, their offices and 
their work arrangements. The justices would see any future removal of such officers 
from their courts as a diminution of their authority. Control of the Probation Service 
in Scotland lay with the local authorities and never with the courts.  
The Ingleby Report led to a few significant changes to juvenile justice in 
England/Wales but the Scots rejected it as a basis for any further reforms of juvenile 
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justice. With the age of criminal responsibility remaining at eight years in Scotland, 
rather than 10 years in England/Wales, and the under 14 year olds not having the 
added protection of doli incapax, Scottish juveniles were in a different position from 
their English counterparts. An earlier report by Morton in 1928 had regretted 
rejecting the concept of juvenile justice being dealt with under the Education 
Department because of its own proposals for a much reformed juvenile court system. 
This had never materialised, and paved the way for reconsideration of that concept. 
 Throughout this period, leading up to the reforms of the 1960s, the 
legislation applying to England/Wales and to Scotland was often parallel, but its 
practical application was very different. There were inherent differences in other 
relevant legislation, the management of the probation service and the magistrates’ 
courts, and an underlying philosophy that in England/Wales juvenile offenders 
should be dealt with in the courts, while the Scots’ emphasis was to keep them out. 
All this was to have a considerable bearing on the subsequent fate of the Social 
Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and the Children and Young Persons Act 1969.  
 
ooOoo 
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CHAPTER 4  
 KILBRANDON and LONGFORD – THE 1960s 
 
The 1960s were a period of considerable social change, not least because the 
public was made more aware of social issues through the growth of television 
journalism. As T. Morris (1987:100) has observed, group violence of the kind that 
occurred at Millwall in the 1920s was unknown outside the immediate area, but in 
Clacton-on-Sea at Easter 1964, the ‘Mods and Rockers’ became a front-page story 
and “police intervention was swift and magisterial justice severe”. After subsequent 
seaside disturbances, local MPs talked of  
a sense of horror and outrage… as if all the conventions and value of life 
had been completely flouted … MPs announced they would be calling 
for a return of corporal punishment for hooliganism (S. Cohen 1987:52 
and 133).  
There was also “a series of spectacular escapes from prison” (Callaghan 
1987:240). 
A Labour government was elected in October 1964, after 13 years of 
Conservative rule, which had ended in a scandal involving the Minister of Defence 
at the height of the ‘Cold War’ with Russia. The Establishment was rocked. The new 
Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, wanted to modernise the country, and spoke of the 
“white-heat of the technological revolution” to wipe out poverty and social 
inequality. He gathered academic social scientists around him, who had “a profound 
impact on Labour Party juvenile justice policy in the 1960s” (Pitts 1988:5). This led 
to a “substantial shift in power away from central government towards local 
authorities; away from the courts and the legal profession, and towards welfare 
professionals and experts” (Pitts 1988:6). The government embarked on a massive 
legislative programme including reform of juvenile justice and the magistracy in 
England/Wales.  
These reforms were passed against a backdrop of ‘folk devils’, “the Mod, the 
Rocker, the Greaser, the student militant, the drug fiend, the vandal, the soccer 
hooligan, the hippy, the skinhead” (Cohen 1987:11). The consumer society was in 
the ascendancy: more people owned more things with “greater opportunities for 
acquiring them illegally” (Ingleby 1960:11); and more cars and motorbikes, with 
their implications for road traffic legislation. The young wore different clothes from 
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their parents’ generation, had long hair, and played pop music. Military conscription 
had ended, which some thought would have dealt with delinquency: boys sent to 
detention centres were immediately given a military ‘short back and sides’.  
International matters were an added factor. The expulsion of Kenyan Asians 
in 1968 led to some 13,000 arriving in January and February, with no homes or jobs, 
and sometimes little money. Newspapers carried 
lurid and exaggerated accounts of how homeless families were drawing 
lavish assistance from Social Services… Everything conspired to build 
up an atmosphere of alarm, resentment and panic…Enoch Powell fanned 
prejudice to fever heat with his speech in April 1968…Dockers marched 
to Parliament to support his attacks (Callaghan 1987:265). 
 The Vietnam War led to students all over Europe protesting: in England,  
the LSE occupied, all the provincial universities occupied. People of a 
conventional outlook were deeply troubled because it must have felt like 
1848 for some people…I can recall going to a meeting of the London 
Magistrates’ Association at the time of the Grosvenor Square 
demonstrations outside the USA Embassy … We were all summoned to 
this meeting to be addressed by a senior officer of Scotland Yard…We 
were shown a film and briefed on how mounted police were going to be 
used to nudge the crowd... There was a feeling that you had to hold 
certain institutions together, and they were very important, and law was 
one of them.
 82
 
In Scotland there were only minor demonstrations against the war, and the 
universities were not affected. In his Scottish ‘History of the Nation’, Professor 
Devine (2000) makes no reference to any social disturbances in the 1960s, but the 
political scene was changed by the rise of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) in 
1962. In the West Lothian By-Election, the SNP came second to Labour and the 
Conservatives lost their deposit. The SNP put up 15 candidates in the 1964 election, 
and after wining the Hamilton by-election in 1967, the membership rose to 80,000 
(Marwick 1990:166). The Conservatives never regained their majority of votes or 
seats in Scotland after losing the 1964 general election. Both England/Wales and 
Scotland were affected by “violence in Northern Ireland, which had entered a new 
crisis phase in 1968, [which] increasingly overshadowed British life” (1990:14). 
There was no universal system of juvenile courts in either Scotland or 
England/Wales, and criticism of both the systems and their office holders. Following 
the findings of the Ingleby Report of 1960, and with a widespread belief that crime 
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was “one of the gravest social problems of our time” (Longford 1964:7), the time 
was ripe for reform. Significantly, “there certainly wasn’t much difference between 
the Parties and it was still the post-War consensus when the understanding 
developed about the welfare state”. 83  In England/Wales, the Conservative 
government only incorporated minor aspects of Ingleby in two Acts of Parliament in 
1961 and 1963, while in Scotland the criticisms of the Ingleby Report were noted.  
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4.1 Kilbrandon  
The relationship between politicians and civil servants in Scotland was 
different from that in England/Wales: the ministerial departments were in Edinburgh, 
the headquarters of the Scottish Office in Whitehall, and Parliament held in 
Westminster. The five Scottish Office Ministers inevitably carried a much wider 
range of responsibilities than their English counterparts, and could not be expected to 
bear in mind everything (Cowperthwaite 1988
84
). It was not unusual for Scottish 
Office officials to initiate debate on policy, and that led to rejection of the Ingleby 
Report by the Conservative Secretary of State, John Maclay. He had been a National 
Liberal MP, was still president of the National Liberals and his brother had been a 
Liberal MP. He proposed a new committee: 
to consider the provisions of the law of Scotland relating to the treatment 
of juvenile delinquents and juveniles in need of care or protection or 
beyond parental control and, in particular, the constitution, powers and 
procedure of the courts dealing with such juveniles, and to report. 
(Kilbrandon 1964 para.1) 
An existing statutory committee, Scottish Advisory Council on Child Care 
(SACCC) was seen as one of “two major, positive progressive influences of the 
period” (Murphy 1992:114), particularly in relation to children’s officers and social 
work. It produced critical and constructive reports (SACCC 1961 and 1963) and 
instigated the McBoyle Report (1963) on dealing with child neglect and abuse. Most 
significantly, SACCC was chaired for many years by Baroness Elliot, JP, one of the 
first women Life Peers; long-serving member of the Advisory Council on the 
Treatment of Offenders (ACTO),  visiting every prison in the UK; and national 
chairman of the Conservative Party 1956-65. She was “an important strand in 
Scottish Unionist politics and in Alec Douglas-Home’s life” (Thorpe 1996:36), the 
Prime Minister when the Kilbrandon Report was published in 1964.  
Her father was a Gladstonian Liberal; her half-sister was Margot Asquith, 
wife of the Liberal Prime Minister; while a half-brother, the Liberal MP ‘Jack’ 
Tennant, had introduced a private Member’s Bill in 1906 for separate courts for 
children, the fore-runner of the 1908 Act. “She grew up… with strong Liberal 
ideals…never lost touch with her Liberal roots”; studied under Laski and Beveridge 
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at the London School of Economics (LSE) and “remained a passionate opponent of 
the death penalty, and closely involved in prison reform” (Linklater 2004). She was 
renowned for her political salon in Westminster with its “cross-party friendships” 
(1996:56) and had “the respect and affection of her political opponents”85. Lord 
Sanderson
86, a later Conservative Scottish Minister, said he could “well understand 
her attitude towards juvenile courts and children’s hearings! She was a real 
individualist and went her own way…” In Scotland she was on the social work and 
education committees of her county council and in the ‘Lords’ “was incapable of 
trimming…the despair of the whips” (Linklater 2004).  
4.1.1   Kilbrandon and His Committee 
The choice of chairman had not been obvious. Officials had “doubts about 
the appropriateness of a senior judge as chairman” but Ministers’ views prevailed. 
Before choosing Lord Kilbrandon, the Conservative Maclay had rejected “with 
regret” the social scientist and Labour Baroness Barbara Wootton, because being a 
juvenile court chairman in London she would have been too identified with English 
law (Cowperthwaite 1988:68). Soon afterwards, Wootton (1961:677) criticised her 
own juvenile court system and, somewhat presciently, proposed health and education 
responses to juvenile delinquency. Kilbrandon had chaired the Standing Council of 
Youth Services, and was “elected Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, the highest 
honour which can be conferred on a member of the Scots bar” (Brand 2004). The 
Scottish Conservative Lord Balerno, described him as “one of our most eminent and 
humane Judges and Senators of the College of Justice…” (Hansard HL 291:180). 
Professor Stone, appointed to the Kilbrandon Committee, said he was “quite 
remarkable, an extraordinary character…he cared about people. No question about 
that…. great charm and a very quick mind…”87 
Kilbrandon, with Cowperthwaite as an adviser to the Committee, chose the 
members from SACCC and Scottish Advisory Council on the Treatment of 
Offenders (SACTO) and Baroness Elliot recommended her protégé, the child 
psychiatrist Stone. Kilbrandon later described his Committee: 
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there were two judges of the sheriff court…one a woman… three 
magistrates experienced in juvenile court work, two of them being 
women, an expert in probation work, a professor of law, an approved 
school manager, a clerk to a juvenile court, a very distinguished child 
psychiatrist, a well-known secondary school headmaster, and a senior 
county chief constable... This does not look like a bunch of firebrands… 
(Kilbrandon 1966:114)  
Stone explained that he, personally, was “there for a reason”: he had written 
an influential paper on dealing with the behavioural problems of traumatised 
children. Kilbrandon relied heavily on him when Committee members expressed 
punitive responses. Kilbrandon would say, “You’re not listening to what Fred Stone 
is saying from the point of view of someone who is in child psychiatry. We may all 
have opinions but he is doing it, it’s his work, so listen”.  
The Kilbrandon Committee sat for three years, consulted widely and 
members visited juvenile courts and residential institutions; police juvenile liaison 
schemes; and studied systems in other countries. Stone considered Kilbrandon “a 
magnificent facilitator of a committee… He brought out things from all of us that we 
didn’t know we had…” But, “some of the ideas which emerged as the Committee’s 
conclusion… were his. He just pushed the discussion”88. Kilbrandon (1968:235) was 
to write of his “intense pleasure” to have chaired the Committee.  
4.1.2   Kilbrandon Report –‘Children and Young Persons Scotland’ 1964 
… the question which confronts society (in the shape of the juvenile 
courts) in every case is the essentially practical one, namely, the child’s 
need for special measures, since the normal educational process has for 
whatever reason fallen short or failed to have effect. Our proposals 
ultimately imply no more than a full and realistic acceptance of that fact 
and the consequences flowing from it. (Kilbrandon 1964 para. 87) 
 
The Kilbrandon Committee learned “over the entire field” of the “sense of 
dissatisfaction and unease” (para.16). It saw that the courts had conflicting roles, 
which could not “fail in practice to create confusions and misconceptions” (para.71), 
and that “the legal procedures involved … were incomprehensible to the parties”89. 
As the greatest influence on a child was its home, it considered parental co-operation 
very important and not readily secured in the adversarial courtroom, particularly 
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unnecessary when the facts were disputed in only 5% of cases. Kilbrandon found, 
“the true distinguishing factor, common to all the children concerned, is their need 
for special measures of education and training…” (para.15), regardless of whether 
they had committed offences, were in need of care or protection, were refractory or 
beyond parental control, or were persistent truants. 
Kilbrandon identified, as had Ingleby, the problems arising from the 
incompatibility of criminal responsibility and punishment with the principle of 
prevention and the welfare of the child: early intervention could lead to stigma, 
whilst fear of a disproportionate response to an offence could lead to a lack of a 
suitable and timely intervention. The Report found it  
inconceivable that a court could ever guarantee to have chosen, at the 
moment of commencement of its sentence, the exact treatment - to be 
given perhaps over a period of years – appropriate to the individual 
person before it. (para.54) 
The problems were compounded because there was no “formal responsibility 
on anyone” to inform the juvenile courts of the apparent effectiveness or otherwise 
of the measure applied (para. 88). Additionally, Kilbrandon considered that two co-
accused should be dealt with differently since they had different needs. This might 
be thought to conflict with the principle of ‘equality before the law’, although 
Professor Stone did not remember any such discussions about this issue, which later 
so vexed the magistracy and the Conservatives in England/Wales. 
Kilbrandon (1966:118), himself, was highly critical of the concept of the ‘age 
of criminal responsibility’90; it was “emotional immaturity - which is at the bottom 
of a great deal of crime”. The report (1964 para. 62) observed “It cannot possibly be 
said that the age so laid down bears, or was ever intended to bear, any relation to the 
observable phenomena of child life”, and offered no guide to personal responsibility. 
It recommended that, “any rule of law or statutory provision establishing a minimum 
age of criminal responsibility should be repealed” (para.139). 
The issue of parental responsibility, rather than their rights, had featured in 
most juvenile justice legislation. From the 1908 Children Act, successive Acts made 
parents liable for their children’s fines. However, Kilbrandon wanted the co-
operation of the parents and considered that fining “amounts to a vicarious liability 
on the parents” (para. 22) and would be counterproductive. Kilbrandon, himself, 
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“was absolutely adamant about this,” saying “the skills needed to help the families in 
difficulties are totally contradicted if you start issuing fines.” Stone recalled, “There 
was a lot of quiet dissent, nobody challenged it openly”91. The report was equally 
opposed to compulsory restitution, as the child would see it as punishment and the 
parents’ co-operation could be damaged, especially as a direct relationship between 
the parent’s and child’s actions could not be assumed (para.32), although voluntary 
restitution with the agreement of the parents was considered “highly desirable”. 
However, if the child was subject to compulsory supervision and there was no 
obvious parental co-operation, the panel could impose a “Finding of Caution92 by 
parents for the child’s good behaviour” (para. 159). 
Kilbrandon was convinced that the way forward was through social 
education on a persuasive and co-operative basis to help the parents and child 
understand their “situation and problems, and the means of solution which lie to their 
hands" (para.35). Punishment was not specifically rejected in the report, but could 
only “be imposed for its value to the purposes of treatment… not for its own sake” 
(para.53), so that participation at an attendance centre might have a “useful if limited 
part to play…to be run by the social education department” rather than the police 
(para.166). 
Measures such as corporal punishment and admonitions were rejected largely 
because of their incompatibility with securing parental co-operation, as they did not 
help “parents to face the potential seriousness of the situation” (paras.34-6). Junior 
DCs had never been set up in Scotland and Kilbrandon felt short-term discipline 
should be provided under educational rather than penal regimes. The Committee had 
visited DCs which “were awful…really disgraceful” 93 . Borstal training was not 
available for those under 16. Kilbrandon rejected detention in remand homes, as it 
was “almost always ineffective” as a method of treatment (paras.191-2). Approved 
schools had catered for both the delinquent and those in need of care or protection, 
but were seen by the public as “punitive establishments” and should be re-designated 
as residential schools to avoid the stigma (para.179). 
Kilbrandon opted for a completely new structure because: 
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We do not believe that a retention of the present system, resting as it 
does on an attempt to retain the two existing concepts in harness, is 
susceptible of modification in any way which would seem likely to make 
any real impact on the problem (para. 80).  
It rejected the whole concept of juvenile courts and treatment through the 
criminal justice system. The key new principles were the separation of treatment 
from a dispute of the facts; the use of a lay panel to decide on treatment; the needs of 
the child being the first and primary consideration; the vital role of the family in 
tackling the children’s problems; and the adoption of a preventive and educational 
approach to the whole issue. 
The executive body was to be a Social Education Department, in the 
Department of Education, “drawing on a long Scottish tradition of the importance of 
education” (Bottoms 1974:341). The Committee was surprised and delighted that the 
Directors of Education “liked the idea of the school as the basis…” 94 . Scottish 
schools were highly regarded throughout Britain, with their strict discipline, corporal 
punishment, and attendance officers who prosecuted parents of truanting children. 
The system of private boarding schools prevalent in England was not a common 
practice in Scotland and schools were rarely residential, even special schools for 
those with disabilities (Lockyer/Stone 1998). The department would need specialist 
services, such as psychiatrists and psychologists, along with those normally within 
education and social services, to provide special measures, advice and guidance to 
parents, a family service. Many of the agencies for this co-operation had already 
been identified in the 1963 Act (para. 233). 
An entirely new, lay tribunal, the ‘juvenile panel’ would deal with the 
treatment of those children thought to be in need of compulsory measures of care, 
regardless of whether their presenting issue had been as offenders, truants, in need of 
care or protection or beyond the control of their parents. Kilbrandon had wanted “a 
way of getting in touch with families in difficulties that [would] somehow be 
acceptable to the public”. The Committee had observed the Danish system of ‘family 
interviews’ and was convinced of the need for a system of “volunteers to sit and 
observe and listen and get professional advice when they need it… so emerged the 
idea of the panel, as it was called.” 95 
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The sheriff would appoint the lay juvenile panel and designate the chairman 
and two deputy chairmen. Members would be selected because they were “specially 
qualified either by knowledge or experience to consider the children’s problems”; 
whenever practicable a woman should sit; members should be able to sit regularly 
and for a continuous period of three months each year; appointments would be for 
three years, renewable; with retirement at 65 years. Their appointment was not to be 
linked to the appointment of justices (paras. 92-95), and there would be a possibility 
of some full-time, paid, panel chairmen (paras. 225). These criteria were very similar 
to those for the appointment of the ILJP. Kilbrandon expected people similar to 
those already sitting in Scots juvenile courts (Stone 1995:xii). 
An official would be required to deal with the referral of children up to the 
age of 16, whether for offence, truancy, care or protection issues, from the police, 
schools, GPs, health visitors, priests, education welfare officers (EWOs) and others. 
This independent official, the ‘Reporter to the Panel’, would be legally qualified and 
have administrative experience relating to child welfare and education. The main 
role would be to sift cases. Having established that the grounds were accepted, and 
after close co-operation with the police and social education departments, the 
Reporter could decide to take no further action, arrange voluntary support, or, where 
that failed and compulsory care was considered necessary, put the juvenile before the 
hearing’s panel for it to decide. Only juveniles charged with the most serious 
offences, - murder, attempted murder, grievous bodily harm (GBH) and rape - would 
be referred by the Lord Advocate directly to the Sheriff or High Courts.  
Kilbrandon (para.77) had feared that a lay bench might favour treatment 
needs without applying the legal test, leading to “unintended irregularities”. Thus a 
sheriff in the privacy of chambers would deal with any disputed facts. If proved, the 
case would be sent back to the panel for a treatment decision based solely on needs. 
The Reporter would also be the legal adviser to the panel; present the case to the 
sheriff when necessary; and keep the records (paras. 98-100). 
The juvenile panel itself was to meet in simple, modern accommodation, 
entirely away from criminal courts and the police, possibly in schools after normal 
closing time, or in libraries, places with plenty of waiting areas (para.226). There 
should be some evening and Saturday sessions so that both parents could attend, 
with the possibility of reimbursement for loss of earnings and travel costs. The 
meeting should be conducted in an “atmosphere of full, free, unhurried discussion” 
 103 
to “enlist the co-operation of the parents”, and in private (para.109). The new panel 
was to have continuing oversight of the measures applied. Supervision would be 
local, under the social education department and not probation officers as they were 
too closely associated with the criminal courts. All orders and variations could be 
appealed to the sheriff. The jurisdiction would be up to the age of 16 for new 
referrals, and to 18 for those already under supervision. Orders would have the force 
of law, but the whole philosophy of the panel was to assume co-operation by the 
family, and only where there was a total lack of this, would the child be removed 
from home. 
4.1.3   Receiving the Kilbrandon Report – The Conservative Government 
The Kilbrandon Report, published in April 1964, reflected the unanimous 
decision of the Committee and was described as “incontestably the best argued 
British policy document in this field in the 1960s” (Bottoms (1974:341). A former 
Conservative Lord Advocate, Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, wrote 30 years later that it 
was “remarkable in its time and it still reads as a clear, fresh and enlightened 
document” (Fraser 1995:ix).  
The relevant Scottish Departments were “aware of [its] radical nature”, and 
its publication in April 1964 was done in close co-operation with them 
(Cowperthwaite 1988:25). Michael Noble, the Secretary of State, insisted on 
consultation with interested parties, having distilled the recommendations of the 
Report into two broad proposals:  
(1) … where compulsory measures are required, they should be ordered 
not by a criminal court but by a public authority which would maintain a 
continuing oversight over the measures concerned and have powers to 
vary them, as appropriate; 
(2) …the re-organisation of the services at present concerned with 
children and the creation of a new ‘social education department’ under 
the education authority (p.27). 
The Scottish Office wrote “a careful summary to form part of the Press 
Notice announcing the Report’s publication” for fear that media treatment and the 
public response might “‘kill’ the Report” (p.26). Kilbrandon “anticipated there 
would be very high resistance, from police and probation officers especially….and 
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went all over the place talking and writing” to make sure it was received properly96. 
‘The Scotsman’ (13.iv.1964) reported a speech by Kilbrandon in which he spoke of 
the failure of the current system to reduce juvenile delinquency, and the 
ineffectiveness of the “kindly admonition” of the juvenile court. Ten days later, the 
newspaper wrote of the controversial and radical nature of the report and how it 
would “bring Scotland into the mainstream of world penal reform” (The Scotsman 
23.iv.1964), distinct from England/Wales, perhaps an accolade that would appeal to 
the rising Scottish Nationalists. ‘The Times’ leader expressed no opinion, but 
commented  
"There would no longer be any distinction between children who have 
committed an offence and children in need of care or protection" and that 
"going wholeheartedly for prevention rather than punishment opens a 
new vein of argument" (The Times 23.iv.1964).  
The tactic had worked. The summary of media responses given to Ministers said, 
“Despite the possibility of a line that the Report was proposing ‘letting young thugs 
off’, there was a remarkable and complete absence of criticism…” (Cowperthwaite 
1988:28).  
A week later, at a meeting of the JCC (1964:119) in London, a member made 
a somewhat defensive reference to Press comments on the Kilbrandon Report as it 
“might have been taken to reflect upon the work of juvenile courts in England”. It 
was “suggested… that Lord Kilbrandon be invited to speak on his report at a week-
end conference”. Nothing appears to have come of that idea even though in its 
submission to the Royal Commission on Penal Affairs, the MA referred to a 
“minority of our members… [who] would be in favour of a system on the lines 
recommended by the Committee on Children and Young Persons in Scotland 
(Kilbrandon) Report” (M.A. Ann.Rep. 1964-5 App.V.). 
Kilbrandon’s persuasive powers, the later emphasis on the greater power of 
the new system with its continual oversight of the juveniles, and media support (A. 
Morris 1974), encouraged the Secretary of State in June, 1964 “to accept the 
recommendation on juvenile panels” [Hansard HC 764:49]. As Kilbrandon 
(1968:235) himself remarked, this was “after a period of reflection in high quarters 
which was to us flatteringly brief, but which to others no doubt seemed to be 
scandalous and irresponsible precipitation”. A summer general election had been 
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anticipated but was postponed. This, fortuitously, given the general acceptance of the 
revolutionary proposals, allowed time for a ‘Grand Committee’ in Scotland to air the 
report, and ascertain the views of Scots MPs  
4.1.4   ‘Grand Committee’ Scottish, 23rd July 1964 
A ‘Matter Day’ debate was held with only MPs for Scotland, and no voting. 
38 MPs attended, two thirds were Labour, including Margaret Herbison, who had 
once been a Scottish minister and was a member of the Longford Committee in 
England, yet chose not to speak in this debate. The Labour Thomas Steele, a member 
of SACTO, said it would “mean the end of the cry ‘Punishment to fit the crime’ …” 
and represented “the consensus of experience and informed opinion today”, 
mentioning the Longford Report, with its “rather similar general conclusions” (HC 
SC vol.vi 1963-4:57-60). He was wary of using the over–pressured Education 
Department and wanted to wait for local government reorganisation. Another Labour 
MP, Neil Carmichael, agreed about not using the Education Department and spoke 
of the “sane and humanistic” approach, having attended a large meeting addressed 
by Kilbrandon (vol.vi 1963-4:72). The Conservative Miss Harvie Anderson 
remarked that it was a “social problem quite outwith party politics” (vol.vi 1963-
4:80).  
Two magistrates spoke, both Labour, one against the reforms, William Small, 
as the proposals were “too rapid a change in thinking” (vol.vi 1963-4:95). Lady 
Tweedsmuir, Under Secretary of State, called it a “fascinating and far-reaching 
Report”, and although waiting for the results of the widespread consultations 
accepted that the present system did “not obtain the willing co-operation of the 
parents”. The common need of delinquents was for education and training (vol.vi 
1963-4:66). She recognised the changing role of the probation service, and the 
necessity “to balance the claims of society… to extend social intervention” with “the 
very valued right of a family to be protected from undue interference” (vol.vi 1963-
4:72). She was the only one to speak of ‘rights’. No one else raised the issues of 
public protection or deterrence, and only eight members spoke. 
The Kilbrandon Report had identified the “need for special measures of 
education and training” (1964 para.15) so logic demanded that the new social work 
department would be housed in the education departments of the local authorities. 
Forrest (1998:214) has argued that the Scottish Grand Committee may have decided 
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against this proposal because at that time, Scottish schools still had no ‘guidance’ 
teachers; secondary schools were selective; and there was still corporal punishment, 
none of which factors was conducive to a “progress toward social selfhood” and the 
“constant and active goodwill” towards the child as envisaged by the Advisory 
Council on Education 1947. However, with such minimal criticism of the radical 
Kilbrandon Report, and acceptance by the Conservative government of its principles, 
the way was clear for officials in the Scottish Office to devise the new structures and 
plan a White Paper. 
4.1.5   ‘Social Work and the Community’ (Scotland) 1966 
A week after the Kilbrandon Report was published the Labour Party 
delivered its review ‘Crime – A Challenge to Us All’ (Longford Report 1964) under 
the chairmanship of Lord Longford. It made little reference to the Kilbrandon 
Report, accepting that some proposals reinforced its own views, and that a working 
party was urgently needed. It would seem Labour was committed to future 
legislation. At the general election in October 1964, a Labour government was 
elected, with a slim overall majority of five. 
With Kilbrandon as a government report, albeit Conservative, favourably 
received in Scotland, with a basic philosophy not dissimilar from ‘Longford’, in 
February 1965 Scottish Office officials put forward their submissions including the 
results of the consultations. The higher judiciary, sheriffs and probation officers were 
opposed but there was the “important support of the chief constables” 
(Cowperthwaite 1988:30-1), and enough others to proceed with the Kilbrandon 
reforms.  
The new, Labour Secretary of State William Ross and the Minister, Judith 
Hart, accepted the main proposal of juvenile panels but rejected the organisation 
being based in the education department. They considered this was too inflexible 
with its demands for parental responsibility, and likely to thwart “the emphasis 
within social work on the need to assess all the factors (social, environmental, and 
individual) which influence a child’s development” (McGhee, Waterhouse and 
Whyte 1996:57). They suggested that it be based in social work departments. Hart 
had a particular interest “and background in this field” and appointed and worked 
closely with her advisers, the social work consultants Richard Titmuss, her old tutor 
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from the London School of Economics; Megan Browne from Edinburgh University; 
and Kay Carmichael, from Glasgow University
97
. Stone
98
 claimed this was 
the hidden agenda of the Kilbrandon Report… because they realised they 
could propose detailed planning in such a way as to give a huge boost to 
their own discipline… There was no such thing as a professional social 
worker until that Report was accepted.  
The Scottish working party deliberated for another year before publishing its 
White Paper in October 1966, ‘Social Work and the Community – Proposals for 
Reorganising Local Authority Services in Scotland’. It proposed the reorganisation 
of social work in new, autonomous, local authority social work departments to 
include childcare, community care, care of the handicapped and the aged, and 
significantly, Kilbrandon’s new juvenile panels.  
The Scottish justices had not objected to the reforms, since few had any 
connection with juvenile courts, and Kilbrandon had expected juvenile justices to 
become the new panel members, appointed by the local sheriff. However, this was 
altered by the White Paper, which, stressing the desirability of the community 
dealing with its own problems, wanted a wider range of people from the local 
neighbourhood. They were to be appointed by a special body, because Kilbrandon 
had rejected the juvenile court “based in part on the inappropriateness of the skills of 
the judiciary for making decisions about the welfare of children” (Asquith 1983:99). 
Lawyers, used to fiscals exercising their discretion, had no problem with the concept 
of the ‘reporter’ and, with the legal safeguard of appeal to the sheriff court, did not 
resist (Bottoms 1974). 
Kilbrandon (1966:120) did not consider that social workers or their 
department which provided the information should be on the decision-making 
tribunal: the child might need to be “protected against the social worker”. The 
sheriffs had now accepted the new panels, but wished to keep an autonomous 
probation service for adults, instead of being absorbed within social work 
departments. The National Association of Probation Officers (NAPO) objected to 
this, but, unlike its English counterpart, concentrated on its own position rather than 
the substantive issue of the replacement of juvenile courts with juvenile panels. Their 
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cause had not been helped by a poor report (Morison 1962) on the Scottish Probation 
Service (1974:342).  
The White Paper did not incorporate any of the three measures that had an 
element of punishment about them, the power to admonish, with or without a 
supervision order (Kilbrandon 1964 para. 160); to require limited attendance at an 
‘attendance centre’ (para. 166); or to make a finding of caution (para. 159). The most 
contentious part of the White Paper was the size of the local authority unit chosen, 
counties rather than large burghs. Local authorities wanted to wait until the outcome 
of the Wheatley Royal Commission on local government reform, three years hence. 
Kilbrandon continued to promote his reforms, pleased they had “been studied and 
debated with a wonderful openness of mind” and that professionals with daily 
responsibility for children “faced the proposals with a disinterested integrity which 
[did] them infinite credit”. He felt that the criticism of his proposal to use the 
Education Department was a “subjective reaction against educationalists”, who were 
seen as reactionary and disciplinarian, whereas he saw teachers as well as social 
workers as at the front line to spot things going wrong (Kilbrandon 1968:235, 237). 
He reiterated his belief that the public was not being protected by the current system, 
and earlier intervention was more likely to be helpful.  
4.1.6   Conclusion 
…there is no reason whatever to suppose that the substitution of the 
social for the criminal tribunal will in any sense herald a permissive 
millennium, or that in practice the treatments ordered by the panels will 
be more lenient than heretofore. (Kilbrandon 1968:238) 
 
The key principle underlying the Kilbrandon Report, that those under 16 
found guilty of offences should have their welfare needs addressed rather than be 
punished, was never seriously challenged in Scotland, and the practicalities were 
barely altered up until publication of the Bill. Issues of ‘due process’ were not 
considered relevant in treatment decisions, and professional judges would deal with 
disputed matters. There was no united juvenile judiciary to oppose the reforms, and 
any objections were about the administrative rather than philosophical changes. 
Kilbrandon himself, a respected senior judge, part of the criminal justice system in 
Scotland, had the support of the Scottish Office, and as the “policy entrepreneur” 
(Kingdon 1995:122) promoted the reforms vigorously. The report had been 
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commissioned and accepted by the Conservative government and then the Labour 
government. There were eighteen months between publication of the White Paper 
and the Bill published in March 1968. The only significant change was 
organisational, which was not announced until after the Queen’s Speech proposing 
the legislation. This was to prove the only stumbling block. 
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4.2 Longford 
I think we had, on reflection, a naïve belief in the automatic effectiveness 
of all social work…We thought you did not need to prove that somebody 
is ‘ill’ in the same way that you need to prove that somebody is guilty of 
an offence. That it was a social malady capable of being rectified, 
providing we went about it in a generally benign and positive way. We 
hadn’t addressed the question of civil liberties and all the rest of it.99 
 
4.2.1   Lord Longford and his Committee  
In December 1963, whilst in Opposition, Harold Wilson asked the Earl of 
Longford
100
, 
to advise the Labour Party on the recent increase in recorded crime, the 
present treatment of offenders, and the new measures, penal or social, 
required both to assist in the prevention of crime and to improve and 
modernise our penal practices. (Longford 1964:1) 
In 1954, Longford had undertaken an ‘Inquiry into the Causes of Crime’ to 
which the MA had given constructive rather than punitive responses (MAC 
1954:1145 para.13), and he may have thought it would still hold those more 
progressive views. David Faulkner
101, Callaghan’s Private Secretary, said Longford 
was generally thought to be “very clever, intelligent, sharp”, his public persona that 
of a Labour politician, a peer, “with a personal reputation for eccentricity… a person 
you could not make part of a team”. However, Professor Morris, a member of 
Longford’s Committee, described him as “…a brilliant chairman… a man who 
mended fences and built bridges, having what is now called ‘people’ skills”102.  
The members of the Longford Committee included two lawyers, both to 
become Lord Chancellors, Gardiner and Elwyn Jones; and five members became 
Ministers, one the social worker Bea Serota. Margaret Herbison was the only 
Scottish MP and two other MPs, James MacColl and Charles Royle were members 
of the Council of the MA. The remaining four were a criminologist, a former police 
officer, a Prison Visitor and a psychiatrist, TCN Gibbens, whose negative experience 
as a prisoner of war made him “all the more sensitive to penal affairs”103.  
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The Committee finished its Report by 28
th
 April 1964, having “made an 
intensive study of the whole field of crime and penal practice” (p.1). This was one 
week after the Kilbrandon Report was published, and the only reference to its 
comparatively similar, radical reforms of juvenile justice were that Longford had 
taken note of them and did not consider its own findings were affected, although 
were “in some respects” reinforced by them (p.3). Longford recommended that “both 
Family Courts and Young People’s Courts should be set up in Scotland as well as in 
England/Wales” (Longford 1964:27), which rather suggests the Committee had not 
known of Kilbrandon’s proposals for ‘juvenile panels’. There is no evidence of any 
meetings with members of the Kilbrandon Committee, and when Margaret Herbison 
later sat on the Scottish Grand Committee debating Kilbrandon, she made no 
reference to her having served on the Longford Committee.  
In its four months, the Longford Committee had 25 meetings, took written 
and oral evidence and visited a range of institutions. Its remit was very wide and 
juvenile justice only a minor part. Indeed, Morris
104
 claimed that there was: 
A sub plot of Longford… being hatched by Gerald and Elwyn105. They 
were sketching out the blueprint for the legislative programme for 
reform, this cataract of reform; the abolition of capital punishment; a 
new criminal justice bill; the legalisation of homosexuality; abolition of 
the Lord Chamberlain’s powers of censorship… 
Perhaps this intense activity may explain the lack of overt interest in 
Kilbrandon.  
4.2.2   The Longford Report -‘Crime – A Challenge to Us All’  
Something more is needed for the true protection of the citizen: the 
prevention of crime by the care of the inadequate and immature, the 
healing of the sick, the rehabilitation of the offender, the restoration of 
his self-respect and his training in respect for the rights of others. These 
are the positive aspects of penal practice and reform. (Longford 1964:6) 
 
This Report, covering four broad areas of criminal justice, was not “a policy 
statement by the Labour Party, but a report submitted to it” (Brown 1964 Foreword). 
The overall aim was to “forestall delinquency”, and it proposed reforms of the 
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treatment of juveniles, the police and prison services, the courts’ sentencing 
practices, and the law relating to murder.  
Regarding juveniles, it proposed a ‘family service’ to remove from the 
criminal courts and the penal system all children below the school-leaving age, then 
15 but raised to 16 in 1973; and to extend the ‘welfare principle’ to those under 21 
years. The guiding belief for Longford (1964:4) was that whilst “it is an axiom that 
democracy means the acceptance of responsibilities as well as the claiming of rights” 
it is also true that “a society which fails in its obligations to many of its citizens must 
not be surprised if some of them do not keep its rules...” It noted that some half 
million children lived on National Assistance, and proposed a broad response to 
“remove or reduce the factors which predispose people to crime” (Longford 
1964:12) by better housing, education and health reforms.  
The ‘family service’, echoing Kilbrandon, extended the powers conferred by 
the Conservative government
106
. Local authorities were to provide advice and 
assistance for the welfare of children, especially those with any kinds of handicap, 
for these “as well as causing great personal unhappiness, can predispose to anti-
social behaviour or delinquency” (Longford 1964:17). Early identification and the 
closest co-operation between teachers, health visitors, school medical and housing 
officers, welfare staff and other agencies were important.  
If there was no agreement, Longford, like Kilbrandon, said that there must be 
a judicial body to resolve any dispute and ensure that “individual liberty is 
protected.” This ‘family court’, would deal with care cases, criminal cases for those 
aged between 15-18 years, plus family matters of the magistrates’ court. Specially 
selected magistrates would be suitably trained and “the emphasis and atmosphere of 
the court will… be essentially human: the welfare of the family as a whole will be a 
primary consideration” (Longford 1964:23), the court conducted under civil 
proceedings. Children under the school leaving age would only be referred to the 
court if there was no agreement with the parents as to the treatment proposed by the 
family service. For those over 13, if there was serious delinquency, the police as well 
as the family service could refer the case to the court. Removal from home would be 
through a ‘fit person’ order if necessary. The family court would have the full range 
                                                 
106
 Cl.1 Children and Young Persons Act 1963 
 113 
of facilities, including residential. There would be the right to appeal decisions and 
those aged 14-18 could elect trial by jury on indictable offences. 
The report also proposed ‘young people’s courts’, with special panels of 
magistrates to deal with those over the school-leaving age and under 21, so that the 
“principle that the welfare of the child or young person should be a primary 
consideration – should be extended to young people up to 21” (Longford 1964:26). 
Longford also considered that radical changes were needed in the approved school 
system, along with a complete reappraisal of residential treatment for young 
offenders, including DCs. 
Unlike Kilbrandon, which spoke of the random nature of an appearance in a 
juvenile court because of care or criminal proceedings, Longford (1964:21) 
emphasised the socially divisive nature of the juvenile court:  
There are very few children who do not behave badly at times; but the 
children of parents with ample means rarely appear before juvenile 
courts. The machinery of the law is reserved mainly for working-class 
children who, more often than not, are also handicapped by being taught 
in too big classes in unsatisfactory school buildings with few amenities 
or opportunities for out-of-school activities. 
Suggestions of a class bias in their courts would have sat uneasily alongside 
the obligations of the magistrates’ judicial oath, “to do right to all manner of persons 
without fear or favour, affection or ill-will” (Lord Chancellor’s Office, 1974). 
On publication, ‘The Times’ (18.vi.1964) made no comments, merely 
reporting Alice Bacon’s explanation of the new proposals. The ‘Magistrate’ 
published a lengthy critique just two months before the General Election: 
The bench is above politics, but politics, needless to say, is not above 
intervening in the affairs of the bench. In order therefore that you may 
know what you are voting for or against in the forthcoming general 
election, here, very briefly summarised, are some of the Labour Study 
Group’s recommendations… 
It mentioned family courts superseding juvenile courts; raising the age of 
criminal responsibility to the school-leaving age; young people’s courts for offenders 
aged 16-21; giving written reasons for refusing bail; reform of the system of 
appointing magistrates, “to give more attention to interest in and aptitude for social 
and welfare work in candidates for the bench”; and an end to “the widespread 
flouting by magistrates of the First Offenders Acts”. The article acknowledged that 
the proposals had “…not yet been accepted as the official policy of the Party” 
(Mag.1964:120), but by underlining the implied criticism of the magistrates, had put 
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them on notice: if they voted Labour, this was how their powers would be changed. 
In the event, however, the Labour Party made no reference to juvenile justice in its 
election manifesto (Downes and Morgan 1994). 
Dr Gray, JP, (Mag. 1965:82) complained that the family court would 
“deprive the Bench of its most experienced magistrates in matrimonial work”. 
Another article from a magistrate
107
 questioned whether magistrates would  
become a rubber stamp to the whims of the reporting social workers, 
endorsing out of sheer lack of knowledge and skill such reports – 
sometimes ill-conceived, ill-informed and biased – as are presented? 
(pp.114-5)  
The Longford Report was not solely devoted to juvenile justice, and the other 
reforms may have attracted more interest from the public. The early magisterial 
response to the juvenile justice reforms would appear to have been more hostile than 
favourable, and at this stage more concerned about its own changing powers.  
4.2.3   Royal Commission on the Penal System 
In 1964 the Conservatives had set up a Royal Commission on the Penal 
System (RCPS), under the chairmanship of Viscount Amory
108
: 
to frame a philosophy for criminal justice and to measure the 
performance of penal proceedings against it. The remit extended to 
offenders of all ages… the prisons, young offender institutions, approved 
schools and the Probation Service… (Windlesham 1993:100)  
The 15 members included a Scottish judge, whilst three of the four 
magistrates were members of the MA Council, a fact noted with satisfaction by the 
‘Magistrate’ (1964:127). The MA responded with a ‘Memorandum of Evidence’ 
(MA Appendix V 1965). It wished to retain Juvenile Courts for those under 17 years 
of age; and “to safeguard the interests of the individual, the judiciary should remain 
independent of the social and welfare services and the ultimate disposal of a case 
should rest with juvenile court magistrates” (para.19). It did not approve of non-
judicial tribunals to deal with juvenile offenders but welcomed further development 
and strengthening of the 1963 Act, including ‘family advice centres’, as magistrates 
recognised the need for “all possible help from social services, voluntary and 
statutory, working in this field”. It did not consider it practicable to combine juvenile 
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court and domestic proceedings in ‘family courts’, nor see any necessity for ‘youth 
courts’. It accepted that there were “grounds for criticising the present Juvenile 
Courts” and suggested “stricter application of the rules for electing juvenile court 
magistrates from among persons with special qualifications”, who should have 
special training. It admitted that the Home Secretary should amalgamate juvenile 
courts since they “will not combine voluntarily”. The MA sent the Memorandum to 
the press “and received wide notice” (JCC 1965:183). 
The MA also printed the minority view (para.19A) on the Council, lost 66 to 
11, which supported reforms similar to Kilbrandon and Longford. That this 
alternative proposal was published may be indicative of the weight of authority of 
those who were behind it. It included two Labour MPs both on the Longford 
Committee, one now on the Royal Commission itself, the other ennobled and Deputy 
Chairman of the MA. Furthermore, Cordelia James was a liberal-minded former 
teacher, a member of the Seebohm Committee on Social Services, and a great friend 
of the Commission member Bea Serota
109
, with whom she would later serve on the 
new Advisory Council on the Penal System (ACPS). Events overtook the Royal 
Commission and after resignations of half the members, the Labour Prime Minister 
Wilson took the “almost unprecedented decision” to disband it (Windlesham 
1993:100-05). 
4.2.4   White Paper - ‘The Child, the Family and the Young Offender’  
The causes of delinquency are complex… much delinquency – and 
indeed many other social problems – can be traced back to inadequacy or 
breakdown in the family. The right place to begin, therefore, is with the 
family. (HMSO 1965 para.5) 
In August 1965, the first White Paper was published, with provisional 
proposals for consultation and to “seek advice of those who will have to operate any 
new system” (HMSO 1965 para.1). It included the somewhat altered ideas of the 
Longford Report. Its two main purposes were still to take children and young 
persons “as far as possible outside the ambit of the criminal law” and to keep the 16-
21 age group for trial and treatment separate from ordinary criminal courts (para. 
42). Perhaps anticipating some resistance, just as Kilbrandon had done, it also stated 
that: 
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the determining factor… must be the welfare of the particular child or 
young person… The object… must be to make him into a useful and 
law-abiding citizen. There is no intention to deal lightly with young 
offenders…What is needed is firm discipline and constructive treatment 
directed to the welfare or rehabilitation of the individual… (para.43). 
On top of the family service, it introduced ‘family councils’, “social workers 
of the children’s service and other persons selected for their understanding and 
experience of children...” They were to include a man and a woman, to “be 
conducted in an unhurried manner”, and “would in no case meet in a court building” 
(para.12). They would deal with all offenders and care cases for under 16s. The 
decisions could be made only with the agreement of the parents, and “formally 
recorded… and in any event be reviewed from year to year” if not sooner (para.14). 
Treatment could include supervision by social workers; periods at an attendance 
centre; in a detention centre; in an approved school once they were absorbed into 
general residential care; and payment of compensation, although not fines. 
Where there was no agreement or “the gravity of the case” was such, a case 
would be heard by special magistrates’ courts, juvenile courts transformed into 
family courts, to determine the facts, where the “full safeguards of the law are 
available”. If proved, “the case would be referred back to the family council for the 
discussion of treatment” (paras. 11-13) or, conversely, the family court could make 
any order available to the juvenile court, except where “long-term residential training 
was considered to be appropriate, the child or young person would be committed to 
the care of the local authority” (para.15). This court would also have the power to 
order to a remand centre those aged 14 and 15, if ‘too unruly or depraved’. 
The structural proposals were similar to those of Kilbrandon, sharing a 
philosophy of reform through care and support for juveniles, removing treatment 
decisions from the criminal court, with the safeguard of judicial proceedings where 
there was dispute. But, there were three crucial differences. First, there was no 
independent ‘reporter’ but a council of social workers to decide on agreed treatment; 
second, the Scots juvenile panel was quite separate from the providers of services, 
whereas this White Paper proposed that the family council would include “social 
workers of the children’s service” (para.12), thus removing that element of 
independence and, as Kilbrandon (1966:120) had observed, put justice at risk, for the 
child might need to be “protected against the social worker”. Thirdly, this council 
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had the power to order punitive measures, attendance and detention centre orders, as 
would the family court, which could order fines as well. 
The MA held a special meeting and later at the AGM, debated retaining 
juvenile courts (Mag. 1965:169-175). The chairman of the JCC, Mrs MacAdam, was 
unequivocal in her view: 
the judicial function of magistrates in properly constituted courts must be 
maintained for all young offenders, whose liberty should have adequate 
legal protection. The agreement of weak and irresponsible parents was 
not a sufficient safeguard…The sooner young offenders realised that the 
law would catch up with them in a court, the better. 
One former chairman of the JCC wanted the facts established in the juvenile 
court and the treatment decision by the family council while Cordelia James, a future 
chairman of the JCC, opposed the resolution:  
Children under ten could already be sent to schools and away from home 
by administrative decision in a great number of ways. The liberty of the 
subject had been pressed into service as a bogeyman. The family should 
be brought more into the picture, even though all parents were not 
perfect. The judicial power would still be there to deal with difficult or 
contested cases.  
However, the resolution was carried by a resounding 269 votes to 38. 
A deputation took a memorandum (MA 65/197) of the Association’s views to 
the Minister, Alice Bacon, but was “given little opportunity to discuss the proposals” 
(Exec. 1965:3439). “Juvenile Courts should be retained and that there should be no 
power by a non-judicial body to intervene until there had been proof in a court of 
any allegations concerning a young person under 17.” Once again, a memorandum 
was sent to the press and the ‘Magistrate’ (MAC 1965:1795). It did not agree with 
raising the age of criminal responsibility to 14, let alone 16; and rejected family 
councils because they “would be able to overbear many inadequate parents who 
cannot state their case, and who need an advocate and the judicial process to 
safeguard the weak and stupid” (Mag. 1965 Dec). It considered that “probation 
officers who are officers of the court” should supervise those over 14. Significantly, 
the Probation Committee, composed entirely of magistrates, employed and 
controlled probation officers.  
Lord Royle was re-elected Deputy Chairman of the MA, despite saying he 
would vote in Parliament in favour of the reforms; and the ‘Magistrate’ (1965:161) 
published an article describing the Swedish system, similar to that being proposed. 
But, another three articles were critical of the philosophy of the White Paper because 
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it “studiously avoids words like ‘finding of guilt’, ‘justice’, ‘right and wrong’, 
‘punishment’” (Mag.1965:162). There was a fear that the family councils “would 
become a closed shop” and it would “need more courage than most parents possess 
to resist Auntie’s suggestion for residential treatment” (Mag.1965:165). This 
paternalistic view of parents was later echoed by Cavenagh (1967:275), a 
Birmingham Juvenile Court chairman, in her book on juvenile courts: 
The type of parent commonly seen in the juvenile court, muddled, 
inadequate, beaten, pathetic or truculent would not be capable of 
becoming involved in discussion of the type envisaged”  
Wootton (1961:226), a social scientist, and significantly, a Labour peer and 
ILJP chairman, rejected the White Paper because she wanted informal proceedings, 
but was emphatic that if the system of establishing guilt and delivering punishment 
were to remain: 
a case can be made for the present procedure. For to retain the basic 
pattern of criminal jurisdiction, but at the same time to jettison the 
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt and to deprive the 
accused of his present rights to self-defence, would be a most dangerous 
compromise…That is why one must view with concern …to substitute 
‘Family Councils’ for the present Juvenile Courts.  
She feared “the strong inducement that it will hold out to the child to admit 
whatever is alleged against him so as to ‘get it over with’ and not have to go through 
the whole rigmarole again before another body”. She wanted a complete change of 
system because she considered social and moral training was “a matter of 
educational, not penal concern” (Wootton 1967:227). 
The Conservatives claimed that the White Paper had “few friends and many 
enemies… probation officers, many magistrates and many of the children’s officers 
have condemned this Report most substantially” (HC723 –CFYO Oral Questions). 
As Bottoms (1974:329) observed, there was a “flood of criticism”, interested parties 
mostly arguing for judicial assessment, which, coincidentally, would involve their 
own jobs. The probation service shared the philosophy behind the reforms, but was 
concerned that the family councils lacked independence, and was also sceptical of 
parental co-operation. It thought “a well conducted Juvenile Court” should involve 
the parents and that had the resources been put behind the 1963 Act, “the situation 
the White Paper seeks to remedy may have been prevented or considerably 
minimised” (NAPO 1965:83), as did the MA (MAC 1966:1821).  
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The government withdrew the White Paper: it had a massive legislative 
programme, major economic difficulties, and a majority of only three in the 
Commons, with 10% of MPs also magistrates and about 13% in the Lords. The 
government felt it had to wait until a more propitious time for this reform. The new 
Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, was more concerned with reforms of the police and 
the criminal justice system as a whole than those of juvenile justice that might risk 
defeat. Alice Bacon “was definitely committed to it herself, and it was probably the 
political pressures and judgments of Jenkins and Callaghan which caused them to 
move away”110. Others said the Paper had been poorly argued, a short document 
(Harris and Webb 1987), unlike its successful counterpart in Scotland, the 
Kilbrandon Report. The Conservatives had allied themselves with the magistrates, 
clerks and the police and fought their cause successfully (Parker et al. 1981) The 
Longford Committee members felt  
considerable disappointment, verging on hostility …We had no idea that 
it is possible that the restriction of liberty for children and young people 
could be actually something that needs to be scrutinised for its legal 
status.
 111
  
Nor did they invoke Kilbrandon in support, “No. It didn’t apply. Scotland 
was another place.”  
4.2.5   ‘Children in Trouble’ 1968 
To me it seems to set the system back 100 years or more…Oliver Twist 
will have to run away because of the threats of the Council’s Children’s 
Officer, because there will be no juvenile court to provide scrutiny and 
protect innocence from official intervention. (Juvenile Panel Chairman 
Mag.1968:161) 
“The decision was taken right at the top in the Home Office in effect to ditch 
the first White Paper, to bring in some new people and start again” 112. Roy Jenkins 
wanted to keep the government policy “to rely less on judicial proceedings, and 
‘punishment’, and to concentrate on the background of the children, and what could 
be done to improve their prospects in life...” 113He brought in Derek Morrell from the 
Department of Education to be head of the Children’s Department, “a distinctive, 
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imaginative approach, quite unlike the usual civil servant…” 114 , described as 
“brilliant and strong-minded” (Callaghan 1987:238); and Joan Cooper, former 
Children’s Officer for East Sussex, became head of the Children’s Inspectorate. “The 
two of them were formidable advocates for the ‘69 policies”115, and Morrell “left a 
deep impression on the children’s world” particularly relating delinquency, 
deprivation, supportive educational and therapeutic responses and community 
participation (Fries 2004). 
In November 1967, Callaghan became Home Secretary. He was influenced 
by the experience of his wife, who chaired the South-East London Children’s 
Committee and saw that “control of delinquency in children is not a separate process 
from social measures to help and protect them and their families” (Callaghan 
1987:232-4). The new White Paper, ‘Children in Trouble’, was published in April 
1968. The title “was deliberately all embracing, not trying to distinguish between 
whether the ‘trouble’ was technically a criminal offence or, if it was because they 
had no proper family or whatever. The issue was how best to improve matters”116. 
The ‘Magistrate’ (1968:86) claimed, “On many points it echoes the constructive 
criticisms which the Association made in common with other bodies”.  
To meet the demands of earlier critics, the Paper proposed no changes to “the 
system of courts for dealing with offenders both over and under 17” until “further 
consideration” of other current inquiries. It reiterated that “the Government attaches 
great importance to the further development of the services concerned with the 
prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency …” (HMSO 1968 paras 3-10). The 
Paper also declared that “an important object of the criminal law is to protect 
society” (para.7), a comment much welcomed by the magistracy, because “the 
determining factor must always be the appropriate balance between the protection of 
the public and the welfare of the child or young person in the particular case” (MA 
Appendix V 1968). 
The Paper wanted better assessment centres, greater variety of residential and 
non-residential facilities and greater flexibility to “increase the effectiveness” of 
treatment (HMSO 1968 para.20) to help children grow into responsible, mature 
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members of society. It acknowledged the “devoted attention” of the magistracy and 
said its proposals would “preserve for each of the services concerned an important 
role in co-operation with the others” (para.8). The changes would be implemented 
over a period of years, as staff would need training and resources, and meant that 
different places could be at different stages of implementation. 
The idea of ‘family councils’ was abandoned in favour of voluntary 
agreements with the parents, and failing that, determination through the judicial 
proceeding of the juvenile court. The upper age limit for the court would remain at 
17 years, with a division at 14, seen as a “critical phase” in the transition from 
dependence to responsibility. This meant that children under 14 would only be 
subject to care proceedings for the commission of any criminal offence, except 
homicide, thus effectively raising the age of criminal responsibility to 14 years. Even 
for ‘young persons’, those aged 14-17, prosecution would be restricted, and 
“possible only on the authority of a summons or warrant issued by a juvenile court 
magistrate” based on set criteria (HMSO 1968 para.16), and with discretion 
somewhat similar to that of the Reporter in Scotland. 
As in Inner London, magistrates in the new juvenile courts would be 
appointed directly by the Lord Chancellor, to avoid “invidious choices” or elections 
conducted in ignorance of the candidates; and panels would be encouraged to 
amalgamate (para.13). There would be much closer consultation and co-operation 
between all the agencies, including the magistracy, both at the local and 
county/borough level “to appreciate different aspects of the problems of 
delinquency” (para.18), and at regional level through Joint Planning Committees 
(para.28).  
There were three main changes envisaged to the treatment of juvenile 
offenders. The approved school order would be abolished and compulsory removal 
from home would be through a care order to the local authority. All supervision of 
children under 14 would be by the local authority and not the probation service. 
There would be a completely new form of treatment, “intermediate between 
supervision in the home and committal to care” (para.21), using “facilities not 
provided expressly for those who have been before the courts” (para.25). There 
would be two types, “temporary residence, attendance or participation” totalling not 
more than a month a year of supervision, and residence at a specified place for a 
maximum of three months. “The court will fix the actual period… its timing and 
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nature to be decided by the supervisor” (para.26-7). The ACTO Report 1962 on non 
residential treatment had “laid the foundations for the[se] recommendations” (PSSC 
1977:14). 
Importantly, as ‘intermediate treatment’ (IT) developed, borstals, detention 
centres and attendance centres would be phased out, although their facilities might 
be incorporated into the new schemes. Juvenile offenders would no longer have the 
right to jury trial except those accused of grave offences
117
, when the juvenile court 
would decide the venue. 
The Children’s Department of the Home Office invited a Consultative Group 
of the JCC (1968: June), led by Cordelia James, to be “consulted informally on 
detailed points in preparation of the Bill to give effect to the proposals”. Ironically, 
on the same day as the Scottish Standing Committee on the Social Work (Scotland) 
Bill 1968 accepted that children under 16 should not be prosecuted, a few miles from 
Westminster, the JCC held a special meeting to discuss ‘'Children in Trouble'. Its 
new chairman, Cordelia James, “on the reforming side certainly”118 was the sole 
voice “who wished to raise the age of criminal responsibility to 16 years… children 
should be dealt with under care, protection and control proceedings” (MAC 
1968:1903), just as Kilbrandon had proposed in Scotland.  
The JCC was to see its support for many of the proposals over-ruled by the 
Council. Curiously, its Memorandum, (MA 68/119) without the Council’s heavy 
amendments, is no longer in its Minute Book, but a report in ‘The Magistrate’ 
(1968:138) mentioned four major alterations, “keenly debated”. The JCC agreed that 
the Lord Chancellor should appoint panels, but the Council preferred “the present 
democratic vote by Benches”. The JCC wanted the age for criminal proceedings 
raised to twelve, but the Council “after a spirited if confused debate” kept it at ten. 
The JCC had been divided about the upper age, 17 or 18 years, the Council preferred 
17, as in the White Paper. The JCC had agreed to abolish approved school orders but 
its vice-chairman proposed that courts should recommend to the Home Secretary a 
new custodial treatment away from home, which the Council agreed. The changes 
led to “the strong feeling in the Committee that some of the Council members who 
had voted against proposals in the Memorandum, 68/119, may not have had recent 
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experience of juvenile court work” (MAC 1968:1918). Importantly, neither body 
wanted the additional criterion of the offence ground having to be coupled with the 
need for compulsory care before any action was possible. 
The MA appreciated the retention of the juvenile court, and the abandonment 
of family councils. It accepted “that children should not be brought before the courts 
unnecessarily…” (MA Appendix V 1968: Paras. 3 and 4), but considered that the 
restriction to bring children who had offended to court solely under care proceedings 
was “likely to lead to injustice. It would mean that a boy from a 'good' home could 
not be brought before the court, whereas a boy from a 'bad' home could be…” 
(Para.12). A letter in ‘The Times’ (19.ix.1968) signed by 21 ILJP chairmen 
expressed the same concerns. The MA was to argue this point forcefully through its 
members and the press when the Bill was subsequently published. The MA also 
objected strongly to the idea of a single magistrate deciding whether prosecution 
should proceed or not for the 14-17 group as  
the juvenile court magistrate is in effect being asked to join with the 
police and the children's department, or act as umpire between them, in 
exercising discretion in what would be a social welfare rather than 
judicial decision” (Para.19).  
This role was very similar to that of the Reporter in Scotland, who would 
then put the child before a panel to decide on compulsory measures of care, but not 
take part in those proceedings. Invited to explain the Paper by the JCC (1968:261), 
Morrell suggested 
that since the Association was to all intents and purposes fundamentally 
opposed to the Government’s proposals there would be little to be gained 
from a formal discussion of the Association’s official views. There was 
instead ‘an informal exploratory exchange of ideas’. 
The MA complained that 95% of requests for junior detention centre places 
had been refused in 1966 (JCC 1967:230) and continued to argue for more places, 
despite their proposed abolition, and to keep approved schools. Throughout the 
summer and autumn of 1968, there were continual discussions, debates, articles and 
letters in the ‘Magistrate’, almost all expressing negative views of the White Paper. 
The editors wrote that it would “drastically curtail” the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court, and gave statistics to indicate that about 50,000 children in 1966 were found 
guilty and in future “will have to be dealt with either informally or as in need of care, 
 124 
protection or control” (Mag.1968:77). In “A critical Comment on the White Paper” 
the author
119
 claimed that delinquent children were “virtually untreatable” because 
their appearance in court was too late, and that many parents would be unwilling or 
unable to accept help (Mag.1968:84). Mr Justice Thesiger raised the spectre of 
political influence on the courts through the local authority (Mag.1968:113), while a 
children’s officer 120  claimed “appearance and non-appearance at court will be 
determined by the most ephemeral whims and prejudices, alike of social workers and 
police” (Mag.1968:143). 
Cordelia James, as chairman of the JCC visited branches to discuss 'Children 
in Trouble' and many disagreed with the Paper. She “expressed her own personal 
views and indicated those of the Association, emphasising points of difference with 
Government” (Mag.1968:155). The civil servant who observed the JCC meetings 
felt that: 
she was pulled in two different directions. She was progressive and could 
see what the two White Papers were getting at. But, as a magistrate and 
chair of the Juvenile Courts Committee, she had to reflect, and did 
genuinely reflect, the views of the magistracy…121 
In October 1968, three months after the successful passing of the Social 
Work (Scotland) Act 1968, which was largely his brainchild, Kilbrandon spoke at 
the Annual Luncheon of the MA “as Chairman of the Scottish Law Commission…” 
(Mag. 1968:171) There is no record of his having referred either to his juvenile 
justice reforms, although he had campaigned ceaselessly for them in Scotland, or the 
proposed English/Welsh reforms. Scottish ministers, both Labour and Conservative, 
have observed at different periods that there was very little interest in any Scottish 
proposals by the English
122
. Faulkner, later of the Home Office, said, “That doesn’t 
surprise me at all. Scotland and England really are two separate systems. They 
certainly were then and as far as I can tell, still are.” 123  Morrell’s replacement, 
Gordon-Brown
124
 echoed this, “I knew that the Scots were pursing their own line 
which was normal: why have a separate Scottish set up if they are going to do the 
same as the English and vice versa?” 
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Through the ‘Magistrate’ and their branch membership members of the MA 
were alerted to the proposed legislative changes to their juvenile courts, while their 
leaders continued to press for changes before a Bill would be published. Nowhere 
was there any mention of the recent and very radical reforms of the Scottish juvenile 
justice system. Perhaps the Parliamentary debate would rectify that situation and 
enlighten the English/Welsh MPs and the juvenile courts. 
4.2.6   1967 – Parallel Reforms 
The 1968 White Paper mentioned that the government was awaiting the 
outcome of reports on related issues, Latey on the Age of Majority, the Beeching 
Royal Commission on Assizes and Quarter Sessions, the Law Commission and the 
Advisory Council on the Penal System. Even these expected reforms were not the 
only ones taking place and likely to impinge upon the role of the magistrates. 
Marwick (1990:10) claimed “The upheavals of the 1960s were at least as great as 
those of the Second World War”. 
In 1964, the Home Office had produced a handbook for magistrates, the “first 
official publication of its kind” (Mag.1964:77) but Faulkner125 remembered it as 
“another continuing row… magistrates thought their discretion was being curtailed.” 
Lord Dilhorne finally instigated compulsory training and spoke of the reluctance of 
successive Lord Chancellors to do so as “lay magistrates are volunteers giving their 
service to their fellow-citizens at the cost of some sacrifice of time and money”. ‘The 
Times’ noted that “it is only the preliminary or basic training which is to be in any 
sense compulsory” (Mag.1964:101. The Justices of the Peace Act 1968 introduced 
compulsory retirement for justices at 70 years, implemented over five years so as not 
to denude benches. Choosing who should go “was a most invidious task and only 
served to exacerbate the feeling of grievance among those who were obliged to go 
immediately” (Skyrme 1979:143). Beeching’s proposals on reform of the higher 
courts, with its implications for magistrates, were in the pipeline. 
The Criminal Justice Act 1967 included two measures which directly 
affected the magistracy and others affected them indirectly. A new form of selection 
included an interview; and ex-officio appointments were abolished. The latter move 
was fiercely resisted, successfully for a time with the help of the MA, by the 
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influential City of London bench which, incidentally, provided the prestigious venue 
of the Guildhall for the AGMs. More controversially, magistrates had to suspend any 
prison sentence, with a few exceptions. This loss of their traditional discretion was 
“frustrating, almost humiliating” (Mag. 1968:29). The Conservatives opposed this 
measure too and the MA campaigned until amended by a Conservative government. 
Another measure
126
 removed the magistrates’ power to order corporal punishment in 
Prison Service establishments: no Home Secretary had used the power since June 
1962, and Jenkins refused a magistrate’s decision to birch a prisoner in Maidstone. 
Another clause introduced licenses for shotguns, which was “unpopular with farming 
and sporting interests and was strongly opposed by Conservative members” 
(Windlesham 1993: 111); and probably the squirearchy on the rural benches too.  
The 1970 Social Services Act, arising from the Seebohm Committee 1968, 
created local authority social services departments, a local, generic service to include 
all the welfare services for the elderly, homeless, handicapped, sick, children and 
babies. This meant the disbandment of a specific childcare service (Hendrick 1994), 
and put the Children’s Department of the Home Office in a somewhat anomalous 
position. As the Home Secretary Callaghan (1987:235) observed: 
by combining welfare, discipline and care in the hands of one Ministry 
we would initiate a reform that would be more beneficial both to the 
children in trouble and to society. Unfortunately, this objective was 
threatened by a parallel set of reforms published at almost the same time. 
This massive reorganisation of social services took place just as that much 
greater responsibility was being transferred to social workers from the courts, a 
problem noticed by the magistrates (MA. Appendix v 1968).  
The government introduced social reforms of a more universal, and to some 
magistrates, very radical nature. The Murder (Death Penalty) Act 1965 might well 
have been opposed by a sizeable number of magistrates, given there were 14 
subsequent attempts to reintroduce capital punishment. The Divorce Law Reform 
Act 1969 led to 120,000 divorces per year, treble the total number for the preceding 
four years, although “a justice who was cited as a co-respondent was normally 
required to resign” (Skyrme 1979:146). This restriction was relaxed only marginally 
in the mid 1970s. The reform of the laws regarding homosexuality by the Sexual 
Offences Act 1967 did not apply to the magistracy: the Lord Chancellor felt justices 
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“who indulged in homosexual practice even without infringing the Act should not 
remain in office” (Skyrme 1979:146). Further, if a magistrate took part 
in a peaceful demonstration which did not involve a breach of the law… 
it was the Lord Chancellor’s practice to ask him to consider whether 
what he was doing was compatible with his position as a magistrate 
and to remind him that he had not been obliged to accept the office of justice 
(p.141).  
The traditional, conservative view of society was further challenged by the 
loosening of the laws relating to pornography; the abolition of the role of the Lord 
Chamberlain in censorship; the 1967 Abortion Act; and the Committee on Drug 
Dependence 1967, which recommended relaxing the laws on cannabis (Newburn 
1992). As Morris T. (1987:119) has observed, in six years there were more reforms 
affecting the criminal justice system than in the rest of the century. Furthermore, 
‘The Times’ exposed examples of gross misconduct by senior officers in the 
Metropolitan Police, “a bombshell that still reverberates…and what was most 
shocking was the revelation of the systematic, institutionalised and widespread 
network of corruption” (Reiner 1992:78-9). It is not surprising that traditionalists 
would favour “a firm response within existing frameworks, rather than resort to a 
new and untested framework based on social work principles” (Bottoms and 
Stevenson 1992:36). 
4.2.7   Conclusion 
Unlike Kilbrandon in Scotland, it took three attempts before a Bill was 
published. Interested parties, especially the magistrates and lawyers, had demanded 
judicial oversight of any decisions. Magistrates were contemptuous of parental co-
operation and feared coercion by social workers, who, unlike probation officers, 
were not officers of their courts, nor answerable to them. They did not accept the 
premise that the needs rather than the deeds of the offending juveniles were the 
paramount consideration. Additionally, other reforms affected the magistrates’ role 
and status, and wide-ranging social reforms challenged their traditional views. All 
this may have led them to feel their world was changing beyond recognition, and to 
blame the government, Labour, and to mobilise resistance. Through the MA they 
were in a position to lobby politicians and galvanise the membership throughout the 
country to influence Parliament, especially the Conservative Opposition. The 
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government had made concessions, by keeping the juvenile courts, but never 
invoked the successful Kilbrandon reforms to support its cause.  
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4.3 Conclusion 
One is reminded of the mighty precedent of the Reformation, complete 
and drastic in Scotland, moderated in England to a broadly conservative 
re-adjustment of ecclesiastical and dynastic loyalties. (Mack 1968:245) 
 
The two major reports on juvenile justice in the early 1960s, Kilbrandon’s 
‘Children and Young Persons Scotland 1964’ and Longford’s ‘Crime – A Challenge 
to Us All’ were published within a week of each other. Despite their similarities, 
there was virtually no official communication between the two committees, their 
officials or even the MPs responsible for passing the resulting legislation. Both were 
critical of the dual role of the juvenile court with its punishment and welfare 
dichotomy, and produced solutions based solely on the welfare of the child. Both 
wanted the establishment of the facts separated from the choice of treatment. Both 
wanted a ‘family service’ removing all school-age children from the criminal courts. 
Where there had been no agreement with the family, both wanted a new, 
independent tribunal, a ‘juvenile panel’ in Scotland, a ‘family court’ in 
England/Wales to make decisions as to treatment. Yet the metamorphosis of these 
reports into Parliamentary Bills was remarkably different. 
In Scotland, the Conservative government had appointed Kilbrandon, a 
respected High Court judge, to examine juvenile justice and protection only. He 
produced a completely new system for children aged up to 16 who had committed an 
offence or who satisfied another specified ground, and aimed at securing the co-
operation of the parents. Kilbrandon, himself, took many opportunities to promote 
his reforms, and was supported by the Scottish Office and Baroness Elliot, an 
influential Conservative peer. The newspapers saw the reforms as putting Scotland 
in the mainstream of international penal reform. These facts, together with the rise of 
the SNP, may have had some influence on the readiness of the Conservative 
Secretary of State to accept the broad principles of these revolutionary proposals. 
Two years were spent formulating the White Paper, and the professional judiciary’s 
criticisms were largely met. Kilbrandon had rejected the principle of ‘due process’ as 
irrelevant in the field of the treatment of juveniles, but made sure disputed facts were 
decided by a professional lawyer, many of whom were critical of lay members 
making legal decisions. The main criticism was about the administrative base for the 
new system, not the principles behind it. Kilbrandon continued to promote the 
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reforms until the publication of the detailed Bill in 1968, by which time the Labour 
government had been re-elected with a large majority, and was supportive. Although 
the reforms were aimed at the least advantaged children, there was no reference to 
any previous class bias in the justice system. Children accused of very serious 
offences would appear before a sheriff, exceptionally a judge and jury, while those 
aged 16+ would effectively be treated as adults and face penal custody. 
In England, the Labour Party had appointed Longford, a career politician to 
consider major and wide-ranging reforms of several parts of the criminal justice 
system. The juvenile section was short, was largely aimed at securing a less class-
biased system, and removed school-age children from the criminal courts. It created 
a family service to help families, and a family court for disputed cases. There 
appears to have been little attempt to promote its conclusions, and the MA rejected 
most of its proposals; indeed, a hostile article in ‘the ‘Magistrate’ referring to other 
reforms in the report linked them to magistrates’ choices in the impending general 
election. The ideas of Longford were later crucially altered in the first White Paper: 
the ‘family service’ became a ‘family council’ of social workers with powers of 
punishment, though as with Longford, a special family court for disputed facts. 
There was strong opposition from many quarters; the Law Society, the probation 
service, and particularly the MA, who feared coercion of ‘weak’ parents by social 
services and wanted under 14s to appear in their juvenile courts. All had a vested 
interest in the existing proceedings. The Labour government, fearful of defeat 
withdrew the Paper. 
A new start was made under the leadership of a charismatic civil servant, 
who produced another White Paper, ‘Children in Trouble’, carefully named to 
include the troublesome as well as the troubled. It wisely spoke of the need to protect 
society, and kept the juvenile courts, though under 14s found guilty of offences 
would only be brought to them if they were also in need of care. It included phasing 
out punitive custody once alternatives were in place, and proposed new methods of 
appointing juvenile court magistrates. The MA mounted a nationwide campaign to 
remove the ‘care’ criterion, claiming it would make their courts look discriminatory.  
The Labour government had embarked on a raft of legislative reforms that 
affected the world of the magistracy, and the 1960s’ social revolution, repeatedly 
evident in the media, challenged their stable world still further. Scotland did not have 
a single, powerful judicial body to resist Kilbrandon’s reforms and had the support 
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of Conservatives and Labour. Both jurisdictions relied on the rehabilitation of 
children in trouble by meeting their welfare needs, but the Scots believed in the 
power of the family, with support and guidance, the English/Welsh magistracy did 
not.  
Kilbrandon had rejected the argument for ‘due process’ in this field, and 
equality of outcome, and saw the needs of the individual child as paramount. Only 
the choice of the administrative base for the juvenile justice reforms was to prove the 
stumbling block, not issues of ‘due process’, ‘children’s rights’, punishment, 
deterrence or public protection. In England/Wales, the magistracy and lawyers, 
supported by the Conservative Opposition, strongly opposed the perceived inequality 
between the treatment of two juveniles found guilty of the same offence. The 
Longford reforms were rejected from the beginning by the magistracy, and neither of 
the two subsequent White Papers was acceptable to them. Throughout, there had 
been a remarkable lack of communication between Scotland and England/Wales: 
neither jurisdiction had invoked the reforms of the other in support. It was left to the 
Parliamentarians to do so.       
 
ooOoo 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE SOCIAL WORK (SCOTLAND) BILL 1968 AND THE 
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS BILL 1969 
 
The Bills were heavily based on their earlier White Papers, the Scots ‘Social 
Work in the Community’ and ‘Children in Trouble’ for England/Wales, both 
published in 1968.  Whilst the Scottish reforms proposed an entirely new body to 
deal with juveniles in trouble and those who were troublesome, and the English 
retained their juvenile courts, nonetheless there were considerable similarities 
between the two Bills. Each required a body of lay people to take decisions over the 
future of the juveniles; used a single individual to sieve the cases; expected the 
‘hearing’ or the court to be used as a last resort; required that the child was also in 
need of compulsory measures of care; involved a change in the use of the existing 
probation services; required multi-agency co-operation; and had been developed 
over several years. 
However, there were significant differences between the two countries before 
the start of these proposed reforms. The age range for children accused of offences 
was 8-17 in Scotland, 10-17 in the English juvenile courts. There was no single 
juvenile court structure covering Scotland, but a mixture of several, including lay 
people and sheriffs, and no single organization to represent them to politicians or 
civil servants. In England, there was essentially one uniform structure and a central, 
powerful body to represent its interests. The English courts had a full range of 
punitive measures, including borstal training from 15 years, DCs, attendance centres 
and fines, whereas Scotland only had fines as a purely punitive measure, apart from 
borstal training for 16s. Both had approved schools and could order remand in penal 
custody under ‘unruly certificates’, an exceptional measure. The English were more 
used to punishing than the Scots and would see it as a weapon in their armoury 
against juvenile delinquency. 
Both Bills were before the Houses of Parliament for the United Kingdom at 
Westminster, the Scottish Bill was first introduced in the House of Lords, the 
English Bill in the House of Commons. After the general election of 1966, the 
Labour government was returned with a majority of 100. In the Commons, of the 
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630 members, no fewer than 65 were currently or had been Justices of the Peace (JP) 
in Scotland or England and Wales, and another 108 were lawyers. In Scotland some 
were burgh magistrates, elected councillors, but all held judicial office in a lay 
capacity and are referred to here as magistrates as are the JPs in England and Wales. 
Of the 68 Scottish MPs, 17 were magistrates, of those, 13 were Labour, four 
Conservative. Politically, there were nearly twice as many Labour MPs in Scotland 
as there were Conservatives, 41 to 22, with five Liberals. In the Lords, at least 132 of 
the 1000 peers were magistrates. Lord Merthyr, a deputy speaker, was the current 
chairman of the MA; Lord Royle a former Labour MP and deputy-chairman of the 
MA; several peers had wives who were magistrates, including Cordelia James and 
Teresa Rothschild, both members of the JCC. There was a large Conservative 
majority in the House of Lords. At the time, the MA represented some 15,000 
magistrates, about 65% of the total number in the country on the active list. 
The Social Work (Scotland) Bill 1968 was debated in Parliament from March 
to July 1968, covering the period of the publication of the English White Paper 
‘Children in Trouble’, but the ensuing Children and Young Persons Bill was debated 
almost exactly a year later.  
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5.1 Social Work (Scotland) Bill 1968 
The Parliamentary procedure of the United Kingdom was extremely complex 
and a Bill that was essentially Scottish in nature had added rules to circumnavigate, 
as did one introduced in the House of Lords, such as this Bill.  As the Second 
Reading was not opposed, the Conservatives when in power had accepted the main 
proposals, the Bill had been ‘considered in principle’ by a ‘Grand Committee’, of all 
Scottish MPs in July 1964. For various technical and procedural rules the main 
scrutiny was now by the ‘Scottish Standing Committee’ of the Commons, only 
Scottish MPs and reflecting the Party numbers, so that the government kept its 
majority (Cowperthwaite 1988); and the Second Reading was taken on the Floor of 
the House of Commons (Hansard SC 1967-8 X:554).  
There had been one major change to the White Paper in writing the Bill. The 
original had proposed that the whole county should be the ideal administrative unit, 
big enough to provide a career structure to attract the best talent, resources and 
facilities for the new role of social work departments. However, the Bill proposed 
the large burghs, not least because some burghs were much larger than counties in 
population, and many Labour MPs were from the large burghs. It was to prove a 
highly controversial change. 
On the 6
th 
March 1968, Lord Hughes
127
, a magistrate himself, introduced the 
Bill in the House of Lords. He said that the Bill intended to restrict the prosecution 
of children for offences and “to establish children’s panels to provide children’s 
hearings in the case of children requiring compulsory measures of care” (HL 289: 
1348). The old juvenile court maximum age limit of under 17 would be lowered to 
under 16 for the children’s hearing, except for those already subject to supervision, 
when it would be under 18. The minimum age would remain at eight years. With the 
new age limit, it meant that those aged 16 were no longer protected by care and 
control proceedings, and could be liable to be sentenced to borstal, detention centre 
and young offender institutes. The children’s hearings system would mean that the 
current, single arena for trial and sentence, the court however constituted, was to be 
replaced with two separate bodies if the ground were not accepted, a sheriff in 
chambers for the establishment of the ground, and the hearing for the disposal.  
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5.1.1   Lords – Second Reading 
Hughes introduced the Second Reading in a debate that started at 8.40 p.m. 
The lateness of the hour attracted considerable criticism from the Opposition, rather 
than the principles surrounding the radical concept of the non-prosecution of those 
under 16, the needs rather than the deeds of the child being the relevant factor. 
Hughes, in introducing the debate, set the tone by declaring that: 
The quality of any society may depend largely on the stature and calibre 
of the people who shape it, but in the last resort it will be judged by the 
humanity it shows towards those who are shaped by it. I believe that this 
Bill offers us the means to extend that humanity in accord with our social 
conscience… (HL 290:801) 
The Marquess of Lothian from the Conservative benches rose “to extend a 
general welcome to the Bill…any criticisms and suggestions which are offered by 
my colleagues and me are offered in an entirely constructive spirit” (HL 290:801-2). 
After paying tribute to Kilbrandon, he supported both the Bill’s fundamental 
purposes, a single social work department and the abolition of juvenile courts, 
replaced by “children’s panels composed of lay persons of experience, whose 
decisions, if disputed, can always be subject to appeal to the sheriff” and welcomed 
the more “relaxed, informal and sympathetic atmosphere” of the children’s hearings 
and that they “should operate by parental consent” (HL 290:802). 
Only one speaker, the Scottish Ferrier, a Conservative, refused to support the 
Bill, “so full of defects that it would be much better to start again” (HL 290:834-6), 
and said “Local authority councillors are not fitted to select such panels” yet that was 
exactly how the burgh magistrates were appointed. Others who had reservations 
about the hearings were all on the Conservative benches, except the Labour Wells-
Pestell, the only non-Scot to speak, a former probation officer. He could see no 
reason to abolish juvenile courts (HL 290:825). Baroness Elliot was “anxious to see 
it become a good and useful Act” but implied that it was hardly necessary to set up a 
whole new machinery for the small number of delinquents (HL 290:821).  
Given that new lay panels were to replace the lay JPs and bailies who dealt 
with about two thirds of the cases of young offenders, Hughes, a justice himself, 
acknowledged the “risks in investing a lay body with this wide range of compulsory 
powers over a child” (HL 290:798), and offered to have “careful selection of people 
to serve on these panels”. Lothian wanted obligatory training, a fixed period of 
appointment and proposed an age range 25 – 65, suggestions considered ‘eminently 
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reasonable’ by the government at Committee stage. Lothian also wanted the 
appointment of “housewives, and people like that who have experience of children 
and of families from the practical point of view” (HL 290:805). 
Many on both sides of the House had praised Kilbrandon, and no one spoke 
of the need for punitive measures against juvenile delinquency. As a Scottish Bill, 
the legal issues based on Roman law were not of interest to those English 
parliamentarians who were lawyers practicing Common Law, and thus took little 
interest in it. However, magistrates from both jurisdictions had spoken, none 
speaking of the loss of powers, the need for punishment, or any inherent unfairness 
in the proposed new system.  
5.1.2   Lords - Committee Stage  
This Committee was of the whole House of Lords. A Conservative 
amendment to remove the large burghs from the local authority unit to administer the 
Act was by far the most contentious and politically problematic issue for Labour 
given the Conservative inbuilt majority in the Lords. Of the 76 peers who voted in 
favour of the amendment, ten were magistrates, but a further eight were happy to 
vote with their Party against the amendment, and none spoke claiming any authority 
as magistrates. They all voted on Party lines, and the government lost 47:76,  
The second contentious issue was that of the absorption of the probation 
service into social work departments. Two people, who spoke quoting their 
experience as magistrates, were from each side of the House, and took opposing 
views. The government won 48:46 with 15 English magistrates equally divided. 
The Conservative Balerno wanted the panel to have a responsibility to reduce 
and prevent delinquency and in that role, saw the importance of better family 
services and recreational facilities; and his colleague Drumalbyn wanted to enforce 
the dissociation of the hearings from the criminal courts and police stations, and to 
restrict the numbers able to attend a hearing. Hughes acknowledged the tension 
between the press and the public’s legitimate interest in the hearings, and the need 
for an informal atmosphere, and hoped the “Press will be able to do much to form 
public attitudes towards the hearings” (HL 291:227). 
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5.1.3   Lords - Third Reading 
The most criticised aspect of this radical Bill was the speed with which the 
Conservatives perceived it had proceeded. Whilst a number of peers were or had 
been magistrates or bailies and several mentioned that fact in their speeches, none 
spoke on behalf of them nor that they had been lobbied in any way by any related 
organisation. Some had mentioned that the Sheriff-Substitute Association had 
objected to the removal of the probation service as an independent body. With the 
exception of Ferrier, everyone approved of the principles behind the radical 
proposals of Kilbrandon, if not all the practicalities, regardless of their judicial 
experience. 
5.1.4   Commons – Second Reading – 6th May 1968 
Crossman and Hart
128
 of the Department of Social Services, aware that 
Scotland was a year ahead of England/Wales with proposals for social services 
reforms had intended to listen to the debate. However, just as they were going in: 
we realized that the Scots would suspect some poisonous English 
conspiracy so we would have to keep out, come what may. I quote this to 
show how deep is the separation which already exists between England 
and Scotland. (Crossman 1977:48) 
Hart’s absence demonstrates this divide even more: although her brief now 
was social services, she had been the Under-Secretary Scotland who had proposed 
that the new juvenile panels in Scotland would come under the social services and 
not the education department which Kilbrandon had planned. 
Ross, the Secretary of State, outlined the three main parts of this unopposed 
Bill, with the “very considerable change on the lines recommended by the 
Kilbrandon Committee” with its establishment of children’s hearings to replace 
juvenile courts. He emphasised the need to safeguard the legal rights of the child and 
that panels should be carefully selected for their “suitability and their ability to help 
children and not because of their prominence in any existing organisation or body” 
and properly trained and prepared.  Like many later speakers, he reminded the House 
of the concern about delinquency and that the hearings would not be a soft option 
(HC 764:58-9). 
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Noble, for the Opposition, gave a warm welcome to the Bill, having been the 
Secretary of State for Scotland who had accepted the recommendations of the 
Kilbrandon Report. He too, spoke of the “appalling rise in juvenile crime”, but also 
of “the fragile generation, the teenagers between 14-16 who seem to be the hardest 
and most difficult to handle”. He spoke of the need to recruit far more and better 
qualified social workers, comparing the position unfavourably with that in England. 
The only areas of disagreement were about the timing, the issue of the large burghs 
and the need for the probation service for adults to remain a separate identity.  
Two magistrates next spoke, from each side of the House: both mentioned 
the rising crime rate, and both generally supported the proposals. Many speakers 
mentioned the volume of their post-bag, and the main comments against the 
proposals were the dangers of a lay body The Conservative Wolridge-Gordon was 
one of the few to want an element of punishment and Lord Dalkeith wanted to fine 
the parents, a proposal particularly rejected by Kilbrandon because of the need to 
seek the co-operation of the parents. 
In summing up this debate, remarkably uncontentious on the substantive 
issues, Millan, the Under-Secretary of State, mentioned the continuing responsibility 
that the hearing would have over the child, and that if Scotland were ahead of the 
English in this legislation he hoped to maintain that advantage (HC 764:142).  
5.1.5   Commons – Scottish Standing Committee  
There were 30 Scottish MPs on the Standing Committee, including three 
lawyers and nine magistrates, and Margaret Herbison had been a member of the 
Longford Committee. There was a Labour majority. There was an extremely lengthy 
debate on the use of large burghs as the administrative base, which the government 
won 11:8, reversing the decision of the Lords. The second contentious issue was the 
absorption of the probation service into the social work departments. The 
Conservative Younger acknowledged that the probation service itself was divided 
over the issue, but courts needed to “have real confidence that a completely new face 
which appears before them will carry out the requests of the court” (SC 67-8 X:330). 
The government won, voting being on Party lines. Confidence in the probation and 
social services was to be a key issue in the implementation of the English juvenile 
justice reforms too. Members on both sides of the House had spoken of the shortage 
of social workers in Scotland.   
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Clause 31, the heart of the Bill, restricted prosecution of children (8-16) to 
offences such as murder, culpable homicide, rape or robbery and other crimes 
considered serious enough to be brought to the attention of the Lord Advocate. The 
Conservative lawyer Wylie welcomed this restriction. Millan said that there was a 
problem with road traffic matters, which might require disqualification and the 
children concerned would have to go before a court. With no official opposition, and 
few other comments, there was no need for a vote on this crucial clause and thus 
children under 16 in Scotland would no longer be prosecuted except for special 
categories. 
Clause 32, concerned the issue of children being in need of compulsory 
measures of care before they could be brought before the hearing, the vital ‘second 
leg’. The Edinburgh Conservative, although English barrister, Hutchison, “was 
concerned about the child’s rights and feared that the informal atmosphere 
encouraged the child to admit his or her guilt”. He wanted experts to “handle them 
rather than a lot of amateurs” (HC SC 1967-8 X: 379), rather suggesting that he was 
unaware that two thirds of juvenile cases were already dealt with by lay people with 
minimal training in the burgh and juvenile courts. 
The rights of the child, in relation to the protection thought to be afforded by 
the judicial approach of the court rather than the informal hearings, were a 
continuing theme throughout the Committee’s deliberations, Conservative MPs 
largely supporting that contention. But, the Labour Eadie, a former juvenile court 
chairman, described a juvenile court as, “one most prejudicial to the best interests…” 
(1967-8 X:462). A vote on a Conservative amendment requiring the child to have the 
charge put to him and a formal admittance or denial was just defeated, 10:12, 
Members voting on Party lines, Millan stating it was inconsistent with the whole 
spirit of the hearings (1967-8 X:458). 
Dewar questioned bringing minor offenders before the hearings and Millan 
reminded him that providing the parents were co-operative with the social workers, 
there would be no need for a hearing. Two Conservative lawyers were alarmed at 
this, “offences vanishing into thin air” (1967-8 X:386) but another Conservative was 
assured by Millan that the hearing would be able to rebuke a child. At ‘consideration 
stage’, Dewar reiterated his wish for a wide range of sanctions and said that in 
England and Wales in the White Paper ‘Children in Trouble’ courts would still have 
the deterrent of the fine, and asked why not in Scotland (HC 768:1531). Millan was 
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not unsympathetic to the dilemma of the minor offence question, but feared that the 
fine “may become an easy way out for the children's hearing which is perhaps 
slightly baffled or puzzled about what it might do” (SC 1967-8 X:504). 
Millan emphasised Kilbrandon’s view of the importance of the hearings 
meeting in schools, local halls, not purpose built because “if they were to establish 
premises of their own which were recognised as premises belonging to the children’s 
hearing that advantage would be lost” (1967-8 X: 392).  That desire to remove any 
sense of stigma had been a key feature of the juvenile justice reforms in the 
Longford Report too. The Conservative Baker feared that “it is the do-gooders who 
will be put on the panels… we shall have cosy chats taking place within the panels, 
with no kind of sanction on the child” (1967-8 X:395), a view supported by the 
Conservative Hutchison. However, a quite contrary view was taken by another 
Conservative, MacArthur, pointing out that many Members had talked of the 
“terrifying rise in juvenile crime in Scotland”, which had happened under the present 
system, and he did not want to give the impression that there was any substantial 
concern about the proposed reforms. He wanted to see “commonsense panels… cast 
the net more widely” (1967-8 X:400).  
The Opposition welcomed Millan’s offer of the safeguard that legal 
representation for the child would not be excluded. He assured them that the 
independence of the new ‘reporter’ was critical, although need not be a lawyer but 
perhaps a children’s officer or a probation officer.  
Millan explained that implementation would be in two distinct phases: the 
reorganisation of the local authority services, followed by the introduction of the 
children’s hearings once the “matching field organisation” was in place, the panels 
appointed and trained and the reporters recruited. He hoped commencement would 
be sometime in 1970.  The Opposition had tabled some hundred amendments, yet no 
one seriously challenged the philosophy of this radical Bill, despite the Labour Hugh 
Brown later claiming that “tempers were somewhat frayed, doors were being banged 
and various points of order were being raised…” (HC 768:1473) 
5.1.6   Commons – Consideration  
There was considerable discussion about the finger-printing of children, a 
practice that was allowable from the age of eight years, whereas in England there 
had to be special circumstances for under 14s. Most of the Labour MPs were against 
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the practice because it was “associated with the concept of criminality... abhorrent 
and so contrary to the other ideas embodied in the Bill” (HC 768:1460). Ross 
countered that serious offences were committed by children and it was sometimes 
essential for collecting evidence.  
In discussing the complex issue of informality and public accountability in 
the hearings
129
, as offered by the presence of the press, Millan said there would be 
provision to remove the press from the hearing if necessary. There would also be a 
prohibition on publishing anything on the proceedings or to identify the child, and 
that the numbers of people at the hearing should be limited (HC 768:1522). Dewar 
was not happy with the press being present and argued that if the child or parents 
“feel that they are getting a raw deal, they can go to the Press and turn the spotlight 
of publicity on events.” (HC 768:1523) The Conservative, MacArthur, sympathised 
with that view but argued that as this was a “challenging experiment…public interest 
in them should be encouraged” (HC 768:1524) Dempsey, the Labour justice, said he 
had never ever seen anyone from the press in court (HC 768:1526).  
5.1.7   Commons – Third Reading 
Some Conservatives still had reservations: Wolridge-Gordon thought 
punishment was essential, while Baker thought the Bill would have to be 
reconsidered. Nonetheless, the Conservative MacArthur felt able to point out that 
Kilbrandon “was set up by the Conservative Government, and the Bill which largely 
resulted from it was introduced by this Government, so … we can both share the 
credit” and significantly mentioned the “rising crime and frightening violence in 
Scotland” (HC 768:1526).  Mackenzie for the Liberals said that his Party welcomed 
the Bill (HC 768:1588). As in the House of Lords debates, no one spoke of a 
campaign by any organisations to defeat or alter the philosophy of the Bill. Margaret 
Herbison, the former member of the Longford Committee, though she never referred 
to that in any of her speeches, somewhat ruefully observed that, “having had the 
Kilbrandon Report early, [we] are going far ahead of England and Wales in this 
social legislation provision” (SC 1967-8 X:553). 
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5.1.8   Lords Consideration of Commons Amendments and Assent 
Hughes said “when the Bill was considered in another place it was given a 
general welcome, as indeed it had been by your Lordships. There has been no 
appreciable dissent from the main purposes of the Bill…” The Commons’ 
amendments were accepted, only three peers spoke. Lady Elliot hoped local 
authorities would combine and she would “do everything possible to see that the area 
in which I live co-operates… I hope that it will prove to be a successful Act of 
Parliament” (HL 295:1208). Royal assent was granted on the 26th July 1968. 
5.1.9   Conclusion to Social Work Scotland Act 1968 
Cowperthwaite (1988:1), the Assistant Secretary of the Criminal Justice 
Division in the Scottish Home Department during the period, wrote an account of the 
progress of the legislation of this particular Act, because he had: 
a continuing feeling of surprise that so radical a change in measures for 
dealing with juvenile delinquents should have taken place so smoothly in 
a country that had not previously been strikingly innovative or 
‘progressive’ in the criminal justice field.  
Magistrates in Scotland and in England and Wales had certainly contributed 
to the debates on this Bill in both Houses, but their partisanship had been to their 
political party rather than their judicial office. We cannot know what conversations 
may have been had outside the debating chambers, and can only speculate on the 
influence the justice Baroness Elliot may have had on her Tory colleagues, both as 
chairman of the Conservative Party and as a close personal friend, as the powerful 
and knowledgeable chair of SACCC, and her association with the Kilbrandon 
Committee. As Professor Stone said “People were terrified of her!” 130 
There was no evidence of any concerted effort to resist the fundamental 
change in philosophy in regard to juvenile delinquents that the Social Work 
(Scotland) Act enshrined. Cowperthwaite (p.31) mentions that both the higher 
judiciary and sheriffs opposed the ‘hearings’ part of the Bill in 1965, but there is no 
evidence that they pressed their complaint. It is possible that Kilbrandon himself, a 
very senior member of the Scottish judiciary, was able to allay their fears, just as he 
had won over the Conservatives back in 1964. The abolition of the juvenile courts 
clearly aroused little opposition, perhaps because of their disparate nature and 
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because the justices in Scotland had a “lack of a national political movement and 
opposition from the population as a whole” (Skyrme 1991 vol. III: 91). 
What little talk there had been of punishment only referred to fines. 
Significantly, there was no mention of deterrence, not even in terms of a threat once 
the age threshold had been crossed into ‘adulthood’, with the punitive powers 
available post 16 years. 
It was an Act that returned wholesale to the belief propounded by the Lord 
Advocate Shaw in the 1908 Children Bill, “the object [is] to treat these children not 
by way of punishing them – which is no remedy – but with a view to their 
reformation” (Shaw 1908). Perhaps it was the manifest failure of the existing system 
to reform, as the Conservative MacArthur had pointed out, that had led to so little 
opposition, and a willingness to try radical new measures.  
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5.2 Children and Young Persons Bill 1969 
 
On the 30th January 1969, the JCC held its regular meeting, at which 
Cordelia James, despite personally wanting to see the age of criminal responsibility 
raised to 16, was re-elected as chairman. They discussed ‘Children in Trouble’ and 
the ‘CAYP Bill  and reported that representatives of the Committee had a ‘useful’ 
meeting with members of the Liberal Party and were about to meet those from the 
Labour and Conservatives Parties. The Conservatives’ Home Affairs Committee had 
first suggested a discussion, and, no doubt mindful of the MA’s apolitical 
constitution, Cordelia James had consulted the other political parties too (JCC 
1969:271). 
On the 4
th
 March 1969, she chaired a special meeting of the Committee to 
discuss the CAYP Bill one week before its Second Reading. The Secretary of the 
MA, AJ Brayshaw, pointedly reminded the Committee of the MA policy in the 
memorandum ‘Children in Trouble’ July 1968, when the Council had “substantially 
amended” the JCC’s own response. He warned that if there were changes, “any 
apparent indecision or wavering of opinion would be taken to discredit the firmness 
of the Association’s views” (JCC 1969:274). There was none. The JCC endorsed the 
Council’s view to delete the additional requirement to bring a child or young person 
before the court only if he were also “in need of care or control…” However, even at 
this late stage, two members, unidentified, voted against the official response of the 
MA on this crucial clause: both Cordelia James and Teresa Rothschild, close friends 
of the Minister Baroness Serota, were present at the meeting. 
The Committee was unanimous in wanting to retain the power to order 
compensation; to delete all reference to the consent of a juvenile justice before 
proceedings could be brought; to recommend that the Secretary of State should give 
directions to the local authority about a child in their care; the parent to have a right 
of appeal; and that if the age of criminal responsibility were to be raised at any time 
it should only be by one year until treatment facilities were available. Since the Lord 
Chancellor had explained that he would only use his power to appoint juvenile 
panels outside London where the panels were not working well, the Committee 
decided to take no further action. They wanted to change the name of Community 
Homes by adding ‘and Schools’, with special school status under the Department of 
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Education and Science. A campaign was launched against the provisions of the Bill 
to which the Association objected, Cordelia James and the Secretary would send 
letters to Parliament, and the media, especially ‘The Times’ (JCC 1969:274). 
5.2.1   Commons - Second Reading - 11
th
 March 1969  
The Bill is not in any way ‘soft’ or permissive… it is endeavouring to get 
to the root of the troubles with which we are dealing, and not just 
attempting to handle the symptoms and then forget the cause of the 
problems… (Callaghan – Hansard HC 779:1177) 
On Tuesday, 11
th
 March 1969, the first letter in ‘The Times’ was from 
Brayshaw, Secretary of the MA, highly critical of the crucial clauses of the CAYP 
Bill. It announced that equality before the law was at peril, and juvenile offenders 
would get off scot-free
131
, a view, according to the civil servant dealing with the Bill, 
that the proposers would have considered   “a grossly distorted and partial 
presentation of the facts”132. 
When the Home Secretary, Callaghan, rose later that day to introduce his 
Bill, he faced a House of Commons which could include some 47 current or former 
magistrates in England and Wales, 27 from his own benches, 20 from the 
Opposition. Added to this powerful group were many MPs, who had been lobbied by 
their local magistrates individually, or the local bench, or by a letter from the MA or 
seen the MA’s comments in the libraries of both Houses. During the debates many 
MPs were to quote these comments of the magistracy, or, indeed, their own 
experiences as magistrates. However, there were a further 17 Scottish magistrates, 
fresh from the successful and radical reforms of their own juvenile justice system, 
which had moved entirely to a welfare-based system to deal with the issues of 
juvenile delinquency. Of the 17, three were Conservatives who had served on the 
Standing Committee of the Social Work (Scotland) Bill 1968, none had voiced any 
objections to the principles of the proposed Children’s Hearings System, which 
provided that only those thought to be in need of compulsory measures of care 
should be brought before a tribunal. Other Members in the Commons with a 
particular interest were 107 lawyers, including 46 on the Labour Benches, 52 on the 
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Conservative, four Ulster Unionists, four Liberals and one from the Scottish National 
Party who had wished to retain the juvenile courts in Scotland. 
Callaghan, well aware of the antagonism towards the main thrust of the Bill, 
acknowledged that the Opposition Amendment “accepts the case put forward by the 
Magistrates Association”, although “not all magistrates or juvenile magistrates 
support the case” (HC 779:1189). There were two “distinguished lawyers” 
supporting the magistracy leading the Opposition, Mark Carlisle and Quentin Hogg, 
QC. Callaghan spoke of the Bill’s aim, “to prevent the deprived and delinquent 
children of today from becoming the deprived, inadequate, unstable or criminal 
citizens of tomorrow”, and countered the charge of unfairness in Brayshaw’s letter 
by explaining that the government hoped,  
to ensure as nearly as we can real equality for all children of all classes 
and backgrounds… I mean ‘equality’ and ‘uniformity’. [Because of 
police cautioning] …there are thousands of children who, in the strict 
sense of the word, are delinquents, but who do not go near a court today 
(HC 779:1177)… They should come before the court only as a last 
resort. I want to see that the range of facilities which is naturally 
available to support the middle-class child who goes wrong – what is 
called in the letter from the Secretary of the Magistrates' Association  the 
‘good’ home as against the ‘bad’ home…available for other children 
(HC 779:1191). 
Hogg, for the Opposition, moved an amendment to refuse the Second 
Reading, on this issue of ‘fairness’. He quoted the separate memorandum from the 
London and Southport magistrates saying that all they needed were more facilities 
(HC 779:1197). Perhaps with an eye to the weight of magisterial support, he made a 
less than oblique reference to the fundamental tenet of the magistrate, “…some of us 
care more about justice than almost anything else in the world…” (HC 779:1203). 
The Labour barrister Peter Archer spoke of the “more rational and compassionate 
way of dealing with these problems”, and that the MA saw the law distinguishing 
only “between conduct, not between persons or circumstances... equality before the 
law means that the law makes only distinctions which are relevant to fairness and 
commonsense” (HC 779:1278). He warned that courts must take great care over the 
offence condition, since “an innocent child has a right not to be helped” (HC 
779:1278).  
Several Labour lawyers spoke. Paul Rose mentioned the MA and his own 
constituency juvenile panel in Manchester, and gave an unflattering description of 
the courthouse environs:  
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an overcrowded ill-lit room, in which the juvenile offenders, traffic and 
other offenders, police officers, court ushers, probation officers, 
children’s officers, solicitors, counsel –all sorts of people- mill about, 
apparently aimlessly… (HC 779:1209) 
 Gordon Oakes MP spoke of such areas as a “snakepit” outside the courtroom, often 
in the corridors, whilst in the courtroom, the magistrates sit 
… in lofty isolation on their bench far removed from the children they 
are considering. The children stand bemused, often amused, in the well 
of the court. The parents stand behind them disconsolately or angrily, 
knowing little of the proceedings going on (HC 779:1235).  
Harry Howarth, JP, Labour, former member of the MA Council, challenged this 
view saying they were “conducted in the best possible manner with the equipment 
and facilities available” and the Conservative lawyer, David Waddington had the 
“highest regard for juvenile court magistrates… the great care which is already taken 
to make juvenile courts different in character and atmosphere from ordinary courts”. 
Waddington also thought the Lord Chancellor should not appoint juvenile 
panels “in secret” (HC 779:1272), seemingly unaware that the vast majority of 
magisterial appointments were made in complete secret (Mag. 1971:81). Howarth 
hoped that no-one would be appointed to the juvenile panel if they had not served on 
the adult bench, as was the case in Inner London, and that the Lord Chancellor could 
not know the suitability of potential juvenile magistrates more than the local 
Benches (HC 779:1257). The Conservative William Deedes agreed, accepted that 
some magistrates supported the Bill, but thought “the majority have reservations” 
(HC 779:1218). The Labour Member and juvenile court chairman himself, Charles 
Mapp thought the early sifting process should not be done by a magistrate and 
wanted some form of compensation to victims (HC 779:1223).  
  Gill Knight quoted the MA to support her view that the age of criminal 
responsibility should remain at ten years, and that it “was a considered opinion of the 
magistrates that no changes were needed in the treatment of the 10-17 age group” 
(HC 779:1240). The Liberal lawyer Emlyn Hooson wanted children to be held 
accountable for their actions and the age not to be raised. At the Standing 
Committee, Worsley spoke of the “many magistrates’ courts, as far apart as 
Wimbledon and Tees-side”, wanting the age to be raised by only one year at a time, 
and the Conservatives wanted affirmative action by Parliament, a later vote, to raise 
the age from 12 to 14 years. This was agreed at Report Stage by the lawyer Elystan 
Morgan, Under-Secretary, Home Office (Hansard SC 1968-9 V: 472). 
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Concluding for the Opposition, Sir Peter Rawlinson, QC said that as some 
150,000 juveniles were being cautioned or prosecuted, it was 
 no time for softness... the interests of the State demand that an offence 
shall, generally, be prosecuted, irrespective of the circumstances of the 
accused. (HC 779:1288)  
He made no reference to the role of cautioning, nor how that discretion was 
exercised, a point picked up for the government by Morgan, who also mentioned the 
silence of the MA on the matter, and the huge variations between police services in 
the rates of cautioning, from 65% to under 5%. The Bill was designed to  
reflect developments in the organisation of the services concerned …how 
personal and environmental factors during childhood and adolescence 
may influence the whole of an individual’s later life. (HC 779:1291) 
Each child had individual needs and to ignore them would be unjust.  
The Conservative amendment to reject the essence of the Bill was lost by 140 
to 200 votes. There had been 44 magistrates in the House, 14 Conservative, 1 Ulster 
Unionist and 29 Labour, but all voted on party lines. The Conservative MPs who 
voted included five who had been on the Scottish Standing Committee for the Social 
Work (Scotland) Act 1968. Only one of them had expressed outright hostility to that 
Act, the other four, two were JPs, nevertheless voted against Clause 1 of this 1969 
Act. 
‘The Times’ on the following morning, took an unfavourable line, 
concentrating on the lack of punishment for the under fourteen year olds, “… a child 
needs above all an exemplary punishment as a sharp warning to mend his ways”. A 
lengthy article in the ‘Magistrate’ (1969:45) sent to all 15,000 members forcefully 
recorded the views of the MA, its strong objection to the ‘double’ test, “...the whole 
idea of equality before the law is flouted”, one law for the rich and another for the 
poor. The MA did not accept the proposed various forms of treatment excluding 
punishment, and felt “very strongly indeed that the court should retain power to 
order payment” of compensation and fines. Magistrates all over the country had 
equally objected to the proposal that consent of a juvenile court magistrate was 
required, as “it was a social welfare decision rather than a judicial one”. The article 
concluded in stark terms,  
the Bill will encourage children to believe that they are not answerable 
for their actions, nor have they to pay any penalty for wrong-doing ... 
they will know that some favoured children are never brought to court, 
when others are. 
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A further note reported that two Labour MPs, who were magistrates, had 
been left off at Committee Stage because they had criticised the Bill.  
5.2.2   Commons – Standing Committee - 20th March - 13th May 1969 
The Standing Committee, with 20 members and chaired by the Labour MP 
Rogers, included eight lawyers and two magistrates, one Conservative and one 
Labour from Scotland, the Opposition complaining at some length about the 
composition of the Committee. Each MP had received a letter from the MA 
expressing its strong reservations about the Bill, and not surprisingly, in speaking 
against the Bill, almost all MPs mentioned communications from magistrates or their 
own experiences.  
The Conservative David Lane reported letters from the Cambridgeshire 
Juvenile Panels “worried by some of the provisions” and that it was “a measure of 
their concern that for the first time they have thought it right to raise these matters 
with their local MP” (SC 1968-69 V: 13). Carlisle reported objections by Manchester 
City and the London Juvenile Benches; the “strong article in the Times”; the Clerk to 
Liverpool Justices and MPs with “experience of being magistrates and chairmen of 
benches” (1968-69 V:59).   Gill Knight thought the Bill would lead to “Young 
persons appearing at any rate in the eyes of the public, to get clean away with wrong 
doing…” She had “watched with enormous admiration, the way in which juvenile 
benches have dealt with children appearing before them” (1968-69 V:76). An 
opposite view was taken by two Labour lawyers: Davidson, who had practiced in the 
same courts as Carlisle, said “it is very rare indeed for a young child, as for anyone 
at all, to come out of court feeling that he has been fairly treated” (1968-69 V:71); 
and Oakes said there were “many magistrates on this side” along with the 
Association of Municipal Corporations, the Association of Managers of Approved 
Schools, and the County Councils Association (1968-69 V:78).  
Callaghan expressed “astonishment that there is such unanimity in supporting 
the magistrates’ view among the Opposition” (1968-69 V:86).  In defence of Clause 
1, he quoted the Conservative s.2 Children and Young Persons Act 1963 which 
stated that if a child “…is not receiving such care, protection and guidance as a good 
parent may reasonably be expected to give”, and said in the new clause the definition 
of a good parent had been removed, as it was about the child and not the parent; and 
spoke of the dissatisfaction of both children and parents with the juvenile courts, 
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which he learnt in his surgeries as an MP. The Opposition amendment to remove the 
second hurdle, ‘in need of care…’ was defeated by 8:10 votes. On learning of this, 
Cordelia James, as chairman of the JCC, had urged all MA Council members to keep 
up the pressure by contacting their MPs, particularly if they happened to be members 
of the Standing Committee as the clause might be changed at the Report Stage or in 
the House of Lords.  
Several Conservatives quoted magistrates in their own area wanting a greater 
range of treatment, and powers to award compensation and fines “rather than other 
powers such as probation orders or conditional discharges” (1968-69 V:115), which 
Morgan noted were “all founded upon a punitive element… entirely repugnant to the 
main theme of the Bill”. Callaghan explained that social workers visiting children in 
their own homes would have much greater insight than magistrates in an hour in a 
courtroom, which was why he did not want “the magistrate to fetter the discretion of 
the children’s officer” (1968-69 V:127-8). He wanted to encourage parental 
responsibility, offering greater facilities and when that failed, a police caution, and 
even try voluntary measures after that. (1968-69 V:184). Worsley feared a “young, 
rather headstrong… children’s officer going to a family and involuntarily putting the 
matter as a threat… So the matter is agreed” (1968-69 V:190). Carlisle said 
probation officers, like magistrates, also felt that there was too much discretion being 
given to supervising officers, who could ignore the court’s directions (1968-69 
V:324). Morgan noted that the MA had originally said the probation service should 
operate from the 10
th
 birthday upwards but recently had made no comment in a new 
memorandum, and presumed their objection was “no longer sustained” (1968-69 
V:352). 
Clause 5, which required the consent for criminal proceedings against young 
persons by a single magistrate, was one of the few clauses to be criticised by both 
sides of the Committee. Carlisle proposed an amendment, supported by magistrates 
and probation officers, thinking the concept “cumbersome…largely 
unworkable…undesirable… unnecessary” (1968-69 V:226). Archer, Labour, spoke 
of the difficulties of a single magistrate deciding, being unable to investigate like a 
‘Juge d’Instruction’. Morgan said it was an “accident of geography” that a child 
appeared in court, and expressed surprise that the “Magistrates Association has taken 
the attitude that this is no proper part of magistrates’ functions”. However, in view of 
the opposition from both sides of the Committee he withdrew it (1968-69 V:235), 
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but there would be consultation between the social services and the police before a 
decision to prosecute. 
Carlisle objected to the power in Clause 10, which removed the court’s 
discretion to publish names, “another example of the slight…anti-magistrates’ court 
bias which appeared to exist in the Home Office at that time…” (1968-69 V:298). 
He quoted a magistrate’s letter in ‘the Times’ and information from the London 
Magistrates Association. Goodhart quoted objections from the Chair of the ILJP. For 
the government, Morgan said that the specific power to use publication to trace a 
witness had not been used since 1932 and there was a suggestion that  
courts might consider that they could use this in a punitive way, that the 
actions of the young person were such that it would be proper for him to be 
exposed to public stigma and contempt. (1968-69 V:305-6) 
  
At Report Stage, the Opposition accepted an amendment to publish only to “avoid 
injustice” (HC 784:1124). Over future years there would be repeated calls by 
magistrates for identification of young offenders (JCC 1979:711; 1982:913; 
1994:1436). 
In Clause 19, Morgan explained the role of the Regional Planning 
Committees, which were expected “to work in the closest co-operation with the local 
magistrates, the police, the probation service and any voluntary organisations in the 
area.” The Home Secretary would have the power to withdraw DCs “after alternative 
facilities already exist and are actually in operation”, using existing facilities like 
youth and sports clubs, and dramatic and musical societies and whilst programmes 
might include repairing damage or clearing up mess, “punishment should not be 
regarded as the central, dominating theme in relation to the needs of young children” 
(SC 1968-9 V: 399). Carlisle warned that the public would not “necessarily accept 
readily what we have heard from the Under-Secretary… they should be sold to the 
public if we are not to have public resentment against them…”  
Clause 21 gave the courts power to vary or discharge care orders on 
application, and the local authority to review all care orders after six months with an 
idea to discharge. The government considered it inappropriate for the court to be 
involved at that stage (1968-9 V:431). Unlike in Scotland, there was going to be no 
power for the independent body to have a statutory review of a case.  
In discussing the role of new ‘community homes’, both Carlisle and Worsley 
wanted to “distinguish between what we have been calling the deprived and the 
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depraved persons…” and did not want them placed together (1968-9 V:508), nor had 
Waddington. Morgan replied that “the determining factor in every case is the 
particular condition of that particular boy and his own special needs.”  
Worsley JP, opposed the Rules relating to the appointment of juvenile court 
panels as “magistrates know their fellow magistrates better than the advisory 
committee and, obviously, better than the Lord Chancellor sitting in London”. This 
new scheme was like that for Inner London but he claimed that London was 
different, with many more magistrates to choose from and possible for the Home 
Office to know them (1968-9 V:584). Lane suspected an element of political 
interference and a shift of power from the provinces to the centre.  Carlisle had heard 
“the general condemnation of the Clause by a great many individual benches of 
magistrates… who have written to members of this Committee”. Morgan, however, 
said that the idea had come from magistrates throughout the country and the MA was 
divided on the issue. He spoke of large areas where people “year by year [were] re-
elected to these positions, and sometimes persons who are not suited to discharge 
those duties” (1968-9 V:590). They had ample evidence, but the power would only 
be used in a minority of areas.  
5.2.3   Commons – Report Stage - 9th June 1969 
The June ‘Magistrate’ reported “an astonishing number of communications 
from Branches, Benches and individual magistrates all over the country. Almost 
without exception, they support[ed] the main points which the Association had 
raised” (Mag. 1969:88). The article mentioned the government concessions: that the 
effective age of criminal responsibility would only go up to 12 until experience 
showed what happened; compensation orders would be available; and the 
requirement for a justice to give consent for prosecution had been removed.  
Morgan, having conceded the rejection of the position of the examining 
magistrate, a position Archer QC had noted was rather like that of children’s reporter 
in Scotland (HC 784:993), said it had been accepted by the Association of Municipal 
Corporations, County Councils Association, the Police Federation and professional 
child care associations. The critics had been the MA, a number of juvenile court 
panels, the Justices’ Clerks Society and a majority of chief officers of police. 
Morgan explained the need for criteria for prosecution to reduce the huge cautioning 
discrepancies (HC 784:1002), it was “Parliament’s job to remedy this situation”. 
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Only a qualified informant could lay information, they must consult the local 
authority, and prosecution should follow, under criteria set by the Home Secretary 
(HC 784:993) and only if the matter could not be dealt with by the parents or 
teacher.  
Carlisle, supported by another lawyer, Grieve, said it was unnecessary to 
restrict the prosecution of young people of 15 and 16 as the public expected them to 
be punished (HC 784:994). A contrary line was taken by the Labour lawyer, Paget, 
who said whilst children must learn not to do certain things, the infliction of 
punishment or pain was likely to be counterproductive (HC 784:999). Morgan 
reminded the House of s.1 of the Children and Young Persons 1963, that the local 
authority must make available “such advice, guidance and assistance as may 
promote the welfare of children by diminishing the need … to bring children before 
a juvenile court” and s.1 of the Children Act 1948 in which the local authority had a 
duty to receive a child into care, for example if an offence arose out of family 
difficulties and parents asked that child be received into care (HC 784: 1004). The 
Tory amendment to remove restrictions on prosecuting 15 and 16 year olds was lost 
141: 203. 18 JPs voted with the Conservatives, 24 JPs voted with the government. 
The House considered Clause 1 yet again, and the Conservative amendment 
to delete the second leg, requiring a child to be in need of compulsory measures of 
care, which, Carlisle said  
was wholly opposed by the Magistrates’ Association…by all those involved 
in administration of justice… substantially opposed by a great many 
members of the probation service and by the chief probation officers (HC 
784:1021). 
 
Another lawyer, Miscampbell, said serious offences were committed by those aged 
12-14, and Goodhart complained of the likely workload of the children’s 
departments and feared “Young girls coming from university, with a sociology 
degree” being influenced by “the superficial appearance of the relationship between 
the child and his parents…” (HC 784:1030). Two magistrates spoke, the 
Conservative Errington of the great difficulty of having to prove two things, and the 
Labour Mapp thought “magistrates always try to find the answer and then see 
whether the law lets them take that course” (HC 784:1027). Davidson said that 
“there was always a sense of resentment and injustice” by the parents or anyone 
given different sentences. Morgan reported that the MA stated “quite categorically 
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its wish never to see a case taken to court unless it is necessary that that should be 
so” (HC 784:1040). The basic question was not the background of the child but the 
needs of the child. The amendment was lost 125 votes to 182, 15 magistrates voting 
with the Conservatives, another 22 with the government. Two Scots, the 
Conservative MacArthur and the Liberal Mackenzie, having welcomed the 
additional “in need of care” in Scotland, voted to abolish it in this Bill.  
Carlisle proposed an Amendment to Clause 7, wanting probation available 
from the age of 12 not 17 years, again fearing the “comparatively inexperienced” 
children’s officers. Turton, a member of a probation case committee and the juvenile 
court, spoke of “destroying one of the greatest and most worthwhile weapons we 
have for dealing with juvenile delinquency…” (HC 784:1092), echoed by the Labour 
Mahon JP, who said children’s officers did not have enough experience. The Home 
Secretary said after 20 years they had wide experience while Dame Irene Ward still 
sat as a magistrate, and insisted “that the probation officers know exactly how the 
magistrates’ minds work on these matters” (HC 784:1103). The Amendment was 
defeated 160:117, 16 JPs voting with the Conservatives, 22 with Labour. 
Another successful government amendment restored words that had been 
removed in Committee, which had taken discretion away from a supervising officer 
to decide the nature of the treatment. The Opposition had feared that a “supervisor 
would be able entirely to disregard the powers given to him by the court and issue no 
directions at all…” (HC 784:1130), a charge that was to be levelled later at the social 
workers by magistrates. The Opposition   Knight successfully moved an amendment 
for a probation officer to remain dealing with a family if already involved, but failed 
in an amendment to limit a ‘Care Order’ to three years as she feared the local 
authority, under pressure of work, was not likely to review the case “thoroughly” 
every six months (HC 784:1149).  
5.2.4   Commons – Third Reading - 9th June 1969 
At 2.30 a.m. the Home Secretary, Callaghan accepted that the Bill was better, 
and “the fulfilment of a personal ambition”. There had been …“complete agreement 
that children who are in trouble should, wherever possible… be dealt with outside 
the courts” and went on to pay tribute to the juvenile courts and the probation 
officers (HC 784:1180).  He tried to allay some fears of the Opposition, saying the 
Bill would be “introduced at a time when the local authority structure can stand the 
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additional weight that will be placed upon it” (HC 784:1182). He said the essence of 
the ‘Care Order’ was that the local authority needed “the power to select the 
arrangements which are best calculated to meet the needs of the particular child” and 
had had experience over 35 years acting “as substitute parents for children of all 
kinds, including those who have broken the law and been prosecuted” (HC 
784:1183). The Bill aimed “to combine social justice with protection for the liberty 
of the subject” (1184). 
5.2.5   Lords - Second Reading - 19
th
 June 1969 
Lord Stonham, the Minister of State, Home Office, opened the debate with 
the contentious Clause 1, and a membership that could have included some 120 
justices. He referred to the discrimination already existing in the system and a speech 
of the President of the Association of Child Care Officers about the juvenile court, 
“A segment of the social services reserved almost exclusively for the working class” 
(HL 302:1129). He described “indefensible discrimination” in the rates of police 
cautioning and pointed out that juvenile courts distinguished between joint offenders. 
He noted a recent letter in ‘The Times’ from the chairman of a juvenile court 
attacking the clause and demanding that all should be brought before the court, 
regardless whether they were in need of care and control (HL 302:1133). 
Lord Jellicoe, for the Opposition, reminded the House that he had launched 
the 1963 Act, which had introduced an obligation on local authorities to look at 
measures to prevent juvenile delinquency, but considered that Clause 1 would create 
injustice. Lord Byers welcomed the flexibility and thought once the public 
understood it, much healthier attitudes would develop. The Bishop of Leicester 
welcomed the Bill on behalf of the Bishops’ Benches, and was happy with the age at 
14, and welcomed the abolition of custodial detention. Lady Gaitskell mentioned yet 
another letter in ‘the Times’ from a magistrate objecting. No fewer than five juvenile 
court chairmen spoke, four of them women. The Labour Baroness Birk, wanted to 
raise the age to 16 years and spoke of the stigma of the courts and the sense of 
unfairness; Baroness Wootton wanted 
to remove the juvenile courts altogether as a separate structure and 
extend the educational system to embrace the problems of the difficult 
child… we make more delinquents in the waiting room than we ever 
cure in the court room. (HL 302:1187) 
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Two Conservatives, Lord Hamilton, President of NAPO welcomed the 
intentions of the Bill; while Baroness Emmet did not think the current method of 
selection for the juvenile court was right as on small benches everyone under 65 was 
appointed (HL 302:1175).  
Baroness Serota, Minister of State at the DHSS, in summing up for the 
government was encouraged by the response of the Lords,  
Not one of your Lordships has raised serious doubts about the general 
wisdom of the changes proposed, nor seen this move … as a threat to the 
individual liberty of children or, indeed, to the proper inculcation of 
moral values during their upbringing” (HL 302:1203).  
She said that discrimination existed already, one child before the court the 
other not (HL 302:1207). The Bill was designed to help parents in bringing up their 
children and was based on the 1963 Act introduced by Lord Jellicoe. 
5.2.6   Lords - Committee Stage - 3
rd
 July 1969 
The first session was chaired by Lord Royle JP, Labour, a former deputy 
chairman of the MA. Lord Stonham, a Home Office Minister, explained that the Bill 
did not raise the age of criminal responsibility, but under 14s could not be charged 
with any offence except homicide, “A child remains capable of committing an 
offence... the Bill raises to 14 age at which two of the normal consequences of 
criminal responsibility – liability to prosecution and to punishment – take effect” 
(HL 303:751). At the next session, Baroness Wootton moved, unsuccessfully, an 
amendment to remove the offence ground, speaking at length about the inordinate 
complexity of the Bill and the age of criminal responsibility, which she thought 
should be the same as the school leaving age. She objected to the concept of guilt as 
children under 14 “are either troublesome to other people or they have troubles of 
their own” (HL 303:771). 
Jellico moved an amendment to remove from Clause 1, the ‘second leg’. 
There was a lengthy discussion about the issue of discrimination and fairness, as 
there had been in every debate on this Clause, Jellicoe arguing that it discriminated, 
slowed things up and set parent against the child. The government supporters said 
that if the courts were seen as helping agents, this issue of discrimination would be 
irrelevant. Wootton, from her experience said “juvenile courts are for other people’s 
children… middle-class and public school children are not brought to court” (802), 
but she voted with the Conservatives on this occasion as she disapproved of 
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interfering before the offence had been proved, otherwise the House divided on Party 
lines. The amendment was carried 68 to 48 votes, 11 JPs voting with the 
Conservatives, nine with the government, three had spoken in the debate, and the 
article in ‘The Times’ of another JP was mentioned. 
At a meeting of the JCC the result was reported and that the Minister had 
hoped the Commons would reinstate it. The Secretary of the MA had written to ‘The 
Times’ on the 24th July urging it not to be done. Aware of the MA’s hostility to 
many of the Bill’s proposals, Alec Gordon-Brown from the Children’s Department, 
before it had even been passed had “supplied for the Committee a confidential note 
setting out the expected stages of the gradual implementation of the Bill” (JCC 
1969:288). 
In a series of amendments that were eventually withdrawn, magistrates and 
lawyers featured significantly as speakers, the Labour Leatherland JP pleading for 
comprehensible legislation for the lay magistrates, who had to decipher it; Wootton 
wanting to remove joint offenders from the adult court; Stonham pointed out that 
NAPO had accepted the new role of probation but not the Central Council of 
Probation and After-Care Committees, composed mainly of magistrates. Stonham 
referred to the MA memoranda on both the White Papers in relation to the probation 
service and Jellicoe spoke of the Oxfordshire magistrates and their twice yearly 
meetings with child care officers being most useful, leading to fewer approved 
school orders (HL 303:1112).  
5.2.7   Commons – Lords’ Amendments  - 15th Oct 1969 
Morgan opened the debate on the Lords’ amendment to Clause 1, saying it 
was the third time it was being discussed and there were no new arguments, the 
words represented a statutory aim, to deal with children outside the court if possible 
and that had been “championed from the very first by the MA which had written, 
‘We share the desire to keep children out of the court as far as possible and to 
involve their parents in responsibility for their future good behaviour’.” At Report 
stage, Hogg had agreed that not every child should be prosecuted (HC 788:416). 
Morgan said that “Slavish uniformity of system would bring not equality of justice 
but only equality of misery”. Carlisle for the Opposition spoke of the debate being 
between all sides of House.  
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Backbenchers, whatever their other professional interests, did not necessarily 
speak on their party line, though no one actually voted against his/her party, but no 
Conservatives spoke in favour of the amendment to restore the need for care. Several 
Labour members took a punitive line: Mapp, JP said the age should only be raised to 
12 years, but did not vote, while Ted Leadbitter MP,  a former head-teacher, spoke 
of “the weakness in authority. Too much time is spent in pontificating pseudo-
psychology” and forcefully complained of magistrates “imposing nominal fines for 
thuggery, for vandalism and for theft” (HC 788:439-40). He said he was respected 
for his quick justice by the boys he caned, and he could not support the government. 
He was applauded by the Scottish justice Glover and the lawyer Grieve, both 
Conservatives. Oakes took a quite contrary view, “Most of those who deal with 
children in trouble – probation and children’s officers; and not all magistrates take 
the view of their Association – support the Bill” (HC 788:425). The Amendment was 
rejected 146 votes to 120, the Liberals voting with the Conservatives, against the 
‘care’ test, having supported it in the juvenile justice reforms in Scotland. 
5.2.8   Lords – Commons’ Disagreements to Lord’s Amendments  
Jellicoe had noted the narrow vote to reinstate Clause 1 and said it “may well 
reflect something of the disquiet which has been felt on both sides of both Houses” 
and warned of the “grave risk of serious discrimination” because 50% of young 
people before the court were jointly charged. He said he was “quite willing to grant 
that there is a great deal of good in this Bill” (HL 304:1629), the Opposition 
acquiesced and Royal Assent was read on the 22
nd
 October 1969. 
5.2.9   Conclusion to Children and Young Persons Act 1969 
In Parliament, the Opposition repeatedly quoted the magistracy and the MA 
and concentrated on the ‘fairness’ argument, that two juveniles guilty of the same 
offence would be receiving different treatment. It never accepted the argument by 
the government that discrimination was already taking place, both by the police in 
their decision to caution or not, and in the different sentences of the courts. Given the 
high profile of the magistracy in Parliament, and the sustained campaign of letters 
and articles in the press by the MA, it is noteworthy that on only two occasions, 
magistrates voted against their party. However, the Conservatives, supported by the 
MA were implacable in their opposition to the main tenet of the Act, that the needs 
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rather than the deeds of the juvenile were the key factor. A change of government 
could spell disaster for the implementation of the Act. 
The new Act retained the lay magistracy in juvenile courts; the age of 
prosecution and the ‘double test, would only be raised to 12 years without 
affirmative action from Parliament; borstals, detention and attendance centres would 
only be abolished when other constructive facilities such as ‘intermediate treatment’ 
were available. There were new supervision and care orders; and the court would 
have discretion for the 14 plus age group to be supervised by a probation officer 
rather than social worker. Fines and compensation orders were still available. The 
juvenile courts had been given a raft of new measures without their previous ones 
being removed, and the government had abandoned the idea of the ‘examining’ 
magistrate. The only immediate problem for the magistrates was their difficulty with 
the concept of the child aged 10-12 years being in need of compulsory measures of 
care as well as admitting an offence before he/she could be brought to court. The 
problem for the government was to produce the resources and facilities for the new 
measures. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
These two acts, each containing radical reforms of juvenile justice, one 
relating to Scotland, for children 8-16, and in England and Wales for children 10-17 
years, were debated one year apart. Each Act intended that juveniles should only be 
brought before an official tribunal of lay people as a last resort, and for those under 
16 in Scotland and under 14 in England and Wales, they must also be thought to 
need compulsory measures of care. In Parliament, the Scottish Act received almost 
unanimous support for its clauses relating to the ‘hearings’ system, no one 
challenging that last concept for care, and no objections were  raised by English or 
Scottish lawyers. Yet, in England, it was seen as an assault on ‘equality before the 
law’, unfair and discriminatory, bitterly opposed by the lawyers and others in the 
Opposition, who openly claimed support from the MA and magistrates throughout 
the country. 
Parliamentarians from all sides had shown some resistance to the 
reorganization of the probation service in each country, supported by the sheriffs in 
Scotland and the magistracy in England and Wales: the magistrates in the juvenile 
courts were losing their absolute control over the probation officers in their courts, in 
return for unknown social workers who were outside their control. The Scots had 
accepted the new post of reporter, that person to act as a filter between the police and 
the hearing, whilst the English had successfully rejected the offer of a single 
magistrate to act in that capacity, a role seen as unacceptable by the MA, yet no one 
had suggested an alternative arbitrator. The juvenile court would decide any disputed 
matters in the normal criminal trial, while in Scotland any disputed matters would be 
heard before a sheriff in chambers, making a complete separation of trial and 
disposal. 
The Scots Act made no provision for purely punitive measures, the English 
Act proposed to abolish all punitive measures other than fines when alternative 
facilities were available. Each country would require a multi-agency, co-operative 
approach with some radical reorganization of departments to cope with the new 
arrangements. Whilst greater discretion for treatment was vested in the social 
services, the hearing in Scotland would have a statutory duty to review each order 
annually, in England, the court could only vary an order on application from other 
parties. This lack of oversight by the magistracy was to prove highly contentious. 
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The Children and Young Persons Bill 1969 was fully debated one year after 
the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 was passed in the same chambers. There was 
just one reference to that Act, by a Labour QC comparing the role of the reporter 
with that of the examining magistrate, a measure that failed. The government did not 
refer to Scotland in any way, neither mentioning any arguments used to support the 
wholesale conversion to a welfare system of juvenile justice, the support of the 
justice MPs there, nor to any advice the civil servants may have been able to offer to 
put the Act into practice. As Professor Morris
133
, a member of the Longford 
Committee has commented, “It would seem that Scottish affairs only really attracted 
a minority of people who were interested in what was going on in Scotland”. 
However, only a handful of MPs from either House voted differently in the two 
Bills, and the government won its reforms, but, as the civil servant Cowperthwaite 
(1988:61) observed,  
Although the objectives of Part I of the Bill were the same as those of 
Part III of the Social Work (Scotland) Bill, its reception in Parliament 
was strikingly different… subject of criticism and resistance by the 
official Opposition throughout… 
The judiciary in Scotland had played a very minor role in the arguments, the 
lay members virtually silent on the loss of their juvenile courts, unlike the English 
magistracy, which had been vociferous in its objections. A civil servant working 
closely on the reforms in England, and observer on the MA Council commented that 
it “was generally accepted as a fact of life that in most areas, but not all, the 
magistrates would be Conservative rather than Labour inclined” and they felt that “if 
there had been an offence proved by proceedings in court, it was natural that 
punishment should follow. That attitude in some cases was so ingrained that they 
either couldn’t or didn’t want to adjust”134. 
The history of juvenile justice legislation suggests that both its 
implementation and the practice has at best been problematic. Many of the English 
reforms were conditional on new measures being made available, and whilst the 
Scottish civil servants had been planning for over three years, the English also 
needed time before implementation. Neither system was to become operational until 
1971. Tragically, and perhaps significantly for the future of the 1969 Act, the 
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charismatic Morrell was to die before implementation, leaving its supporters without 
a persuasive protagonist. However, he had seen his two other related projects for 
positive discrimination, ‘educational priority areas’ (Plowden Report 1967), and 
‘community development projects’(Lees R and Smith G 1975) accepted (PSSC 
1977). The unexpected change of government just eight months later to a party that 
had bitterly opposed the 1969 Act was to have a profound effect.  
 
ooOoo 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CHILDREN’S HEARINGS (SCOTLAND)   
We had one criterion: the decision had to be made in the best interests of 
the child. There was no other criterion. We could not consider what was 
best for society, the community, that this child was a danger to the 
community so ought to be locked up. That was not part of our work, only 
the best interests of the child. (Margaret Dobie, Chairman of the 
Dumfries and Galloway Regional Panel
135
). 
 
It took three years from the passing of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 
to its implementation, but as Lord Kilbrandon (1976:ix) remarked, “It was quite a 
feat that the elaborate, and in some ways revolutionary, system was evolved and 
brought into action so soon”. This was especially so given the long history of failure 
to implement juvenile justice legislation; the likely radical reform of local 
government arising from the Wheatley Commission; and in June 1970, a return to 
the Conservatives, who had recently strongly opposed a welfare model in 
England/Wales. However, the previous Conservative administration in Scotland had 
accepted the Kilbrandon proposals; their 1970 manifesto had described the root 
causes of crime as “social problems, educational inadequacies, and economic 
frustration” (Scottish Conservative Party 1970); and Gordon Campbell, the new 
Secretary of State, was “the first since 1945 to belong to a government that did not 
possess a majority of votes or seats in Scotland” (Devine 2000:581). This all 
reinforced “the long-standing tradition that England does not interfere with Scotland 
on criminal justice”136.  
The system of lay ‘children’s panels’ and ‘hearings’, based in the new local 
authority social work departments, was part of the philosophy of “involving  the 
community in finding solutions to the problems that arise within it” (Social Work 
Services Group [SWSG] 1979:9); and would deal with children whether offending, 
truanting or subject to neglect or abuse. The philosophy of Kilbrandon was carried 
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through to implementation. The dual function of previous juvenile courts was 
abandoned, because:  
Criminal procedure does undoubtedly affect the whole atmosphere and 
manner of proceedings in juvenile courts; it also colours the entirely 
separate stage of the proceedings in which… the question of practical 
action falls to be resolved. (Kilbrandon 1964 para.71)  
A full-time, professional judge, would determine any disputed grounds,  for 
fear that a lay bench might “lean too far to treatment” and produce “unintended 
irregularities” (para. 71) by not applying the correct legal test in its eagerness to 
provide help; and would hear appeals against the decision of the hearing. Only 
children satisfying one of the specified grounds and thought to be in need of 
compulsory care, would be referred to a ‘reporter’, and if necessary referred on to the 
new children’s hearing. This, a panel of lay people, would decide on the most 
appropriate treatment and thereafter that treatment would be the responsibility of the 
social work department, although the hearing would review the case on at least an 
annual basis. 
By April 1971, the reporters and panels had been appointed and trained, the 
places to hold the hearings identified, and the legal, judicial and police procedures 
put in place. Scotland was about to embark on its radical new juvenile justice 
system
137
 whereby the needs and not the criminal deeds of those aged 8-16 years, 
always explicitly referred to as children, were the paramount consideration. There 
was no mention in the Act of retribution, deterrence or public protection. As one 
sheriff remarked, “The onset of the children’s hearings system was greeted with 
some apprehension and perhaps some hostility by the legal profession, including the 
judiciary” (Kearney 1998:159), although one of the first reporters, a lawyer, 
observed, 
Right the way down, members of the legal profession were at least 
prepared to give it a try, and even convinced that the newly proposed 
system had a part to play… on the other side, the social work side, there 
were many people who thought it was not going to work at all.
138
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6.1 Implementation and Practice – The First Decade 
6.1.1.   Before the Hearing 
Kilbrandon (para.149) had valued the role of police juvenile liaison schemes 
in diverting young offenders from the formal criminal justice system. That “long-
standing and widely recognised practice” continued (Bett 1976:45) with the police 
filtering out 20% of cases between 1970-76, (Morris, A. & Giller, H., Szwed, E & 
Geach, H. 1980:59). For centuries the procurators fiscal had acted as a ‘gate-keeper’ 
between the police and the courts, and the new role of reporter to the hearings 
exercised a similar and additional role. Statistics confirm this belief in diversion 
from formal responses to offenders, at all levels of decision-making (Murray G. 
1976:17). 
Table 6.1 Diversion and Treatment of Juveniles Committing Offences 1972-
1974 
Action 1972 1973 1974 
Offences by children u 16 29,626 35,932 38,993 
Police Warnings 9,167 9,824 10,716 
Juvenile Liaison Scheme 599 740 758 
Proceedings  in all courts 2,390 3,192 2,900 
All Reports to Reporters 
(incl. non-offence grounds, c. 20%) 
24,219 29,384 31,524 
Reports referred to Hearings 12,519 14,961 15,108 
DISPOSAL AT HEARING    
No supervision requirement 4,502 (36%) 6,155 (41%) 6,335 (42%) 
Non-residential supervision 6,209 (50%) 7,069 (47%) 7,181 (48%) 
Residential Supervision 1,808 (14%) 1,737 (12%) 1,592 (10%) 
(Martin & Murray 1976:17) HMSO Scottish Social Work Statistics 
Residential supervision meant that the child was required to reside at home, 
with relatives, foster parents or in one of a range of residential establishments S.44 
(1) 1968 Act. 
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Reporters 
The official at the heart of the hearing’s system was the reporter, who 
exercised wide discretion in choosing which cases to put before the hearing; acted as 
administrator and legal advisor to the panel;  convened the hearing, ensured 
attendance by the appropriate people and provided all the necessary reports. It was 
essential that the reporters liaised with all the agencies, including police, fiscals, the 
social work department and the schools, to obtain the fullest information about each 
child. 
They were appointed, employed, and their costs were borne by the local 
authority. Of the 100 initially appointed, 50% were solicitors, others were probation 
officers or had worked with young people. There was a gender balance throughout.  
Only the Secretary of State could dismiss them, to safeguard their independence, so 
that their decisions were not subject to “temporary political or social considerations, 
only to the perceived good of the individual child” (McCabe et al. 1984:35). The 
post, according to Finlayson
139
, attracted  
really interesting characters… such as Donald Dewar, later Scotland’s 
First Minister, who used his familiarity with Parliamentary process and 
issues... as a great source of information and support…  
However, after the Wheatley reforms
140
 many reporters resigned, especially 
the lawyers, who did not wish to be absorbed at lower grades in the enlarged 
administrative areas (Martin, Fox & Murray 1981:15).  
Training was provided by the SWSG, although one reporter complained of 
little training at the beginning
141. Asquith (1983:29) claimed that the reporter’s “lack 
of a definitive statement as to his qualifications” and the wide discretion to be  
exercised led to different policies in different areas, perhaps not least because the 
reporters did not “share a common set of beliefs concerning the factors that indicate 
the need for compulsory measures” (Martin et al 1981:65). But, 75% of all new 
referrals diverted from a hearing in 1976 did not come to the reporter’s attention 
again. 
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Children in Criminal Courts 
About 10% of children accused of offences were not dealt with by the 
hearings, regardless of whether they denied the charge. For those offences on the 
Lord Advocate’s List142, the fiscal, by training aware of the sentencing options and 
their nature at the different levels of court, in consultation with the police and the 
reporter would consider prosecution at the Sheriff Court or the High Court of 
Justiciary, or referral back to the reporter
143
. Initially there were wide variations in 
practice, but this gradually changed as understanding and confidence grew between 
fiscals and reporters (Finlayson
144
), and many more were diverted to the hearings. 
Wherever the referral ended up, both the fiscal and the reporter had to be satisfied, 
“on an identical standard of proof, that they believe they can prove the offender’s 
guilt beyond reasonable doubt” (Finlayson 1992:42).  
Table 6.2 Referrals by Fiscals back to Reporters 1975 – 1981 
Referrals 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
From Fiscal to 
Reporter 
3,470 4,367 4,686 4,883 5,134 6,063 6,808 
(McCabe et al. 1984: 37) Children’s Hearings Statistics 1981 
There was a pragmatism about the reporters’ decision making, probably born 
of the Scottish belief, arising from the general historical levels of poverty, “in the 
efficacy of running works, businesses or services on the simplest and cheapest lines” 
(Murphy J. 1992:10). When told that domestic burglary by a juvenile would be tried 
at the Crown Court in England, a reporter responded, “How do they have the time to 
deal with such things?” 145  The fiscals became increasingly prepared to let the 
hearings rather than the sheriff deal with cases. 
Most juvenile cases in courts were summary prosecutions with a sheriff 
sitting alone, and most of those because there was an adult co-accused. Of the 3,192 
juveniles before the court in 1973, about one third was there for theft including 
housebreaking and another third for breach of the peace.  
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In September 1973, a girl aged nine convicted of a serious stabbing was 
given two years detention by the Glasgow Sheriff Court. Widely reported in 
England, where the age of criminal responsibility was ten, it was thought that a nine 
year old should not have been put through a public trial, identified and given that 
sentence. The Court of Appeal reduced it to probation, and the case consolidated 
public support for the hearings. Lord Advocate King-Murray QC declared that no 
child under 13 could be prosecuted without authorisation from the Lord Advocate’s 
office (Cowperthwaite 1988). Lord Kilbrandon (1976: ix) expressed his “misgivings 
at the number of cases” prosecuted, considering it “… a concession partly to a public 
opinion which is not yet sufficiently familiar with the new system… and partly to the 
innate distrust of change common among those learned in the law”. The use of courts 
went down by two-thirds from 1972 to 1979. 
Table 6.3 Referrals to Reporters & Children in All Courts 1972-1979 
Year Total 
referrals to 
Reporters 
Number of 
children 
referred 
Children (u.16) 
proceeded against in 
all courts 
% 
1972 24,219 17,950 2,390 13 
1974 31,876 21,907 2,900 13 
1976 29,514 18,638 2,094 11 
1977 28,551 18,537 1,727 9 
1979 25,842 16,924 1,055 6 
(Data from Martin et al. 1981:35) N.B. A child may be referred more than once p.a. 
The pattern of juvenile crime changed little over the decade, theft rising and 
housebreaking decreasing proportionately, probably related to more self-service 
supermarkets and shops generally. Research showed that cases of taking and driving 
cars accounted for 20% of cases dealt with at the courts, not least because the 
hearings could not order driving disqualification (Martin et al. 1981).  
There were special procedures for the court
146
: it was held at a different time 
and place (usually in chambers) from adults, in private, with the juvenile kept away 
from adult offenders. The judge explained the charge in language understandable to 
a child. The parents could assist in the child’s defence, a lawyer or anyone else could 
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represent both them and the child
147
, and legal aid was available. Publication to 
identify anyone under 17 was prohibited, except by permission of the Secretary of 
State.  
The sheriff in summary matters could remit to the hearing for advice or 
disposal, order an absolute discharge, admonition, fine, probation, or committal ‘to 
such place as the Secretary of State may direct for the purpose of residential 
training” 148 , and detention not exceeding two years in a ‘List D’ school. On 
indictment, the powers were similar but detention was for a fixed period, with 
release through the parole board
149
. Significantly, any case except murder could be 
remitted to the hearing for advice (Gordon 1976). As in England/Wales, children 
over 14 were sent to penal institutions for unruly behaviour: numbers varied widely 
each year, as low as seven in 1989, 67 in 1995
150
. 
Referrals 
Anyone, a friend or neighbour, could refer a child to the reporter if concerned 
about its welfare, but all were obliged to act “in the best interests of the child” 
(SWSG 1979:14).  
Table 6.4 - % of Alleged Grounds by Type 1972-1980 
Ground 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
A. Beyond Control 3.0 2.4 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.0 2.6 3.1 
B. Moral Danger 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 
C. Lack of Care 2.1 1.8 2.3 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.5 4.1 4.6 
D. Victim 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.7 2.4 3.1 
D.D. At Risk - - - 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
E. Incest 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 
F. Truant 6.0 6.8 7.2 6.5 9.7 11.8 11.3 9.7 9.8 
G. Offence  87.5 87.9 86.8 87.8 84.1 81.6 80.8 80.2 78.3 
H. Transfer 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 4 - Social Work Services Group 1980 – Statistical Bulletin – Scottish Office 
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In 1973, of those referred, 82% were by the police, 8% by the fiscals, 5% by 
the education authorities, 1-2% by social services and 0.6% by the RSSPCC (Martin 
FM 1976:33), statistics that remained fairly constant to the end of the decade. A 
child was defined as under 16, but if already under supervision to the hearings 
system, could be referred back again until 18. Other offenders aged 16 - 18 were sent 
to court where they were no longer subject to ‘care and control’ procedures, and 
were eligible for detention centre or borstal orders. 
At least one of nine grounds
151
 had to be established for consideration of 
referral for measures of compulsory care. Decisions, taken on a local basis, 
inevitably reflected the conditions and facilities in a given community: “social 
conditions around Scotland vary quite widely… I think autonomy of this sort is very 
valuable”152. 
Thereafter, the reporter had three courses of action, playing a pivotal role in 
deciding who entered the formal system
153
: discharge the case, provide voluntary 
help, or put before the hearing. Of the 18,000 children referred to the reporter in 
1972, only half went on to a hearing. However,  cases marked with the statutory 
phrase ‘no further action’ actually meant the reporter explaining “such decisions to 
parents and children in a way geared to promoting appropriate parental responsibility 
for their own children and backing parental authority in this regard” (Finlayson 
1992: 43).  
Table 6.5 - Offence Referrals 1972-1974 
 To Reporter To Hearing % to Hearing Residential 
1972 33,107 19,260 58% 15% 
1973 44,713 25,697 57% 12.5% 
1974 47, 933 26,473 55% 9% 
(Asquith 1983:130) 
The main indicators for referral to the hearing were a previous history of 
offending or known family problems (Lockyer & Stone 1998:56-61). The shortage 
of either community facilities or social workers, even if the parents were fully co-
operative, might mean that the reporter referred the case to the hearing for 
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compulsory measures to access the treatment
154
. For those referred on offence 
grounds, there could be the added complication of co-defendants receiving differing 
treatment, compulsory measures or not, which might be considered unfair and 
discriminatory, the view taken in England/Wales.  
With duplicate or multi-offenders we could, and on many occasions did, 
refer one or more to hearings and deal differently with co-offenders… 
we felt obliged to recognise parents' and children's sense of ‘fairness’: 
we could not expect them all to understand the nuances or niceties of the 
pure legislation.   This might be particularly the case where the ‘major 
player’ in the offence did not seem to be in need of measures of care but 
‘tail-end Charlie’ did155. 
Social Workers 
Before the 1968 Act, probation officers had dealt with juvenile offenders in 
the courts, but now they were absorbed with social workers and childcare officers 
into the new ‘social education’ department of the local authority, which dealt with all 
children’s issues. “Kilbrandon had assumed specialist, not generic social 
workers”156. The Director was answerable to the hearing. Probation officers more 
used to office-based reporting and holding children accountable for their behaviour, 
brought “different methods and values”, whilst child-care officers worked within the 
home context, dealing with poverty, alcohol abuse and relationships. However, “the 
distillation of the two approaches tended to favour the child-care model” (Gilmour & 
Giltinan 1998:147). In Dumfries, the panel chair, herself a former social worker, 
thought that  
social workers on the whole were not sympathetic to the hearing system. 
I was very surprised about that. They resented these lay people coming in 
thinking they could take decisions about these children…We worked 
very hard at trying to build bridges… It persisted for a good many 
years.
157
 
A different problem in Edinburgh was hardly better: “the social services were 
very thin on the ground. The caricature of the picture ‘When did you last see your 
father?’ turned into ‘When did you last see your social worker?’”158 In the 1970s, 
49% of social workers had less than 5 years professional experience, and overall 
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numbers doubled in the latter half (Martin et al. 1981: 240). These problems were 
compounded when the local government reforms came into force in 1975. Some 
courts were highly critical, one sheriff speaking of the disastrous decline in service 
described the new social workers as mini-skirted ‘Rosemarys and Gwendolines’ 
(Murphy 1992:179). 
 Both the reporter and the children’s panel relied heavily on the fact-finding 
and opinions of the social workers. The reporter liaised with the police and fiscals, 
and along with the panels could seek the advice of the schools, EWOs and medical 
and other specialists. Social workers were obliged by law to provide the panel with 
the relevant reports at least three days before the hearing. Some “had a constant 
battle to get the reports in time”159.  
6.1.2   The Hearing – the Participants, the Place and the Procedure 
Kilbrandon (1964: para.73-4) had wanted this new body, a ‘juvenile panel’, 
to be a totally independent, public agency with the widest discretion to vary or 
terminate the treatment, with members appointed by the sheriff and drawn from “a 
much wider field of suitable persons than is at present the case” in the old juvenile 
courts (para.78). The White Paper
160
 “dramatically changed the emphasis to 
‘community involvement’…” (Murray K 1976:58), and to disassociate itself still 
further from the past, it would be called a ‘children’s panel’, and the criteria161 for 
membership included “a genuine interest in the needs of children in trouble and their 
relationship to the community”. Initially about 1,500 members were required, chosen 
by a local ‘children's panel advisory committee’ (CPAC). A ‘hearing’ required a 
chairman with two members.  
The CPAC and the Panel 
Each CPAC normally had five members, ten in Strathclyde, reflecting the 
50% of Scotland’s population in that local authority area. The Secretary of State 
appointed the chairman and two other members, the local authority another two. 
Members came from a variety of backgrounds but, unsurprisingly, included a high 
proportion of middle class professionals (Lockyer & Stone 1998). The CPAC 
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submitted names for consideration of appointment to the Secretary of State; decided 
the appropriate number of members necessary; considered responses to poor 
performance and training needs and the relationship of the panel with the public; and 
commissioned research. The CPAC also chose the chairman of the whole panel. 
Panel chairmen monitored their members, their availability and attendance at 
training; whilst members of the CPAC observed hearings and discussed any 
problems with the panel, which were not always welcomed.  
One of the first panel candidates, responding to a newspaper article, 
considered “The committee had no training whatsoever… most of them hadn’t taken 
in the Kilbrandon philosophy that there was no punishment… they had a lot to 
learn” 162 . Other CPACs were more rigorous in their selection procedures for 
hearings members. The system was standardised by guidelines in 1982 after a 
national meeting of the chairmen of the CPACs, “though each area would have its 
own particular way of following them”163. 
Recruitment began with “a massive advertising campaign: full page 
advertisements on radio and television and notices and explanatory videos available 
in libraries” (Ravenscroft 1987:475). Selection was done in a four-stage procedure:  
initial applicants were sent an explanatory leaflet. Those that responded were given 
an interview by two members of the CPAC, with a third observing candidates in the 
waiting room. They had to consider availability to serve; commitment to attend 
training, both pre- and in-service; and clear unsuitability. Only on the unanimous 
decision of all three members would a candidate be rejected at this stage. The third 
stage involved a whole day: candidates were sent “a time-table of the day’s events 
and a case-study, with school reports and social inquiry reports. Each candidate took 
part in a group discussion of topics such as alcoholism, drug abuse, truancy, etc, and 
an individual interview” (Ravenscroft 1987:476).  They were assessed by the CPAC 
and experienced panel members. All were told that the final decision, by the 
Secretary of State, would be made within three months, allowing time for 
assessment, police checks and constructing the panel to reflect the wider community, 
with a balance of sexes, and age range between 20-60 years. 
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The commitment of panel members was for three years, renewable only after 
reassessment; to sit once fortnightly on average; and to undertake training delivered 
to national guidelines (Murray G. 1976:8). The local authority had a duty to publish 
the names and addresses of panel members, particularly at places like the local 
library. It was also responsible for paying members their expenses (SWSG 1979:13). 
Initial appointments were much more likely than English justices to be from 
the health, education and welfare professions (Asquith 1983:134). A decade later, 
there was not much change except a “modest increase in the proportion of manual 
workers” (Martin et al. 1981:240),  “lorry-drivers, farmers, shift-workers in factories, 
people living in huge local authority housing estates, single-parent mums dependent 
on supplementary benefits” (Ravenscroft 1987:476). There were equal numbers of 
men and women; every hearing had to include one of each
164
. The average age of 40 
years was much lower than for other public bodies (Murray G 1976:13), 11% were 
under 30 and 58% between 40 and 59 (Reid 1998:186). This broad selection 
succeeded, perhaps because wide publicity had attracted enough recruits: Dumfries 
and Galloway, for example, had 50 applications for six vacancies (Martin & Murray 
1976:234). Whatever their background, panel members seemed to share values and 
beliefs; and showed a flexibility acceptable to clients (Martin et al (1981:159); they 
“had a wonderful pioneering spirit… felt privileged and very very enthusiastic”165. 
Within five years there was a turnover of 20-25% p.a., thus bringing in more recruits 
and spreading knowledge of the system. The children’s panels, based on the large 
burghs, varied in size from the 900 members in Strathclyde to 11 in Shetland. In 
1977, the Scottish Association of Children’s Panels was formed to provide a single 
voice for negotiations with the Scottish Office. 
The chairman of the panel did not always chair the hearing, but could choose 
who chaired on each occasion. The chairman at the hearing had certain statutory 
duties over and above being a panel member, although all joined in the discussion 
with the child and the family. Chairmen were not without their critics: “the belief 
that all panel members are able to chair a Hearing flies in the face of reality” (Grant 
1982:65-6).  
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Training 
As in the previous system of juvenile courts, the decision-makers were lay 
people but now came from a greater variety of backgrounds. Their duty was to make 
decisions about compulsory measures of care having assessed the information from 
different professionals, both written and oral. Panel members had their common 
knowledge but needed specialist information about the social work possibilities and 
“to develop considerable skills to overcome silence, reticence, fear or aggression” on 
the part of children and their parents (McDonald M 1976:231). They learnt “a lot 
about child development. It was extremely helpful”166. 
Children’s panel training organisers, based in universities, provided the 
training, although each area developed independently (Reid 1998:188) and “several 
professional bodies [were] involved and not just the social work profession” 
(Asquith 1983:101). Dumfries panel members 
were given a very interesting reading list, with not only text books but 
also several novels, one of which was ‘High Wind in Jamaica’... all 
about the behaviour of children when they have misbehaved… [which] 
to me indicated the breadth of the whole concept that our training was 
going to embrace…167 
Another wrote of the importance of training to build up “good relationships, 
based on mutual respect… between the part-time lay panel members and the full-
time professionals” (McDonald M 1976:230).  Visits included schools, children’s 
homes and social work teams to discover what could be done to help children in 
trouble, and “discussing and scrutinising the services available” (Lockyer & Stone 
1998:47). In the early 1980s in-service training became part of the panel members’ 
commitment, with experienced members often acting as tutors and monitoring 
performance. Glasgow University provided a Panel Training Resource Centre 
(Martin et al. 1981:272). Research findings on the hearings were put into standard 
training manuals (1998:67).  
The Place  
Kilbrandon (1964 para.226) wanted the new panel to be entirely away from 
criminal courts and police stations, with simple accommodation. Large urban areas 
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had premises “exclusively for this purpose” (SWSG 1979:12), but in the late 1970s 
Martin et al. (1981:94-5) observed 301 hearings across the country and found 
“hearings centres ranging from excellent to wholly inadequate”. One was “a more 
formal setting than the most sumptuous juvenile court” (p.95), while in Dundee 
hearings were “held in a large tenement flat in the centre of town” (p.94). There was 
no record of any being held near courthouses or police stations. 
At the hearing, in most everyone sat around one table, “a few used armchairs 
and coffee tables…a box of tissues on the table was almost universal” (Martin et 
al.1981:95).  The size of the table could provide some protection at times of high 
tension when unpopular decisions were made, and could also be a barrier to 
informality (Lockyer & Stone 1998:51).  
Most of the hearings were in the evening… After a while, the social 
workers rebelled against the evening sittings… We tried not to have 
more than one family waiting at any one time
168
.  
The system allowed detailed investigation, given the median duration was 31-45 
minutes, significantly longer than the old juvenile courts, where “it was by no means 
unusual to have 40 individual cases disposed of in a two hour session” (Finlayson 
1992:41).  
The Children and the Parents 
Any child referred to a hearing was obliged to attend, except in very limited 
circumstances
169
; and it was desirable that the parents attend; both had the right, and 
one must attend
170
. Failure to do so could result in a fine
171
. Both parent and child 
could each be accompanied by a representative
172
, although this was rarely exercised 
(Adler 1985:140). All were entitled to claim expenses for travelling and subsistence 
from the local authority
173
 but legal aid was not available.  
Children came before the panel on a variety of grounds, and during the first 
decade there was a tenfold increase in children as victims, of physical, emotional or 
sexual abuse. This changed the gender balance considerably from 7:1 boys to girls 
down to 3:1, although the figure remained constant for girls on offence grounds, 1:8 
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in the same period (Lockyer & Stone 1998:57-8). 75% of referrals were on offence 
grounds and 16% truancy.   
nearly half the children… were classified by their schools as having a 
poor level of attainment in relation to age; three in ten were graded as 
average and only five per cent as ‘good’ (Martin et al.1981:82).  
Offending charges varied from the “relatively trivial to unquestionable 
seriousness”. Property offences predominated, some 80%: “forced entry into 
premises [were] not very much less common” than other forms of stealing. There 
was violence or the threat of violence in 8% of cases, but serious assaults were sent 
to the sheriff court (Martin et al.1981:96-7). Some 8% were for drunkenness or 
breach of the peace, while drug offences did not warrant separate recording in the 
1970s. 
At the hearing, significantly, the child was without any co-defendants as “the 
offence has lost its importance and the needs of the offending child [were] the 
panel’s first concern” (McCabe et al. 1984:34). 81% of children were with their 
mother; 55% their father, and in 11% of cases with a grandparent or older sibling 
(Martin et al.1981:99). The panel was keen to promote a relaxed atmosphere, but 
mindful of the quasi-judicial role many found this  
a difficult reconciliation… the Hearing is not a democratic meeting of 
equals, discussing the child’s best interests from equal standpoints… one 
set is going to impose a decision on another … backed by the full force 
of the law (Dobie 1976:226-7).  
Nonetheless,  
The majority of parents spoke very positively of their experiences. Most 
parents also felt that they had understood everything that happened… 
their own opinions were valued and that they had participated in the 
process in a way which would not have been possible in another setting 
(Martin et al.1981:233-4).  
The Procedures 
Panel members were expected to arrive prepared, having read the reports. 
Kilbrandon (1964 para.109) had wanted an “atmosphere of full, free, unhurried 
discussion” to “enlist the co-operation of the parents”. Thus, the hearing was held in 
private, with, importantly, no police or fiscals. The press was allowed, but in practice 
rarely attended, and could not identify the child.  
To reduce the chance of informality conflicting with due process (Lockyer & 
Stone 1998:51), there was a statutory duty on the chairman to explain the procedures 
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and their rights to the parents and child, including that of appealing the decision
174
. 
“If you hadn’t done that, it would invalidate any decision that was made.”175 The 
next duty was to ascertain if the child and parents accepted the ground of referral
176
. 
Even that could be fraught with difficulties for the chairman, who might be accused 
of ‘leading’ to achieve an admittance of the act alleged (1998:53). Any disputed 
grounds were referred to the sheriff “to secure a ‘finding’” (Kearney177 1998:159). 
Legal aid and representation were available before the sheriff, as this process 
established the culpability or otherwise of those concerned. In 1979, of the 1,999 
applications for proof of ground, some 15% of all referrals, in 40% the ground was 
not established or the case abandoned. 
At the hearing, anyone could speak, everything was discussed “in front of all 
the participants and the decision [is] reached in public” (Adler 1985:76) with all 
three panel members asking questions. The chairman of the panel, after discussions 
with the child and family, and using the relevant reports, consulted publicly with his 
panel colleagues, and announced the decision, together  with the reasons for it, 
explaining the substance of reports if it were material to the decision
178
. Panel 
members could technically adjourn for a discussion but “most of the panel members 
felt it would be contrary to the spirit of the Kilbrandon philosophy” 
(Asquith1983:188). At the end of the hearing, the chairman was obliged to explain 
the right of appeal to the sheriff court, where legal aid was available
179
. Finally, the 
panel would write its full decision with reasons, and hold another hearing within a 
year to review the case. The chairman alone, and not the reporter, was responsible 
for seeing that the hearing complied with all legal requirements
180
. 
Not all panels and reporters were as diligent as this however: research found   
that “a mere 6% of over 900 panel members …thought that the observance of 
procedural requirements was an important aspect of the Hearing” (Adler 1985:143). 
In one third of all cases, there was no attempt to explain the purpose of the hearing 
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(Martin et al. 1981:103) and in one quarter there was no mention of the right to 
appeal, although most of those cases were for discharges some were for residential 
supervision (p.104). Compliance with rules increased with the seriousness of the 
offence, and was more common for offence grounds than truancy. But these 
researchers felt that “anything that falls short of 100% compliance must be taken 
extremely seriously” and that reporters should intervene more to ensure correct 
procedures (Martin et al.1981:107-8). The lawyer and panel member Grant (1976: 
214) had felt “the Act and the Rules afford adequate protection in the Hearing 
situation,” but five years later admitted that the findings in ‘Children Out of Court’ 
were “nothing less than an indictment of the way the system has operated for the past 
decade” (Grant 1982:66). 
There were few complaints by parents, although most thought the offence the 
reason for being at the hearing (Martin et al.1981:234), and a “significant minority… 
felt the need for some kind of advocacy on their behalf…”(p.233).  However, the 
hearings compared favourably with the earlier juvenile courts by most parents 
experienced in both (Murray K. 1998:234);  and 85% of the children said they were 
satisfied they had told the hearing everything they wanted to and 50% felt they had 
influenced the decision (Erickson 1982:98).  53% knew who everyone was, only 
10% none (1981:193). 
On appeal, the case was treated as a civil matter to be discharged or remitted 
back to the hearing. The sheriff could only change the decision for a procedural 
error, not because another treatment might be more appropriate
181
; nor could a 
hearing change the decision of the sheriff by acting on reports which had not been 
before the sheriff
182
. Appeals were extremely rare: of 32,000 disposals during 1972-
4, there were just 61 appeals, of which 2/3rds confirmed the disposal (Scottish Office 
Statistical Bulletins). This too, would suggest a high degree of satisfaction with the 
hearings system. 
6.1.3   Choosing the Treatment 
 It is perfectly feasible for an individual to be concerned about the 
serious nature of offending and the need to offer society protection 
without being committed to punishment. (Asquith 1983:169) 
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In many cases these decisions are not being carried out... there are not 
the resources in the form of residential places and social workers' hours 
to give the child the care he needs. The Hearing is then akin to a charade. 
(Dobie 1976:225) 
The sole criterion for the panel, once the grounds had been accepted, was 
acting “in the best interests of the child”183 to decide if compulsory measures of care 
were necessary. Having read the relevant paperwork, the panel could explore 
concerns further at the hearing. As lay people, they were expected to challenge the 
opinion of the expert, the social worker (Morris A.1974:369), a difficult task, but as 
a panel chairman explained, members should  
be consoled by the thought that the task is one to which experts of 
different kinds have applied themselves all down the ages and it can be 
seen by the state of our society today how unsuccessful they have been. 
(Dobie 1976:227) 
There was a “much closer relationship between the social workers and the 
panel members” than had been found in English juvenile courts (Asquith 1983:164), 
and the writer of the report was normally present at the hearing, although in around 
6% of cases there was no social worker at all (Martin et al. 1981:99).  But, standards 
varied: “In more than half of all the cases examined, the reports did not provide the 
Hearing with information on basic features…” and in 14% of cases there was no 
recommendation by the social worker (pp.156, 161). Where there was one, the panel 
agreed with the social worker’s recommendations in over 80% of cases (Morris 
A.1974:368).  
The panel expected to have a school report, but the relationship between the 
schools and the hearings was often unsatisfactory. Budget constraints meant it was 
hard for teachers to attend the hearings, while many parents were fined by the courts 
for their children’s failure to attend school, when the children might have been in 
need of compulsory care. Panels saw the importance of schooling, emphasised in 
91% of cases, “with reminders that the Hearing possess powers to compel school 
attendance by making residential orders” (Martin et al.1981:113). Some teacher 
members  
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found it very difficult to tolerate what they saw as impertinence from the 
children. They would slip into their teacher role and start to tell them off 
if the child, often from fear and a sort of bravado, would appear to be 
cheeky, and needed to be ignored.
184
  
Corporal punishment
185
 in schools was not made illegal until 1986
186
. This 
may explain the more punitive attitudes expressed by teacher panel members, but 
also emphasises the radical, welfare approach of the hearings. 
Critics of the philosophy of the hearings argued that because reporters were 
influenced by the persistence, seriousness and the previous record of the child, the 
panel was similarly influenced, and its decision was not based solely on the needs 
(Morris A. 1974:368-9). Asquith’s research found no evidence of any such tariff, but 
that a more serious case “may well indicate a greater need for intervention, rather 
than provide the basis for some form of penal calculus” (1983:160). There were “no 
overt references to punitive objectives” (1983:173), but some panel members would 
“endow the Hearing with an air of formality, despite the promise of the Act… 
lecturing and invoking a sense of shame…” (1983:204). One reporter felt obliged to 
“stop a children’s panel member… being rather too hard on the laddie who was in 
front of him” 187 . A Strathclyde panel member (Watson D. 1976:201) felt that 
regardless of the intentions of the panel, sending a child away would look like 
punishment to him or her, so that the hearing was not totally different from the old 
juvenile court, for “the worst imaginable eventuality for most children is the prospect 
of separation from their family and usual environment” (Erikson 1982:94). 
“The majority of panel members favour the view that something outside the 
child is most likely to be responsible for his or her delinquent behaviour” (Martin et 
al. 1981:244). Although the “overwhelming view” was that parents’ shortcomings 
were the major factor (Martin et al. 1981:219), the panel seemed to avoid criticism 
or apportioning blame and was “usually extremely reluctant to risk provoking a 
confrontation”, such that the parents were not made to feel that the “measures to be 
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imposed by the Hearing [had] relevance for them as well as to the child” (Martin et 
al. 1981:247). 
The Powers 
If the panel did not consider compulsory measures were necessary, it 
discharged the matter, although probably aware that voluntary measures of care had 
been agreed. Over the first decade, around one third of cases were discharged
188
. The 
panel would want an assessment of the appropriateness of different types of 
supervision in the reports, and was expected to have visited any projects and 
establishments in its area. As a Glasgow panel member (McDonald 1976:232) 
commented,  
It is quite irresponsible of any panel member to be a party to a decision 
to remove a child from home if he does not have a clear idea of the type 
of establishment to which that child is being committed.  
Members maintained an independent stance, remaining “impervious[ness]… 
to social work or any other professional language” (Martin et al.1981:139). They 
wanted to know about “the social, personal and environmental circumstances of the 
child” and the child to explain his actions to ascertain his moral development, rather 
than the intention or culpability (Asquith 1983:193-4). 
Table 6.6 Decisions of Hearings for Offence Grounds 1972-1981 
 Non-
Residential 
Supervision  
Residential  
Supervision 
Requirement 
Un-changed 
Supervision 
Requirement 
No 
Supervision 
Requirement 
 
Total  
Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. 
1972 4,794  1,377 13.6 - - 2,902  9,073 
1973 5,495  1,421 11.8 - - 4,133  11,049 
1974 5,438  1,301 11.4 - - 4,276  11,015 
1976 4,133 26.5 1,752 11.2 1,370 8.8 4,972 31.9 12,227 
1977 3,918 25.9 1,633 10.8 1,237 8.2 4,541 30.0 11,329 
1978 3,373 23.8 1,522 10.7 1,094 7.7 4,413 31.1 10,402 
1979 3,312 24.1 1,415 10.3 878 6.4 4,568 33.3 10,173 
1980 3,538 23.0 1,457 9.4 817 5.3 4,974 32.3 10,786 
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1981 3,394 21.5 1,353 8.6 794 5.0 5,568 35.3 11,109 
Social Work Services Group – Annual Statistical Bulletins – Scottish Office 
If it were thought that compulsory measures were necessary for the proper 
development of the child’s character and abilities189, the panel had only two powers, 
to make a supervision requirement in the community, with or without  ‘intermediate 
treatment’ (IT), or a residential requirement. It would decide the type and any 
conditions, which could include “attendance at some place, the performance of some 
task or a combination of these conditions” (SWSG 1979: 26). As the panel acted “in 
the best interests of the child,” it had to be aware of the consequences to the child of 
breaching those conditions; that any action might be done best voluntarily rather 
than compulsorily; and the problems arising if one child did an activity voluntarily 
and another child under compulsion. As any change required another hearing to 
consider it, with the panel exercising its continuing responsibility for choosing the 
treatment, the SWSG recommended flexibility through lack of detailed prescription. 
There were no powers to order borstal, detention centre or attendance centres, nor 
any financial penalties, including restitution or costs. Once a requirement was made, 
it was normally effective from that date, and for most purposes allowed “the local 
authority in appropriate cases to assume parental rights”190 (SWSG 1979: 29). The 
panel did not specify the period but was obliged to hold a review within one year.  If 
the child offended again during the period, the reporter would decide whether to 
refer the child back to the hearing or deal with it guided by the views of the social 
workers. 
Supervision in the community applied to about 80% of those in need of 
compulsory measures of care. The child would live at home, have one-to-one or 
family-oriented casework, or 
Be involved in group activities…community service, sport or outdoor 
pursuits… or in group discussions under the social worker’s guidance 
(SWSG 1979:24-5). 
Two thirds of social workers saw the objective of home supervision as “less 
emphasis on control of the child and more on working with the family” (Martin et 
al.1981:252) to provide the necessary measures of care. 
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IT
191
 was another form of supervision, “intermediate, that is between 
supervision at home and residential care”: the purpose was to prevent the child 
“requiring residential care in the future” (SWSG 1979:26).  It was based on the 
concept that by providing “recreational pursuits to widen the child's interests” it 
would “increase his ability to find satisfaction in purposeful co-operation with 
others” (McDonald M 1976:11). There was a serious shortage of this provision. If 
the hearing had recommended a short residence away from home and that was 
unavailable, another hearing had to be convened to reconsider the treatment.  
A residential condition, specified in the order, could involve sending a child 
to a foster placement, a children’s home or a residential school. The SWSG 
(1979:25) warned that “removal from home is a drastic step which can greatly upset 
the child and his family,” and should only be done “after careful consideration of the 
advice and views of those concerned and a full assessment of the child’s problems.” 
Residential establishments were run by the local authority or voluntary 
organizations. Most children, some 1,617 in 1973, went to ‘List D’ schools, the old 
approved schools  (Murray G. 1976:11)
192
, and most children needed remedial 
educational help (Murray K. 1976).  
There were huge regional variations in the use of residential requirements, 
ranging from four to 37 per cent of disposals
193
. Kilbrandon had warned of the 
possible over-use of resources by hearings finding extensive needs of children 
despite minor offences, and in the early 1970s demand for List D schools was 
“outstripping availability” (Cowperthwaite 1988:54), with panel members “resistant 
in principle to allowing supply to determine demand” (Lockyer & Stone 1998:62). 
By 1976 demand had reached its maximum of 1,750, marginally higher than those 
sent to approved schools and under sentence in remand homes just before 
implementation of the 1968 Act. Additionally, there were 52 secure places, and a 
demand for more. 
Panel members were vociferous in their complaints: 
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We were wasting our time, having come to a decision that residential 
care was essential, and then nothing was happening. We were cross and 
lobbied our local MP. 194 
Later she admitted that, as history has shown with many new initiatives in the 
juvenile justice system, “There was an overuse of residential orders in the 1970s and 
in the 1980s it went down.”  
Children were sent to List D schools not only from the hearings but by the 
Sheriff and High Court as a result of criminal convictions. Significantly, research 
(Rushforth 1978) found that of boys sent to List D Schools by the courts or the 
hearings there was no difference in their home background or offending history but, 
‘court’ boys stayed longer in schools and were likely to be transferred to borstal. To 
Adler (1985:50), this indicated that despite being subject to the judicial process, 
“granting legal rights in itself guarantees very little…and more stigmatisation than 
those who are referred to the panel for similar offences”. Asquith (1983:203) found 
Panel members do confess to differentiating between children who 
appear for offence reasons, and those who appear for other 
grounds…[which] underlies the demands by some panel members for the 
provision of separate establishments for offenders and non-offenders and 
for more powers to deal with ‘hard cases’. 
By the end of the decade there was a surplus of List D school places with 
“serious discussion of possible closures”, due to falling referrals and growth of 
community based IT (Martin et al.1981:20 & 313). There were the inevitable 
geographical problems, with the right placement often far from the child’s home. 
This led to alternatives such as foster care, so that by 1981 50% of those subject to 
compulsory residential supervision were in foster homes as opposed to children’s 
homes (Lockyer & Stone 1998:63-4).  
The hearings had exceptional powers to refer a child for special education, 
hospital or guardianship for mental health considerations; or transfer to another 
hearing. They could also detain a child in a “place of safety” for up to seven days 
pending a hearing: “In 1980, there were 202 orders for detention … in which the 
grounds of referral involved offences committed by the child” and 621 where the 
child’s protection was the primary consideration (SWSG 1980 para.19). 
After wide consultation, a review of the powers by the newly returned 
Labour government in 1974 concluded that minor procedural changes were 
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necessary, but rejected any suggestion of fines and cautions
195
 on parents 
(Cowperthwaite 1988:57). Despite the hopes of the politicians, the volume of work 
was such that social workers had to deal with the crisis first, rather than any 
preventive work with vulnerable families. In 1978, there were 15,000 referrals to the 
hearings, all requiring reports, 7,000 orders for supervision in the community and 
1,500 for residential (Martin et al.1981:15). 
Reviews 
“No child shall continue to be subject to a supervision requirement for any 
time longer than is necessary in his interest”196, and every case was reviewed before 
a hearing, within one year
197
. At the review it was customary to include one of the 
original panel members: however, despite the crucial importance of knowing the 
results of their actions, some 80% of panel members claimed some difficulty in 
following the progress of their cases (Martin et al.1981:263). The hearing could 
terminate, continue or vary the supervision requirement: early research showed 38% 
of cases were terminated and another 36% varied (Morris A. 1974:371-2).  
6.1.4   Conclusion to the First Decade 
In 1973 there were severe financial constraints arising from the international 
oil crisis and subsequent widespread industrial disruption just as the hearings system 
was trying to establish itself. Nonetheless, sufficient panel members had been openly 
recruited, by rigorous selection procedures, from a broad and younger spectrum of 
the local community, and were trained and monitored; a variety of venues was used 
for the hearings, none in any way connected to the courts or police stations.  The 
new post of reporter had attracted enough applicants, but there was a serious 
shortage of social workers, many lacked experience, and the situation was 
exacerbated by the reorganisation of social services following the Wheatley reforms.  
There was a good deal of criticism of the hearings, encouraged by lurid 
articles in the popular press (Glasgow Herald 1975). Furthermore, the initial 
enthusiasm of the panel members was severely dampened by the lack of resources to 
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implement their decisions. While Kilbrandon himself (1976:x) regretted “the 
inadequacy, arising from malnutrition, of the supporting field organisation”, he felt it 
important to emphasise the fact, not infrequently ignored, that the 
available resources would be equally inadequate were they deployed by 
the criminal enforcement agencies.  
Later research indicated that “the system had come to be accepted as an 
integral part of the Scottish scene”, with “muted condemnation” by the police 
(Martin et al.1981:21). Between 1974 and 1978 the numbers of field social workers 
had doubled; the numbers referred to the reporter had declined; and there were spare 
places in List D schools. Whilst some panel members clearly harboured punitive 
thoughts, with “the use of sarcasm and sermonising” (Martin et al.1981:270), most 
saw the young offenders “to an overwhelming extent” as victims of their 
circumstances, and of the inadequacies of their parents (Martin et al.1981:318). 
Kilbrandon had emphasised the importance of co-operation with the parents and 
perhaps this may explain the reticence on the part of panel members to confront the 
parents with their failings. There was academic criticism of the hearings’ failure to 
observe procedural matters, although the families largely felt  
a sense of having been listened to, a sense of having been allowed to 
express themselves, a belief that panel members were genuinely 
interested in the views expressed and were helpful in their intentions 
(Martin et al.1981:271).  
For the 10% of children dealt with by the courts, only a quarter received a purely 
punitive sanction, that of a fine, although most children sent to a List D school would 
have seen it as punishment. For the 90% of children reported for offending to the 
hearings system it had dealt with them, along with all the care cases, on the basis of 
their needs.  
There was consistent criticism of the hearings during the first decade related 
to the two ideologies of “welfarism and legalism”, balancing the rights of the child 
and the parents and the proportionality of response to the offence. Some academics 
were critical of what they deemed were the indeterminate and disproportionate 
‘sentences’ and called for a return to determinate sentences and proportionality in the 
interests of justice (Morris, Giller, Szwed & Geach 1980).  
After the diversionary methods of the police, reporters and the hearings, 
some panels,  despite not identifying any reason for the offending,  felt they could 
not ‘do nothing’ so assumed a ‘need’ for a supervision requirement (Adler 1985:79). 
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“There is an argument which says that some attention, even of the wrong kind, is 
better than none” (Dobie 1976:225), offending behaviour required a response. As  
in so many other areas of penal policy, results matter rather less than the 
impression that something firm and decisive is being done about the 
problem in hand” (Taylor, Lacey & Bracken (1979:64).  
With the return of a Conservative government under a new leader, the non-punitive 
hearings might be vulnerable to scrutiny and reform. 
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6.2 Review and Reform in the 1980s  
There is a sense of pride, reflected by the media in Scotland, that 
Scotland should have introduced a unique and radical approach to the 
problem of child offenders. Criticism has never developed, either in 
Scottish public opinion or in Parliament, into a concerted demand for the 
replacement of the system. (Cowperthwaite 1988:57) 
 
The first decade of the operation of the hearings in Scotland had been under 
both Conservative and then Labour governments. In 1979 the Conservatives were 
returned under their new leader, Margaret Thatcher, on a ‘law and order’ platform.  
The Scottish Conservative Party Election Manifesto (1979:22) spoke of reviewing 
the children’s panel system, and would “consider whether it might be appropriate to 
extend their [community service orders] use to the panels” and thought “compulsory 
attendance centres and custodial sentences may be the only remedy, particularly for 
football hooligans”.  
The subsequent consultative document found no need for “fundamental 
alterations”, but considered there were not “sufficient measures of discipline and 
punishment” (SWSG 1980…) and suggested fines, reparation, and community 
service orders for children, and cautions (recognisance) on parents. It was widely 
distributed, and of the 61 responses, all were highly critical of any punishment 
powers save the Scottish Police Federation, which “wholeheartedly endorsed the 
punitive measures” and claimed lack of punishment contributed to the “escalating 
crime and vandalism rate” (SWSG 1980…), a view not supported by the statistics.  
The Strathclyde Panel (50% of all panel members in Scotland) said the government 
did not understand the philosophy, since grafting punishment onto the welfare 
approach would produce the “worst of both worlds” (Lockyer & Stone 1998:69-70).  
In 1981, the Secretary of State Sir George Younger rejected any additional 
powers. His predecessor, the Labour Millan, felt that as  
a traditional Tory… it must have been difficult for him. He had to fight 
to maintain some degree of Scots independence…  We will do things 
that suit Scotland.
198
 
Consistent with that, a clause restricting the reporting and identifying of 
juveniles in all criminal courts was passed in the Conservative’s Criminal 
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Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, having fallen in Labour’s 1979 Bill 
(Cowperthwaite1988:56).  
6.2.1   Panels 
Research by Martin et al (1981:266-7) on attitudes of panel members and 
social workers to additional powers produced a rather more mixed picture, where 
“…the not insubstantial ghost of a belief in the efficacy of the crime-punishment 
approach to delinquency still lingers.”   
Table 6.7 Views on Extended Powers for Hearings System 
Supporting power to:- % of Panel Members 
(no. 921) 
% of Social  Workers 
(no. 170) 
Defer decision 66% 65% 
Fine parents 41% 25% 
Confiscate weapons 63% 48% 
Reparation or CSO 89% 75% 
Reclaim goods/ cash 58% 38% 
Corporal punishment 11% 5% 
Refer to Sheriff 74% 59% 
       (Martin et al. 1981: 266) 
That three-quarters of panel members wished to refer cases to the sheriff, and 41% to 
punish parents, suggested a considerable challenge to the ethos of Kilbrandon. 
Conversely, there was strong support to include custody arrangements after divorce 
or separation, and adoption and fostering, reflecting 
the assumption inherent in the Hearings system that children who offend 
and children who are in need of protection or basic care constitute 
compatible groups” (Martin et al.1981:268).  
Although there had been significant support for voluntary reparation, a Circular 
(SWSG 1982) found it was little used. 
In the late 1980s, the Children’s Panel Chairmen’s Group (CPCG) 
commissioned research on the panels. This found 20% of the panels felt their 
decisions were constrained by lack of resources, with offence and truancy cases 
twice as likely to suffer. Some felt there was a danger of saving the young only to 
abandon them as teenagers (Lockyer 1988:2). There were enough national residential 
places but local shortages, and “panel members wished to see more children 
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adequately contained in an open setting than more locked places” (Lockyer & Stone 
1998:85). The worst problem was the lack of time for home supervision, and IT was 
scarce and not seen as an alternative to residential provision.  
Panels showed a decline in male members from parity in 1971 to only 37% 
of the new intake in 1996, but social representation had widened, with the manual 
and skilled group some 47% of the total membership (Lockyer 1992). Although 
there was never a shortage of applicants, there was much ‘early’ retirement: in 1992 
the average length of service was under five years, with some new authorities having 
more than half with less than two years experience (Lockyer & Stone 1998:185-
191).  
6.2.2 Referrals 
Table 6.8 Initial Reports on Children aged 8-u16: Action by Police 1980-1988  
Police Action 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
All Reports 33,087 33,578 30,859 33,357 32,284 33,528 31,922 32,186 27,842 
Police warn 
or JLO  
5,661 
17.1% 
5,020 
15.0% 
4,821 
15.6% 
6,148 
18.4% 
5,693 
17.6% 
5,400 
16.1% 
4,649 
14.6% 
4,871 
15.1% 
3,518 
12.6% 
Referred to 
Reporter 
16741 
50.6% 
18147 
54.0% 
16540 
53.6% 
16986 
50.9% 
16825 
52.1% 
17981 
53.6% 
17471 
54.7% 
19851 
61.7% 
20505 
73.6% 
Reported to:  
Fiscal 
10685 
32.3% 
10411 
31.0% 
9498 
30.8% 
10223 
30.6% 
9766 
30.3% 
10147 
30.3% 
9802 
30.7% 
7464 
23.2% 
3819 
13.7% 
Reports per 
1000 children 
48 50 48 54 54 59 59 61 55 
SHHD 1990 Statistical Bulletin, Table 3 
During the 1980s, the police gave proportionately fewer warnings, but in line with 
the Lord Advocate’s new guidelines in 1987, fewer children were sent to the fiscal 
and more to the reporter. Overall, the nature of referrals to the reporter changed 
considerably, with far more children referred on grounds for their protection than 
previously. 
Whilst “offence grounds constituted 7 out of every 10 cases with fresh 
grounds for referral” (Scottish Office 1988 para 4.3) there was a tenfold increase 
over the period 1977-1987 in physical and sexual abuse cases. 
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Table 6.9  % of Alleged Grounds by Type 1981-1989 
Ground 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
No of 
Referrals 
30,786 29,226 30,071 31,595 34,151 36,306 36,785 37,545 37,252 
No of Children 20,111 19,017 19,365 19,529 21,108 21,865 22,150 22,403 22,460 
Rate per 1000  16.7 16.3 17.0 17.5 19.4 20.4 21.0 21.6 21.8 
A. Out Control 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0  4.5 
B.Moral 
Danger 
0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6  2.0 
C. Lack Care 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.0 7.0  11.5 
D. Victim 3.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 7.0 9.0  19.0 
D.D. At Risk 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5  1.5 
E. Incest victim  - 0.0 - - - - -  0.0 
F. Truant 10.0 9.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 9.0 8.0  9.0 
GG. Solvents 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0  0.5 
I  Care of LA   0.0 - - - -  - 
G. Offence 79.0 79.0 78.0 75.0 73.0 71.0 70.0  51 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 4 - Social Work Services Group 1988 – Statistical Bulletins – Scottish Office 
* a child could be referred more than once and for different grounds 
6.2.3   Legislative Reforms 
In 1983 the hearings were given the power
199
, with stated criteria, to 
authorise ‘secure’ accommodation. Against their wishes, they could be overruled by 
the directors of social work who needed the flexibility of treatment to suit changing 
needs (SWSI 1996), although there was a ‘widespread belief’ that this related to 
scarcity of places
200
. Scotland had proportionally 30% more secure places than 
England, in constant demand (1996 para 85). Whyte (1998:209) suggests this may 
have been due to a shortage of community–based programmes with “routinely 
available, intensive day programmes”. 
                                                 
199
 Health and Social services and Social Services Adjudications Act 1983 
200
 In 1994, 2/3 to ¾ of authorizations led to a placement. Hearings competed with courts for interim 
detention. Early 1980s, Scotland had over 50 designated secure places, but still some children were 
held in police cells or remanded to prison (Lockyer and Stone 1998:74-6) 
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In 1986, the chairman of the panel and the sheriff were given the power, 
where there was a conflict between the parent and child, to appoint ‘safeguarders’201, 
the majority were solicitors, others social workers. Most were appointed for cases of 
non-offence grounds (McGhee, Waterhouse & Whyte 1996), which took at least 
75% of the reporter’s time (Lockyer & Stone 1998:82-3). This changing character of 
the hearings reflected the increasing awareness of the level of child abuse, 
particularly sexual, and required panel members to have less training based on 
delinquency and much more on issues related to child abuse (Reid 1998:191). An 
early attempt by academics to compare methods of dealing with such cases with the 
DHSS in England/Wales was rebuffed: there was a  
deep reluctance to embark on any investigation which might conceivably 
be interpreted as implying that there was anything useful to be learned 
from the barbarians in the North (Murray K. 1998:236). 
In 1988 the Secretary of State for Scotland set up a review (Scottish Office 
1990), but  
emphasised that the system should remain ‘as a separate and distinct 
feature of Scottish legislation for children whose conduct has brought 
them into conflict with the law or who are in need of care or protection’ 
(Scottish Office 1990).  
It made 95 recommendations, with no radical changes to the hearings, but 
improvement and simplification. This was in direct contrast to a similar review in 
England/Wales, where care proceedings were removed from the juvenile courts, thus 
separating ‘the troubled and troublesome’. 
                                                 
201
 Children’s Hearings Rules 1985 
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6.3 Review and Reform in the 1990s 
In 1991, the UK ratified the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
with a reservation to operate the children’s hearings without allowing legal 
representation. At the time, there were serious concerns surrounding much 
publicised child abuse cases in England (Cleveland and Rochdale) and in Scotland 
(Orkney), while Fife concerned relationships between the panel and social workers. 
In the latter two, public inquiries (Kearney 1992 and Clyde 1992) exonerated panel 
members from any criticism (Reid 1998: 191). A White Paper (Scottish Office 1993) 
covering the hearings, residential care and adoption law, and local government 
reform took specific account of those Reports, the UN Convention, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), although not previously considered 
applicable in Scotland (Reed 1999:22). 
6.3.1   Children (Scotland) Act 1995 
This came fully into force in April 1997, just before another general election 
fought partly on a juvenile crime and law and order platform by the Labour Party, 
which was returned to power. It was also a period of extreme publicity related to 
juvenile offending, when “juvenile crime became the single most discussed criminal 
justice issue in Western nations” (Roberts 2004:495). Yet, essentially, the Act 
redefined and re-emphasised the 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act and was based on 
six key principles, all reinforcing those of Kilbrandon: 
 the interests of the child are paramount  
 children who have offended and children in need of care and protection 
are dealt with in the same system  
 children and parents are involved in the process  
 the views of children must be taken into account  
 inter-agency co-operation and partnership  
 intervention only when legally justified, necessary and to the required 
level (Miller 2001:44) 
 
The ‘best’ interests of the child were raised, so that when a hearing or court 
decided “any matter with respect to a child, the welfare of that child throughout its 
childhood shall be their or its paramount consideration”202. But, significantly, further 
sub-sections allowed derogation from that principle “for the purpose of protecting 
                                                 
202
 S.16(1) Children (Scotland) Act 1995 
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members of the public from serious harm”203, which was not defined. Five years 
later Bottoms & Dignan (2004:28-31) found this derogation had “rarely been 
invoked”. The hearing could make a “secure accommodation authorization”204, once 
approved by the director of the social work department or the person in charge of the 
residential establishment, where a child was at risk of harm to self or others and 
absconded. Additionally, ‘compulsory measures of care’ became ‘compulsory 
measures of supervision’, which might not necessarily include guidance and 
protection issues (Lockyer & Stone 1998:111). 
To comply with the ECHR
205
 and its incorporation into UK law, on appeal a 
sheriff could hear further evidence
206
 and substitute his/her own disposal for that of 
the hearing
207, because an appeal had to be a “genuine review of all aspects of the 
Children’s Hearing decision, albeit one which respects the primacy of the Hearing’s 
decision where it can be seen to have an objective justification” (Reed 1999:29). 
Some thought this was against the Kilbrandon principle of the separation of fact 
finding and treatment disposal, but as only the parent or child could appeal, it was 
considered unlikely to be a “covert way to introduce punitive powers” (Lockyer and 
Stone 1998:117).  
There were more powers to protect the rights of the child. Hearings could 
exclude people, including the parents, and the press
208
, whose reporting restrictions 
were increased; safeguarders could appear in a greater range of cases, their duties 
clarified; legal aid became available for representation; and the hearings had to 
announce the review date when an order was made. It was once feared that lawyers 
would alter the whole nature of the proceedings, but they soon became  
aware of the difference between courts and hearings and most lawyers 
have adopted the discursive and constructive role required (Reid 
1998:191).  
                                                 
203
 S.16(5) An earlier case, Humphries v S 1986 SLT 683, which found that a child  could be detained 
in his own interests to stop him making his position worse by continuing to offend, may have 
prompted this clause (Kearney 1998) 
204
 S.70(10) 
205
 Hearings were ordering compulsory measures in a non-adversarial system 
206
 S.51(3) 
207
 S.51(5)(c)(ii) 
208
 S.43(4) 
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The Act, by certain expectations of parents,
209
 explicitly set out “parental 
responsibilities as the foundation of parental rights” (Lockyer & Stone 1998:107). 
There were new Children’s Hearings Rules 210  and, like the principle in the 
English/Welsh 1989 Children Act, no order should be made unless “it would be 
better for the child that the requirement or order be made than that none should be 
made at all”211. This was not the “minimal intervention” approach, the “radical non-
intervention” found by the Fife Report (Kearney 1992) but the “no non-beneficial 
order” principle of Kilbrandon (Bottoms & Dignan 2004:44). 
A specific power
212
 enabled the hearing to order the child to attend some 
form of IT instead of a residential order. Recommended in the 1968 Act, panels had 
waited a long time for any schemes, often of great diversity, innovation, and little co-
ordination. The more intensive, lengthy, more structured IT programmes for the 
‘heavy end’ had the best outcomes (Hill 1998:141-2). Arising from the lack of co-
operation in Fife, the panel chairman and chief reporter were to be consulted when 
the local authority was planning services for children
213
 (Lockyer & Stone1998:93-
4). Another clause gave the panel, not the reporter, the duty to write the report of the 
hearing. 
6.3.2   Reporters 
In 1996, the reporters’ service was reorganised into the national, Scottish 
Children’s Reporter Administration214 (SCRA), whose “benefits will be consistency 
in practice, national guidelines, a national data bank and a research facility” (Lynch 
1997). Four years later there was a national average of 24% of offence referrals 
passed to the hearing, yet without a standard assessment, there was a range of 10 to 
47% in the 47 ‘reporter areas’ (Audit Scotland 2002:24). But the role itself 
                                                 
209
 Part 1 s.1(1): a) safeguard and promote health, development and welfare, b) provide direction and 
guidance, c) maintain regular contact (if not living with), d) act as child’s legal representative. 
Applies to both parents whatever their subsequent relationship, and for the children, these apply up to 
16 and as guidance to 18 
210
 Rule 5(3), arising from the ECHR (McMichael v United Kingdom (1995) EHRR 205), required all 
documents to be seen by ‘each relevant person’ entitled to be present at the hearing, except the 
children, although the substance had to be explained to them. Courts and hearings were obliged to let 
the child, depending on maturity, express his/her own views and to take them into account (s16 [2]), 
and the child had a right to attend. 
211
 S16[3] 
212
 S.73 
213
 S.19(5) 
214
 Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994 
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demanded wide discretion as well as the knowledge of local circumstances, and there 
appears to have been little serious criticism of the reporters’ service. Kuenssberg and 
Miller (1998:178-80) hoped that with the SCRA accountable to the Secretary of 
State and thus Parliament, there would not only be more publicity and interest in the 
hearings, “often surprisingly little understood by the Scottish public at large”, but the 
opportunity “to defend its welfare principles when under attack”.  
6.3.3   Jointly Reported Children and Young People 
The Lord Advocate’s guidelines were further refined in 1996, such that for 
children under 16  to be prosecuted, the offences had to be ‘very serious’; or likely to 
result in disqualification from driving; or, at the discretion of a chief constable, other 
offences if there were special reasons, which had to be stated (Kearney 2000:15-6). 
Nonetheless, these could have included simple assault, breach of peace and 
shoplifting. 
Research revealed that children aged 13-17 referred by the police and jointly 
considered by the fiscals and the reporters were amongst the most vulnerable to 
neglect and criminality. They: 
had experienced major social adversities, had long histories in the 
Children’s Hearings system, and had been subject to supervision at some 
time in their lives…..A number had experienced neglect and abuse in 
childhood, and had recorded psychological or psychiatric difficulties – 
alcohol and drug misuse represented a serious problem for some of the 
young people and was a major concern of professionals. Just under half 
(46%) had experienced public care.  (Waterhouse et al. 1997-9: Chapter 
Five, Summary) 
It was thought that the fiscals lacked information, for some 64% of this group 
were sent to court where nearly two-thirds were given financial penalties, yet, “given 
their financial circumstances, many might have been at high risk of default” 
(Waterhouse et al. 1997-9: Chapter Five, Jointly Reported). Additionally, 
outstanding offences could not be ‘taken into account’ (TIC) at a single court 
hearing, making it possible that “many young people found themselves sentenced to 
custody for persistence, as much as for the seriousness of their offending” (Chapter 
Five, Jointly Reported). That research preceded implementation of the Act
215
 
                                                 
215
 S.168 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
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whereby fiscals and courts were encouraged to refer to the hearing for advice or even 
disposal
216
, which led to a significant reduction in numbers before the courts
217
. 
6.3.4   The 16-18 Age Group 
Research by Waterhouse et al. (1997-9 : Chapter Five) covered 175 children 
over 16 who had been referred to the hearings for offences in February 1995 and 
found 74% had a criminal conviction in a court two years later. Of those, 53% were 
from lone parent families; 58% relied on state benefits; 34% were in public care in 
1995; 28% had at least one period of detention, half of whom had more; and 74% 
had previous referrals for offending. As Asquith et al. found (1998:114), 
There has been an unspoken tradition that when the 16
th
 birthday is 
reached, supervision requirements are discharged, casting young people 
adrift and leading to problems with homelessness, drug abuse and 
offending, which often results in prison sentences. 
Scottish criminal statistics did not even record as a separate category those 
sentenced to custody aged 16-18. 
Other Acts in the same period encouraged a closer relationship by all the 
agencies when dealing with offenders up to 18. This was significant because the 
hearings in 1994 for offence grounds dealt with 442 offenders aged 16-18 (Scottish 
Office 1995). As with the under 16s, for those under 18, the Lord Advocate or fiscals 
could seek reports
218
; and the courts could seek the advice of the panel
219
 and even 
remit to the hearing for disposal.  
The first director of the SCRA, the reporter Alan Miller (1999:42-4) felt the 
system should  
stop treating 16 and 17 year olds who offend as if they were adults… 
Many of them have far more basic needs than the kind of needs that 
sentences such as probation are designed to address.  
The penal custody figure for this age group in 1998 was 215, only marginally less 
than the total proportionate use in England/Wales, a system which used penal 
custody from the age of 14. The custody figures
220
 are even more phenomenal when 
compared with other European countries, the UK locked up six times more as a 
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percentage than Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Spain and Sweden (Bottoms & 
Dignan 2004:143). Yet, as Whyte (1998: 211) has observed, there is  
no research evidence to support the view that punitive, coercive or 
custodial responses have any positive effect on reducing crime among 
children and young people. Overall the evidence indicates that such 
approaches have a destructive and negative effect. 
6.3.5   Referrals in the 1990s 
Research into 464 children referred to reporters for offending in February 
1995 revealed that 86% were boys, 88% were aged between 12-15 years and 68% 
were aged 14 or 15 and 2% were over 16 at the time, reflecting the law. 80% were 
referred by the police, 5% referred at least six times. 74% had been referred to the 
reporter before for offending, with an “average of 10.9 referrals each before 1st 
February 1995”, for a variety of grounds.  Reporters found adequate or good 
childcare in the lives of only 9% of the children and  
many…were growing up in personal circumstances of discontinuity and 
disruption in family relationships, and in adverse social and economic 
circumstances…just under a third had at least one experience of living in 
care away from home (Waterhouse et al. 1997-9: Chapter Five, Children 
and Young People who Offend).  
Of their previous referrals, 30% were for being beyond parental control and 30% for 
truancy, both “factors strongly associated with later offending behaviour”. As to 
their offences, over 50% were property related and 16% for assaults, which reflected 
a typical picture for offenders under 16.  
Table 6.10 - Initial Action by Reporters on Alleged Offence Referrals 1980-2000 
 
Offence 
Referrals 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % 
22,303 100 25,144 100 24,694 100 27,606 100 26,766 100 
Action by Reporter 
To Hearing 10,705 48 9,806 39 8,149 33 8,282 30 6,424 24 
To SWD. 892 4 1,006 4 1,481 6 1,656 6 2,677 10 
To Police  1,784 8 1,760 7 988 4 828 3 
No Action: 8,698 39 12,321 49 13,829 56 16,840 61 17,666 66 
Data from Bottoms & Dignan 2004:48-9221 
                                                 
221
 It looked as if diversion from the Hearings increased during the late 1980s and 1990s, while in 
England the reverse applied, but a direct comparison is risky as if the child were already on 
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Waterhouse (2002) thought there was a danger of youth justice not being 
seen to be taken seriously, a view endorsed by Bottoms & Dignan (2004:55). The 
Strathclyde police, who, despite recognising the large part played by truancy and 
domestic violence in the lives of children, felt  
authorities must be able to demonstrate to neighbourhoods and 
communities that they are able to respond to the repeat offenders who 
demoralize and cripple the development of safe and secure areas… 
(Pearson 1999: 44)  
Reid (1998:191-2) warned that the proper provision of facilities, including 
residential, was  
necessary if the Scottish system is to continue, to resist the popular 
clamour, which is periodically heard in England for more Draconian 
measures to deal with youth crime.  
Between 1976 and 1996, residential placements, mostly for offenders and those with 
behavioural problems decreased from 6000 to 2000 (Hill 1998: 138). 
Table 6.11 - Disposals by Hearings in Offence-Based Cases 1987-2000:
222
  
Children not Already Under Supervision (%) 
Year Supervision  
Requirement 
Discharge or  
Other Disposal 
Total N 
1987 54.3 45.7 100 2,984 
1990 62.0 37.9 100 2,552 
1995 64.6 35.4 100 1,730 
1996 63.9 36.1 100 2,102 
1997 63.6 36.3 100 1,498 
1998 58.9 41.1 100 1,480 
1999 58.4 41.6 100 1,092 
2000 61.0 39.0 100 1,170 
(Bottoms & Dignan 2004:56) 
 
                                                                                                                                          
supervision, the Reporter would be unlikely to refer back to a Hearing. On average, about 18% were 
already on supervision in the 1990s. (Bottoms & Dignan 2004:48) 
222
 SWSG Statistical Bulletin – Annual Volumes 
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6.3.6   Post-Devolution Developments  
The children's hearing system was one of the functions fully devolved in the 
new Scottish Parliament in 1999, along with its related services, the police, local 
authority services and the criminal justice system. Now, Scottish politicians were 
more clearly and publicly accountable to their electorate, who “if opinion polls are to 
be believed – worried about crime…” (Bottoms & Dignan 2004:76); and, “the 
criminal justice … policy-making network that worked through Edinburgh not 
Westminster… relatively insulated from close scrutiny”, which had produced the 
hearings, would now be open to the scrutiny of the Scottish Parliament (Young 
2001:37-8).   
Youth crime and the hearings became of significant interest to the Scottish 
Executive, and almost immediately led to the ‘Advisory Group on Youth Crime’ 
culminating in an Action Plan with fast-track schemes
223
 for the “hard core of 
persistent offenders”; pilot youth courts in Hamilton for 16/17 year olds and 
persistent offenders
224
; national standards for youth justice (Scottish Executive 
2002); and targets for reducing the number of persistent offenders (Bottoms & 
Dignan 2004:75).  
In 2005, the hearings were given the power
225
 to impose a ‘movement 
restriction condition’ (MRC) for up to 12 hours per day, as part of a supervision 
requirement on young people aged 12 plus who fulfilled the ‘secure criteria’226. 
Where compliance was monitored by an electronic tag, “in accordance with the 
welfare approach of the Hearing’s System” the young person would receive “an 
intensive package of support that is tailored to their individual needs and ‘deeds’” , 
an intensive support and monitoring service (ISMS) 
227
(Vaswani 2006:2). There was 
no criminal sanction, unlike the English system, as the condition was a measure to 
protect the child without resorting to removal from home. Early research in Glasgow 
indicated “some small but positive changes observed in frequency and seriousness of 
offending” (Vaswani 2006:16). 
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 in court within 10 days from charge 
224
 3 separate incidents with criminal charges in last 6 months 
225
 Antisocial Behaviour (Scotland) Act 2004 
226
 “a) having previously absconded, is likely to abscond and, if he/she absconds, it is likely that 
his/her physical, mental or moral welfare will be at risk; or 
b) is likely to injure him/herself or some other person” 
227
 a direct alternative to secure accommodation 
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Morris et al. (1980:48) at the end of the first decade had argued that  
It is not at all clear that doing something is better than doing nothing, or 
that doing one thing is better than doing another. It is also now clear that 
intervention can harm as well as help, and that the actions of even the 
well-meaning do as much harm as good. 
A generation later, longitudinal research (McAra and McVie 2007) on some 
4,300 Scottish children, found that “the deeper a child penetrates the formal system, 
the less likely he or she is to desist from offending” (p.315). The researchers 
considered that:  
the key to tackling serious and persistent offending lies in minimal 
intervention and maximum diversion. Although the Scottish system is 
better placed than most other western juvenile justice systems to deliver 
such an agenda, as currently implemented it appears to be failing many 
young people. (p.319) 
They acknowledged the role of the police and the reporter in diversion, but 
also in recycling ‘the usual suspects, those who had previously been referred.” On 
social work, they commented on “the relative paucity of regular one-to-one contact 
with child offenders”, that “only one in three were in receipt of any offence-focused 
work” and “the sometimes chaotic nature of social work services and supervision” 
(2007:335-7). Whyte (1998:203) too claimed that “the empirical evidence from 
Scotland supports the case for the maximum use of informal processes and diversion 
from prosecution”, and suggested special focus on parenting and the individual 
characteristics of the child.  
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6.4 Conclusion 
Nobody dreams of blaming a boy who has a deformed foot for not being 
able to do gymnastics. The boy is excused his disability and given the 
normal love and care which every child needs... But many people do 
blame a child who is born into a situation where he is not wanted and 
who grows up unable to love and care about other people...They are 
therefore handicapped emotionally and require help rather than further 
punishment.  (Margaret Dobie 1976:225, Chairman of the Dumfries and 
Galloway Regional Panel). 
 
In 1971, a Conservative government implemented, without reservation, Part 
III of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, largely based on the principles of the 
Kilbrandon Report and concerned with the welfare of children, including offenders, 
aged under 16. Before 1971, Scotland had encouraged diversion from the formal 
process, initially through police cautioning and liaison schemes, and then by the 
fiscals, who also chose the level of court. Under the new hearings system, diversion 
was likewise exercised by the police and the fiscals when relevant, and additionally 
by the reporter and even the hearing. In the first decade about 40% of cases were not 
referred on to the hearing, and in the latter two decades this rose to over 60%. The 
reporter, responsible for collecting all relevant information about the children, 
exercised great discretion to divert children to informal measures, or put them before 
a hearing to consider compulsory measures of care, or occasionally in fairness to a 
co-defendant, for the hearing to take that initial decision.  
Cases in the Lord Advocate’s List were dealt with by a sheriff or on 
indictment by a sheriff and jury or, exceptionally, the high court with a maximum 
power of sending the child to a list D school up to aged 18, thereafter penal custody. 
In line with the Kilbrandon philosophy, co-operation between reporters and fiscals 
kept these numbers down to around 10% cases per year. Sheriffs in the privacy of 
chambers, using language and procedures appropriate to the child, including a more 
inquisitorial approach, would deal with any dispute as to facts, and appeals. Only the 
Secretary of State could approve identification of the child in court, and no one could 
identify a child before a hearing. 
Before hearings were introduced in 1971, children accused of an offence 
aged between eight, the age of criminal responsibility, and 17 years would appear in 
one of four different types of juvenile court. They had the power to send boys aged 
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16 to borstal, otherwise all juveniles were eligible for detention up to 28 days in a 
remand centre/police cell/prison; for an approved school; for care by a ‘fit person’; 
for probation, a fine, or an admonition or a caution
228
. 
Under the hearings system, all children aged 8-16 admitting to offences 
would be dealt with solely on the basis of their needs; while any child under 16 
could be referred for other grounds, mostly related to their protection from abuse or 
neglect. The similarities in the backgrounds and circumstances of children who 
offended and those needing care or protection far outweighed the differences, and 
the vast majority of children referred for offending were living in poor economic and 
social circumstances. The system was predicated on the local community taking 
responsibility for its own problems: panel members were recruited from a wider 
section of the community than previous decision-makers, through open and widely 
publicised advertisements. Candidates went through rigorous selection procedures, 
with many younger people and equal genders being appointed. Training was given 
before taking part in the hearings, and reappointment was contingent upon 
satisfactory performance. In the 1990s, the average length of service was less than 
five years, and some 11,000 citizens had been panel members, enabling a wider 
understanding by the community of the complexities of adolescence, juvenile crime 
and its links with childhood deprivation and abuse. 
From first encounter with the authorities, everything was designed to enlist 
the co-operation of the parents, including paying their travelling expenses to the 
hearings, which were held in inconspicuous buildings. There, the children appeared 
without police, prosecution or co-defendants: the offence lost its central role and 
only the child’s needs were relevant. The chairman had a duty to explain the 
procedures, the rights of participants and how to appeal, and both parents and child 
were given the opportunity to take part fully in the discussion. The panels showed a 
great reluctance to confront the parents, although many members believed they were 
mostly responsible for their children’s offending behaviour.  Despite some failings 
on the part of some panel members, most parents and children felt they had been 
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listened to and their opinions valued. The hearings had removed the stigma of court 
appearances and sanctions. 
The local community, through its local authority and voluntary agencies, was 
expected to provide facilities for the social, educational and physical development of 
children before the hearings found in need of compulsory help. Reorganisation of 
social services to provide a generic service to deal with all aspects of family 
problems, combined with rising unemployment, higher family breakdown and rising 
expectations, dissipated the availability of experienced staff and the quality of 
provision.  For the first decade, there was great demand for residential places, mostly 
List D schools, but demand declined by 2/3rds in the mid 1990s; intermediate 
treatment did not become a reality until the 1980s; and even supervision at home 
suffered from the shortage of staff. 
The 1995 Act, passed at a time when concern about juvenile crime was a 
major political issue in Britain, strengthened the rights of children and their parents, 
in line with international conventions. Despite the premise of the Act, the needs not 
the deeds, a minority of panel members favoured some punishment-based measures 
to demonstrate the unacceptability of certain behaviour. In effect, the new hearings 
had only removed the punitive sanctions of short detention in a remand centre and 
fining. It could be argued that where preferred community treatment was not 
available but punitive sanctions were, either in the form of fines, attendance centres 
or, more importantly, the residential provisions of detention centres and the new 
punitive borstals, they might have been used to ‘protect the public.’ As it was, the 
measure in the 1995 Act invoking the protection of the public did not introduce 
penal custody or deterrent sentences: the treatment of the child, albeit through tighter 
control using welfare measures, remained the goal and the reality.  
However, the hearings system effectively ended at the age of 16, two years 
below the UN definition of adulthood at 18 years. Thereafter, penal custody was 
ordered at a rate similar to that in England/Wales, such that punitive custody for all 
offenders under 18 was only marginally less in Scotland. This was despite the 
knowledge that the circumstances of these older children were very similar to the 
younger group in terms of multiple disadvantage. It would seem that, as with the 
hearings, if punitive sanctions were available, decision-makers in the criminal justice 
arena would use them in the alleged interests of the public rather than measures for 
the long-term rehabilitation of the young offenders. Research has shown that for the 
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majority of offenders under 18 informal action is likely to be more successful, and 
for the few with multiple, serious problems, the hearings need to identify those early 
and provide targeted, high quality, non-stigmatising support and help. Having 
successfully resisted any punitive sanctions for 35 years, the culture of the hearings 
would suggest that record would continue: the challenge is to embrace such an 
entirely constructive, positive approach with the more troublesome and damaged, 
especially in the 16-18 age group. 
 
ooOoo 
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CHAPTER 7 
 ENGLAND/WALES – JUVENILE COURTS AND THE 
CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS ACT 1969 
Every court in dealing with a child or young person who is brought 
before it, either as an offender or otherwise, shall have regard to the 
welfare of the child or young person and shall in a proper case take steps 
for removing him from undesirable surroundings, and for securing the 
proper provision is made for his education and training. (s44 Children 
and Young Persons  Act 1933 as amended  by s72 (4) Children and 
Young Persons Act 1969) 
 
I do remember the resistance, the resistance…229 
 
The welfare principle had been explained by Caldecote LCJ as not “cut-and-
dried rules” but “a privilege entrusted to them [magistrates] of shaping the destinies 
of children who would otherwise be wholly without guidance or protection” (Watson 
and Austin 1975:8). Far from criminalising juveniles, the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1969 was predicated on the belief that the delinquent and deprived were 
one and the same and should be dealt with outside the criminal courts whenever 
possible. No child under 14 could be prosecuted except for homicide, and those aged 
14-17 only in specific cases:  it was hoped that voluntary agreements between the 
family and local authority would suffice, and if not, the non-criminal ‘care 
proceedings’. This was broadly similar to the philosophy held in Scotland but 
crucially, in England/Wales, included a requirement to consider the public interest as 
well as the child’s welfare. The Bill passed in October 1969 also indicated clearly 
that certain vital clauses would be implemented only when the appropriate facilities 
were in place.   
The Magistrates’ Association (MA), supported by the Conservatives, had 
consistently opposed the main clause of the 1969 Act, clause 1, that a child found 
guilty MUST ALSO be found to be “in need of care or control which he is unlikely 
to receive unless the court makes an order …”, before any disposition could be 
made, the ‘double test’. In March 1970 a general election returned a Conservative 
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government, and Quintin Hogg was appointed Lord Chancellor, who had not only 
championed the MA’s opposition but was now its President230. 
The Act placed great responsibility on the local authorities, particularly the 
completely reorganised and short-staffed social services departments (Crossman 
1977) and the education departments, which were for several years politically 
divided and functionally weakened by the introduction of comprehensive schools 
(Devine 2000:580). The new Home Secretary
231
 transferred the Children’s 
Department to Social Services, cutting its links to the criminal and police 
departments within the Home Office, leaving “no one with overall responsibility for 
juvenile offenders” (Morris P.1978:ix). 
The magistracy’s direct concerns were compounded by domestic factors: the 
compulsory retirement for justices at 70; the greatly changed “nature of the office of 
lay magistrate” through abolition of Quarter Sessions 232 , (Raine 1989:12); the 
strongly resisted re-organization of magistrates’ courts233 (MAC 1972:2056); and the 
Home Office guide, the ‘Sentence of the Court’, “deeply resented” by the MA234. 
The issue of the mandatory ‘suspended prison sentence’235 was also fiercely resisted 
(Mag.1971:24) until repealed by the Conservatives in 1972
236
. The Lord Chief 
Justice, Parker, had refuted the autonomy of Benches (Mag.1970:17), and the Lord 
Chancellor
237
 told magistrates not to do anything “thought to be in conflict with their 
position as keepers of the peace”, a view robustly challenged by some magistrates 
(Mag.1970:52 & 154).  
Compounding this catalogue of fears, upheavals and objections was the 
increasing social tension in the country as a whole: serious industrial violence and 
disruption; an energy crisis and financial depression; IRA bombers threatening 
ministers, and killing and maiming in major cities; gang violence, police murders, 
and the arrival of ‘the Mugger’. Government, Parliament and public opinion were 
increasingly concerned with law and order, “a tense House of Commons” asked “to 
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choose between democracy on the one hand and ‘chaos, anarchy and a totalitarian or 
Communist regime’ on the other” (Campbell J. 1994:593). The conservative 
magistracy was now being asked to implement a radical, non-punitive justice system 
for juvenile miscreants. Would it be equal to the task?  
 210 
7.1 The Juvenile Courts: the Law and Implementation in the 1970s  
7.1.1 Implementation?  
Limited parts of the Act became operational in April 1971: the historical 
structure for juvenile justice in England/Wales, the juvenile court, with its dual 
function of dealing with both criminal and care proceedings, remained unchanged. 
The Justices’ Clerk would administer and advise the court; and with no authority to 
divert would receive cases for prosecution (those aged 10-17) from the police, and 
for ‘care’ (from birth to 18) from local authorities. Panel members would still be 
chosen by their magisterial colleagues on the adult bench
238
, and sit in their former 
court rooms to decide the cases and the disposals. The local authorities and probation 
service were expected to apply the orders, as would staff in borstals, detention 
centres and attendance centres until replaced by IT (intermediate treatment) schemes. 
There were new ‘welfare’ powers for care and control measures. 
The new Home Minister, Carlisle, believed that “the vast majority of 
magistrates” opposed raising the effective age of criminal responsibility239  to 12 
years, let alone 14 and  did not implement relevant sections of the Act 
(Mag.1973:152). “The Conservative Government and the Magistrates' Association 
were really more or less at one, that those key features of the Bill were not to be put 
into effect.” 240 The age was never raised, even by the subsequent Labour 
government, a purely political decision informed by public opinion (Tutt 2000:7). In 
1978, several letters in the ‘Magistrate’ (1978:9, 61, 90) suggested lowering the age 
to six for ‘teeny criminals’. 
Twelve Children’s Regional Planning Committees241 (CRPCs) were created 
to design comprehensive systems of community homes and intermediate treatment 
facilities. Magistrates wanted to serve on them, although “the initiative would have 
to come from the local authorities acting through the Children’s Committee” (MAC 
1969:1967). Magistrates were soon complaining bitterly about “the shortcomings of 
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local authority social services’ departments” (MAC 1972:2061) and even in 1978 
were complaining about their limited role on the committees (JCC 1978:622).  
 
… the fate of a child depends very often on whether he or she first 
bumps into a policeman or a social worker. The Act seeks to reduce the 
odds in this strange lottery. (Ford
242
 1975:11) 
Non-implementation of sections 4 and 5
243
 meant that juveniles accused of 
offences could be brought to a juvenile court under either care or criminal 
proceedings. None of the regulations regarding criteria for prosecution (Anderson 
1978), or that a juvenile co-accused with an adult must be tried at a juvenile rather 
than a magistrates’ or crown court unless this was considered “undesirable”, were 
implemented. This was despite consideration of diversion, prosecution or care 
proceedings being a crucial gate-keeping exercise. Most cases were brought as 
prosecutions (Cavenagh 1976:14), leaving magistrates able to make punitive orders 
and not obliged to apply the extra test of needing care which they had so disliked. 
Some police areas organised Juvenile Bureau Schemes for consultation with 
education, social services and the family, otherwise the initiative came from the 
social services. Some magistrates were highly critical of this discretion, particularly 
for joint offenders (Mag.1974:54-5
244
), complaining to the police (JCC 1977:553) 
but the JCC (1974:431) eventually accepted, as did some courts (JCC 1977:564), 
that the police should deal with each case on its merits. This broad discretion still 
baffled some senior magistrates: “We don’t know that, do we? We only saw the ones 
that came to court”245. Although there were considerable variations between forces in 
cautioning, by 1974 two thirds of the 10-13 age group were cautioned, double the 
number before the Act, and one third in the 14-16 group, up from one fifth 
(Mag.1977:35; Ditchfield 1976).  
The new social services were given responsibility for the prevention of 
offending and most of the treatment of juvenile offenders. Added to reorganisation 
of local government, with its new boundaries, duties and staff, the old children’s 
departments were absorbed into social services, their expertise dissipated by new 
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responsibilities for all needy members of society. Local authorities had, however, 
looked after delinquents in approved schools, remand homes and reception centres. 
The probation service, employed and monitored by the magistracy, was expected to 
be largely divested of its role with juveniles, but at the discretion of magistrates still 
supervised some of the 14-16 age group. Social workers were answerable to a 
committee of the local authority: magistrates were “expressly excluded, by a ruling 
of the Lord Chancellor from membership” (McCabe & Treitel 1984:16). The MA 
seemed to fear contamination of the probation service by social services, rejecting 
any amalgamation (MAC 1971:2029) or even a statutory forum to exchange views 
with both (JCC 1973:379). 
7.1.2   Juvenile Court  
In the family court the welfare of the child was paramount, but in the 
juvenile court we had regard for the welfare, and there were these kinds 
of differences that we recognised in the different courts.
246
 
The lynchpin of the Magistrates’ Courts was the Justices’ Clerk.  In 1977 
some 17% of the 345 were neither barristers nor solicitors: some were part-time 
(Skyrme 1979:155-65), and some covered several benches. They were administrators 
of the benches and courts, ensured the training, much of the content devised by 
themselves, of their magistrates, if not the delivery itself, and most were Secretaries 
to Advisory Committees
247
. It was their duty, whether invited or not by the 
magistrates, to advise them on the law, practice, procedure, and sentencing 
guidelines
248
, as well as recording all decisions. Their advice might not be impartial 
(Ball 1983; Darbyshire 1984; Mag.1977:164; Raine 1989), and they could restrict 
information to their justices (Mag.1977:95). Significantly for the principles of the 
1969 Act, one assistant clerk was told: 
… not to be involved with other agencies because it interfered with 
judicial independence... Most people would only just marginally have 
taken notice of what came from the Home Office… Social Services, you 
didn’t have to talk to them if you didn’t want to, you didn’t have to deal 
with them at all.
249
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With several courts held at the same time, often “where the least experienced 
chairman is sitting, the clerk will be one of the most junior” (Mag.1977:180) and 
“some magistrates would do illegal things because the justices’ clerk would not 
contradict them” 250 . Other magistrates “left too much of the conduct of the 
proceedings to the clerk” (Skyrme 1979:163). Clerks were seen to be the most 
punitive by far of criminal justice agencies, including magistrates (Mag.1994:32-3). 
One Justices’ Clerk wrote of the new Act: 
a blank cheque has been written for all children and young persons under 
the age of fifteen and that there is no effective measure of control over 
them... (Berlins and Wansell 1974:77) 
As the clerk was the one constant in the life of the magistrates, “he can be 
and often is, the master of the whole proceedings” (McCabe and Treitel 1984:81). 
The Judges 
…social scientists will increasingly number among bench numbers in the 
future. If we value freedom, democracy, unfettered justice, and reality in 
dealing with offenders we must now be on our guard. (Mag.1977:13)
251
 
The juvenile panel was the body responsible for dealing in court with 
juveniles who were thought to be offenders or in need of care and protection. The 
1969 Bill
252
 had enabled the Lord Chancellor to appoint all juvenile court panels 
directly, from outside the magistracy. However, opposition from the MA and 
Justices’ Clerks, claiming “the blend of the more informal atmosphere and procedure 
of juvenile courts and of the more formal approach in adult courts is a benefit to 
both” (Hansard SC 1968-9 V: 584), led the Labour government to concede that these 
powers would be used only “in those areas representing a minority of juvenile 
courts” (V:592). No regulations were ever brought in to alter the original system of 
the juvenile panel being elected by and from among the ‘adult’ bench magistrates, 
whose recruitment was still shrouded in mystery, with candidates sworn to secrecy 
by the Advisory Committee (Mag.1977:123; Burney 1979:56; Mag.1979:84; 
McCabe & Treitel 1984:15; Ravenscroft 1987:475/6; Raine 1989:15).  
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This meant the magistracy was essentially a self-perpetuating body:  “I was 
invited to put my name forward. In those days that’s how it was done”253. In 1974 to 
interview candidates was “by no means uniform practice” (MAC 1974: 2158). In 
1982, 94% of the Advisory Committees were magistrates, which limited the range of 
values and attitudes sought in candidates, with single parents, the industrial working 
class and the unemployed not represented at all. Yet there were shortages: “They 
were so desperate for magistrates that year that we were sworn in by the chairman of 
the bench.”254 Gibson255 found the full range of social class on his panel but “there 
was never any great tension, and they would often come to the same kind of decision 
about cases…” Virtually all the men would have done two years compulsory 
National Service
256
, and the majority had fought in the War.   
It was from this body of people that members of the juvenile panel were 
elected every third year, “having regard to their age, special qualifications and 
aptitude for the work involved” (Mag.1977:154), none of which was explained. “I 
think it was because I was younger…I am not aware of anyone being appointed and 
asked their special qualifications”.257 In some areas all the younger magistrates were 
put on the juvenile panel without any election (McCabe & Treitel 1984:16), while 
others regarded the juvenile court as a “distinct specialism”, with middle-aged and 
middle-class women sitting very frequently (Parker, Sumner and Jarvis 1989:22). 
“The difference in the social class and educational background of most magistrates 
[from the juveniles was]… one of the major problems” (Mag.1979:5). Initial 
appointments were unlikely after the age of 50, retirement at 65. 
Magistrates sat in the juvenile court from once a fortnight to less than four 
times a year
258
: the average was monthly, with all their other sittings in adult 
criminal courts. Their overall annual commitment had been reduced to a minimum of 
26 half days (Mag.1971:19). Small juvenile panels yet again were advised to 
combine
259
 to “enable their members to sit regularly” (Mag.1977:38). Juvenile panel 
magistrates after sitting in an adult court might help to finish the juvenile court list 
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(Asquith 1983:131), with the inherent difficulties of switching their minds from 
adult to juvenile court jurisdiction. Until 1979, only the chairman or deputy of the 
panel could chair the court
260
, and received no specialised training until the late 
1980s. 
Beware all compulsory training. The law may be observed to the letter 
by obtaining our physical presence; but like the horse taken to the water, 
drinking does not always result.
261
 (Mag.1979:175) 
Training for the juvenile court although compulsory was “short and sweet… a few 
evenings’ training.” 262 For some, “in large measure, you were trained by the 
Chairmen of your Bench”263 and many magistrates felt much of their training was 
best achieved while ‘sitting’ (Mag.1974:78; Ralphs & Norman 1987; Raine 1989; 
Parker et al.1989). Others were trained by the clerk,
264
 “very good old court clerks, 
not these intensive courses with piles of notes and where you came out cross-
eyed”.265  Local training reinforced Bench ‘culture’ and insularity (Parker et al.1989) 
and when shared with the local juvenile justice agencies constrained sentencing 
decisions (NACRO 2000). In 1974, Monger JP, (1974:123) commented that training 
was at a “disturbingly basic level”. 
Magistrates were told that their prime duty was  
“to sustain the rule of law, to maintain order and to enable decent people 
to live in peace and happiness”, and acting as “in a court of law, not on a 
welfare committee” (Mag.1977:162266).  
The training concentrated on the law, procedures and powers of the juvenile court, 
and the nature and purpose of sentencing (Mag.1976:164). In the mid 1980s 
magistrates were encouraged to follow a more structured decision-making process to 
improve standards (Ashworth 1986, Haynes 1987; Barker & Sturges 1986), but 
“Throughout the country, the provision of continuing training for members of 
juvenile court panels is often scanty, and sometimes non-existent” (Mag.1986:12). 
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Importantly, “magistrates never had any training at all on child development”267, 
even though they also dealt with child protection cases, when the training focused on 
the legal aspects for the protection of the child, not the relationship that abuse might 
have to later delinquency. With no official reading list, the diligent could have found 
several articles in the ‘Magistrate’ (1974:28, 30268 ,139; 1977:113-4), about 90% 
received it,  related to childhood deprivation, violence and criminality,  alongside 
many articles demanding severer, deterrent punishment; and information about the 
MA, and some Appeal Court decisions. 
Successive Lord Chancellors seemed apologetic about the “additional burden 
of undertaking courses of instruction” (Mag. 1976:85; 1979:1; 1986:171), and by 
1977 there were still magistrates who claimed they did “not require to be trained” 
(Mag.1977:181
269
). Refresher training, of twelve hours instruction within three 
years, was not even compulsory until the 1980s. Panels were obliged to meet twice a 
year to discuss matters related to the juvenile court, but attendance was not 
obligatory.  
The Judged 
…a new privileged class of young thugs and vandals270 
Dad tried to strangle my Mum and the kids were screaming and furniture 
got broke (Tutt 1974:147). 
In the juvenile court for criminal matters, the powers and procedures were 
different for the two age groups, ‘children’ 10-14, and ‘young persons’ 14-17. 
Juvenile offending was “predominantly a male problem”: in 1971, of all offences 
committed 19.3% were by boys under 17, only 2.1% by girls (Tutt 1974:5). Most 
children were from the working-class, not least because   
middle class children in particular [were] likely to be defended in various 
ways, both by their parents and by their schools, from prying police eyes 
(Wootton 1978:154).  
Tutt (1974:11; Newson & Newson 1962; Trasler 1962) considered that 
different, class-related child-rearing habits played a very significant role in working-
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class families: “…aggression was often fostered and indirectly encouraged”, the 
child expected to stand up for himself and hit back. Middle-class parents resolved 
issues by verbal not physical means.   
The Act had accepted, as many official reports before it had done (Ingleby 
1960: 10), that  
It is the situation and the relationships within the family which seem to 
be responsible for many children being in trouble, whether the trouble is 
called delinquency or anything else.  
In March 1976, some 100,600 children were in the care of the state in 
England/Wales (Mag.1977:99), and additionally, later research indicated that 
generally, around 22,000 children were in refuges escaping domestic violence each 
year (Women’s Aid Federation). Tuck of HORU (Mag.1992:131) thought domestic 
violence “may account for a quarter of violent crime” because “too many of the 
offenders … have grown up in violent circumstances and have themselves become 
corrupted by that violence.”  Research on persistent young offenders identified their 
having chaotic family lifestyles, in and out of care, high levels of drug and alcohol 
abuse, truanting and exclusion from school (Hagell and Newburn 1994; Graham and 
Bowling 1995).  
An AGM debate of the MA revealed that 700,000 children were truanting 
each day (Mag.1974:183). Given that low achievement preceded and was closely 
linked to delinquency (Tutt 1974:27), it was little wonder that magistrates were 
exercised about truancy and saw the need for excluded children to have education in 
special units (JCC 1976: May – 76/56AA). Truanting had many causes, mostly 
related to family circumstances, low self-esteem (Devlin 1995), delinquent brothers, 
and bullying, about 450,000 children were bullied at school at least once a week 
(Williams 1996:9). The Criminal Law Act 1977 provided a requirement that children 
should attend school (JCC 1978:616) as a sanction for breach of supervision order. 
The MA (JCC 1979:750) persistently called for rigorous enforcement of school 
attendance, demanding residential care orders (Mag.1978:18), which was rejected by 
the Department of Education and Science. Another magisterial initiative, simple 
monitoring by the court, was said to reduce truancy (Mag.1978:22-3
271
) but 
independent research claimed this was more about social conformity, with lack of 
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understanding by magistrates of the complexities of the problem (Grimshaw and 
Pratt 1985). Tutt (1974:176) found nearly 30% of children in one Approved School 
were classified with an IQ less than 80% and in another, “half of the boys needed 
some very intensive remedial education to alleviate the situation”. In 1971, about 
7000 children were in Approved Schools. 
“75% of juvenile crime is some form of larceny…delinquents have a 
high need for material goods but a low achievement motivation”   and 
rather than “satisfying their needs through legitimate means, therefore, 
they opt for the delinquent solution.” (Tutt 1974:29) 
Children were brought before the courts as much due to varied cautioning 
practices as to the seriousness of their offences, and even to satisfy “specific policing 
practices based on organisational goals” (Parker, Casburn and Turnbull 1981:76). 
The pattern of juvenile offending always showed acquisitive crime around 80%. 
Table 7.1 - % of Boys 10-14 and 14-17 Convicted of Indictable Offences in 1971 
Offence Under 14 years 14 - 17 
Violence v person 1.8 6.7 
Sexual offences 0.6 1.4 
Burglary and Robbery 47.1 36.4 
Theft/ taking 41.5 47.3 
Handling stolen goods 5.7 5.5 
Fraud 0.6 0.7 
Other 2.7 2.0 
            (Tutt 1974:5) 
 
Far greater use…must be made of measures against parents who fail to 
exercise control over their children; after all, it is their job, not that of the 
Social Services. We need more of this enforcement by realistic penalties 
and less ‘taking into care’ which merely releases the parents from any 
further duties. (Mag.1977:136
272
) 
Such attitudes by magistrates may have led them to demand penalties on 
parents for their children’s misdeeds, “a parental bind over with other types of 
punishment and treatment …” (JCC 1979:709). Some magistrates were well aware 
of the poverty of the families, “It wasn’t uncommon to find three generations of 
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unemployed”. 273  Many parents may have lacked the skills to become effective 
parents and needed help (Taylor, M. 1994).   
Due Process – The Courts 
Adults and children would enter through the same main entrance of the 
Guildhall, a big old Victorian building, and you would then divide in the 
big lobby off to the different courts. 
274
 
This made nonsense of the rule
275
 to keep juveniles away from the 
contamination of adult offenders by allowing an hour to elapse between adult and 
juvenile sittings. There had been little commitment by the magistrates, who were 
responsible for providing and administering their courts, to “recognize, in the design 
of special rooms or the provision of separate buildings, that the juvenile court was 
set up to promote the welfare of the child” (McCabe & Treitel 1984:24). Many new 
courthouses were built in the 1960s and 1970s, but only some had special rooms 
designed solely for juvenile courts (Asquith 1983:182).  
At least one parent was expected to attend the court with the child, probably 
several times for one matter. They were not given expenses or loss of earnings. 
Families would sit anxiously in a crowded waiting room, from 10 a.m., some until 
late afternoon, which did “nothing to enhance for them the authority of the courts” 
(Curtis 1999:189), while ushers, “generally officious … provoked resentment” 
(Anderson 1978:15-18). Better management could have timetabled cases. Luckier 
families were assisted by having an explanatory leaflet
276
 to read, which had taken 
the MA many years to agree (JCC 1975: 4530; 1976:529; 1977:591; 1978:618, 663). 
Children and parents entered a room full of unknown people to face the 
magistrates, many women in hats until the mid 1970s (Mag. 1972:1 & 44; Brook
277
), 
sitting high up on a raised dais, even the “smell and feel of traditional criminal 
courts” (Parker et al. 1981:46), the situation compounded by poor acoustics (Carlen 
1976). “All the while the magistrates maintain[ed] their usual expression of severe 
impassivity” (Monger 1974:124). Some courts were held in a small room, with 
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magistrates on the same level at a desk, parents and children sitting a few feet in 
front of them.  
Of course, the defendants – and if they are present - the parents, arrive in 
court with some trepidation. It is surely right that they should do so… 
too much informality might perhaps take away some of its awe which I 
believe to be a vital part of the child’s education. (Mag.1979:54278) 
The proceedings were similar to the adult court, with the additional 
requirement “to have regard for the welfare of the juvenile”, although the practice 
and ethos varied greatly between juvenile courts, one an “instrument of law”, 
another, an “agent of social welfare” (Anderson 1978:18; McCabe & Treitel 1984; 
Parker et al. 1981). In some the police introduced the juvenile to the court to 
“emphasise the gravity of the proceedings” (Mag.1979:54 279 ); in others, the 
chairman “eyeball them… leaving the solicitor to show them where to sit” 
(Mag.1998:42
280
); or the chairman or clerk tried to explain the proceedings, which 
were often “completely incomprehensible to the defendant and parents” (Ford 
1975:61; Mag.1978:109; 1979:5-7
281
).  
Research showed that children are “particularly susceptible to efforts to 
change their behaviour at this climatic stage of appearing before the judge” but 
confusing traditional courts do not enable this to happen (Martin et al. 1981: 192). 
The juvenile, presumed innocent
282, probably told to “Stand up straight and take 
your hands out of your pockets” (Mag.1979:6), would be identified by the clerk or 
chairman and asked whether the offence was admitted (90% of cases) or denied. 
There was a duty to explain the substance of the charge in simple language
283
. The 
prosecutor, until 1986 usually a uniformed police inspector or solicitor for the police, 
would then dominate the proceedings. If the juvenile were under 14, the prosecution 
had to rebut the principle of doli incapax
284
, (see Chapter 2) although by 1998, when 
it was abolished, some courts had not been “assiduous in applying the presumption” 
(Ball, McCormac & Stone 2001:20-1): “Children are far more intelligent than adults 
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give them credit for, and they know whether they should or should not do 
something”285. 
If magistrates felt the alleged offence committed by a young person would 
require a greater sentence than their powers, they could commit the juvenile to a 
higher court with a judge and jury. The twelve-fold increase in these ‘grave crime’ 
proceedings
286
 during the 1970s probably reflected the rising juvenile crime rate, the 
increasing numbers of juveniles in court and the general increase in the use of 
custody (Dunlop and Frankenberg 1982:44). The most serious offenders were found 
to be the most damaged by their childhood (Boswell 1996). 
 
Children whose lives have been damaged and disfigured by 
disadvantage, neglect and abuse are the very children who occupy the 
juvenile remand wings of our prisons. (Goldson 2001:51)  
 
A young person could be remanded in penal custody only if the court was 
satisfied that the local authority could not “undertake his safe-keeping” and issued a 
‘Certificate of Unruliness’287, some 4,750 in 1976, although a measure often forced 
upon magistrates through lack of alternative provision (Goodman 1973). A further 
5,900 children and young people were estimated to have been placed or detained in 
care (Mag.1977:99). The MA considered it a scandal to remand juveniles to prison 
establishments, and “kept up unremitting pressure for more secure places to be 
provided by local authorities…”, not satisfied with the 20 extra places from 1975 to 
1977, and a further 118 under construction  (Mag.1977:198). By 1979 no girl under 
17 could be committed to penal custody
288
. 
If a trial was necessary, the proceedings were much the same as for an adult, 
although the juvenile without a lawyer was allowed a parent, guardian or friend to 
“actively assist with such matters as cross-examination of prosecution witnesses” 
aided by the court if necessary (Pain 1982:33). Legal representation of juveniles was 
the “exception rather than the rule” (Morris P 1978: vii) but rose to 40% in 1984 
(Allen 1991); some lawyers were noticeably more acceptable to the bench than 
others (McCabe & Treitel 1984:19). Lawyers increased the adversarial atmosphere 
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and inhibited participation by children and parents (Asquith 1983). No one other 
than those engaged in the case, which included the press, was entitled to be in the 
court, although Burney once counted 20 adults. Section10 of the 1969 Act made it 
clear that publicity was not to be used as a punishment, only to reveal names in order 
to protect others who might have been wrongly accused. Some magistrates wanted 
football hooligans identified “as an added deterrent to those responsible”, a view 
rebutted by the Home Office (JCC 1979:711). 
After a finding or admittance of guilt, the prosecution gave details of the 
offence. Not all areas informed the court of any previous cautions (MAC 
1973:2,100), and by 1978 still the “practice varied throughout the country, as it did 
also on cautioning itself”, some magistrates refusing to hear cautions (Mag.1978:14). 
Home Office guidelines
289
 said the police should inform the court (p.91).  
The prosecutor could not suggest  the sentence and once the social workers or 
probation officers, at the invitation of the bench, had given their reports, magistrates 
frequently whispering between each other, and only the chairman speaking to the 
court, the bench would ‘retire’ to make a decision. The people in the courtroom 
would have no idea how long those discussions might take, from five minutes to 
perhaps an hour. The clerk usually joined them at some point. 
 Both the parent and juvenile could appeal to the Crown Court, or the High 
Court in specific cases, but had to enter into a recognizance beforehand and “pay 
such costs as that court may award” (Pain 1982:88). For many years the MA 
opposed the idea of giving reasons, believing it could stigmatize some witnesses and 
“provide gratuitously the grounds for a successful appeal” (Young and Clarke 
1980:38). The juvenile court was not obliged to inform the juvenile or parent that 
there was a right of appeal. This, coupled with the fear of the cost and the possibility 
of an increased penalty, were major disincentives.  
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7.1.3   ‘Disposals’  
The aims of sentencing were much discussed at the time. Fundamental 
among these was the primary duty of the bench to protect the public. By 
which of the methods could this best be achieved? The public were 
obviously safe while the offender was in custody – all the better if some 
training could be incorporated. But on release without such support they 
often regressed” 290 
I have lately been perturbed at what I consider to be the increasing 
tendency to ‘understand’ the motives of the delinquent, rather than to 
assist in stamping out delinquency itself. (Mag.1979:54
291
) 
Retribution and the protection of society are often at odds with what is 
best for the offender and this difficult equation is not made easier to 
solve by outbursts suggesting that punishment presents no problems if 
only there were enough of it. (Mag.1974:155
292
) 
Because of the partial implementation of the 1969 Act, the court still had full 
discretion as to the response to the offender and the offence, ranging from an 
absolute discharge to committing a 15 year old to the Crown Court for borstal 
training. As local authorities, at their expense, brought in the new ‘welfare’ 
measures, supervision and care orders and especially ‘intermediate treatment’ (IT), 
the use of the punitive measures, attendance centres, detention centres and borstal, 
all funded by the Home Office, would cease. 
Deciding the order was extremely complex, with different magistrates 
attaching different weight to the evidence presented and the persons presenting it 
(Burney 1979:141; Shapland 1987:80-5; Morris & Giller 1987:200; NACRO 2000). 
Magistrates were much influenced by their local ideology: “Privately we believe the 
1969 Act a disaster” (Anderson 1978:20; Parker et al.1989). As well, their training 
(Lemon 1974: 48), their sentencing aim, even working part-time could lead to 
inconsistencies (Thomas 1987:13).  There was the added pressure of, and response 
to, public opinion (Ashworth 1987: 237), much of that gleaned from newspapers in a 
circulation war, with “crime reporting an integral component of Murdoch’s 
sensationalist formula” (Chibnall 1977:74), while a “single banner headline in the 
Sun carrie[d] more weight” than Home Office Research Studies (Downes 1988:203). 
Other opinions came from magistrates’ own social groups, “reports back from 
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various people…different organisations in which you were involved”293, and views 
held by  “right-thinking members of the public” (Lawton LJ294).  
Children should be punished for their wrongdoings. It’s the level of the 
punishment, the level of reparation, the level of activity that helps the 
child not to repeat that offence but I still think the child should be 
punished.
295
 
Magistrates “frequently” wanted corporal punishment back as a judicial 
punishment, “Haven’t we all smacked our children?” 296  Several articles in the 
‘Magistrate’ reported uncritically on the use of corporal punishment in other 
jurisdictions. 
Magistrates were able to continue using the old determinants of sentencing, 
previous convictions (Priestley et al. 1977; Cohen 1985) and gravity of the offence 
over-ruling the best interests of the child, conflicting with any social work-based 
decisions (Morris A. 1976; Freeman 1981). Whilst lawyers for both prosecution and 
defence emphasised the offence, social workers, probation officers and teachers, 
mostly through written statements, gave the court advice on the juvenile’s 
background. In some areas more weight was placed on reports from school teachers, 
perhaps because there were teachers on juvenile panels, or because teachers spent 
more time with the children, while social workers relied on information from the 
parents. Some teachers expressed their frustration about children (NACRO 1984:24), 
others relied on unsubstantiated allegations (Ball 1981:482). As Anderson (1978:25) 
observed, it was “difficult to uncover the parameters of decision-making” by the 
magistrates.  
Courts still had discretion to choose a probation officer rather than a social 
worker for young persons, but the under 13s were not transferred to local authorities 
from the probation service until 1974, and then not if the family was already 
involved with probation (Mag.1974: 113). This brought into focus magisterial 
attitudes to the two different services. Probation officers were seen to have: 
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an even keel, a balance, they could see the good and the bad… with the 
social workers, they were heavily biased towards the client, not all of 
them… they were ‘way out’ with all the ‘Sixties Thing’, with no 
apparent respect for the court whatsoever…297 
Social workers “were certainly very much anti-punishment”298 and “thought 
of themselves as god’s gift to the law and we were getting in the way”299. They were  
dolly birds of 22 fresh off their social studies courses…go to Keele for 
two years, have their brains removed, get a plastic card with their picture 
on and think they’re a social worker (Parker et al 1989:94-5).  
Communications were often strained:  “she didn’t quite think I was the devil 
with horns and claws, but jolly nearly”300, and Stacpoole301 of the DHSS thought 
“Social workers could be offensive and were not very helpful at times. The Act was 
deliberately compromised by many of them”.  Magistrates302 even protested when 
they heard probation officers were being trained alongside social workers. A 
contrary view, by a senior social worker
303
, thought joint training might have been 
very helpful: 
I was appalled by how many people were recommending custody…some 
probation officers had the very strange idea that people would stop 
offending if you threatened them. They had no idea about maturation or 
adolescence.  (Rutherford 1992:25) 
Later, probation officers also became the object of magistrates’ criticism, and 
for reasons similar to that meted out to social workers (Mag. 1976, 1977). A 
Stipendiary warned magistrates: 
[not]… to interfere, or even want to interfere, with what happens to an 
offender following the court’s decision. Judges and adult court 
magistrates do not tell prison governors nor probation officers how they 
should deal with people.
304
 (Mag.1978:162) 
The real problem was that social workers were outside magisterial control, 
and seen to be “‘sentencing’ the juveniles” (Mag.1978:123). This loss of control 
over the fate of their ‘orders’ was to be a major source of magisterial resistance to 
the working of the 1969 Act. 
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There was a legal obligation
305
 on magistrates to explain the reports to the 
children and the parents and give them an opportunity to challenge critical 
comments. This varied “from scrupulous adherence to total non-compliance” (Ball 
1983:198), such that “collusion of clerks and juvenile panel justices… could, on 
good grounds, be open to charges of administering ‘secret justice’.” (p.203). Before 
announcing the order, the court was obliged to ask the parents and children their 
views on the proposed action
306
.  The influential Justices’ Clerk B.T. Harris advised 
differently: 
The aggressive father and the hysterical mother are characters who 
regularly put in an appearance in most juvenile courts and the effect of 
asking them what they think of the proposal to send their son to a 
detention centre is at best to interrupt the proceedings dramatically, at 
worst to give rise to yet a further prosecution. Faced with such an 
extreme situation, most chairmen, very sensibly, disregard the strict letter 
of the law. (Mag.1979:42) 
The lightest order that could be imposed was a conditional discharge, which 
meant no further action unless the juvenile was reconvicted within a maximum 
period of three years. There was little change in the percentage of such orders made 
after the 1969 Act, about 21%. 
Welfare Measures 
These included supervision, IT, and care orders. All gave the responsibility 
for the nature of the order to the professionals, those with “the day to day intimate 
knowledge of the character of that young person, of his problems,” more able to take 
into account any development which might have taken place over some months 
(Hansard SC 1968-9 V: 332), rather than assessment by magistrates during a court 
appearance. This premise was not accepted by magistrates who, aided by reports, 
were expected to make rapid judgments about the character of the young defendant: 
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You do a juvenile no favours if you let him pull the wool over your 
eyes... There are youngsters who know the law perfectly well, who 
decide to defy it, and there are others who are really totally the victim of 
their circumstances, and it is those who would come under care 
proceedings. The others must be dealt with quite firmly
307
. 
Of the ‘welfare’ based orders, the basic supervision order replacing the 
probation order was the least intrusive but could last up to three years, and in fact, 
73% of supervision orders for 14-16 boys were by probation officers in 1978. The 
supervising officer gave advice and guidance for constructive leisure and education 
(Jones 1983). However, “only a miniscule proportion” (Harris & Webb 1987:118) of 
the boys were persistent offenders and virtually all were in education, training or 
work. Additionally, 30% of supervision orders were for thefts or damage of value 
less than £10 and common assault, which suggested supervision was being used 
unnecessarily (Bowden & Stevens 1986), and could lead to “an inappropriate 
escalation” of orders (ACC 1984 para 5.4.13). The Criminal Law Act 1977 added 
requirements to  supervision orders, with fines or even attendance centre orders for 
breaches, quite contrary to the view that “refusal to participate may mean needs 
should be met in another way” (PSSC 1977:44). The MA asked ministers for 
penalties for parents (JCC 1977:553). 
 
Social workers and the like were called by their Christian names by the 
young delinquents. Interesting and expensive hobbies – boating and even 
horse-riding – which prompted the observation – ‘Is there not a 
possibility of youngsters offending so that these luxuries are available to 
them?’ (Mag.1979:175)  
 
We really believed in the possibility of rehabilitation, but it had to be for 
real and there had to be sanctions
308
. 
IT schemes
309
 for “the enrichment of the child’s environment to aid his 
development as an ‘individual and member of society’” (DHSS 1972) were 
programmes between supervision at home and residential provision. To avoid any 
stigma, they were for “the benefit of boys and girls generally, not for the minority 
who have been before a juvenile court”, using residential facilities like adventure 
holidays, and non-residential local youth centres (Watson and Austin 1975:114-7). 
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The court authorised the requirement for treatment but the supervisor “set the wheels 
in motion and then, only if he thinks fit to do so”310 (Mag.1972:34), a discretion 
resented by magistrates (Mag.1970:141). Financial restrictions meant that by early 
1973, only 6/11 regions had submitted IT schemes: the MA suggested that members 
should lobby their MPs and social services’ directors (MAC 1973:2100). Later, 
charities became involved in projects (JCC 1978:617, 662). 
Magistrates criticised the “recreational content of IT” (JCC 1976:547). By 
1976/7 only about 8000 children were involved, of whom only a small minority were 
subject to court orders, and had not been “in serious danger of entering the care or 
custody system” (Pitts 1988:35). Where IT was used as an alternative to custody it 
was cost effective
311
, particularly important at this time of severe financial 
stringency (1988:34). Statutory circulars, such as those explaining IT (DHSS 1977), 
were “sometimes felt to be an unacceptable addition to the circulars received by the 
courts…” (Mag.1978:7). 
More and better programmes were needed as realistic alternatives to custody: 
magistrates weren’t getting a real chance to do anything because Social 
Services themselves were not coming up with real strategies…What they 
were missing was the scope of the supervision order. That was the key to 
it, the expansion of that.
 312 
‘Treatment’ varied widely: 90 day residential courses for “intensive work 
with the child and incidentally [to] help the family”; Birmingham provided a 24 hour 
service, meeting “the full range of needs without removing a child from home”; 
while “Dorset did little more than list youth clubs and voluntary organisations” 
(Mag.1977:201-2). Magistrates were seriously concerned at the non-implementation 
of their orders (JCC 1978:617), often still for lack of funding (1979:692). Many 
successful IT schemes were the product of local juvenile panel initiatives, with the 
“uncompromising objective of reducing the number of custodial and residential 
sentences in the juvenile court to zero” (Rutherford 1992:113). They were 
people who had a deep interest in the future of the children they were 
dealing with… prepared to be a bit innovative, to take a chance, not to 
accept the dogma they were being fed…313  
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Other areas merely “had a flirtation with Intermediate Treatment… No, I 
never went to one…It just faded, it came and went, faded away”314.  
The care order
315
 replaced the approved school and fit person orders and was 
designed for “cases presenting more serious problems and giving rise for greater 
concern” (Ford 1975:26). The rights and responsibilities of parents of a juvenile until 
18 were transferred to the local authority, which was obliged to review all care 
orders every six months. All parties could apply for a discharge. Some magistrates 
were concerned that decisions taken administratively rather than in a court 
“undermined the rights of people” (Mag.1972:183; 181). The local authority had 
total discretion to choose the treatment, whether the juvenile remained at home or 
“in the residential establishment best able to meet his or her need” (Tutt 1974:41). 
These included foster homes and the new CHEs (community homes with education). 
Many felt these were little changed from the approved schools with their difficult 
task of providing a caring home and the control needed within a school environment 
(Cawson 1978). 
Only one month after implementation of the 1969 Act, the JCC (1971:325) 
received complaints about the lack of experience and accountability of social 
workers because they:  
didn't have the same views as magistrates, there wasn't a meeting of 
minds as there was and is with the Probation Service. They were always 
suspect… You had the care orders, and more care orders and these kids 
kept coming back, and there was nothing you could do about it
316
.  
Barely six months after implementation, the JCC was “compiling a dossier 
with a view to making representations when the Act had been in operation for a full 
year” (MAC 1971:2049) of general complaints about care orders. Courts said they 
were ‘powerless’ when juveniles in care committed a further offence 317 , which 
“looked very bad both to the press and the public; busy people were not going to 
give their time to sit in the juvenile court under these conditions” (JCC 1972:342). 
Callaghan (1987:235), who had introduced the Bill, felt “there was substance in such 
complaints.” Previously, if magistrates wished to remove a child from home they 
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made an approved school order, often some distance away and, as Otton
318
 
explained, if the boys re-offended they appeared before a different juvenile court, the 
original unaware of their reoffending, and there was as much secure accommodation 
as before the Act (JCC 1972:351). In the new CHEs with the emphasis on openness 
and community involvement there were doubtless greater “opportunities for 
absconding…” (Tutt 1974:45). Otton recommended meetings with social services, a 
plea necessarily repeated by magistrates over the decade (MAC 1975:2194) as 
knowledge varied from “total misunderstanding to an appreciation of each other’s 
roles” (Mag.1979:157319).  
Magistrates had expected, erroneously, that any order for ‘care’ would result 
in removal from home (Mag.1972:130, 155,181). This led to a sustained campaign 
throughout the decade demanding, from Conservative or Labour governments, for 
‘care’ to mean removal to “Community Homes, purpose built, for the satisfactory 
containment of children in care” (JCC 1974:413). Two DHSS surveys (1972 and 
1973) revealed that children had not been “wrongly allowed to remain at home 
instead of being placed in residential accommodation” (Mag.1974:173). But, 
averages were meaningless to magistrates who “only knew what was happening to 
their care orders, not what was happening in other areas” 320 : there was no 
mechanism for them to find out. Their objection was about “a tough minority 
(particularly in large urban communities) where this approach [was] inadequate and 
ineffective” (Mag.1974:84).The situation was not helped by grave shortages of staff 
(JCC 1973:382) and “closure of the remaining CHE… was resulting in the courts 
sending more children unnecessarily to custody…” 321  A major, multi-agency 
conference run by the MA was addressed by Sir Keith Joseph
322
 who promised more 
secure accommodation but told the magistrates, 
Please don’t spoil your admirable record of public service by, in any part 
of the country, making it difficult for the social service department to 
consult with you, to explain to you, and to co-ordinate with you, when 
they seek to do so. (Mag.1973:38) 
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For the next five years the MA instigated regular meetings with government 
departments, often at ministerial level, joint working parties with national agencies, 
and numerous resolutions, mostly demanding more powers, especially residential 
and secure custody (JCC 1976:534; 1977:553; 1978:635). The MA was not satisfied 
with the government’s White Paper (HMSO 1976) arising from the House of 
Commons (1975) review of the working of the Act, which it considered more 
favourable to its view. By 1977 there were 300 places and a further 200 planned, 
from just 60 in 1969. Magistrates seemed confused about the terms, residential and 
secure care. The latter meant solitary confinement, a decision only for the principal 
of the CHE, who was “in the best position to judge what the requirements of the 
situation demand” (Mag.1979:83). Professionals found it “costly and ineffective to 
lock children up except for strictly limited periods...” (p.110). By 1979 Labour’s 
guidelines assumed that the court expected the juvenile to be removed from home, 
with exceptions (Mag.1979:11). The care order was popular with magistrates, some 
19,000 thought to be subject to s.7 (7) in 1978 (Parker et al.1981:6). 
Punitive Measures 
Do you let them just run riot in the community? How do you contain 
them? 
323
 
Nothing (other than the admirable remedy of corporal punishment) is 
more calculated and likely to make a young offender see the error of his 
ways than a short time in custody… (Mag.1978:135324) 
During the Parliamentary debates, the MA had felt “very strongly indeed that 
the court should retain power to order payment” of compensation and fines 
(Mag.1969:45). Both these measures were retained (Mag.1976:164), and often 
reflected a somewhat hostile attitude to the parents: 
In far too many cases parents display complete indifference to the anti-
social behaviour of their children…Would it not be possible and 
desirable for legislation to provide that where juveniles cause damage of 
any kind the parents, unconditionally in every case, could be ordered to 
pay up to a maximum of, say £100? (Mag.1974:11
325
) 
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Table 7.2 - Maximum Financial Penalties 1971 and 1977 
Penalty CHILD YOUNG PERSON 
 1971 1977 1971 1977 
Fines Maximum:  
£10 
£50 £50 £200 
Costs If juvenile pays = less than fine 
If parent = maximum actual costs incurred 
Damages and 
Compensation 
Max £400  Max £400  
Parental 
recognizance 
Max.£50 £200 n/a n/a 
 
Of all available disposals, fines were the “most frequently used” (Cavenagh 
1976:17). They reflected the seriousness of the offence and the lack of financial 
resources of juveniles, the latter relevant to the payment of compensation too. 
Parents had to pay any financial orders against a child, and for a young person, 
unless the parent or guardian proved that they had exercised their parental 
responsibilities. The same rules applied to the local authority if the juvenile was in 
care. The Criminal Law Act 1977 gave magistrates the power to order the juvenile to 
an attendance centre for default on payment, as well as raising the maximum 
financial orders. 
The Conservative government announced in August 1972 that it “intended to 
defer, until it can be seen what alternative facilities are available” the removal of the 
penal custodial and attendance centre measures (Mag.1972:135).  
An attendance centre order could be made for boys
326
 aged 10-17, for 12 
hours, unless considered excessive for a child, to a maximum 24 hours. Breaching 
rules could mean being re-sentenced. The main purpose was to impose punishment 
through loss of leisure, but “physical training [was] a normal part of the regime” 
(Mag.1977:143). Most were run by the police. The activities ranged 
from tedious, if useful, fatigues… to crafts like carpentry, leather work 
and basket making… the ideal [should fall] between so much drudgery 
that the boys become resentful and embittered, and such agreeable 
occupations that they enjoy themselves too much. (Watson & Austin 
1975:136) 
This suggests the doctrine of ‘less eligibility’, nowhere mentioned in the Act,  
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the age-old conundrum of how appropriately to deal with delinquents: 
there must be enough kindness to motivate them, to catch their interest, 
but not enough to reward misbehaviour. (Harris & Webb 1987:18)  
It applied even more to IT schemes. 
There were calls for more attendance centres (JCC 1977:578), even places for 
girls, although Stacpoole (DHSS) considered that IT powers should be adequate, yet 
two centres were later opened (JCC 1979:694). Some magistrates wanted the 
maximum time increased to 36 hours. In 1978, a proposal for “certain junior 
attendance centres to include 17 and 18 year old offenders” 327attracted no comment 
about mixing adults and juveniles (Mag.1978:146), rather, the MA members who 
met the Home Secretary were “delighted” (JCC 1978:640). Instead of their proposed 
abolition, by 1979, there were 10 new junior centres, making 70 in total 
(Mag.1978:191). 
When a young thug came into court with a grin on his face it was very 
salutary that he should leave that court immediately in a police van 
where he would have a spell of discipline (Mag.1972:183
328
) 
Bag snatching – “even in cases of youths under 15, detention centre 
orders should be made” 329(Mag.1976: 91) 
It was an avuncular feeling that I got from the chaps who ran it. I think 
they cared…it was kinder than a boys’ boarding school… There 
probably was a bit of bullying, that’s human nature, you get that in the 
office”330. 
Youngsters in detention centres have quite openly admitted that they are 
better clothed, fed, housed and quite prefer their hardly restricted way of 
life there, to that at home. (Mag.1977:188
331
) 
A detention centre (DC) order was available for boys 14-17, for whom the 
court had found that no other form of treatment was appropriate, and they had not 
previously been sent to an approved school or borstal. Such boys, the “wrong type”, 
were being sent, causing “acute dismay” to the BOV332 (Mag. 1972:42).  Magistrates 
sent boys because generally they lacked confidence “in the efficacy of care orders” 
and wanted more community homes with secure provision (Watson & Austin 
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1975:160-1). The period of detention was for three months with automatic remission 
of one third, followed by a maximum of 12 months supervision.  
The report (ACPS 1970
333
) on DCs said the earlier regime had been seen as 
“a short sharp shock” a warning to boys to “change their habits and behaviour” 
(ACPS 1970: para 71). But, until their proposed closure, there would be an 
“increased emphasis on remedial and general education334, and firm but less rigid 
discipline” (Mag.1970:46). This “horrified and surprised” one magistrate: “a further 
example of the ‘soft approach’ which is so clearly undermining discipline and 
encouraging the general increase in crime and violence …” (Mag.1972:170335). An 
academic and professional social worker found detention centres “overtly punitive… 
hard work, physical education and militaristic discipline” (Tutt 1974:39). The ACPS 
(para 71) was “entirely opposed to the routine cropping of hair as a depersonalising 
and punitive measure”, while an influential magistrate felt “it really wasn’t very 
important was it?”336  
The regime was “unsuited to those… seriously handicapped physically or 
mentally” (HMSO 1969: para 28), yet two boys arrived with  
infectious hepatitis and a form of dysentery… Out of 226 receptions, 
only ten had been medically examined at court. Trainees have been 
received walking on crutches.  
An editorial asked: 
Why are courts not arranging for a medical examination…Are they 
saying that because it is not a legal requirement they will not comply 
with what appears to us a reasonable request, and to those running the 
centres, an essential pre-requisite? (Mag.1978:99)  
Even before the Act was operational the JCC (1970:301; 1971:331) had 
repeatedly warned the Home Office of the serious shortage of places. The MA 
chairman wrote to the Home Office, “It would be wrong if I did not impress upon 
you the seriousness with which my Council views this situation”, and received the 
logical reply that it was  
not easy to invest a significant amount of public funds… for the benefit 
of junior detention centres at a time when Parliament had recently 
enacted provisions for their abolition (JCC 1972:351).  
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Undaunted, the AGM, with about 650 present, voted unanimously for more. 
Six months later the JCC (1973:379) repeated that request. Two resolutions, from 
individual Council members, calling for a halt until an evaluation of the comparative 
successes of DCs and other treatment, failed (MAC 1973:2117). By March 1974, the 
chairman of the JCC reported that “largely as a result of the Association’s pressure… 
places had been increased by about 70%” but “might still not meet all requirements” 
(Mag.1974:78). This was the period of miners’ strikes, the ‘three-day week’ and 
“severe recession after the 1973 oil-price hike” (Whitehead 1985:182), and a change 
of government back to Labour, with no overall majority. The Conservatives now in 
Opposition, kept in contact with the MA, which responded “with details of recent 
complaints” (JCC 1974:430).  
A simultaneous argument had been taking place over the requirement to 
check for a vacancy before making a DC order. An AGM resolution in 1971 called 
for its removal: one member, to applause, claimed he “sent young men to detention 
centres and had them well on their way before remembering to inquire about 
vacancies” (Mag. 1971:184). The Conservative Home Office minister Viscount 
Colville warned that failure to make enquiries “might result in the detention centre 
system ceasing to be made available to the offending courts” (Mag.1972:142). To 
which “Council members took strong exception … Parliament made the law, not 
Home Office circulars”337; and accused the Home Office of ignoring “the paramount 
obligation of every magistrate” to do justice (p.145), one spoke of blackmail.  A 
resolution sought “the support of the Lord Chancellor”, Hailsham (MAC 1972: 
2074), an old ally of the MA and its President. The courts continued to ignore “the 
understanding” (JCC 1973:387; 1974:408): magistrates were unrepentant,   “….if 
detention was the only appropriate way to deal with them, then Detention Centre it 
is, and you find a place.”338  If not available, the courts were more likely to commit 
for borstal training, with juveniles held on remand in prison (JCC 1972:342).  
The second general election in 1974 returned Labour with a miniscule 
majority. No doubt aware of the resistance being shown to the principles of the 1969 
Act, the new Labour Lord Chancellor Elwyn-Jones, who had been a member of the 
Longford Committee, in an attempt to introduce some small measure of  guidance if 
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not control, declared unequivocally in the first ‘Handbook for Newly Appointed 
Justices’ issued in 1974: 
Magistrates cannot choose which laws to enforce and which not to 
enforce. …it would be wrong for a judge or a magistrate to continue to 
sit and adjudicate if he conscientiously felt that he could not apply the 
law as it was. 
A similar injunction was repeated by Lord Hailsham when Lord Chancellor 
in 1985 (Mag.1985:16). 
The MA wanted one month detention centre orders, although one member
339
 
warned of the danger that this “tough measure” would be used for minor offences 
(Mag.1974: 181). The HOC (148/1975) reported an increase from 347 places in 
1972 to some 600 and, most significantly, confirmed the government’s original 
intention to phase out junior DCs as soon as “local authorities have developed 
adequate alternative forms of treatment.” The MA deplored the increase in remission 
to one half, as “undiscriminating Executive interference” (1977:160). Stacpoole, 
observing the JCC from 1973-1979 said that “the majority tried to convince me to 
have the power to make life more unpleasant for young offenders.”340 
Table 7.3 -% of Juvenile Offenders Sentenced and Cautioned in 1970 and 1979  
Sanctions 1970 1979 
Cautioned 38 50 
Conditional Discharge 13 10 
Fined 20 17 
Attendance centre 5 6 
Probation/Supervision 15 9 
Approved/Fit Person/Care Order 5 3 
S28 remit to Crown Ct [Borstal] 1 1 
Detention Centre 1 3 
Other 1.5 1 
    (Morris & Giller 1987 p.96). 
Far from espousing the welfare of the juvenile, these statistics demonstrate 
the punitive response, “although magistrates argue that they have no alternative in 
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view of the offences committed by a persistent minority of the children in care” 
(Anderson 1978:14). Others said the magistrates were circumventing social workers’ 
discretion (Parker 1980; Farrington 1984; Pitts 1988), or, conversely, social workers 
were responsible for the increase, not “an unsympathetic magistracy or judiciary”, 
owing to their equivocal or even punitive report recommendations (Morris and Giller 
1983:151; Morgan 1981:57; Thorpe et al. 1980:3; Jones 1983:100). The situation 
was compounded by the unnecessary, early use of community-based treatment. On 
reappearance in court, this led to “an assumption often implicit in the reports and 
certainly in the mind of magistrates” that treatment had failed and thus “hoisted up 
the sentencing tariff” (Thomas H. 1982:94). 
Of those discharged from DC in 1974, 73% were reconvicted within two 
years (Muncie 1984:167). It could hardly be said that the public had been protected, 
but most magistrates “have never seen any research or statistics to know about 
reoffending rates,” 341 nor what other benches were doing, the discrepancies 
producing “major inequities” (Parker et al. 1981:242).  
It seems that being in borstal is becoming more and more like attending 
one of our splendid holiday camps… When we do send them there we 
want them to be taught a lesson and a lesson they should be taught. 
(Mag. 1972:169
342
) 
The juvenile court could only commit to the Crown Court with a 
recommendation for borstal those aged 15-16 for an indeterminate sentence of 6-24 
months, on average nine months. The governor, not the judge, chose the release date.  
The MA wanted magistrates to order borstal training directly, despite its intended 
abolition (Mag. 1972:184), and Council members repeatedly pressed for its retention 
(MAC 1974:2163, 2181). Borstal, originally designed as constructive training, was 
changed in the 1961 Act, “to increase the severity of the penalty” (Hood 1965:76), 
and seen as punishment, with officers back in uniforms. Not all magistrates visited 
borstals
343
.  
They really believed they were sending people away to be trained to 
learn a craft or trade… It was a great shock to many magistrates to learn 
that just being sent to custody was more damaging than what you might 
learn whilst in there (Tutt 2000:7). 
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DCs had not been phased out but that ultimate goal had not been abandoned 
unambiguously by either Party, until Labour’s Green Paper ‘Youth Custody and 
Supervision’ (1978). This suggested “there might be a new single junior custodial 
sentence for 14 and 15 year old boys” and 16 year olds to the new youth custody 
sentence (Mag.1979:18), proposals supported by the MA (JCC 1979:738).  
7.1.4   Conclusion to the 1970s 
The fate of the compromise 1969 Act was sealed six months after Royal 
Assent by the General Election in 1970. The Conservatives, backed and briefed by 
the MA did not implement the radical proposals to remove under 14s from the 
courts, to restrict prosecution for those  aged 14-16, or to abolish penal custody. The 
least intrusive   welfare orders declined, while the MA maintained constant 
communication with ministers of each government, demanding greater restriction on 
juveniles in care. Custody was still used extensively because of 
lack of faith in treatment in the community. Firstly there was a bit of 
resistance and secondly, because they did not feel that those people who 
were supposed to be in control and in charge were able to do their job 
properly…344 
Labour’s Green Paper in 1978 recommending junior youth custody showed 
that the architects of the 1969 Act were no longer committed to a welfare-based 
system of juvenile justice.  
A decade after the passing of this radical Act, no part had been repealed by 
Parliament. Yet, the juvenile courts were still staffed and run and used powers of 
punishment across the juvenile age range as if there had been no Act, bar the 
additional use of new orders of control and care. Neither the spirit nor the letter of 
the law had been embraced by the vast majority of juvenile panels, with huge 
variations between them, and many of the children and families were befuddled and 
belittled. Academics and practitioners concerned with due process and the 
encroachment of criminal justice into welfare (Morris et al 1980; Taylor et al 1980), 
called for rejection of the 1969 Act, and lobbied for a ‘justice’ based approach with 
more openness, accountability and proportionality of sanction to the offence. Far 
from an increasing use of ‘welfare’ measures, there had been a decrease and an 
increase in ‘punitive’ ones: “the opposite to that intended by the Act had occurred” 
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and “paradoxically, the Act was blamed for this” (Morris and Giller 1987:97). But 
there was a “real danger that over-reaction to the failure of the welfare model” could 
“lead to a highly punitive system being introduced in the name of ‘justice’” (Ball 
1983:204). 
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7.2 The 1980s: Political Surprises  
 ‘Six of the best’ is now considered an affront to human dignity, largely 
because it shamed the recipients – many of them not into offending 
again.
345
 (Mag.1985:23) 
 
The Conservative government elected in 1979 partly on a ‘law and order’ 
platform announced it would amend the 1969 Act “to strengthen the powers of the 
courts” (Mag.1979:174). Whitelaw’s 1982 Criminal Justice Act, its principles based 
on the offence not the needs of the offender, largely met most of the demands made 
by the MA with ministers (JCC 1980: 791; 813). However, in a deliberate attempt to 
reverse the expensive, almost 100% increase in custody for 14-16s during the 1970s, 
it introduced custody criteria
346
, made more restrictive by the campaign of the 
Parliamentary All-Party Penal Affairs Group, not the government (Windlesham 
1993:168-172). 
The detention centre order was reduced to three weeks with a maximum of 
four months, which the government hoped would reduce its use, others feared 
magistrates would be tempted “to use custody on a much wider scale” (Cavadino 
1983:31). By 1985 all centres had the tougher regime, parades, inspections, and 
minimal “privileges and association” (Mag. 1985:64). “I have no idea whether it 
worked but it seemed to me it was worth trying.” 347  Borstal was replaced by 
determinate ‘youth custody’ for the 15-20 year olds, to be ordered directly by the 
magistrates, another long-standing request, and parents could be held legally 
responsible for fines and compensation
348
. The latter was rarely awarded, even by 
1995 only 2245 compensation orders out of 67,000 findings of guilt (O’Doherty 
1997), although Hailsham
349
 had said compensation should be paid before costs and 
fines (Mag.1985:16). Despite the MA welcoming the new curfew orders, ‘night 
restriction’ in supervision orders, and wanting them as a separate order (JCC 
1982:893), they were also little used (Ashworth 1995:275).  
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The statutory custody criteria, introduced without comment by the JCC, “one 
panel …claimed never to have heard of the Act” (Parker et al 1989:41), were largely 
ignored by magistrates, and often with the connivance of their clerks (Burney 1985; 
Reynolds 1985), as had happened before (Windlesham 1993:168). Magistrates filled 
the youth custody centres rather than detention centres, probably in the mistaken 
belief that youth custody was like the old training borstals (Newburn 1995:140). In 
1987, 82% of the 3,090 young persons discharged were reconvicted within two years 
(Windlesham 1996:110). 
Supervision orders were made more rigorous with ‘specified activities’, 
returning some discretion from social workers to magistrates (Burney 1985:4). In 
1983, the DHSS (LAC 1983) provided £15 million for IT in 62 areas for alternatives 
to care and custody. It worked: where magistrates were given the opportunity to use 
constructive methods custody dropped to 7.7% in these areas, the national figure 
11%, with no evidence of net-widening. But, “other areas of the country, often with 
long histories of punitive justice, [have] remained largely untouched by these 
developments”, hence ‘justice by geography’ (Parker 1989 et al.:18). Often, the 
radical ideas came from social workers rather than senior management (Rutherford 
1992:20-1) and enlightened benches: “if anybody had gone against the idea and 
started making detention centre orders, they would have had all Hell coming down 
on them.”350  
School reports, in terms of their confidentiality, continued to be used in 
diametrically different ways by courts (JCC 1984:990, 1004). A multi-agency 
working party, with MA representation, looked at the Scottish hearings, which were 
“strongly opposed by the Association” (1008). 
 
All the available evidence suggests that juvenile offenders who can be 
diverted from the criminal justice system at an early age in their 
offending are less likely to re-offend than those who become involved in 
judicial proceedings. (White Paper ‘Young Offenders’ HMSO 1980) 
Cautioning was officially encouraged
351
 and increased from 49% in 1980 to 
82% in 1992. Although the majority of the JCC felt cautioning was not the business 
of magistrates, others “expressed concern about the establishment of the Juvenile 
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Bureau Panels (JCC 1985:1039), and the danger of their “assuming the court’s role” 
(1051). Some schemes such as in Northamptonshire, arising from multi-agency co-
operation including the magistracy, were very successful in diverting young 
offenders from formal proceedings, from custody and in reducing offending,  saving 
considerable public funds, and reducing court time by 80% (Bowden and Stevens 
1986). The 1987 AGM of the MA voted substantially to restrict cautioning 
(Mag.1988:4), supported by other magistrates (Mag.1989:55, 111) but not the JCC 
(1988:1214). Academics criticised cautioning for the quite different reason of its 
discriminatory use (Parsloe 1978; Harris and Webb 1987; Evans and Wilkinson 
1990; Rutherford 1992; Ashworth 1994), and its use instead of informal cautions 
(Sarri 1983:54-8). 
These discrepancies added further ammunition to the ‘Children’s Rights 
Movement’ (Hendrick 1994). Systematic appeals were encouraged against custodial 
sentences, resulting in 86% being given a lower sentence in Kent (Stanley 1988), and 
magistrates generally heeded the Court of Appeal guidance. The 1988 Criminal 
Justice Act tightened the custody criteria still further and abolished the distinction 
between detention and youth custody, for pragmatic reasons, creating detention in a 
young offender institution (YOI). Additionally ‘supervision plus specified activities’ 
was to be used explicitly as an alternative to custody, with up to six months 
detention if breached; and community service orders for 16 year olds. All the new 
measures were supported by the MA. 
Between 1985-1990 custody rates for male juveniles dropped 81%. Several 
factors may have contributed to this remarkable reversal: the expansion of IT, with 
influential magistrates and multi-agency teams who disseminated knowledge 
nationwide (Gibson 1992; Rutherford 1992; Newburn 1996); the rigorous appeal 
programme challenging the custodial criteria applied by the magistrates (Stanley 
1988); the increase in cautioning backed by new guidelines; the new Crown 
Prosecution Service exercising its independent powers, which included the welfare 
principle, to decide on prosecution (Mag.1992:109); suggestions of malpractice 
(Home Office 1987) and allegations of brutality in institutions; and the 20% decline 
in the general population of this age group (Allen 1991:35-8). 
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Table 7.4 – Boys Aged 14 – 16 years sentenced to Immediate Custody 
Year Total % of Sentenced 
1980 7,400 12 
1981 7,700 12 
1982 7,100 12 
1983 6,700 12 
1984 6,500 12 
1985 5,900 12 
1986 4,300 11 
1987 3,900 11 
1988 3,200 11 
1989 1,900 9 
1990 1,400 7 
                     (Rutherford 1992:12) 
During this period, public inquiries involving allegations of serious sexual 
abuse of children in the care of the local authorities led the Lord Chancellor to 
reform completely the procedures for the care and protection of the young. The 
Children Act 1989 transferred all care proceedings to the new Family Proceedings 
Court, and ‘criminal’ care orders (s.7[7]) were no longer available.  The troubled and 
the troublesome children, found as one and the same by successive public inquiries 
throughout the century, were now separated completely, ironically by a Scottish 
Lord Chancellor.  
“Many high quality magistrates with considerable commitment to both young 
offenders and care cases” (Ball 1992:285/6) transferred to the more intellectually 
demanding work of complex child abuse and family breakdown cases in the Family 
Proceedings Court. It had been feared by the Home Office: 
We cannot afford to lose their valuable knowledge and experience in 
dealing with young offenders. They have made an immeasurable 
contribution to the success of juvenile justice policies in recent years, 
and are irreplaceable.” John Halliday352 (Mag.1992:33) 
This was to have a profound effect on the next decade of youth justice. 
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7.3 The 1990s:  Moral Panics to Revolution? 
Youth crime is now at the centre of public concern and is lavishly 
covered in the tabloids
353
 (Mag.1996:208) 
 
The last decade of the 20
th
 century saw a plethora of reports and statutes
354
 
from both Conservative and Labour governments proposing radical changes in the 
criminal justice system at national and local levels. There was a particular focus on 
youth offending with an emphasis on inter-agency co-operation; and the 
appointment, management and administration of the magistrates and their courts, 
with inspections and some measure of accountability. 
The Conservatives passed two more Acts affecting juvenile offenders, the 
first firmly based on a due process, proportionate model, the second a punitive rather 
than welfare model and emphasised parental responsibility. The Criminal Justice Act 
1991 renamed the juvenile court a youth court, now included 17 year olds, a decision 
supported by the MA (Mag. 1989:126), but retained the statutory ‘welfare principle’ 
of the 1933 and 1969 Acts. However, it finally repealed the unused clause raising the 
age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 14, and 16 and 17 year olds were to be 
treated as ‘near adults’ according to their maturity rather than their age, leaving them 
vulnerable to adult sentences, including a curfew with electronic tagging. Attendance 
centre orders could be served alongside those aged up to 20 years, with no objections 
by the MA to mixing juvenile and adult offenders, despite the strictures of the 
recently ratified UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (van Beuran 1998). The 
maximum age for magistrates in the youth court was raised from 65 to 70, supported 
by the AGM of the MA, and no restriction on the age at which the many now 
required could be appointed. All magistrates received specific training on this Act, 
some “dismayed at the extent of training deemed necessary” (Mag.1991:59; 
1992:141). 
For the first time, “persons engaged in the administration of criminal justice” 
(s.95 CJ Act 1991) were to be aware of the financial implications of orders, and to 
act without discrimination on improper grounds. Sanctions were to be proportionate 
to the seriousness of the offence,   progressing to ‘serious enough’ for a community 
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penalty or the new criterion for custody, ‘so serious’. Courts could not take more 
than one other offence into account, which definitely reduced custody until that “ill-
fitting strait jacket… incomprehensible to right-thinking people generally” 355 
(Mag.1993: 151) and to the magistracy (p.85), was repealed only six months after 
implementation.  
Media coverage of riots, joy-riding, persistent offenders, and the 
demonization of ‘persistent’ young offenders (Cavadino 1997; Campbell, B. 1993, 
Newburn 1996), the murder of a toddler by two children aged ten
356
 (Fionda 1998), 
and a Home Secretary believing ‘prison works’ (Newburn 1995), all gradually led to 
demands for severer sentences (Ashworth 1995). Penal custody, abolished for 
children in 1991 was reinstated in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, 
with Secure Training Centres (STC) for the 12-14 age group: “Whether or not it will 
do him good has little to do with the consideration magistrates must apply to 
sentencing” (Mag.1993:74357). These powers, opposed by almost every child welfare 
organisation, local authorities, penal reformers and some senior Conservatives 
(Windlesham 1996:111-2), were nonetheless supported by the MA, with letters of 
relief or disbelief in the Magistrate (1993;1995), and calls for the resignation of the 
editor for her opposition. Remand to prison of boys aged 15 and 16 was due to stop 
in 1991: by 1992, there were 1,100 and by 1995, 1,900 so remanded. The MA with 
NACRO issued a Code of Practice showing available alternatives (Mag.1996:200).  
The differences between adult and juvenile defendants were further 
minimized in the 1994 Act. The 10-13 year olds were brought into regulations for 
grave offences
358
 (Fionda 1998), 10-15 year olds could be convicted of indecent 
assault on a woman, and the right of silence was removed from young persons
359
 
(Howard League 1999). Additionally, detention in a YOI was doubled from 12 to 24 
months
360
. Cautioning was now restricted by new guidelines
361
 but the MA regretted 
the abandonment of the presumption not to prosecute juveniles (Mag.1994: i). 
Parental bind-overs had been opposed by the MA (Mag.1991:130) as they might 
                                                 
355
 Taylor, LCJ 
356
 Whose public trial was severely criticised by the ECtHR and led to procedural changes 
357
 Tom Craig, JP 
358
 S.16 
359
 S.34 
360
 S.17 
361
 HOC 18/1994 
 246 
“exacerbate a potentially volatile situation” (JCC 1991:1337). Some magistrates 
expressed contrary views, “…tired of apologists for ‘stressed’ parents” 
362
(Mag.1991:78) and another, despite learning of the serious dangers to the child if 
the parents were punished (p.33) considered, “If it means, at first, a little more 
burden or fragmentation of families, it might be worthwhile long term” (p.78). 
 Bingham LCJ (1997) admitted that the judiciary was being influenced by the 
media, and Appeal Court guidelines reduced magisterial discretion for ‘grave’ 
proceedings: many more cases were sent to the Crown Court (Campbell, Q. 2000). 
This led to a dramatic rise in custody because of the greater powers of 
punishment.
363
 
Table 7.5 Number of Juveniles in Penal Custody 
 30 June 1993 30 June 1999 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Aged 15 126 2 218 7 
Aged 16 279 7 639 22 
Aged 17 870 20 1,479 57 
Total 1,274 29 2,336 86 
Source: Table 3.2, Prison Statistics England and Wales, 1993 and 1999 
The Chief Inspector of Prisons (1997:6) produced a critical report on the damage 
done to “immature adolescents” by the conditions of prison service establishments, 
further endorsed by a Howard League Report (2002); and another report by the 
Social Services Inspectorate (1998:8.8) found that STCs “seemed to strengthen the 
criminogenic behaviour and outlook of the trainees”. 
In 1996 the Labour Opposition  demanded changes to youth justice, accusing 
the system, particularly the courts, of “making a bad situation worse”, more 
concerned with “judicial process than with finding solutions that might break 
offending habits” (Straw and Michael 1996:2-5). The report noted the Scottish 
hearings, and although chose to keep youth courts, these were to be more 
inquisitorial and informal, and, as in Scotland, disputed cases to be heard in private 
by a stipendiary or judge (p.11).  It did not, however, suggest any move towards a 
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welfare rather than punishment-based system. Two more reports were both highly 
critical of the ineffectiveness of youth justice, the Audit Commission’s ‘Misspent 
Youth’ in November 1996 and the government’s ‘Review of Delay in the Criminal 
Justice System’ (Narey Report 1997).  
Labour won the general election in 1997, with a Manifesto commitment to 
reform youth justice, and Straw, now Home Secretary, produced the emotively 
named White Paper ‘No More Excuses’. This was considered to be influenced by the 
Audit Commission report, which Jones D. (2001:364) claimed had been simplistic, 
with a “cavalier use of crime statistics”. The proposed reforms were based on 
prevention of offending; both parents and juveniles taking responsibility; earlier 
intervention;  more concern for victims and less for protecting the identity of young 
offenders; and “partnership between all youth justice agencies to deliver a better 
faster system” (Home Office 1997:1). These led to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
with the “principal aim of the youth justice system to prevent offending by children 
and young persons”364, which was applicable to all the relevant agencies. 
 The age range remained from 10-18 but removed almost all remaining 
differences between adult and juvenile courts. Cautioning was severely curtailed. For 
children, the doctrine of doli incapax, which the MA had argued to keep 
(Mag.1998:258), and the right to silence were abolished: children of ten were now as 
culpable as any seasoned adult criminal. Somewhat paradoxically, parenting orders 
were mandatory unless the court gave reasons for not ordering them. This dual 
responsibility of child and parent was to be criticised in a major report on the 
wellbeing of families (Rutter 2005). 
The one-hour restriction between the sittings of an adult and youth court was 
removed
365 ; as was the requirement not to use the words ‘conviction’ and 
‘sentence’366; and written pleas of guilty were available for 16 and 17 year olds for 
summary offences
367
.  Earlier Acts had encouraged juvenile courts to keep 
jurisdiction for those reaching 18 during the proceedings, but this was now 
reversed
368
.
 
Another Act
369
 removed the restriction on publication of names “where it 
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is seen to be in the public interest.” Over the years, letters to the ‘Magistrate’ had 
repeatedly called for such publication. 
 
More non-custodial sanctions were introduced including those of reparation, 
either to the victim or society as a whole. The Conservatives’ Secure Training 
Centres, not yet operational, were absorbed into ‘Detention and Training Orders’ for 
the persistent offender, from 2-24 months, half served in secure accommodation. 
This led to a 10% increase in custody in the first year to 6,401, with great variations 
between courts (Bateman and Stanley 2002). A letter from the Youth Justice Board 
(YJB 2001) to each court emphasised this and suggested a community penalty rather 
than a short custodial sentence, “an action that was resented by some magistrates… 
as an attempted executive interference in judicial functions” (Bottoms and Dignan 
2004:107). A new order, the ASBO (Anti-Social Behaviour Order
370
), applied to all 
aged 10 and above, and was processed in the adult magistrates’ court, on an 
application from the police or local authority with the civil burden of proof, a 
balance of probabilities. If granted, the court prohibited certain action, and the Home 
Secretary, Jack Straw declared “there should then be a presumption in favour of 
publicising the defendant” (Mag.2001:45). On breach, it became a criminal matter 
and could, and usually did, warrant a custodial sentence.  
Straw  had also demanded changes to the conduct and ethos of the juvenile 
courts, not on the grounds of the defendants’ welfare but rather  to engage the 
juveniles and parents  and might involve “all participants in the case, including the 
magistrates, sitting around a single table” (Home Office 1997:30). It would seem 
that the 1992 Rules
371
 to “require the court to assist the juvenile in putting forward 
his or her case and to understand the proceedings” had not been applied. Lawyers 
often made that situation worse, with children “non-speaking except to give their 
name, address, age and eventually to plead guilty or not-guilty… talked over as if 
they were invisible and dumb” (Curtis 1999: 186/188). A plea for better 
communication and explanations in court was made by the new chairman of the 
YCC
372
 (Mag.1998:42
373
) and a further government document emphasised the 
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continuing failure to do so (Government Departments 1998:11). The Lord 
Chancellor (1998) also wrote to all Youth Panel chairmen explaining ‘demonstration 
projects’, which were to show that: 
72% of magistrates felt that they should sit on a different level to 
maintain the formality they considered necessary (Allen, Crow and 
Cavadino 2001: 34/5) 
and most magistrates had neither been encouraged to, nor thought it 
appropriate to talk to the defendants or their parents (p.15), indeed the YCC, under 
yet new leadership, spoke of the “change…illustrated by the recommendation that 
the chairman should address directly the defendant and his parents” (Mag. 
2000:304
374
).  
This was followed by formal guidance (HO and LCD 2001), compulsory 
training and a special Handbook for all panel members, which still did not include 
anything on child development and claimed an “over-emphasis in the past on welfare 
…has contributed to the loss of public confidence in the youth justice system” (JSB 
2001:7.6). Meanwhile, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
effectively removed all first offenders pleading guilty at a court appearance, to a new 
‘youth offending panel’, two lay members and a professional social worker. They 
would decide a restorative justice programme with the parent and juvenile, in a 
round-table discussion, quite removed from the court, although magistrates retained 
control of the order as they decided the length of time and breaches would be 
referred back to the youth court. This was the only attempt to separate judicial fact 
finding from treatment, as proposed in ‘Tackling Youth Crime’ (Straw and Michael 
1996). The ‘Magistrate’ appears to have made no comment on this new approach, 
but the YCC (1999:1618) 
was concerned about the power the panel would have, which should be 
reserved for the court; that the young person would be entering a contract 
without legal representation; and about what powers the panel could 
exercise over members of the young person’s wider family. 
 Parallel to these reforms over the decade were radical changes to the whole 
structure and management of the magistracy and its courts. The recruitment of all 
magistrates was totally reformed, beginning with publicizing the names of all 
Advisory Committee members by 1993 (Mag.1990: 116) and ending with 
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advertisements for candidates on hoardings, not universally popular (Mag.1999:241) 
and a structured, open procedure for choosing candidates (LCD 1998). A national 
syllabus
375
, supported by the MA, for training, mentoring and appraisal for all 
chairmen, was regarded with “a mixture of enthusiasm, trepidation and scepticism”, 
(Mag. 1994:189), even “an impertinence”376,  “we did not take kindly to it”377.  
I learn my craft from the judicious placings between two magistrates of 
various experience and knowledge… there’s no need to clone us, where 
will it all end? 
378
 (Mag.1993:89) 
By 2000 the practice, Magistrates’ National Training Initiative (MNTI) was 
universal for all magistrates, although appraisal was done by bench colleagues, albeit 
after some training. 
 
It would be difficult to think of any arrangements less likely to deliver 
value for money than the present ones. (Mag.1989:133) 
The Le Vay (1989) Scrutiny had produced a highly critical report on the 
management of the magistrates’ courts by the senior magistrates serving on the 105 
MCCs (Windlesham 1996; Auld 2001). By 1994, the independent Majesty’s Courts 
Service Inspectorate had begun its inspection of MCCs throughout the country, 
looking at the resources and “the quality of service” to court users. The inspectors 
were “a bit disappointed by how much hasn’t been done in the 18 months since 
inspection” (Mag.1996:58-9). Managerial reforms were proposed in the Police and 
Magistrates Courts Bill 1994, much of it resisted by the MA, which mounted a 
campaign using its Parliamentary contacts. Nonetheless, most reforms were enacted 
in the Justices of the Peace Act 1997. For more than 30 years, small juvenile panels 
had been asked to combine with neighbouring ones to provide sufficient experience, 
yet even in 1999, 30/229 youth panels dealt with less than 100 juveniles a year, some 
less than 20 (HO Criminal Statistics 2000). The Access to Justice Act 1999 would 
enforce amalgamations.  
Soon after 2000, the administration of magistrates’ courts was under a 
national service with independent inspections (and magisterial complaints about 
court closures and the loss of local justice (Mag.2002:177)); their training was 
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designed and monitored nationally; their appointments were transparent and made 
within strict, published criteria. In courts, their reasons were not only given but 
recorded (Human Rights Act 1999); but their decisions, as ever, taken within the 
framework of judicial discretion that the Statutes and Appeal Court tolerated. 
Despite their new training in creating a less formal atmosphere in the youth court, 
“this has proved to be more of a challenge to some magistrates than others…it will 
take a little time to adjust”379 (Mag.2002:181). 
                                                 
379
 Anne Foot, JP, Chairman YCC, MA Council 
 252 
7.4 Conclusion  
 
The Children and Young Persons Act 1969 was passed under a Labour 
government, and, although much altered from its incarnation in the Longford Report, 
remained essentially a welfare-based model for juvenile justice for those aged 10-17. 
Its fundamental tenet was the belief in individualised treatment to change the 
criminal behaviour by social work intervention, often through programmes in the 
local community, which had previously only been accessible to those with money or 
knowledge. Parental co-operation was considered essential, and only when that 
failed would the local authority seek parental responsibilities through the ‘care 
order’. 
We had no idea that it is possible that the restriction of liberty for 
children and young people could be actually something that needs to be 
scrutinised for its legal status. We thought you did not need to prove that 
somebody is ‘ill’ in the same way that you need to prove that somebody 
is guilty of an offence. (Professor T Morris, JP, Longford Committee 
380
)  
This reasoning of a member of the Longford Committee perhaps gives an 
explanation as to why even before the 1969 Act was partially implemented, there 
were radical groups claiming it was “retrograde, dysfunctional and an assault on the 
rights of the child” (NCCL 1971p.7).  
The welfare approach to criminal behaviour was an attempt to relieve social 
injustice and deprivation, with treatment based on the pathology of the individual 
child (Longford 1964, Rutherford 1992; Hughes 2001). In practice this could lead to 
injustice, discrimination and lack of proportionality (Morris and McIsaac 1978; 
Morris et al 1980), because children, for minor offences, could be subject to 
compulsory measures for their care, often for very lengthy periods (Taylor et 
al.1980). Others argued that as juvenile delinquency was patently widespread, it 
should be seen as part of the development of adolescence and that treatment would 
make the behaviour abnormal (Morris and Hawkins 1970); and an appearance in 
court itself could be criminogenic (Bacon 1963; Wootton 1968; Kilbrandon 1965; 
Christie 1974; ACC 1984). Some felt it was wrong that children should have to go to 
court to get treatment (NCCL 1971), whilst others considered that only courts should 
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take decisions that impinged upon a child’s freedom or time (Cavenagh 1959; NAPO 
1965; MAC 1965; Morris and Giller 1987). The magistracy had found police 
cautioning suspect on this account. 
Cohen (1985:98) has argued that “It is by making the system less harsh, that 
people are encouraged to use [it] more often…making each consecutive decision 
easier to take”: if the juvenile did not respond to the supervision order, a more 
controlling one was necessary. Magistrates had constantly argued for sanctions for 
failure, more powers to control through the welfare measures. But, too often the 
juvenile received “an effectively more severe sentence than that warranted by the 
offence… what was properly criticised was the misapplication of welfare, not the 
concept” (Mag.1991:29 381 ). Indeed, it is thought that the movement to protect 
children’s rights from the expanding social work departments, with their preventive 
work (Thorpe 1983; Morris and Giller 1987), enabled the proponents of punishment 
to advance their cause in the guise of the due process model (Hudson 1987:165), as 
happened until the restrictive custody criteria of the 1980s were enforced.  
The principles behind the Act had been powerfully opposed before 
implementation in April 1971 by the Conservatives and the magistracy, both 
nationally and locally, and to some extent by lawyers and police. By then, the 
Conservatives had been returned to govern the country facing major social and 
financial disruption, a serious challenge for those responsible for law and order. 
Costly reforms of juvenile justice would not be the priority of any government, let 
alone one which had resisted those reforms. It did not implement the clauses that it 
had opposed, leaving the juvenile court with its traditional dual role of the separate 
care and criminal proceedings; its personnel, buildings and procedures all too 
essentially unchanged, apart from the new, welfare-based orders, which, once 
operational, were additional and not instead of attendance centres and punitive 
custody. Crucially, the age of criminal responsibility remained the same, as did the 
court’s duty to consider the public interest. 
The recruitment of magistrates remained secretive until the 1990s: no one 
without knowledge of the system would have known how to apply. The juvenile 
panel magistrates were still elected, on a three yearly cycle, from the adult criminal 
bench with which they did the majority of their sittings. The majority were middle 
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aged and most remained until they chose to leave the panel, and after the 1991 Act 
could stay until aged 70. Many magistrates were largely untrained and certainly not 
taught anything about child development. They often showed an inability to 
communicate in the courtroom with juveniles and their parents, nor provided an 
environment to foster their support, with proper timetabling, information and help 
with travelling expenses. There is little evidence to suggest that the rights of the 
parents or juveniles, all at different stages of development (Adler 1985; Rutherford 
1992), were protected in the juvenile court. Juveniles and parents were minimally 
involved, they did not understand the procedures (Pitts 1988; Wootton 1978; Jones 
1983), and were   unaware of appeal procedures, or fearful of their financial 
implications. Far from seeking the co-operation of parents, courts were more ready 
to punish them by overt as well as covert means. But, the compulsory parenting 
orders of the 1998 Act did enable parents to access help rather than condemnation. 
Magistrates, guided and controlled by their justices’ clerk, were not shown 
research and did not know the results of their sentencing; some never visited the 
custodial institutions and most did not know the long-term effects of incarceration. 
There was no training on child development and adolescence at any time. There was 
no system of appraisal, much resisted, until the end of the century, and even then it 
was an internal matter, bench colleagues appraising each other. There was little 
accountability through the appeal system until the late 1980s, when lawyers became 
pro-active and clerks were alerted to binding Appeal Court judgments and advised 
their magistrates accordingly. A national syllabus with a structured training 
programme was introduced with monitoring in the late 1990s, although some 
magistrates still resisted new methods. 
Many magistrates had resented changes within their own working domain, 
many small panels refusing to combine to provide greater experience. They made 
little concession to organisations struggling to provide and maintain the services 
expected of them, implementing the three new welfare measures of the 1969 Act, 
during major reorganisation of local government and their own multi-functioning 
social services departments. Many social workers and probation officers were new, 
young and inexperienced, but social workers were not accountable to the 
magistrates.  Their professional viewpoint, concern with the child’s welfare, was 
diametrically opposite to that of most magistrates, who were concerned with the 
offence committed and the protection of the public, albeit also with regard to the 
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welfare of the child. With notable exceptions, many areas made little attempt to 
discuss, let alone mitigate these differences, sometimes not the fault of magistrates. 
By not being fully implemented, the 1969 Act failed in all its intentions. The 
broad range of sanctions enabled the magistrates to exercise extensive discretion. As 
the press increasingly reported crime,  magistrates, using their valued commonsense, 
interpreted public opinion as demanding more protection, more children under 
severe control and needing custody as a deterrent, as plain punishment, or to change 
deep-rooted, criminal behaviour, perhaps unaware, unlike the government, of the 
82% reconviction rate. Custody was virtually always available, unlike its 
‘alternatives’ which required local authority expenditure: failing to find a placement, 
magistrates looked to custody. The MA, from before the 1969 Bill was passed, had 
fought a highly organised campaign against the measures it disliked, mobilising its 
membership at local level to lobby MPs, and at national level, bringing influence to 
bear on its many contacts in government and Parliament, regardless of party 
affiliation and of the financial and other restrictions that national and local 
politicians had to take into account. 
At the end of the 1990s, almost all the differences between adult and juvenile 
courts had been removed. Diversion from the formal system was greatly restricted 
despite recognition of its efficacy in reducing re-offending. The Conservatives had 
accepted that juveniles diverted, not only from the formal system but from any 
institutions, were less likely to re-offend (Bowden and Stevens 1986:327). It was 
Labour who reduced diversion by restricting cautioning in the 1998 Act and blurred 
the boundaries again with the ASBO, with criminal sanctions, including custody, for 
breaching the order. The new tier for referral orders, created for dealing with first 
offenders with restorative rather than punitive measures, left the more serious and 
persistent offenders with the magistrates. As yet, there is little evidence to suggest 
that the new training initiatives or the sanctions available are reducing penal custody 
or that welfare measures are being more readily used to rehabilitate juvenile 
offenders within their own communities, the ambition of the ill-fated Children and 
Young Persons Act 1969. As with offending juveniles in Scotland, research 
indicated that the less formal intervention, the less likely re-offending, and for the 
persistent or serious offender, punishment was an expensive and spectacular failure 
as a means to reform. 
ooOoo 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS: KEY FINDINGS AND REFLECTIONS ON 
THEORY AND POLICY 
Neither the police nor the courts, nor prisons, can solve the problem of 
rising crime rate. By the time the criminal falls into the hands of the 
police, and more particularly, by the time he reaches court, it is too late. 
(Lane, LCJ 1982) 
The rights of children and parents to be heard, to participate fully in 
decisions affecting the child’s future and to do so in an atmosphere 
which does not intimidate them through its excessive formality, are in 
practice much better protected in the children’s hearings system than in 
our juvenile courts. (Baroness Faithfull
382
 1984) 
There really were cultural differences between England and Scotland, 
not least the long history of the independent prosecution service, such 
that diversion from courts has been an accepted part of the criminal 
justice system. (Lord Advocate Elish Angiolini, QC
383
) 
 
This thesis is a comparative, criminal justice narrative of two jurisdictions, 
England/Wales and Scotland, concerned with the application of the welfare principle 
in juvenile justice, specifically from the judicial perspective. It is based on a review 
of the literature and enhanced, when possible, by interviews. It aimed to discover 
why three countries under the same national government, Scotland and the single 
jurisdiction of England and Wales moved to a welfare-based system of juvenile 
justice in the late 1960s, and thereafter, the paths appeared to take radically different 
routes. More generally, it tried to discover the influences and circumstances that lead 
to a welfare-based system of juvenile justice, where the needs rather than the deeds 
of the juvenile offender are the paramount consideration, although the response may 
neither have been seen, nor at times, been proportionate and indeed could have been 
a great restriction on the liberty of the individual. It could also bring juveniles into 
the criminal justice system because they were at risk of becoming, rather than being 
already delinquent, or because of the inadequacy of their parents.  
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 This is in contrast to the justice, due process model, where the punishment or 
sanction was proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and of a determinate 
nature, although ignoring the social and economic disadvantage of some juveniles 
challenged that sense of fairness. Additionally, following strict procedural rules 
could be confusing if not incomprehensible to the juveniles, their families and even 
social workers. It could also be an extremely punitive system when the rights of the 
public took precedence over those of the juvenile and the sanction was harmful to 
the long term interests of the juvenile.  
Much has been written on the theory of the welfare versus due process, just 
deserts debate, and of the role of the various criminal justice agencies in these 
reforms. Bottoms (in 1974) and with Dignan (in 2004) made a lengthy comparison 
of the different systems and organizations in the two jurisdictions, covering the 
theoretical, administrative and legal aspects in great detail. They found, despite the 
overtly welfare system in Scotland, based on prevention of harm to the child, and the 
‘correctionalist’ system in England/Wales, based on prevention of crime, there was a 
convergence post-devolution, with Scots MSPs answerable to their local electorate, 
concerned about crime, the English/Welsh expanding diversion from court with 
reparation and restorative justice. 
This research has drawn heavily on their work but quite differently, has 
concentrated on the effects of the culture and role of the lay judiciary and panel 
members in the two jurisdictions; and the constraints upon them of the particular 
system under which they operated, all in their application of the welfare principle, 
both before and after the 1960s reforms. This final chapter seeks to relate the critical 
findings to the broader literature, the limitations of the methodology; and to suggest 
some implications for future policy, both in the substantive issues and the constraints 
arising from the theory of public policy formulation and implementation.  
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8.1 Key Findings 
 
This section examines the research findings and explains their significance in 
the punishment and welfare dichotomy of juvenile justice.   
Chapter Two described the socio-political and legal differences in the two 
jurisdictions which, this thesis argues, had a profound bearing on the later course of 
events. Cowperthwaite (1988), aware of the Scots need for their separate identity, 
and Bottoms (1974) have both compared the different political /administrative 
situation in the two jurisdictions; the different structure of juvenile justice at the 
beginning of the 1960s; and the role but not the culture of the procurator fiscals or, 
indeed, the legal profession. Social historians, Devine (2000), Marwick (1990) and 
Murphy (1992) have described the culture of Scotland but not necessarily linked that 
to juvenile justice, while Skyrme (1991) and Findlay (2000) covered both legal 
systems, but not linked them to the culture. 
A history of Scotland reveals that it was a poor country compared to its 
immediate neighbour and financial efficiency in all matters was considered essential. 
Consequently, money should not be spent on expensive punishments when cheaper, 
more humane methods would suffice and, coupled with pragmatism, there was a 
readiness to consider diversion from formal responses. The early belief in universal 
education, reinforced by state provision, was such that 98% of Scots children 
attended state schools in 1964 leading to a more egalitarian society than in 
England/Wales, where 9% were educated privately. This division of children was 
exacerbated by the development of comprehensive schools in the late 1960s and 
1970s, when Scotland had completed the conversion, only half had done so in 
England/Wales and several counties permanently retained the selective grammar 
schools. Generally, those who had the time and financial security to give to 
voluntary work, in this instance passing judgment in juvenile courts, were almost by 
definition drawn from a narrow sector of society. A disproportionate number was 
from private schools, or of retirement age, compounding the distance between the 
judges and the judged. This was certainly true when there were no obvious means of 
knowing how to become a magistrate, save by knowing existing members, as largely 
remained the case in England/Wales until the 1990s.  
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In England/Wales, the legal system was based on common law and an 
adversarial system, its jurisprudence practised in the countries of its old Empire and 
not in most of Europe. With thousands of lawyers and a legal history of its own, the 
profession had no need to look abroad for its training or ideas; and had shown great 
reluctance to embrace any changes to its structure, as the Streatfield Committee had 
found in 1961, or to suggestions for specialist training for the judiciary, as the Bridge 
Committee had found in the 1970s. 
Scots law whilst essentially Roman was seen as different by English 
politicians and by lawyers, the former taking little interest in Scots legislation as a 
result, although the relevant 1960s legislation was mostly about systems to enable 
the reform of juvenile delinquents. However, more significantly Scots law was much 
more inquisitorial. Historically, Scots lawyers were trained on the Continent, 
especially in Holland, which had a history of more humane treatment towards 
prisoners, and where the fiscals learnt the rules of the inquisitorial approach, the duty 
to protect the rights of the accused, act in a non-partisan manner, and have 
knowledge of sentencing options. It is this historical, cultural difference of attitude 
that is likely to have influenced the approach to juvenile offenders, where there was 
a legal duty ‘to have regard to the welfare of the child’. This wider legal training 
enabled a greater insight into offending behaviour and its causes, and the 
possibilities for reform through co-operation with the parents by help and treatment 
rather than punishment. Fiscals also had the power, guided by that same culture, to 
choose the venue for trial; while in England/Wales that right rested with the 
magistrates, usually guided by their clerks, and could and did escalate the juvenile 
into the higher penalty range. 
The description of childhood explained the long-term dangers to a significant 
number of children from their own families, often leading to delinquency as a 
symptom of their malaise. Such histories were often not appreciated in the courtroom 
when the seriousness of the offence became the dominating factor, reflecting the 
theories around the welfare and punishment dichotomy, as seen in the other models 
within the UK, and the USA and other western democracies at the time of the 1960s 
reforms. Additionally, this exercise of judicial discretion was made more complex by 
the diverse, autonomous and dispersed nature of some 800 juvenile courts with 
10,000 JPs, and their lack of training and accountability.  
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Kingdon’s (1995) theory of political processes in creating new legislation 
illuminated how the progress of the Kilbrandon reforms fitted exactly that optimum 
model; and explained the methods of pressure groups, particularly in relation to the 
role of the MA, with its remarkable access to the government, as Wilkinson (1992) 
and the MA minutes and the ‘Magistrate’ had revealed. 
Many observers have described the covert, self-appointing, class-biased 
system of the judicial decision makers in England/Wales, and in Scotland the 
mixture of JPs and bailies, local authority councillors, and all lacking training; and 
the inappropriate nature of the juvenile courts until the early 1960s. However, the 
minutes of the MA revealed how the attitudes of the ruling body, the Council, had 
changed radically following the debacle of its internal and rather secretive ‘corporal 
punishment’ debate. From its well-informed, largely positive, progressive attitude to 
juvenile offenders it became much more concerned with control, punishment and 
deterrence by its newly-elected membership. It would seem that the Labour 
opposition was unaware of this crucial change and had no reason to think the MA as 
a body would or was capable of mounting a nationwide, highly public, politicised 
campaign. 
The main research was divided into three chronological parts. Chapter Three 
followed the development of juvenile justice in both Scotland and England/Wales 
from its tentative beginnings in the 19
th
 century to those parts of the 1961 and 1963 
Acts arising from Ingleby (1960). Chapters Four and Five examined the proposals of 
the Kilbrandon and Longford inquiries and their subsequent passage or translation 
into legislation. The final part, Chapters Six and Seven gave a detailed description of 
the implementation of the respective legislation in the two jurisdictions, until the end 
of the century.   
The most obvious finding from the juvenile justice reforms of the first half of 
the 20
th
 century was that even the Acts of Parliament appeared virtually irrelevant to 
the juvenile courts: in both jurisdictions there was chronic institutional failure to 
implement virtually all aspects of them. Wherever discretion allowed no change to 
take place, nothing did change. There was, at best, complete system inertia, probably 
resulting from financial constraints by local authorities responsible for the 
administration. This research has revealed an added impetus for the English/Welsh 
magistrates: from 1949, it had been the responsibility of their local leaders to provide 
their training and special juvenile court buildings. Most had not chosen to provide 
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either, nor change the ethos and environment to reflect the different requirements for 
juveniles. It could be reasonably construed from official inquiries (Morton, Molony, 
Ingleby) Parliamentary debates, the ‘Magistrate’ and the literature (Cowperthwaite, 
Elkin, McCabe & Treitel, Parker et al., Skyrme) that the juvenile justices saw no 
need to improve their courts and provide a less confusing, less hostile environment: 
for many it was seen as part of the punishment. Yet, these courts were the same ones 
for children appearing as victims in need of care and protection, some as young as 
five, their cases often interspersed with those for criminal matters. Additionally, the 
magistrates also controlled the probation service, historically choosing not to appoint 
such officers in some places, or leaving them ill-equipped or under-staffed.  Under 
the 1960s reforms, they were to see their ‘officers of the court’ replaced by social 
workers, who were not within their control. 
The historical research revealed marked cultural differences between the two 
jurisdictions: Scotland had demonstrated an early dislike of purely negative 
punishment and abandoned cruel punishments long before England/Wales. Scotland 
had not allocated money to provide the expensive and punitive detention centres. Its 
residential options had been two months in a remand centre, and approved schools, 
with only fines as pure punishment, which by early statute were related to income. 
The Scots had shown a greater concern to work with rather than castigate the parents 
of erring children. Familiar with the discretion exercised by the fiscals, they were 
equally ready to accept the discretion and diversionary practices of the police, which 
were resisted, even resented by English/Welsh magistrates. 
The diverse system of juvenile courts operating by the early 1960s in 
Scotland meant there was no single body to formulate a response or campaign to 
defend its status, JPs rarely sat in court and the bailies were foremost local 
councillors.  England/Wales basically had one system, excluding Inner London, 
although spread through some 800 Petty Sessional Areas, with little knowledge or 
contact between areas. However, by the early 1960s, the majority of magistrates, 
about 12,000, belonged to the MA, a highly influential and politicised national body 
able to campaign on behalf of its countrywide membership. 
Chapters Four and Five chronicled the deliberations of the Kilbrandon and 
Longford committees and their eventual passage through Parliament. Many 
researchers have commented on the suitability of Kilbrandon, his intellect, respected 
legal authority, his campaigning zeal, including proselytizing, and the outstanding 
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quality of his report. This research has revealed the influence of other key 
individuals, especially the role of Professor Stone, the psychiatrist with an expertise 
in children and adolescents, able to advise the receptive Kilbrandon and his 
committee on what caused delinquent children and how best to deal with them.  
Additionally, a fortuitous confluence of agency and events enabled the 
remarkably smooth passage of the Scots juvenile justice reforms, aided by the press. 
The trio of senior Scots Conservative politicians, Elliot, Maclay and Noble, were all 
progressive Conservatives, and Elliot was key in having the knowledge of child 
development, criminal justice, a strong, independent character and the political 
influence to see the reforms through had it been necessary. While Maclay and Noble 
were ready for a uniquely Scots solution, even more pressing when the report was 
published, with the Scots Conservative party in disarray and the fortunes of the SNP 
and the Liberals rising. The ‘Scotsman’ welcomed this penal reform, and ‘The 
Times’ passed no opinion, other than that Kilbrandon presented a ‘new vein of 
argument’. Having accepted the main proposals of the report when in office, the 
Conservatives were happy to support the Bill, largely untouched by Labour, when it 
came before Parliament. The contentious matters did not affect the original 
Kilbrandon proposals, save the administrative unit was to be based in the social work 
departments and not education. The very few MPs critical of the proposals were 
politically divided. 
It was the Labour Opposition in England/Wales which wanted to overhaul 
the criminal justice system and appointed Longford, a penal reformer and career 
politician. This alone would have raised alarms amongst some of the magistracy, 
aided by a biased, pre-election article in the ‘Magistrate’, let alone a proposal to 
abolish the juvenile courts in favour of a new family service and family courts. 
Longford’s conclusions for juvenile justice were broadly similar to Kilbrandon, 
although there had been an astonishing lack of communication between the two 
jurisdictions, but, as juvenile justice was a minor part of the main report, the 
proposals in Longford were far less detailed and lacked a protagonist.  
Longford referred to a class bias in the system, which, perhaps unwittingly 
by the authors, challenged the fundamental tenet of the magistrates’ court, to act 
“without fear or favour, prejudice or ill will.”  This assault to the very core of the 
magistracy, perhaps especially vulnerable given its own narrowly class-based 
membership, was misappropriated by them when the second White Paper was 
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published in 1968. As in Scotland, juveniles before the court had to be in need of 
compulsory measures of care in addition to their offending behaviour: this was seen 
as discriminatory and class-based, defining children by their ‘good’ or ‘bad’ homes. 
The MA, with the nationwide backing of its membership, mounted a ceaseless 
campaign, in league with the Conservatives in Opposition until the very end of the 
Parliamentary process.  
This all took place during a period of great social change, particular towards 
the end of the decade when the English White Papers were published. The institution 
of the magistracy itself was being reformed and its powers curtailed in other 
legislation, while the liberalising social reforms on divorce and homosexuality could 
not apply to it, and therefore its membership was even more narrowly selected, 
unaware of the difficulties others may face. For many magistrates the abolition of the 
death penalty was yet another example of too liberal a society, and their professional 
equilibrium was rocked by revelations of police corruption at the highest levels. As 
Bottoms and Stevenson (1992) commented, traditionalists would not wish to try 
untested new methods at this time. 
Through Parliament, with a large government majority, the Bill’s basic 
premise remained the same, despite the bitter debates, and the persistent lobbying by 
the MA, benches and individual magistrates. Many MPs made reference to their 
local benches or their own experience as magistrates or lawyers. Labour members, 
with a few exceptions, were very critical of existing juvenile courts, the 
Conservatives content, expecting prosecution and punishment for all ages.  Hogg, 
QC echoed the letter of the MA in ‘The Times’ and raised the emotive threat of the 
injustice the Bill created. The Lords, with its inbuilt Conservative majority, defeated 
the government on the crucial clause but despite rigorous further lobbying by the 
MA, the Commons restored it. Surprisingly, the government conceded to the 
Opposition allowing benches to select their own juvenile panel as before, with the 
proviso that where there were difficulties the Lord Chancellor would intervene. 
Given the system inertia or deliberate magisterial resistance for decades, this 
seemingly minor concession was to ensure the status quo and the culture that went 
with it. 
Despite both Acts sharing the same philosophy, that the needs rather than the 
deeds of juveniles were the problem to be solved, there were notable differences. 
Scotland had a completely new system: any disputed matters were dealt with by 
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professional judges in a different forum, as were very serious crimes. New decision-
makers were recruited specifically to a welfare-oriented tribunal, the ‘hearing’, with 
a responsibility to seek co-operation with parents, and notify them at the end of their 
rights to appeal; and to review the effectiveness of their decisions on at least an 
annual basis. The maximum age range was 16, but could be extended to 18 if the 
child was still under their supervision at a later referral.  
In England/Wales, the same magistrates and same courts would be used, with 
the same traditions and culture and other court personnel. However, their powers 
were altered to those of care proceedings for all under 14, and only fines as a 
punitive measure once IT schemes were in place and borstals, DC and attendance 
centres removed as a power. The age range for offenders was 10-17 and in 1991 
raised to 18. Given the determined campaign by the MA and, it would seem the 
magistracy’s general resistance to the reforms and history of non-compliance with 
legislation, any discretion would be manipulated to its fullest. The change of 
government was fortuitous for them, along with the death of the civil servant who 
was expected to galvanise the local authorities into developing the important IT 
schemes. 
Chapters Six and Seven followed the implementation of the two Acts from 
their beginning in 1971 until around 2000, after further major Acts on juvenile 
justice in the mid 1990s. In both jurisdictions the early reforms took place parallel to 
major changes to local government, and social services reorganised as generic 
services, with their new legal requirements for juvenile offenders an additional 
strain. These potential problems had featured in the Parliamentary debates. This led 
to lengthy preparatory work before the Acts were implemented and against a 
background of severe financial constraint. Most of the financial burden of the 1960s 
reforms fell on the local authorities.  
There is a wealth of literature on the implementation of the Acts, some 
comparing one aspect in each, others concentrating on the results or actions in one 
jurisdiction. This thesis has sought throughout, by a comparative narrative, using that 
literature and aided by the ‘Magistrate’, the archives of the MA and interviews of 
some key players, to highlight the different approaches, powers, expectations and 
behaviour of the decision-makers in the two systems, the new children’s panel in 
Scotland and the juvenile justices in England/Wales.  
 265 
The Scots reforms started with a clean slate, new local authority 
organisations, quite separate from any courts or police services, new professionals, 
new premises, new decision-makers and new approaches. Openness and 
accountability were foregone prerequisites, and once the basic structures were in 
place, recruitment began for the new ‘panel’ members of the ‘children’s hearings’ 
through wide advertising campaigns. Once appointed, and after initial training, 
members were obliged to undergo monthly training programmes and continuous 
appraisal. Whilst turn-over of membership was higher than might have been desired, 
some through frustration at the lack of resources for children, it meant that many 
more citizens were made aware of the difficulties faced by juvenile offenders.  The 
hearings were held in buildings quite separate from any courts; cases were properly 
time-tabled at times more convenient to working parents, some in the evenings. All 
discussions and decisions were taken in front of the parents and all decisions could 
be appealed, the parties being clearly informed of that right on each occasion. The 
only power of the hearing was to decide whether compulsory measures of care were 
necessary and whether that supervision should be residential or not. Unlike any 
previous judicial system, where an order had been made, the hearing had continual 
oversight with a duty to review the case within 12 months. 
The hearings system was not hide-bound by tradition, history, or convention. 
It was specifically set up to promote the welfare of juveniles before it. Enormous 
discretion was vested in the role of reporter, regularly diverting 50% of referrals 
from formal action, with no objection sufficient to lead to any calls for change. Some 
academics were critical of lapses of procedural correctness by hearings, but families 
were largely satisfied by their experience. Some observers felt parents were not held 
to account for their unacceptable parenting skills.  
Such was the lack of serious opposition to the hearings, the Scots 
Conservative administration in 1981 resisted moves to include punitive or any other 
powers. There was much frustration, as in England/Wales, at the lack of community 
resources and some panel members, despite their rationale and training, certainly 
would have ordered punitive powers had they the opportunity, which their 
English/Welsh counterparts had, and exercised. 
However, not all juvenile offenders were dealt with by the hearings. 10% 
went to the sheriff or High Court, about 25% being fined, the only punitive order bar 
motoring disqualification. Those who were sent by the hearings or the courts to List 
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D schools were likely to see it as punishment, but this was done on the basis of the 
needs of the child. The new system dealt with juveniles mostly under the age of 16. 
Some, already subject to hearings’ orders aged under 18 could still be dealt with by 
the hearing, but most were sent to the sheriff court. There, with less knowledge of 
the effects of child abuse and neglect which the hearings dealt with increasingly, 
adult punishment was meted out with no regard to the welfare of the juvenile. The 
culture, the emphasis and the training were geared to adult court reasoning and law, 
so much so that as a percentage of the total numbers under 18, those receiving 
punitive custody were nearly as great as those in England/Wales. Where the power 
to punish was available, the sheriffs exercised it in the hope, largely illusionary, of 
either protecting the public or as a deterrent to that young offender or others.  
Quite against the trend in England/Wales for more punitive action, the 
Conservative’s Children (Scotland) Act in 1995 enabled more ‘jointly-referred’ 
cases to be referred back to the hearings;  and the new clause allowing ‘public 
interest’ to be considered was sparsely invoked. Scotland had kept its separate 
identity, resisting the political and media-led moral panic around juvenile justice. 
With its very high diversionary rates, 60% by the end of the century, and no public 
outcry demanding more punishment, the hearings dealt with 90% of those referred 
on the basis of their needs. That those same juveniles, on reaching 16, became 
subject to punitive disposals, particularly penal custody, reflected the different 
perspective and knowledge of the sheriffs, rather than a failure of the hearings. These 
more damaged juveniles required specialist and often expensive treatment, hard to 
provide when penal custody was available. 
The situation in England/Wales was complicated by the change of 
government from Labour to Conservative only six months after the 1969 Act was 
passed. It brought MPs to power who had been lobbied by the MA and had fought on 
its behalf to resist the legislation. In any event, key parts of the Act were expected to 
be introduced on a sequential basis as provision in the community became available. 
Now, there was no political will to see that happen. Magistrates had demanded more 
DC places after publication of the Bill to abolish them, ignored the rules to check 
availability of places, and continued to use DCs at a much greater rate until they 
were absorbed into ‘youth custody’ in the 1980s, when the regime had become 
progressively more punitive. They also used orders when the offence was not serious 
enough to warrant them. The magistrates had ignored the spirit of the law, the 
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Conservatives allowed them to ignore its letter by not putting sufficient resources 
into alternative welfare measures.  
The magistracy in the courts had not changed: their selection procedures 
remained the same, as did their culture, their courts and their attitudes. Two thirds 
were aged over 50, double that of Scots panel members of whom 50% were under 
40, only 6.5% in England/Wales.  The magistrates’ training was still based on the 
law and procedures. Despite hearing ‘care’ cases in the juvenile courts, there was no 
training on child development, and schooled in the mantra that they were appointed 
as lay people for their ‘commonsense’ relied upon their personal experiences of 
childhood. Most magistrates would expect these children, most suffering at best 
unsatisfactory childhoods, to respond positively to a punitive sentence, as they would 
expect their own children being deprived of their pocket money or forbidden a long-
awaited treat. Even the more enlightened magistrates, who really believed in the 
possibility of rehabilitation, would baulk at failure: “We give them every opportunity 
and it must be for real. I was really strict on that. We have given them a chance.” 384 
Kilbrandon had refused to consider fining parents as counterproductive to 
their co-operation, and gave them their travelling costs. The Longford reforms relied 
on parental support and help, but senior magistrates on the MA Council, with few 
exceptions, displayed patronising and even hostile attitudes to parents. It was 
practitioners themselves, mostly social workers and in notable cases, magistrates, 
who initiated IT schemes, and were then aided by the boost of funding in 1983 by 
the Conservatives desperate to reduce the use of expensive custody. As ever, even 
neighbouring courts varied for “… they were so deeply schooled in the existing 
dogma about sending to custody.”385 However, lawyers and social workers appealed 
the failure of courts to observe the custody criteria, providing the first real measure 
of accountability of the magistrates, and led to the drop in custodial sentences in the 
1980s.  
Some notorious and extensive child abuse cases occurring in state institutions 
led to legislation removing care cases from the juvenile court. The effect in many 
cases was to deprive that court of its most experienced and knowledgeable 
magistrates, and those who remained were joined by new magistrates with no 
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 Interview Gibson 2009 
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experience of ‘care’ cases and still neither received training on child development 
(Mag. 1992:81), unlike those in the new Family Court. It is not coincidental that 
juvenile custody rose, along with a change in the political climate to a more punitive 
stance, motivated by a media-fuelled moral panic about juvenile justice. The 
magistrates resorted to their ‘protection of the public’ emphasis and throughout the 
1990s custody rose again. Their wide discretion allowed such a reversal, even 
though they had been successfully using IT schemes to treat the majority of young 
persons. The Conservatives gave them new powers of custody for children, 12-14 
year olds, and with a change of government back to Labour elected with a manifesto 
pledge to deal with youth crime, the scheme was extended and could even include 10 
year olds. 
Over the next few years Labour instigated a plethora of reports and statutes 
relating to juvenile justice, which it considered had been incompetent and inefficient, 
and a review of the magistracy generally. Acts removed virtually all differences 
between juvenile and adult offenders and ordered changes to the ethos of the youth 
courts, making specific demands on the inquisitorial skills of magistrates, an appeal 
after a 1998 directive appeared not to have been heeded, as history had showed 
throughout the 20
th
 century. A further one in 2001 was accompanied by a 
compulsory training programme. Perhaps reflecting the magisterial inability to 
engage with juvenile offenders, another Act created a new forum for all first 
offenders, a ‘referral panel’, another lay body, quite separate from the court, chaired 
by a youth justice professional, with the aim of restorative justice.  
The reforms to the administration and training of magistrates included 
inspections of courts and appraisal of magistrates, the success of such measures in 
changing the culture of youth courts is not yet known. What is clear is that over 
nearly a century of dealing with juvenile offenders, there is very little evidence that 
the juvenile/youth courts in England/Wales have had any significant effect on 
reforming the juveniles before them, nor in involving the parents in a constructive 
dialogue to further that aim. Some courts have no doubt achieved both, and some 
will have failed lamentably and exacerbated situations for both victims and families, 
and the vast majority have made very little positive difference. Some of this will not 
have been the fault of the magistrates but rather that of a system that allowed inertia, 
indifference or incompetence to prevail.  
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No government in England/Wales succeeded in implementing a welfare-
based system of juvenile justice: when Labour was returned to office four years after 
the initial implementation of the 1969 Act, it did not abolish punitive measures or 
provide training and appraisal to encourage greater use of welfare disposals. 
Furthermore, the evidence would suggest that the rights of children and parents were 
as well protected, if not more so, by the legal procedures of the hearings in Scotland 
and the accountability through regular training and appraisal of its panel members. 
There was a significant percentage of juveniles in both jurisdictions who were 
subject to penal custody, where there was evidence of greater harm rather than 
reform. This would suggest that if the welfare principle, the belief in the reform of 
the individual, is to have any relevance, the professional judiciary in both 
jurisdictions and the magistracy in England/Wales need specific and regular training 
and appraisal on the complexities of child development leading to serious 
delinquency. A humane criminal justice system must involve the exercise of judicial 
discretion but experience would indicate that to achieve the intended result, as 
Thomas D. (1974:147) has argued, the “most effective device is that of the required 
disposition subject to excepting circumstances”,  defined precisely and reinforced by 
appellate review and accountability.  
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8.2 Limits of Methodology 
This study has been based on the extensive existing literature enriched by a 
detailed examination of the extremely lengthy archives of the MA, in particular the 
minutes and the magazine, the ‘Magistrate’, both from 1921 to 2000. It has also 
drawn on political memoirs, diaries and biographies, and some 25 interviews, mostly 
with the few remaining players of the time of the 1960s reforms, in order to throw 
further light on the situation. These usually lasted at least two hours and were 
transcribed by the researcher. The original plan of research had started with the 
appointment of the Kilbrandon and Longford inquiries, but it soon became clear that 
the two jurisdictions even at that stage were not similar, so the research was 
extended right back into the 19
th
 century and earlier to establish what could have 
created the difference and would that explain later variations. Such research could 
only be based on documentary evidence. 
The events around the Kilbrandon and Longford reforms were in the living 
memory of a few people, and the researcher has endeavoured to interview most of 
the key players still available, although many were elderly and their original 
reactions may have been coloured by the passage of time. Several politicians refused 
on the basis that they had absolutely no memory of the events whatsoever, not 
unnaturally given their careers as politicians which required them to sit through 
months of debates. No Labour politician of the time has been located to ask why no 
one sought advice from the Scots, nor a Conservative to explain why they supported 
the Scots reforms and not the English and did not propose amendments to remedy 
the perceived fault. Parliamentary voting indicates that tribal loyalties to political 
party needs at a given time over-ride any other considerations, although neither of 
the two main political parties over the entire 20
th
 century maintained a consistent 
welfare or punitive approach to juvenile justice. 
The most important sources for the England/Wales jurisdiction have been the 
minutes of the MA and the ‘Magistrate’ magazine. The minutes are the official 
records and as such do not record the discussion, often not the opposing views, very 
rarely the voting figures, and sometimes not even the argument for the decision. It is 
therefore very difficult to know the level of dissent on any specific issues by Council 
members. Letters and articles in the ‘Magistrate’ may indicate areas of concern and 
interest but not the level of support or otherwise. Occasionally, by articles or 
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statements, a chairman might express views not supported by the Committee, but 
would have been obliged to accept the majority decision.  The AGM of the MA was 
most likely to reveal different viewpoints, but with meetings held only in London 
until the late 1990s, may not have been an adequate reflection of the magistracy as a 
whole. Given that this thesis is concerned with the responses of 10-15,000 decision-
makers in the courts and hearings only very broad conclusions can be claimed. 
Overall, this specific comparative research would indicate a far greater acceptance 
by the Scots hearings, the politicians and the public to treat the needs of the juvenile 
offenders rather than respond to their deeds, than their English/Welsh counterparts. 
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8.3 Challenges and Implications for Policy  
 
Policy is implemented via individuals. The less clearly defined the policy 
objectives the greater is the scope for individual discretion in the 
interpretation of what the policy is all about. Within organizations scope 
exists for communication failures and the distortion of information. 
(Jackson 1985:15) 
 
This narrative of juvenile justice in England/Wales and Scotland throughout the 20
th
 
century has demonstrated the severe difficulties governments face in producing 
policies that are translated into actions commensurate with the intentions of the 
legislation. In some circumstances the law may not be implemented at all, in others 
the exact opposite from that which was intended may occur, as it was claimed 
happened in the case of the 1969 Children and Young Persons Act in 
England/Wales.  
Jackson (1985) considered that to minimise the risk of the intentions of a 
policy being distorted, the policy must not only be financially, technically and 
legally feasible, its objectives must also be unambiguous and clearly defined. 
Without such safeguards, there will be greater scope for misinterpretation or re-
interpretation to suit local interests. 
In 1908 the different treatment of juvenile from adult offenders in and by the 
courts was deemed sufficiently important that legislation was passed to require it, 
reinforced by further substantive legislation in the 1930s. By 1960, however, little 
had changed. The lack of clarity in the legislation regarding “special juvenile courts” 
and the lack of any provision for inspection or accountability enabled the judiciary, 
both lay and professional, and the various tiers of local authorities to resist any major 
structural changes.  Whether this was due to bureaucratic inertia, changed priorities, 
or “organizational sclerosis…organized interests which act collectively to undermine 
the implementation of new arrangements or new policies” (Jackson 1985:17), it 
would have been more efficacious for Parliament to circumscribe the discretion 
allowing such inaction in the first place, and to provide some measure of control to 
ensure and monitor compliance.  
Consistent with Kingdon’s theory (1995) of the three streams converging for 
political agenda setting, the identification of a problem, the workings of the ‘policy 
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primeval soup’,  and the change of political administration, radically reforming 
juvenile justice legislation was passed separately in the late 1960s for 
England/Wales, and Scotland. However, Kingdon also identified an optimum 
timescale of between two and six years, giving time for officials “to reason their way 
through problems” (1995:126-7) and for a policy entrepreneur to create the right 
climate for the civil servants and politicians to get behind the new policy and, when 
necessary, able to challenge any articulate opponents and powerful organisations 
with vested interests. Additionally, there would be the inevitable element of chance, 
“considerable doses of messiness, accident, fortuitous coupling, and dumb luck” 
(1995:206). 
 The successful 1960s Scots reforms closely fitted Kingdon’s pattern. It was a 
little over six years from the deliberations of the Kilbrandon Committee to 
publication of the Parliamentary Bill, with the vital acceptance of the radical new 
principles after three years. This was after close co-operation between the policy-
making body and Scottish officials, whose role was more pro-active in policy-
making than their English counterparts. There was a policy entrepreneur, the 
energetic, highly motivated and respected Lord Kilbrandon, who was well able to 
confront any articulate opponent, in this particular case his own legal profession, and 
keep control of the policy. One fortuitous factor was the parlous state of the Scottish 
Conservative Party, which needed to be identified with a ‘Scots solution’ to 
counteract the rise of the SNP: the Kilbrandon Report readily supplied that. A 
second fortuitous factor was that at the appropriate time, the three leading 
Conservative politicians closely involved were all on the progressive wing.  
 After much consultation and Parliamentary discussion, the Scots legislation 
clearly defined the authorities responsible for the administration of the new system 
and the channels through which accountability could be ensured. The discretion of 
panel members was severely limited: they could only apply constructive measures 
aimed at the welfare and the rehabilitation of the juvenile, with no powers of 
punishment whatsoever. Their general accountability was defined through a 
transparent appellate system, and personal accountability through regular training 
and appraisal, with reappointment based on a review of their performance. 
 The failed English/Welsh reforms conformed to the reverse of Kingdon’s 
theoretical model for success. The radical juvenile justice proposals were produced 
within just four months. They were one small part of a major review of criminal 
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justice and initially lacked a ‘policy entrepreneur’. They aroused strong reaction 
from several ‘articulate opponents’ within the criminal justice system, “devoted to 
negative, blocking activities” (Kingdon 1995:49). Most vociferous was the MA 
prepared to challenge the new proposals through the public arena of the press, and to 
lobby MPs throughout the country. The proposals in the second White Paper and the 
eventual Bill also met considerable resistance from the earlier antagonists, with 
whom the Conservatives in Opposition had allied themselves. Ill chance then played 
a significant role: the ‘policy entrepreneur’ appointed to drive through the revised 
proposals, particularly with the local authorities, died unexpectedly. The final, 
crucial factor was the change of government before the implementation date to the 
political party that had actively campaigned to resist the reforms.  
In order to improve legislative compliance, governments need to examine 
with particular caution the responses to consultation papers from vested interests, 
whose recommendations are likely to be weighted in their own favour. They need to 
take account of any available academic research, especially given the high turnover 
of civil servants, for research may indicate why measures in the past were or were 
not implemented; and to tailor the policy and frame the Parliamentary Bills in the 
light of this knowledge. Once enacted, all measures require proper funding and 
resources, and an inspection programme within a given timeframe, with a hierarchy 
of accountability that is public knowledge, so that when officials change their role, 
the chain of responsibility does not break.  It was not until the 1990s that an 
independent, national inspectorate of the magistrates’ courts in England/Wales was 
appointed to ensure compliance with administrative matters stemming from 1908. 
 
(Residential staff) “often have their own deeply felt personal views on 
the discipline and control of children. To question these is to hit at a very 
fundamental aspect of the individual’s personality. This must be 
overcome, for a truly professional approach…It is extremely difficult to 
accept criticism…it attacks very basic personal attitudes.” (Tutt 
1974:.212) 
Magistrates were specifically recruited with no defined qualifications save 
for their ‘commonsense’ and a broad expectation that they would demonstrate or 
acquire a ‘judicial mind’. Without any knowledge or training on the particular 
difficulties facing children suffering at best deprived childhoods, magistrates 
naturally fell back on their own experiences of family life and the way they 
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disciplined their own children, as Tutt had found with residential social workers. 
Magistrates’ training was not designed to change their attitudes but to inform them 
about legal issues. That should be changed to include training on child and 
adolescent development, so that magistrates and judges can choose the most 
promising sentencing/ treatment options to break the cycle of recidivism. 
The findings of this thesis indicate that, where long-established, powerful and 
largely unaccountable institutions resist legislative change, the only way to 
overcome that resistance is by removing their discretion, in this case the discretion to 
use punishment in a welfare-based system. If the option to punish is removed, not 
only does it relieve the magistracy of the responsibility to punish and the dilemma to 
choose, it also puts a responsibility on the legislature to provide a wider range of 
treatment options.  This has wide implications for policy throughout the field of 
penal reform since the closure of existing, expensive penal institutions would be a 
financial prerequisite for establishing more welfare options.  
Equally important are the stability and continuity of innovative reform 
programmes, which should not be subject to short-term tests of ‘success’ for their 
survival. Otherwise, there is a strong risk that ‘easier’ clients will be selected to 
ensure the viability of a programme, rather than those with more demanding 
problems. This also increases the number on programmes who would not have been 
considered for such intensive treatment beforehand, as happened in England/Wales 
in the 1970s. 
If the exercise of discretion by the magistracy is clearly circumscribed, and 
shown to be reasoned; if the necessary resources and programmes for treatment are 
provided; and if there is a clear system of accountability, through regular, 
independent appraisal, backed by appellate review, it is possible that the welfare 
principle might prevail. However, this research suggests that discretion exercised in 
favour of the welfare principle, when punitive responses are available, is extremely 
fragile, and highly susceptible to pressure from the public and the media. This 
happened after the statutory criteria were loosened in 1991, despite their 
demonstrable success in the later 1980s, and punishment for serious offences was 
propounded by politicians and vehemently supported by the media. Even Scotland 
with its distinct penal history and culture, with panel members recruited specifically 
to decide welfare measures, and with no powers of punishment, had members who 
favoured a punitive response.  
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Throughout the 20
th
 century reports on juvenile delinquency indicate 
that matters largely external to the child are the key factors in later serious 
offending behaviour. Providing early, non-stigmatising, supportive 
intervention particularly in families with difficulties, and especially providing 
escape routes for those suffering domestic violence, is expensive but 
eventually cost effective. As Tuck suggests, “it could be the most important 
crime prevention that society could undertake” (Mag.1992:131). Continuing 
to punish juveniles who themselves have been punished by their personal 
circumstances is not only profoundly and unacceptably unfair, it is also 
counter-productive. Research throughout the 20
th
 century supported this view 
yet a small but influential sector of society, the largely lay judiciary and 
politicians have continued to deny that evidence, to the long-term detriment 
of future victims and society as a whole. 
 
ooOoo 
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APPENDIX 1.1 INTERVIEWEES AND QUESTIONS 
England and Wales 
Interviews with members of the Magistrates’ Association Council 
Chairmen of the MA: Lady (Enid Ralphs) CBE, JP, DL; Mrs Joyce Rose, CBE, JP, 
DL 
Deputy Chairman of the MA: Mrs Margaret Romanes OBE, JP, DL  
Chairmen of the JCC: Brian Worster Davis, OBE, JP; Dr. Rachel Brooks JP 
JCC and Council Members,   Mrs PH, OBE, JP; Mrs Patience Marshall, OBE, JP 
 
Two JPs, former chairmen of panels, Mrs FM and Mrs HG 
Editor, the ‘Magistrate’ 1990-1995: Caroline Ball, JP, MA 
Justices’ Clerk – Bryan Gibson, Basingstoke PSD. Hampshire 
Inner London Juvenile Panel Members in 1970s – 
Mrs Annabella Scott, OBE, JP; Mrs Anne Weitzman OBE, JP 
Interviews with key civil servants around the period of the 1969 Act: 
David Faulkner, CB Home Office; Alec Gordon-Brown, Children’s Dept. Home 
Office; Sir Geoffrey Otton, DHSS; John Stacpoole, DHSS 
Longford Committee 
Professor Terence Morris JP 
Scotland: 
Hearings: 
Mrs Margaret Dobie, OBE, Children’s Hearings and Chair Advisory Committee 
Mrs Joanne Findlay, Panel Member, Justice of the Peace 
Mrs Janet Parkes, Panel Member 
Alan Finlayson – Reporter to Children’s Hearings, Edinburgh 
John McFadden –First Reporter to Dumfries and Galloway 
Politicians:  
Sir Tam Dalyell MP; Rt. Hon. Bruce Millan 
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Ad Hoc Interviews or Correspondence:  
Niall Campbell, former Under-Secretary for Scotland 
Professor Andrew Coyle, CMG, former Scots prison governor; 
Lord Sanderson, former Scots Conservative Minister of State 
William Stuart, prison officer and Hearing panel member late 1990s 
Kilbrandon Committee  
Professor Fred Stone, Adolescent and Child Psychiatrist 
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
This format was a general guide followed for most of the semi-structured interviews 
with English/Welsh magistrates. 
 
ADMINISTRATION 
1. When and how were you appointed to the Bench? 
2. Was there any training? Reading? 
3. How many magistrates were on your Bench? 
JUVENILE PANEL 
When did you go on the Juvenile Panel? 
What were your ‘special’ qualifications for doing so? Were you asked them? 
Do you remember when women stopped wearing hats in the juvenile court? 
How big was the Juvenile panel? 
How often did you sit in the Juvenile Court? 
What criteria do you think the police used in deciding which juveniles should be 
prosecuted, formally cautioned or just ‘told off’ ? 
Did the press ever attend the court? Were cases reported in your local papers? 
Where was the juvenile court? What was it like? 
Were social inquiry reports read out in court, read before court, or shown to parents? 
MAGISTRATES' ASSOCIATION  
When and how did you get on the Magistrates' Association Council? 
Can you remember the burning issues at the time? 
Who were the movers and shakers? 
1969 CHILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS ACT 
The first White Paper, “The Child, the Family and the Young Offender” proposed to 
abolish the juvenile court. Do you remember that?  
Were you on the Bench when the 1969 Act and the reforms were going through 
Parliament. Were you aware of all that? Were you aware of the Longford Report? 
Discussions on your Bench as the Bill was going through Parliament?    
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Letter from Sec. of MA in the Times, on the day of the debate in Parliament on the 
2
nd
 Reading of the 1969 Act, saying that anybody who valued the principle of 
equality before the law, this was at risk if the Bill were passed. Would you have 
supported that view? 
Were you aware of the Scottish reforms in juvenile justice happening at the same 
time? Were you aware of the Kilbrandon report? 
The philosophy of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 was that children who 
were committing offences were in need of treatment rather than punishment. Did you 
and your Bench accept that philosophy? 
It was going, effectively, to raise the age of criminal responsibility to 14, = care and 
protection issues? 
Intermediate Treatment to replace borstals and detention centres.  
CUSTODY 
Abolition of punitive custody was never introduced because of the change of 
Government, and when Labour returned in 1974, never enacted that power 
What did you think of borstals? Which did you visit? Was it like a boys’ boarding 
school? 
Did you want more Detention Centre places? 
Home Office said should not make a Detention Centre Order without consulting 
whether or not there was a place. Did you? 
What Detention Centre did you visit? Was it like a boys’ boarding school? 
Did you agree with the idea of a ‘short, sharp shock’? 
Did you know that the % of sentences of borstal or detention centre more than 
doubled? 
The 1982 Criminal Justice Act abandoned most of the 1969 Act and introduced 
‘custody criteria’.  
The custody criteria had to be recorded in the court register, the reasons why you had 
chosen a custodial sentence. 
Appealing the decisions - reversal of the custody numbers.  
Do you think you were influenced by the newspapers, the media, the television? 
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CARE ORDERS – SUPERVISION – INTERMEDIATE TREATMENT 
Approved Schools – did you visit one? What did you think of them?  
Did You know about IT schemes going on in your area, visit them? 
Did you feel Care Orders should mean the child was removed from home?  
What were your relationships with probation officers? 
What were your relationships with social workers? 
There could have been a possibility that Prince Charles could have backed I.T. Do 
you think that would have made any difference? 
What did you think of Attendance Centres, which were also going to be abolished? 
PARENTS 
Did parents need help or punishment? 
What powers would you have liked? Either for parents or their children?  
Compensation? Restitution? 
Corporal punishment – NB - still available in schools. 
Did you ever know how effective your sentences were? 
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APPENDIX 2.1 - AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
EUROPE - c1995 
Country Age 
Ireland, Liechtenstein, 
Switzerland 
7 
Scotland 8 
England & Wales 10 
France 13 
Austria Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Germany, 
Hungary,         Slovenia 
14 
Estonia 15 may be lowered to 13 
Czech Republic 
Scandinavian countries  
Slovak Republic 
15 
Latvia,         Macedonia 
Moldova,     Russia 
Ukraine 
16 may be lowered to 14 
Portugal, Spain 16 
Poland 17 may be lowered to 16 
Belgium 18 
(Lockyer & Stone 1998:245) 
Great variety but further East, higher the age 
In Japan, no one prosecuted under 14, even for murder 
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APPENDIX 2.2 – INNER LONDON AND OTHER CITY 
JUVENILE/YOUTH COURTS 
The following six tables provide a comparison between the juvenile court disposals 
of the major urban conurbations of England. If the Metropolitan Police District 
includes more than the Inner London Juvenile Court area, the percentage figures will 
be distorted to some degree by the sentencing practices of those other juvenile 
courts. The Tables for 1980 and 1985 are by Police Force areas, the table for 1988 
by ‘Commission of the Peace’ area, and the tables for 1989, 1999 and 2000 are by 
Juvenile Courts.  
 
It is not surprising that three of the four areas show above the national rate for 
custodial disposals, (this includes committal to a higher court for sentence) given 
their urban nature. For 1980 and 1985, statistics based on Police areas, London did 
not differ for custodial disposals to a significant degree from other areas, though 
Nottinghamshire is consistently lower than the other urban conurbations, over the 
five tables. London was consistently higher than all the areas for ordering fines, a 
purely punitive measure, and ordered marginally more care and supervision orders, 
welfare oriented disposals. From these statistics, it cannot be concluded that the 
London Metropolitan Area passed significantly more welfare than punitive disposals 
from other urban areas. 
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TABLE 2.1  
1980 - Disposals by Police Force Areas  
Aged 10 - 17 years for Indictable Offences  
DISPOSAL 
London Met.  
Police Dist.  
Greater 
Manchester 
Notts. Merseyside National 
Committed for 
Borstal s.28 
MCA 1952 
401 
3.3% 
275 
3.3% 
73 
3.3% 
156 
4% 
2,358 
2.6% 
Total Guilty 12,026 8,137 2,161 3,896 89,192 
Detention 
Centre Order 
725 
6% 
555 
6.8% 
118 
5.5% 
319 
8.2% 
5,823 
6.5% 
Care Order 700 
5.8% 
332 
3.9% 
112 
5.2% 
159 
4.1% 
4,291 
4.8% 
Supervision 1,769 
14.7% 
1,239 
15.2% 
310 
14.3% 
597 
15.3% 
16,163 
18.1% 
Attendance 
Centre Order 
1,126 
9.4% 
1,486 
18.2% 
534 
24.7% 
699 
17.9% 
12,300 
13.8% 
Fines 4,169 
34.6% 
1,993 
24.5% 
617 
28.5% 
1,024 
26.3% 
29,187 
32.7% 
Abs./ Cond. 
Discharge 
3,043 
25.3% 
2,237 
27.5% 
386 
17.8% 
903 
23.2% 
19,274 
21.6% 
Other 83 
0.7% 
20 
0.2% 
11 
0.5% 
41 
1.1% 
336 
0.4% 
Data taken from Tables S3. 3 (B) & (C) ‘Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1980’, Home Office: 
London (1981) 
% calculated on total guilty = includes those committed for borstal training 
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TABLE 2.2 - 1985 - Disposals by Police Force Areas    
Aged 10-17 years for Indictable Offences 
DISPOSAL London Met. 
Police Dist. 
Greater 
Manchester 
Notts Merseyside National 
Total Guilty 6,673 5,619 1,571 2,007 61,507 
Ctted. for 
Sentence  
10 
0.15% 
18 
0.32% 
9 
0.57% 
22 
1.09% 
172 
0.28% 
Youth 
Custody 
227 
3.4% 
159 
2.83% 
24 
1.53% 
88 
4.38% 
1,481 
2.41% 
Detention 
Centre 
537 
8.05% 
388 
6.9% 
78 
4.96% 
158 
7.87% 
3,745 
6.09% 
Care Order 177 
2.65% 
116 
2.06% 
14 
0.89% 
47 
2.34% 
1,334 
2.17% 
Supervision 1,270 
19% 
682 
12.1% 
197 
12.5% 
330 
16.4% 
11,146 
18.1% 
CSO 203 
3.04% 
114 
2.03% 
8 
0.51% 
63 
3.13% 
1,830 
2.97% 
Attendance 
Centre O. 
752 
11.3% 
1,235 
21.9% 
451 
28.7% 
391 
19.5% 
10,068 
16.4% 
Fines 3,038 
45.5% 
1,065 
18.9% 
327 
20.8% 
379 
18.8% 
14,968 
24.3% 
Abs./ Cond. 
Disc. 
1,656 
24.8% 
1,819 
32.4% 
452 
28.7% 
534 
26.6% 
16,559 
26.9% 
Other 103 
1.54% 
25 
0.44% 
11 
0.7% 
3 
0.15% 
394 
0.64% 
Data taken from Vol.3 Tables S3. 2 (B) & (C) ‘Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1985’, Home 
Office: London (1986) 
% calculated on total guilty = includes those committed for borstal training 
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TABLE 2.3 - 1988 - Disposals by ‘Commission of the Peace’ Areas  
Aged 10-17 years for Indictable Offences  
 
DISPOSAL 
Inner London  
& City 
Greater 
Manchester 
Notts Merseyside National 
Total Guilty 2,097 3,459 1,077 1,219 34,801 
Ctted. for 
Sentence  
3 
0.14% 
12 
0.34% 
11 
1.02% 
1 
0.08% 
106 
0.30% 
Y.O.I.  174 
8.29% 
318 
9.19% 
48 
4.46% 
108 
8.86% 
2,630 
7.55% 
Care Order 31 
1.47% 
22 
0.63% 
3 
0.28% 
18 
1.47% 
429 
1.23% 
Supervision 370 
17.6% 
445 
12.8% 
131 
12.2% 
241 
19.8% 
6,193 
17.8% 
CSO 47 
2.24% 
93 
2.68% 
10 
0.93% 
30 
2.46% 
1,266 
3.64% 
Attendance 
Centre O. 
227 
10.8% 
704 
20.3% 
275 
25.5% 
222 
18.2% 
5,550 
15.9% 
Fines 539 
25.7% 
567 
16.4% 
192 
17.8% 
226 
18.5% 
7,706 
22.1% 
Abs./ Cond. 
Disc. 
623 
29.7% 
1,275 
36.3% 
381 
35.4% 
369 
30.3% 
10,506 
30.1% 
Other 83 
3.96% 
23 
0.66% 
26 
2.41% 
4 
0.33% 
415 
1.19% 
Data taken from Vol. 3 Tables S5. 2 & 3 ‘Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1988’, Home Office: 
London (1986) 
% calculated on total guilty = includes those committed for borstal training 
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TABLE 2.4 -  1989 - Disposals by Juvenile Courts  
Aged 10-17 years for Indictable Offences 
DISPOSAL 
ILJP Gt.Man. Notts B’ham Merseyside National 
 10 areas 15 areas 5 areas 1 area 6 areas  
Total Guilty 1,051 2638 1021 509 900 25,015 
Ctted for 
Borstal  
0 
0% 
9 
0.34% 
6 
0.58% 
2 
0.39% 
1 
0.1% 
90 
0.36% 
Immediate 
Custody 
79 
7.5% 
198 
7.5% 
37 
3.6% 
31 
6.1% 
43 
5.3% 
1,521 
6.08% 
Supervision 270 
25.7% 
345 
13.1% 
94 
9.2% 
117 
22.9% 
173 
19.2% 
4,448 
17.8% 
CSO 16 
1.5% 
70 
2.65% 
7 
0.68% 
20 
3.92% 
29 
3.22% 
820 
3.3% 
Attendance 
Centre Order 
86 
8.9% 
504 
19.1% 
239 
23.4% 
128 
25.1% 
152 
16.8% 
3,802 
15.2% 
Care Order. 18 
1.7% 
14 
0.5% 
0 4 
0.78% 
3 
0.33% 
228 
0.9% 
Fines 301 
28.6% 
399 
15.1% 
147 
14.4% 
59 
11.6% 
185 
20.5% 
4,974 
19.9% 
Abs./ Cond. 
Disc. 
344 
32.7% 
899 
34.1% 
453 
44.4% 
136 
26.7% 
327 
36.3% 
8,702 
34.8% 
Other 53 
5.0% 
35 
1.3% 
37 
3.62% 
2 
0.39% 
5 
0.55% 
520 
2.1% 
Data taken from Tables S5. 7 & 8 ‘Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1989’, Home Office: 
London (1990) 
% calculated on total guilty = includes those committed for borstal training 
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TABLE 2.5 - 1999 - Disposals by Juvenile Courts  
Aged 10-18 years for Indictable Offences 
DISPOSAL 
ILJP Greater 
Manchester 
Nott’shire B’ham Merseyside National 
 4 areas 11 areas 5 areas 1 area 6 areas  
Ctted for 
Trial Cn.Ct 
256 
6.8% 
384 
6.14% 
212 
7.5% 
224 
9.4% 
86 
3.25% 
5,284 
6.6% 
Total Sent. 2,059 3,086 1,183 1110 1,384 45,926 
Immediate 
Custody 
159 
7.7% 
274 
8.88% 
77 
6.51% 
131 
11.8% 
103 
7.44% 
3,539 
7.7% 
Av.length 3.6 
mths 
3.4mths 3.3 mths 3.7 
mths 
3.9 mths 3.4 mths 
Community 
Sentences:- 
811 
39.4% 
1,528 
49.5% 
582 
49.2% 
446 
40.2% 
455 
32.8% 
19,996 
43.5% 
Probation 76 103 51 77 20 2,065 
Supervision 421 471 168 146 200 8,387 
CSO 92 239 35 39 65 2,924 
Att C.O. 191 481 306 147 152 5,205 
Repar. O. - - - - - - 
Fines 451 
21.9% 
263 
8.52% 
105 
8.87% 
157 
14.1% 
252 
18.2% 
5,995 
13.1% 
Abs./ Cond. 
Discharge 
507 
24.6% 
988 
32% 
406 
34.3% 
371 
33.4% 
560 
40.5% 
14,739 
32.1% 
Other 131 
5.32% 
33 
1.32% 
13 
1.68% 
5 
0.5% 
14 
0.95% 
1,657 
3.6% 
Data taken from Vol.3 Table S4 1(B) ‘Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1999’, Home Office 
National Statistics: London (2000)  
% calculated on total sentenced 
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TABLE 2.6 - 2000 - Disposals by Juvenile Courts  
Aged 10-18 years for Indictable Offences 
DISPOSAL 
ILJP Greater 
Manchester 
Nott’shire B’ham Merseyside National 
 4 areas 11 areas 5 areas 1 area 6 areas  
Ctted for 
Trial Cn.Ct 
306 
6.8% 
969 
18.5% 
124 
4.2% 
309 
11% 
126 
3.8% 
5,336 
6.6% 
Total Sent. 2288 2422 1260 1,316 1,426 45,355 
Immediate 
Custody 
232 
10.1% 
321 
13.2% 
121 
9.6% 
168 
12.8% 
145 
10.1% 
3,867 
8.5% 
Ave. length 5.9 mths 3.1 mths 5.2 mths 6.2 mths 5.9 mths 6 mths 
Community 
Sentences:- 
1085 
47.4% 
844 
34.8% 
686 
54.4% 
632 
48% 
562 
40.1% 
22,565 
49.8% 
Probation 83 248 20 78 16 1,558 
Supervision 401 - 137 167 167 7,385 
CSO 116 304 48 71 97 3,019 
Att C.O. 147 65 192 191 143 4,013 
Repar. O. 87 - 123 36 30 2,253 
Fines 538 
23.5% 
616 
25.4% 
63 
5 % 
225 
17.1% 
254 
19.5% 
6,042 
13.3% 
Abs./ Cond. 
Discharge 
371 
16.2% 
608 
25.1% 
258 
20.5% 
280 
21.3% 
451 
31.4% 
11,373 
25.1% 
Other 62 
2.7% 
37 
1.5% 
132 
10.5% 
11 
0.8% 
14 
1.2% 
1,508 
3.3% 
Data taken from vol. 3 Table S4 1(B) ‘Criminal Statistics England and Wales 2000’, Home Office 
National Statistics: London (2001) 
% calculated on total sentenced. 
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APPENDIX 2.3 - JPS AND LAWYERS IN 1969 IN PARLIAMENT 
HOUSE OF COMMONS 
NAME LAW/ 
JP 
PARTY  NAME LAW/ 
JP 
PARTY 
Abse L Sol Lab  Evans Gwynfor Sol Lab 
Alldritt WH JP Lab  Evans I L JP Lab 
Anderson D Bar Lab  Ewing Mrs W (S) Sol SNP 
Archer PK Bar Lab  Eyre RE Sol Cons 
Awdrey DE Sol Cons  Fitch EA JP Lab 
Barber APL Bar Cons  Fletcher EGM Sol Lab 
Barnett J JP Lab  Fletcher Cooke Bar Cons 
Baxter (S) JP Lab  Foot Sir D Bar Lab 
Bell RM Bar Cons  Ford BT    Ex.JP Lab 
Bennett, Sir F. Bar Cons  Foster Sir G Bar Cons 
Bennett J (S) Ex.JP Lab  Fraser JD Sol Lab 
Berry Hon A JP Cons  Galpern Sir M (S) JP Lab 
Bishop ES JP Lab  Gilmour IHJL Bar Cons 
Black Sir CW JP Cons  Gilmour Sir J (S) JP Cons 
Blaker PAR JP Cons  Glover Sir D (S) JP Cons 
Body R Bar Cons  Glyn Sir RH Bar Cons 
Boston TG Bar Lab  Goldsmid Sir H d’A JP Cons 
Boyd-Carpenter  Bar Cons  Gourlay HPH (S)  Ex.JP Lab 
Boyden HJ Bar Lab  Gower HR Sol Cons 
Brewis HJ (S) Bar Cons  Grant JA Sol Cons 
Brown HD(S) JP Lab  Grant Ferris  W.Cmd Bar Cons 
Brown RW JP Lab  Greenwood AWJ JP Lab 
Brown Sir E JP Cons  Grieve WP Bar Cons  
Buchanan R (S) JP Lab  Grimond J Bar Lib 
Buck PAF Bar Cons  Harmer-Nicholls Sir Bar Cons 
Carlisle M Bar Cons  Harper J JP Lab 
Clegg W Sol Cons  Harris RR Bar Cons 
Corbett Mrs FK JP Lab  Harrison W JP Lab 
Corfield Capt.F Bar Cons  Hay JA Sol Cons 
Craddock Sir G Bar Cons  Hazell B JP Lab 
Crawshaw LtCol Bar Lab  Heald Sir LF JP Cons 
Crowder FP Bar Cons  Hogg Q Bar Cons 
Cunningham  Sir  Bar UU  Hooson HE Bar Lib 
Currie GBH Bar UU  Howarth H JP Lab 
Davidson A Bar Lab  Hutchison AMC (S) Bar Cons 
Davies EA JP Lab  Hynd JB JP Lab 
De Freitas Sir G Bar Lab  Irvine Sir AJ Bar Lab 
Dempsey J (S) JP Lab  Irvine BG Bar Cons 
Digby KSDW Bar Cons  Jackson FC Bar Lab 
Dunnett JJ Sol Lab  Janner Sir B Sol Lab 
Eadie A (S) JP Lab  Jenkin CPF Bar Cons 
Edwards WH Sol Lab  Johnson J Sol Lab 
Ellis J Ex.JP Lab  Jones Sir FE Bar Lab 
Ensor D Sol Lab  Joseph Sir KS Bar Cons  
Errington Sir E JP Cons  Kenyon C JP Lab 
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NAME LAW/ 
JP 
Party  NAME LAW/ 
JP 
Party 
Kershaw JA Bar Cons  Percival WI Bar Cons 
Lee JMH Bar Lab  Peyton JWW Bar Cons 
Lever LM JP Lab  Pink RB JP Cons 
Lever NH Bar Lab  Prentice RE JP Lab 
Lipton M JP Lab  Quennell Ms JM JP Cons 
Lloyd JSB Bar Cons  Rawlinson Sir P Bar Cons 
Lomas K JP Lab  Renton Sir DLM Bar Cons 
Lyons E Bar Lab  Richard IS Bar Lab 
MacDermot N Bar Lab  Rippon AGF Bar Cons 
Mackenzie JG(S) JP Lab  Roebuck RD Bar Lab 
Maclean Sir F(S) JP Cons  Rose PB Bar Lab 
Maclennan R (S) Bar Lab  Rossi HAL Sol Cons 
Maginnis JE JP UU  Scott NP JP Cons 
Mahon P JP Lab  Shaw MN JP Cons 
Mallalieu EL Bar Lab  Silkin JE Sol Lab 
Manuel AC (S) JP Lab  Silkin SC Bar Lab 
Mapp C JP Lab  Silverman J Bar Lab 
Marten HN Sol Cons  Small WW (S) JP Lab 
Maudling R Bar Cons  Spriggs L JP Lab 
McMaster SR Bar UU  St.John Stevas N Bar Cons 
McMillan T (S) JP Lab  Taverne D Bar Lab 
Miller MS (S) JP Lab  Temple JM JP Cons 
Mills WS Sol UU  Thatcher Mrs M Bar Cons 
Miscampbell NA Bar Cons  Thornton E JP Lab 
Monro HSP (S) JP Cons  Thorpe JJ Bar Lib 
More J JP Cons  Tilney JDRT JP Cons 
Morgan D Elystan Bar Lab  Tuck RH Bar Lab 
Morgan WGO Bar Cons  Turton RH JP Cons 
Morris J Bar Lab  Van Straubenzee Sol Cons 
Moyle RD Bar Lab  Vaughan-Morgan JP Cons 
Mulley FW Bar Lab  Waddington D Bar Cons 
Munro-L-Tooth Bar Cons  Walker-Smith D Bar Cons 
Murton Col HO JP Cons  Ward Dame Irene JP Cons 
Neave AMS Bar Cons  Weitzman D Bar Lab 
Nott JWF Bar Cons  Wells WT Bar Lab 
Oakes GJ Sol Lab  Whitaker BCG Bar Lab 
Page AJ Sol Cons  Willey FT Bar Lab 
Paget RT Bar Lab  Williams AC JP Lab 
Pearson A JP Lab  Williams WT Bar Lab 
Pearson Sir FF JP Cons  Worsley Sir M JP Cons 
Peart TF Bar Lab  Wylie NR (S) Bar Cons 
 
Total MPs  
172/630 
27.3% 
Conservative 
 
 (76) 
Labour 
 
 (86) 
Liberal  
 
(4) 
SNP 
(Scot) 
(1) 
Ulster 
Union. 
(5) 
JP (65)  20 + 4 Scots 27 + 13 Scots 0  1 
Bar (84) 39 + 3 Scots 34 + 1 Scot 3 +1 Scot  3 
Sol (23) 10 11 0 1 1 
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Justices of the Peace in the House of Lords 1969 
Result 120 peers - Scots and England and Wales  plus another 9 married to JPs 
 
NB List includes Scots  JPs who might have had an interest in the 1969 Act, given 
the passing of the Social Work Scotland Act – very similar to the proposal in the 
Child the Family and the Young Offender. England/Wales peers who became JPs 
after the Bill went through Parliament are listed here but not included in the total. 
Dukes - 4 
Scots [1]  
Buccleuch (JP 1975, former Cons MP)  
England and Wales [3]  
Beaufort; Northumberland; Westminster  
Marquesses - 6 
Scots [2]  
Bute, Lansdowne 
England and Wales [4] 
Abergavenny, Bath, Camden, Northampton 
Earls - 29 
Scots [5] 
Balfour; Dundee, Elgin, Galloway, Minto   
Northern Ireland [2] 
Antrim, Erne   
England and Wales [22] 
Ancaster; Avon (JP Hon.);Aylesford; Beauchamp; Bradford; Cranbrook, 
Cromartie, De La Warr, Fitzwilliam, Gainsborough, Guildford, Halifax, 
Harrowby, Howe, Lanesborough, Malmesbury, Mexborough, Middleton, St 
Aldwyn, Shrewsbury, Stamford, Yarborough  
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Viscounts - 8 
Scots [1] 
Thurso  
England and Wales [6] 
Allenby, Ashbrook, Boyne, Bridgeman, Gort (IOM), Monck, St Vincent  
Barons  – 64 
Scots  [3] 
Forbes, Lovat, MacAndrew  
England and Wales  [61] 
Aberconway, Ailwyn, Ashbourne, Ashburton, Ashton, Barnard, Belstead,  
Bolton,  Brassey, Braybooke, Braye, Brecon,  Brownlow,  Burnham, Burton,  
Carnock, Carrington,   Chorley,  Clitheroe, Clwyd,  Cohen of Birkenhead,  
Cornwallis,  Crathorne,  Crook,  Digby, Douglas of Barloch, Fisher, 
Fitzwalter, Forester, Hamilton,  Harris,  Hazlerigg, Hemingford, Hives, 
Hollenden,  Inman, Luke, Lyle,  Macpherson,  Merthyr, Middleton,  Morris 
of Borth-y-Gest,  Morris of Kenwood,  Newton,  Northbrook, Nugent,  
Raglan,  Ravensworth, Rea,  Rennell,  Riverdale, Roborough,  Rollo,  
Rusholme,  St. Levan,  Savile,  Trevor,  Vernon,  Westwood, Wigram, 
Willoughby de Broke.  
Life Peers 9 
Champion, Chelmer,  Hughes (Scot), Peddie, Shawcross,  Walston, Williamson 
women - Elliot (Scots),  Wootton 
Wives were JPs (9) 
V. De L’Isle, E of Rochdale, B. Brabourne , B. Kilmany, B. Ogmore  , B. Rothschild 
B. Lucas (husband of...); Life Peers - James and  Plowden,  
Succeeded or JP after Bill through Parliament (6) 
E. of Mansfield (s1971), E. of Selborne (s1971), E. of Mar & Kellie (JP 1971) 
E. of Enniskillen (JP 1972); E. of Morley (1972), E. of Swinton (1971) 
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APPENDIX 3.1 - JUDICIAL STATISTICS, SCOTLAND  
1907-1925 
 
 1907 1909 1913 1915 1917 1919 1921 1923 1925 
Convictions of 
16-u21 
17,905 16,574 15,879 7,896 9,503 12,133 14,906 13,921 16,488 
Convictions of 
u16 
9,974 9,991 10,975 11,044 11,572 9,501 8,873 8,502 8,741 
Convictions of 
14-u16 
5,070 5,109 5,646 4,054 4,486 4,227 4,308 4,073 4,265 
Convictions of 
u14 
4,904 4,882 5,329 6,990 7,086 5,274 4,565 4,429 4,476 
 Borstal - - 77 54 112 114 107 87 88 
Industrial 
School (offence 
charged) 
130 133 254 295 356 194 136 98 151 
Reformatory 213 200 233 235 278 161 131 135 120 
Whipped 371 328 407 562 925 400 255 316 265 
*Caution for 
Good 
Behaviour 
713 673 590 452 235 333 260 113 289 
*Probation of 
Offenders Act 
1907 – after 
conviction 
1,863 
Act of 
1887  
49 39 27 22 13 11 8 22 
Probation of 
Offenders Act 
1907 –without 
proceeding to 
conviction 
a- dismissed 
b- bond 
a.  
 
 
 
b. 
 
 
795 
 
 
 
548 
985 
 
 
 
605 
1494 
 
 
 
346 
1204 
 
 
 
745 
993 
 
 
 
516 
1038 
 
 
 
213 
763 
 
 
 
296 
964 
 
 
 
231 
s.2 Probation of 
Offenders Act 
1907  
und.14 
 
14-u21 
 427 
 
824 
478 
 
693 
602 
 
751 
385 
 
613 
374 
 
508 
418 
 
635 
477 
 
767 
* All ages     (Data from Morton 1928:14) 
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APPENDIX 3.2 – JUVENILE STATISTICS 1913-1948 ( E/W) 
Children and Young Persons Guilty of Indictable Offences England/Wales  
1913-1948 
 
YEAR 1913 1917 1920 1930 1934 1938 1948 
AGE 7-16 7-16 7-16 7-16 8-17 8-17 8-17 
GUILTY 12,915 22,670 12,919 11,137 20,428 27,875 43,706 
*Custodial 1880 
14.6% 
3032 
13.4% 
1414 
10.9% 
1114 
10% 
2062 
10.1% 
2884 
10.3% 
4437 
10.1% 
Probation 3541 
27.4% 
5587 
24.7% 
4041 
31.3% 
6159 
55.3% 
11158 
54.6% 
14175 
50.9% 
18221 
41.7% 
Fines 1287 
10% 
3452 
15.2% 
2218 
17.2% 
423 
3.8% 
871 
4.3% 
1678 
6% 
6037 
13.8% 
Whipping 2072 
16% 
4875 
21.5% 
1273 
9.9% 
134 
1.2% 
130 
0.6% 
43 
0.2% 
0 
0 
Nominal 
Penalties 
4121 
31.9% 
5605 
24.7% 
3890 
30.1% 
3263 
29.3% 
6027 
29.5% 
8613 
30.9% 
14,021 
32.1% 
Fit Person 
Order 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
65 
0.3% 
198 
0.7% 
418 
1% 
Otherwise 14 
0.1% 
119 
0.5% 
83 
0.6% 
44 
0.4% 
115 
0.6% 
284 
1% 
572 
1.3% 
*Custodial includes reformatory, approved school, remand home, imprisonment   
  (Parliamentary Papers) 
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APPENDIX 5.1 – MA LETTER IN ‘THE TIMES’ 11.iii.1969 
“The Times” - Tuesday, 11th March 1969  
 
Sir – Equality before the law is one of our fundamental freedoms. And it is in peril. 
It is the pride of English law that all are treated alike – Briton or foreigner, black or 
white, rich or poor. But this will be breached if Parliament passes, unamended, a Bill 
now before it. This provides that if children offend, only some of them will be 
brought before a juvenile court while others go scot-free. 
 
The Bill is the Children and Young Persons Bill which has its Second Reading on 
Tuesday. Its first clause says that a child (up to 14) or young person (up to 17) may 
be brought before a court on various grounds, including an offence against the law. 
But in each case he must also be in need of care or control which he is unlikely to 
receive unless the court makes an order.  
 
This means that if a boy comes from a “good” home he cannot be brought to court at 
all, but if he comes from a “bad” home he will be brought to court.  
 
Suppose George from a “good” home and Bert from a “bad” home are both 13 and 
they jointly break into a shop and steal. George cannot be brought to court but Bert 
will be, because his “bad” home means that he is in need of care or control. 
 
The well-meaning Home Office argument is that only one of them needs the 
treatment which the court can secure for him. This is the intention. It is not at all how 
it will seem to the two boys or their parents. Children have a well-developed idea of 
what is fair, They will be quick to recognize that this is not fair at all. The whole idea 
of equality before the law is flouted when, for the same offence, one child is brought 
to court and the other is not. This is the thin edge of a very dangerous wedge. 
 
Emotional and moral factors are the most important in making good homes; and this 
is quite different from the amount of money in the home. But parents who are 
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emotionally inadequate are also often poor providers. So that in many cases (by no 
means all) emotionally insecure homes are also economically poor homes.  
 
The proposed discrimination will certainly be regarded as one law for the rich and 
another for the poor, which is highly objectionable. If this becomes law it is only a 
matter of time before it is popularly (if inaccurately) believed that the grammar 
school boy will not be brought to court for the very things which a secondary 
modern schoolboy is brought. 
 
What is to happen under the new proposals, when Jim (aged 13) cycles at night 
without lights along the pavement and knocks over an old lady who goes to hospital 
with a broken femur? At present Jim would probably be fined. But there are to be no 
more fines for children under 14, because they are to be brought to court under civil 
procedure and no longer under criminal procedure. 
 
If Jim has a “good” home he will not be brought to court at all. What will the old 
lady think of that? What will her family or neighbours think? Or Jim’s friends? If he 
has a “bad” home he will be brought to court, which can order various forms of 
treatment, none of which seem very appropriate. 
 
The court will not be able to order any compensation either. A primary school was 
recently broken into by 12 year old children who did a lot of damage, including 
pouring paint and ink over other children’s shoes in the cloakroom. The parents of 
these other children will have to buy them new shoes. But under the new Bill the 
offending children and their parents cannot be ordered to pay a penny-piece in 
restitution. Is this not outrageously unfair? 
 
The Ingleby Committee on Children and Young Persons recommended in 1960 that 
the commission of an offence should itself be sufficient ground for bringing a child 
before the juvenile court. This is the sensible answer, retaining equality before the 
law. 
 
As it now stands, what will the Children and Young Persons Bill do to children? It 
will encourage them to believe that they are not answerable for their actions, nor 
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have to pay any penalty for wrong-doing. It will tell them that they may break 
windows or cause them damage in the certainty that they cannot be made to pay for 
any part of it. Instead of an even-handed law, they will know that some favoured, 
children are never brought to court when others are.  
 
If we want law-abiding citizens in the future we must show children and their 
parents that the law is fair and just. And that it applies – in the words of the Justices’ 
oath – to all manner of people after the laws and usages of the realm without fear or 
favour, affection or ill-will. 
 
Yours truly, Joseph Brayshaw, Secretary, the Magistrates Association  
28, Fitzroy Square, W.1., March 10. 
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APPENDIX 6.1 –UNRULY CERTIFICATES 
 
Sections 24 and 297 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 provide that 
where a child over the age of 14 appears before a court charged with a crime or 
offence and the court considers that, because of the child’s unruly character, release 
on bail or detention by a local authority is not appropriate, the child may be detained 
in the prison system on the authority of the court. 
 
Scottish Office, Statistical Bulletin, Criminal; Justice Series, Scottish Office 
Home Department: Edinburgh 
Prison Statistics 1995 
Table 22 Unruly Certificates by Sex and Age – Scotland 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
TOTAL 59 45 31 8 30 30 19 21 39 86 
MALE 59 43 31 8 30 30 19 21 39 84 
           
AGE           
14 4 8 5 - 3 2 4 1 5 12 
15 46 33 23 7 23 22 5 12 23 55 
16 7 4 3 1 4 6 8 6 11 18 
17 2 - - - - - 2 2 - 1 
may have been undercounting before 1994 
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APPENDIX 6.2 - REFERRAL GROUNDS TO THE REPORTER 
(as at 2001) 
  
Anyone may refer a child to the Reporter, although the majority of referrals come 
from the police, followed by education and social work sources. A child may be 
referred on more than one ground and these may include both offence and non-
offence grounds:  
 
(a) the child is beyond the control of his parents: or  
 
(b) the child is falling into bad associations or is exposed to moral danger: or  
 
(c) lack of parental care is likely to cause the child unnecessary suffering or seriously 
to impair his/her health or development: or  
 
(d) any of the offences mentioned in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1975 has been committed in respect of the child or in respect of a 
child who is a member of the same household: or  
 
(dd) the child is, or is likely to become, a member of the same household as a person 
who has committed any of the offences mentioned in Schedule 1 to the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975: or  
 
(e) the child, being a female, is a member of the same household as a female in 
respect of whom an offence which constitutes the crime of incest has been 
committed by a member of that household: or  
 
(f) the child has failed to attend school regularly without reasonable excuse: or  
 
(g) the child has committed an offence: or  
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(gg) the child has misused a volatile substance by deliberately inhaling, other than 
for medicinal purposes, that substance’s vapour: or  
 
(h) the child is a child whose case has been referred to a Children’s Hearing in 
pursuance of Part V of this act: or  
 
(i) the child is in the care of a local authority and his/her behaviour is such that 
special measures are needed for his/her adequate care and control.  
 
The Reporter, after investigating all relevant matters of the child’s situation, may 
make one of the following decisions: 
 
 take no further action 
 refer the case to the local authority, for the advice, guidance and assistance of 
the child and his/her family  
 arrange a Children’s Hearing if it appears to the Reporter that the child is in 
need of compulsory measures of  care 
 may refer the child to the police for a warning 
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APPENDIX 6.3 - GUIDANCE TO CHILDREN’S PANEL 
ADVISORY GROUPS 
 
SWSG (1969) Guidance to Children’s Panel Advisory Groups, SW7/69, The 
Scottish Office: Edinburgh 
Social Work Services Group Circular No. SW7/1969 – 
 Appendix A para.1  
 
"Essential to the success of the system of children's panels and hearings is the 
finding of sufficient suitable members of the community to serve on them. They 
should have knowledge and experience in dealing with children and families and 
should be drawn from a wide range of occupation, neighbourhood, age group and 
income group. They require the right personal qualities, including the absence of 
bias and prejudice, and a genuine interest in the needs of children in trouble and their 
relationship to the community. Moreover, the success of the children's hearings will 
depend to a large extent on the ability of their members to get through to the children 
and their parents; and a capacity to communicate with them, and an understanding of 
their feelings and reactions so that they gain their confidence will be of great 
importance. It is hoped that the new system will attract suitable people whose 
occupations or circumstances have hitherto prevented them from taking a formal part 
in helping and advising young people or who might not have previously thought of 
themselves as candidates for public service." 
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APPENDIX 6.4 - INTERMEDIATE TREATMENT 
 
DHSS (1977) IT – Planning for Action  Report of Two Study Groups, Social Work 
Service Development Group, London: HMSO 
 
Includes the “specific aims which are likely to apply to intermediate treatment 
activities…  
 
1. to assist with the acquisition of personal living skills; 
2. to give the children pleasurable experiences; 
3. to assist with the development of literacy and numeracy; 
4. to increase communication with peers and with adults; 
5. to help prevent or reduce delinquent behaviour in individuals 
6. to assist wit the development of new interests and hobbies 
7. to provide a challenging experience which may lead to a sense of achievement, 
and thereby increase the child’s sense of self-respect and self-worth; 
8. to compensate for deprivation, by pushing out horizons, meeting new people and 
enhancing the quality of life; 
9. to promote personal development and maturation; 
10. to give the child the opportunity to do new things and to enable adults to spend 
time with children 
11. to assist in developing the ability to resolve difficulties by verbal rather than 
physical means; 
12. to learn to abide by group and societal decisions; 
13. to learn to accept structure, discipline, limits; 
14. to provide protection and nurture for those in need of care.” 
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APPENDIX 6.5 - RESIDENTIAL SUPERVISION 
REQUIREMENTS (Scotland) 
  Residential Supervision Requirements (RSR) 1973 
 
Region RSRs  as % of 
all disposals 
Highland 7.3 
Grampian 12.7 
Tayside 18.6 
Fife 23.7 
Lothian 11.4 
Borders 4.2 
Central 5.7 
Strathclyde 10.1 
Dumfries & Galloway 37.0 
Scotland 11.6 
                             (Martin 1976:39) 
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APPENDIX 6.6 – JUVENILES PROSECUTED  in SCOTLAND 
1994-99 
Children under 16 Prosecuted in Scottish Courts 1994-1999 
A - By year 
Year Number 
1994 246 
1995 243 
1996 203 
1997 189 
1998 179 
1999 105 
TOTAL 1,165 
B – Type of Offence  
Offence Number % 
Homicide 11 0.9 
Violent crimes incl. robbery 182 15.6 
Offences of violence (simple assault, breach of peace 168 14.4 
Sexual crimes 31 2.7 
Housebreaking and theft by opening lock-fast places 121 10.3 
Theft, fraud, shoplifting 129 11.1 
Fire raising and damage 95 8.2 
Theft and unlawful taking of motor vehicles 291 25.0 
Other motor vehicle offense 32 2.7 
Other offences inc. drug offences 105 9.0 
TOTAL 1,165 100.0 
  Scottish Law Commission 2002 (Bottoms & Dignan:129) 
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APPENDIX 6.7 - PRISON CUSTODY U.18 IN EUROPE 1998 
Prison Custody under 18 
Young Offender Profile of Prison Population 1.ix.1998 
Council of Europe 
Country Under 18 
pre-trial  
and 
sentenced 
% 
Austria 199 2.6 
Belgium 187 2.3 
Denmark 15 0.4 
Finland 7 0.3 
France 822 1.5 
Greece 387 7.3 
Hungary 148 1.0 
Ireland 126 4.8 
Netherlands 59 0.5 
Norway 12 0.5 
Portugal 243 1.7 
Romania 2,327 4.5 
Spain 163 0.4 
Turkey 2,188 3.4 
England & Wales 2,353 3.6 
Scotland 215 3.5 
        [From Bottoms and Dignan 2004:144-5] 
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APPENDIX 7.1 - PROSECUTING JUVENILES  
Chief Inspector I.T. Oliver LLB, Metropolitan Police 
 
(The Magistrate 1974:55) 
 
BEFORE the Act, all juveniles arrested or reported for joint offences were treated 
the same, but there was a fear that this was “operating contrary to the principles of 
the CAYP 1969... from June 1973 each case would be dealt with on its merits and 
although certain difficulties were foreseen it was thought that the problems to be 
overcome were small compared with the possible unfairness that could stem from 
what would otherwise amount to an abdication of discretion. 
 ...there have been instances where magistrates have criticised the change in 
police procedure. The main objections seem to be that ‘justice is not seen to be done’ 
and that it is unfair for one offender to go to court when another has been dealt with 
by way of caution.... there are a number of reasons why a juvenile may not be before 
the court. It is more important that justice is in fact done to the individual than to 
support the impression that it ought to appear to be done to the group. 
One of the objectives of the 1969 Act is to consider individuals and to decide 
which is the best course of action for each person - not to adopt blanket decisions 
which could result in the stigma attached to a court appearance and the disadvantage 
of a criminal record. 
 It is extremely difficult to see any merit in the argument that advocates group 
prosecution under a system geared to the principle that the interests of the individual 
juvenile are of paramount importance. The underlying aim of the Act is to keep the 
juvenile out of court as far as possible and the Commissioner’s declared policy in 
this matter is in line with the spirit and intention of the statute.” 
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APPENDIX 7.2 – COMBINING JUVENILE PANELS 
Home Office Circular No. 136/1976 
 
In areas where juvenile court business is small, and a very small panel would not 
enable its members to sit regularly or would make for practical difficulties in 
arranging juvenile courts, the justices are requested to consider the possibility of 
combining their panel with that of one or more of the neighbouring divisions. A 
combination order provides greater flexibility in the arrangements for juvenile 
courts, enables the justices to acquire the necessary experience, facilitates the 
appointment to the panel of justices whose age and personal qualities make them 
particularly suited to the juvenile courts, and makes it possible for juvenile courts to 
sit more often than they are able to do in many rural areas. The effect of a 
combination order is limited to providing that for juvenile court purposes only the 
petty sessional divisions concerned are deemed to be one and that the justices for 
these areas are deemed to be the justices for a single area. In all other respects the 
petty sessional divisions continue to exist as separate areas. Any bench which 
considers that it would be desirable to combine its panel with that of one or more 
neighbouring divisions should approach the Magistrates Courts Committee with a 
view to their recommending a combination order.  
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 APPENDIX 7.3 - ‘GRAVE CRIMES’ 
 
From 1933 special provision was made under ‘Grave Crimes’ proceedings, s53 (2) 
of the 1933 Children and Young Persons Act for certain offences, murder and 
attempted murder always, to be tried in the Crown Court if they satisfied the criteria 
required, namely that a longer custodial sentence was required than that available in 
the Juvenile/Youth Court.  Originally, this only included three specific offences, 
attempted murder, manslaughter and wounding with intent to do grievous bodily 
harm but S2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1961 deleted the three original offences and 
substituted the words “any offence punishable in the case of an adult with 
imprisonment 14 years or more”. At that time, just three more offences were added 
to the list, rape, robbery and firearms offences, but as subsequent legislation 
increased the penalties for other offences, they were brought within the ambit of 
section 53(2), with the addition of three offences where the maximum penalty for an 
adult was 10 years, indecent assault on a man or woman (applicable to 10-17 year 
olds); and causing death by dangerous driving and careless driving whilst under the 
influence of drink or drugs (applicable to 14-17 year olds).  
 
The extent of the use of section 53 (2) has largely reflected the prevailing philosophy 
of the courts rather than of the legislation, sometimes being in accordance and at 
other times contradictory to it. Whilst the 1961 Criminal Justice Act added rape, 
robbery and firearms offences and the 1968 Theft Act added burglary, there was no 
significant rise in the numbers. At that time, during the 1960s, social welfare, the 
needs of the young offender took precedence over a retributive, just deserts 
philosophy. 
 
Use of section 53 (2) 
1962    1963    1964    1965    1966    1967    1968    1969    1970    1971 
  2           0          3         1           2          2          3           6          4         6            
 
The 1971 Criminal Damage Act added arson to the list of offences capable of being 
dealt with under s53 (2). The rapid increase in use during the 1970s was thought to 
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reflect the rising juvenile crime rate, the increasing numbers of juveniles in court and 
the general increase in the use of custody (Dunlop & Frankenberg 1982:44). 
Use of section 53 (2) – 1971-1981 
   1971   1972  1973  1974  1975   1976  1977  1978   1979  1980    1981 
      6      18       42       3        39      47       58      79      56        65        76 
 
 (Sharon King 1998
386
) 
 
s.6(1) Children and Young Persons Act 1969 a magistrates’ court may not commit a 
young person to the Crown Court for trial unless (i) the charge is homicide, (ii) he is 
jointly charged with an adult and his committal is considered necessary, or (iii) the 
offence is one to which s.53(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
applies.” 
If convicted of an offence where if adult would get 14 years, and “none of the other 
methods available is suitable, it may sentence him to be detained  for such period not 
exceeding the maximum term of imprisonment applicable to an adult… in such place 
and on such conditions as the Secretary of State may direct. ” (Mag.1979:151). 
 
In 1978, sentences for S53 offences varied from community homes, youth treatment 
centres, special hospitals to life. A successful AGM Resolution called for more 
facilities for juveniles convicted of grave crimes, claiming the Scots “had been able 
to find the resources and the courage to create a special unit to reclaim their most 
dangerous and aggressive men… we could consider doing the same for a handful of 
children” (Mag.1979: 187). 
 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993* 1994 1995 1996 
   72   108    152   156  152    175   114  125   101    85     315     387  391   609 
 
Discretion and variance by juvenile courts – the guidance by Court of Appeal 
1986 – R v Fairhurst LCJ & 1996 R v Wainfur 
                                                 
386 Sharon King, PhD student, Kings College, London. Unpublished Paper presented 1998, MSc Seminar
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1982 CJ Act restricted custody to 12 months: judges made relatively shorter s53 
Decrease in custody during 1980s – emphasis on alternatives 
1991 CJ Act – length commensurate with seriousness except for sexual and violent 
offences, when the court had a duty to protect the public from serious harm 
* 17 year olds were brought into the ambit of s53. 
eligible for early release and parole - Crime Sentences Act 1997 – removed parole 
 
1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act – STO and YOI 24 months - doubled 
 
1990s 
Table 12 - Juveniles u18 at Crown Court for Trial 1991-2001 
Year Number Year Number 
1991    5,200 1992 4,700 
1993 2,700 1994 2,700 
1995 3,300 1996 4,300 
1997 5,200 1998 5,000 
1999 4,900 2000 5,000 
2001 4,600   
Criminal Statistics, England/ Wales (Bottoms & Dignan 2004:132) 
Data to nearest 100 
 
NB October 1992 – maximum age in Youth Court raised to u18, hence marked drop 
in the period 1991-93. 
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APPENDIX 7.4 – ‘POWERLESSNESS OF COURTS’ 
 The New Dilemma 
Clerk to Scarborough Borough Justices (JCC 1972:332) 
 
 The juvenile could not be fined because s/he had no means and the parent 
could not be ordered to pay; a supervision order was inappropriate; 
  a care order served no purpose;  
 a bind over was   not applicable;  
 there were no detention centres for girls, no vacancies for boys;  
 an attendance centre was not available to that court;  
 and borstal was only for those aged 15+ (an action supported by the local 
authority).  
 The only choice for the court was an absolute or conditional discharge.  
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APPENDIX 7.5 - 1982 AND 1988 CUSTODY CRITERIA 
Custody was only to be used only where the defendant was: 
a) unable or unwilling to respond to non-custodial penalties 
or b) custody necessary for the protection of the public 
or c) so serious that NON-custody could NOT be justified 
 
The reasons had to be stated and recorded in the court register. The last criterion had 
been introduced as an amendment to cover the comparatively rare occasions of the 
one off serious offence, and the protection of the public referred to that individual 
defendant rather than a general deterrence of others (Burney 1985:55). 
Thoughts on the Criminal Justice Act 1988 – HH Judge Michael Astill 
Detention in YOI (Young Offender Institution) 
Offenders Minimum Period Maximum Period 
17-21 21 days Maximum for offence by 
adult 
15-17 21 days Maximum 12 months 
Girls – 4 months 
14 males only 21 days Maximum 4 months 
 
“It is a check list and the sentencer must on each occasion run through the statutory 
criteria in deciding whether any other method of dealing with the offender is 
appropriate.” 
 
Once decided the court must explain “in a way which will be easily understood by 
him why the sentence of detention is being passed. These provisions are clearly 
aimed at making the sentencer stop, hesitate and ponder before committing to 
custody an offender in these age brackets.” 
 
This Act adds more restrictions to 1982 criteria – under 21, must have legal 
representation or refused it; SIR unless unnecessary – likely to be Crown Court only 
where serious crime. 
1. court satisfied that if over 21, would pass a custodial sentence 
2. within criteria of 1982 Act 
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In (a) “perhaps rarely only will one previous non-custodial penalty be considered 
‘a history’.” 
In (b) definition of ‘serious harm’ 
Suggest “persistent and cumulative violence to the person or damage to property 
even though any one of those offences standing alone may not reasonably be 
described as ‘serious harm’.” 
In (c) “the nature of the ‘serious’ offence…will rarely arise in magistrates’ 
courts.” 
 
“…then state in open court before a sentence of detention in a young offenders 
institution is passed:” 
(i) under what ground court is satisfied 
(ii) give the reasons 
(iii) explain reasons in language ‘easily’ understood  
 
12 months or less = 50% release; time spent on remand in custody or secure 
accommodation will be deducted. 
Should still order compensation where appropriate, and give reasons if not 
Only if able to pay “Courts should not ‘make a guess’ but should investigate 
carefully.”  
 
(Mag.1989:71) 
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APPENDIX 7.6 – REPORTS AND STATUTES IN THE 1990s 
‘Tackling Youth Crime: Reforming Youth Justice’, (Straw & Michael 1996) 
‘Misspent Youth’ (Audit Commission 1996) 
‘A Review of Delay in the Criminal Justice System’, (Narey 1997)  
‘Directions for Advisory Committees’ (Lord Chancellor’s Department 1998) 
Morgan Report (2000) 
Auld Review of the Criminal Courts (2001) 
 
Justices of the Peace Act 1997 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
Human Rights Act 1998   
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
Access to Justice Act 1999    
Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000  
Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000  
Directions for Advisory Committees on Justices of the Peace (Ld. Chancellor 1998).  
 
The Judicial Studies Board introduced the Magistrates’ New Training Initiative 
(MNTI) in 1999 and the Narey Reforms also came into use in the same year, whilst 
the Youth Court Demonstration Project (Allen 2001) led to a new, compulsory 
training programme for all Youth Court justices. Each one of these statutes, 
regulations, publications and projects had far-reaching implications for the role and 
function of the Youth Court magistrates, amongst others.  
 
As a result of an adverse ruling from the European Court of Human Rights in “V” 
and “T”, the Lord Chief Justice issued a practice direction for the conduct of youth 
trials in the Crown Court, where there should be less formality, using ordinary 
language with explanations of what is happening. Under the 1998 Human Rights 
Act, magistrates can be held accountable for the conduct of the proceedings in their 
courts, particularly in relation to the understanding of the child (JSB 2001). 
 
